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Spain Returns to Trial by Jury
By STEPHEN C. THAMAN
I. Introduction: The Jury as a Catalyst in the Reform of Neo-
Inquisitorial Continental European Criminal Procedure"
On May 22, 1995, the Spanish Parliament passed legislation, effective
November 24, 1995, reviving trial byjury in criminal cases.' The legisla-
* Assistant Professor, Saint Louis University. J.D., University of California, Ber-
keley, 1975; Dr. iur., University of Freiburg (Germany), 1992. Besides the judges,
prosecutors, lawyers and court personnel who gave me interviews, and helped me collect
the data on which this study is based (see Appendix), I would like to give special thanks
to the following people who greatly helped me in understanding the Spanish jury system
and provided me with information about the trials as they occurred: Professors Juan-Luis
G6mez Colomer (Castell6n), Vicente Gimeno Sendra (Constitutional Court), Agustin-
Jesds Pdrez-Cruz Martin (Salamanca), Margarita Diges (Madrid), and Iflaki Esparza Lei-
bar (San Sebastidn), Dr. Julio Pdrez Gil (Valladolid), and judges Juan-Jos6 L6pez Ortega
(President of the Palma de Mallorca Provincial Court) and Perfecto Andrds lbhiez (Ma-
drid Provincial Court). Special thanks also go to Dean John Attanasio of Saint Louis
University School of Law, who gave me much needed moral and financial support, and
Dean Rick Chaney of the Madrid Campus of Saint Louis University, who gave me much
needed logistical support during my stays in Spain. Special thanks also go to my research
assistant, Knsti Boardman, who has greatly helped me in digesting the large amount of
secondary material already published in Spain on this new institution, and to Dr. Amd
Koch (Berlin-Jena) who helped me in digesting nineteenth century German treatises.
** All the cases, documents, interviews, and newspaper articles discussed in the
Article will be cited m reference to Appendix I, which lists each provincial case in al-
phabetical order. For example, AL-I refers to the Morade Case, the first case listed un-
der Almeria Provincial Court; PO-5 refers to the Rey Case, the fourth case listed under
Pontevedra Provincial Court, and so forth. In the Article and Appendix 1, the following
abbreviations will refer to the procedural documents used to analyze the discussed cases:
Pub. Pros. P1. (Pleadings of the Public Prosecutor); Pvt. Pros. P1. (Pleadings of the Pri-
vate Prosecutor); P1. Def. (Defense Pleadings); Ord. Tr. (Order Setting Trial); Rul. Just.
F. (Ruling on Justiciable Facts); Jur. Sel. Prot. (Jury Selection Protocol); Tr. Prot.(Trial
Protocol); Obj. Ver. (Verdict Form); Prot. Ver. (Protocol of the Verdict); Judg. (Judg-
ment); Dec. TSJ (Appellate Decision of the Superior Court of Justice). The following
abbreviations will indicate the trial participants: PJ (Presiding Judge), Pub. Pros. (public
prosecutor), Pvt. Pros. (private prosecutor), Pop. Pros. (popular prosecutor), Def. (De-
fense Counsel).
1. Ley Orgdnica el 22 de Mayo, 1995 (B.O.E. 1995, 122). All quotations from the
Spanish Jury Law will be, unless otherwise designated from its final version, published
in MORENO CATENA& LEY DEL JUTRADO (Victor ed., 2d ed. 1995) [hereinafter "LEY DEL
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tion finally implemented the mandate of Article 125 of the 1978 post-
Franco Spanish Constitution, which called for the participation of the citi-
zenry in the administration of justice through jury trial.2 On May 27, 1996,
juries began to try the first cases under the new law in the provincial
courts3 of Palma de Mallorca, Palencia, and Valencia.
4
The reintroduction of trial by jury in Spain and in Russia two years
earlier 5 signal surprising reversals in a long term continental trend elimi-
nating the classic jury in favor of courts composed either exclusively of
professional judges or of "mixed courts," in which professional judges and
lay assessors collegially decide all questions of fact, law and sentence. It
also raises the question of whether the jury can again be a catalyst in a
move to a more adversarial criminal procedure on the European continent
as it was m the nineteenth century in the wake of the French Revolution.
The modem notions of due process and Rechtsstaatlichkeit in crimi-
nal procedure which have gamed general international recognition in na-
tional constitutions and international human rights conventions have their
origins for the most part in Anglo-American concepts that developed in the
context of an adversarial trial by jury: (1) the presumption of innocence; (2)
the privilege against self-incrimination; (3) equality of arms; (4) the right
to a public and oral trial; (5) the accusatory principle; and (6) judicial in-
dependence from the executive. The classic separation of powers within
the adversarial criminal process between a neutral judge, responsible for
deciding questions of law and punishment, and a panel of non-legally-
trained lay persons responsible for questions of fact and guilt, also gave
rise to Common Law rules of evidence relating to hearsay and relevance
and exclusionary rules relating to excessively prejudicial and illegally-
gathered evidence, 6 as well as the principle of "intime conviction" or "free
JURADO"]. The final version of the Spanish Jury Law will be referred to as Law on Trial
by Jury ("LOTJ").
2. Constituci6n Espaffola [CE] art. 125. All citations from CONSTITUcI6N
ESPAi OLA Y TRIBUNAL CoNsTrrucioNAL (Bosch 1995).
3. Spain is divided politically into fifty separate provinces. The court of first in-
stance for serious crimes is called the Audiencia Provincial or Provincial Court.
4. Blanca Cia, Tres jurados populares se estrenan hoy en Palencia, Valencia y
Palma de Mallorca, EL PAIs, May 27, 1996, at 28.
5. For an exhaustive investigation of the genesis of the 1993 Russian Jury Law and
its implementation in the first 114 cases tried thereunder, see Stephen Thanan, The Res-
urrection of Trial by Jury in Russia, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 61 (1995) [hereinafter "Thaman,
Resurrection"].
6. The research of John H. Langbein has seriously called into question, however,
whether the Anglo-American rules of evidence were attributable to the division of labor
between jury and judge, or rather to the "lawyenzation" of criminal trials in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial before
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evaluation of the evidence." 7 Important developments in the substantive
criminal law that affect the presentation and evaluation of evidence such as
the separation of factual from legal questions8 and the breaking-down of
criminal offenses into their various constituent elements, both objective
and subjective, arguably have their roots in the need for the judge to in-
struct thejury on how to apply the law to the facts of the case.9
Although most of these principles have been accepted into the for-
merly inquisitorial criminal procedures of civil law countries, the structural
framework in which they originated--the adversarial trial by jury-has
been largely rejected as being alien to other principles of the inquisitorial
criminal process: (1) the duty of the state (prosecutor, judge, investigating
judge) to ascertain the truth; (2) the necessity of judicial review, as re-
flected in the requirement of providing reasons for findings of guilt or in-
nocence;'0 and (3) the legality principle, which is not only antipathetic to
the unbridled discretion of juries to acquit out of sympathy or nullify the
the Lawyers, 45 U. Cm. L. REv. 263, 306 (1978) [hereinafter "Langbein, Criminal
Trial"]; cf. MnuAN R. DAMAAKA, EVIDENCE- LAW ADRIFT 26 (1997) [hereinafter
"EVIDENCE LAW"] (arguing that the bifurcation of the trial court has created a "space for
technical evidence law").
7. Langbein also sees the seeds of "free evaluation of evidence" being planted in
continental Europe before the introduction of trial by jury with the French Revolution,
with the weakening of the institution of torture and the rise of "poena extraordinaria."
JoHN H. LANGBEiN, TORTURE AND THE LAW OF PROOF 59 (1977) [hereinafter "LANGBEiN,
TORTURE"].
8. Although Sir Edward Coke as early as 1620 proclaimed "Ad quaestionem facti
non respondent judices; ad quaestionem juris non respondent juratores," and early
French and German jury legislation tried to reduce juries to merely the judges of "his-
toric facts," leaving the application of the law to the facts to the professional judge, Ger-
man, and later Russian scholars quickly understood that the jury's verdict of "guilty" or
"not-guilty" was a mixed issue of law and fact, which led the Germans to replace the
classic jury with the mixed court or Sch6ffengericht in which professional judges and lay
assessors decide all issues of law, fact, guilt and sentence in joint session. See John H.
Langbein, The English Criminal Trial Jury on the Eve of the French Revolution, in THE
TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND, FRANCE, GERMANY 1700-1900 at 34 (Antonio Padoa Schioppa
ed., 1987) [hereinafter "Langbein, English Criminal Triar]; for a summary of the nine-
teenth century German discussion, see Peter Landau, Schwurgerichte und Sch6ffen-
gerichte in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert bis 1870, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND,
FRANcEF, GERMANY 1700-1900, supra, at 279; and see generally HUGO MEYER, THAT-
UND RECHTSFRAGE IM GESCHWORENENGERICHT, INSBESONDERE IN DER FRAGESTELLuNG AN
DIE GEscHwoREN (1860).
9. See Ennio Amodio, Giustiziapopolare, garantismo epartecipazione, in I GIUDICI
SENZA TOGA. EsPERIENZE E PROSPETnE DEL A PARTECIPAZIONE POPOLAPE Al GUDIZI
PENALi 13 & n.30 (Ennio Amodio ed., 1979).
10. According to Amodio, Art. I 11 (1) of the Italian Constitution requiring reasons to
be given for all judicial decisions, makes the reintroduction of the classic jury impossi-
ble. Amodio, supra note 9, at 46-48.
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harshness of the sentence,11 but also to the apotheosis of party-control of
the criminal trial, plea bargaining-which developed from the same roots
as jury trial in England and the United States.' Civil law states have
largely abolished juries or converted them into a form of lay participation
more conducive to adherence to the above principles. This form is known
as the "mixed court," which consists of professional judges and lay asses-
sors collectively responsible for all questions of law, fact, guilt and sen-
tence.
To what extent, however, are the universally accepted principles de-
rived from common law crimmal procedure dependent on the classic sepa-
ration of powers in the adversary jury trial? 3 Is it possible to have a pre-
sumption of innocence and an independent fact/guilt finder simultaneously
in the form of a single professional judge, who has studied the investiga-
tive file and determined, before the trial, that sufficient evidence for a
finding of guilt exists? 14 Is the classic jury a useful catalyst in cementing
11. On American jury nullification, see Albert W Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A
Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHic. L. REv. 871-75
(1994).
12. As to the strange symbiosis of trial by jury and plea bargaining, see Bcmd
Schtlnemann, Reflexionen fiber die Zukunft des deutschen Strafi,erfahrens, in
FESTSCHRIFT FOR GERD PFEnER 481 (1988).
13. For the proposition that French and German reformers, enamored with the An-
glo-American jury system, lost sight of the "interdependencies" between that system and
the procedural and evidentiary maxims of the adversary system, which were otherwise
rejected, see Karl H. Kunert, Some Observations on the Origin and Structure of Evidence
Rules under the Common Law System and the Civil Law System of 'Frei? Proof" in the
German Code of Criminal Procedure, 16 BuFF. L. REv. 122, 147 (1967); qf. Amodio, su-
pra note 9, at 13 & n.30. See also C.J.A. MITTERMAIER, DAs VOLKSGERIciT IN GESTALT
DER SCHWUR-UND SCHOFFENGERICHTE 21 (1866) [hereinafter "MITrERMAJER,
VOLKSGERICHT"]; and C.J.A. MITERMAIER, ERFAHRUNGEN OBER DIE WIRKSAMKEIT DER
SCHWURGERICHTE IN EUROPA uND AMERIKA 667 (1865) [hereinafter "M1TrERMAIER,
WMKSAMKErr"]. Mittermaier felt the principle of oral and public trials could only effec-
tively be implemented in the form of the classic jury trial. For an opinion that the above
principles are not dependent on the presence of the classic, bifurcated .Jury court, see
LUIGI FERRAJOLI, DIRrro E RAGIONE: T"oiuA DEL GARANnsAGO PENALE 574 (3rd ed.
1996).
14. Mittermaier doubted that judges could disabuse themselves even of an uncon-
sciously formed "preconceived opinion as to guilt" imbued by study of the dossier of the
preliminary investigation, despite their best efforts. MITTERMAIER, VOLKSGERICHT, supra
note 13, at 22; MITTERMAiER, WIRKSAMKErr, supra note 13, at 683. Modem German
views range from the ultra-pessimistic contention that German criminal procedure is a
Potemkin facade and the trial an orchestrated blessing of the results of the preliminary
investigation, Schfinemann, supra note 12, at 482-83, to cautious assertions that the pre-
liminary studying of the file, while strongly influencing the presiding judge, does not
make him or her incapable of objectively weighing the trial evidence. CHRISTOPH
[Vol. 21:241
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the judge's independence from the executive branch to provide a founda-
tion for an objective "ascertaining of truth?"' 5 If the judge and investigator
have a duty to find the truth and the defendant invokes the right to remain
silent, how effective is this right when the judge is also the finder of
guilt?16 What is the meaning of intime conviction in a "mixed court,"
where the presiding judge has unique access to the dossier, and is respon-
sible for drafting the judgment so that it will withstand the formal require-
ments of appellate scrutiny?
17
This Article will first discuss the seventeen year dispute among schol-
ars, jurists and politicians following the ratification of the democratic post-
Franco Spanish Constitution in 1978 on whether Article 25 indeed man-
dated the reintroduction of lay participation in the criminal trial, and, if so,
whether in the form of the classic jury, or that of a continental European-
style court with lay assessors. An analysis of the Law on Trial by Jury
RENNIG, DIE ENTSCHEIDUNGSFINDUNG DURCH SCHOFFEN UND B.RuFslctinm IN
RECHTLICHER UND PSYCHOLOGISCHER SicHT 177 & Tab 10, 223, 237 (1993); cf Mirjan
Damagka, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure,
121 U. PA. L. REv. 506, 544 (1973) [hereinafter "Damatka, Evidentiary Barriers"];
DAMA&KA, EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 6, at 72.
15. The "pre-prepared version of the truth" presented to the trial judge in the form of
the investigative dossier, Nico J6rg et al., Are Inquisitorial and Adversarial Systems
Converging?, in CRIMINAL JUSTICE N EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 46-47 (Christo-
pher Harding et al. eds., 1995); the "Schulterschlufl" between the trial judge and the
prosecutor, and the "systematic distortion of the processing of information, caused by the
judicial reconstruction of an historical situation" all constitute, according to its critics,
"weaknesses of truth-finding hindered by inquisitorial procedure with an accusatory fa-
cade." Schalnemann, supra note 12, at 475-76, 479.
16. The fact that continental defendants virtually never remain silent, either during
the preliminary investigation or the trial itself answers this question. See MUAN
DAMAAKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE AN STATE AumrrOTY 128 0986) [hereinafter
"DAMAAKA, FACES OF JUSTICE"]; Damgka, Evidentiary Barriers, suipra note 14, at 527;
DAMAIKA, EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 6, at 42-43.
17. As to the problems inherent in the presiding judge logically explaining the rea-
soning of the lay assessors, especially if he or she has been outvoted by them, see Dam-
aska, Evidentiary Barriers, supra note 14, at 540, 543; as to how thefreie Beweiswfr-
digung of the judge, through the necessity of its having to be based in "rules of logic,
experience and/or laws of nature or probability," has led to the re-emergence of new
"formal rules of evidence" which it was supposed to have replaced, see Damaska, Evl-
dentiary Barriers, supra note 14, at 540, and DAMASKA, FACES OF AUTHORITY, supra
note 16, at 20, 55; Kunert, supra note 13, at 124. In his early 'writings, Mittermaier
warned against "declaring legally-educated judges to be jurors" by allowing them to de-
cide by 'frete Beweiswirdigung" because this would put too much power into their
hands. C.J.S. MrTERmAiER, DAS DEUTSCHE STRAFVERFAHREN. ERSTE ABTHEILUNG 222
(2d ed. 1832) [hereinafter "MrERMAIE, STRAFVERFAHREN"].
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("LOTJ") and its implementation in the first year of trials will follow.
18
Where informative, references will be made to Spain's experience with
trial by jury in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 'Where other
countries have addressed similar problems, a comparative perspective will
be offered, in particular with the new Russian jury legislation. The goal of
this Article is both to introduce the new Spanish system of trial by jury to
American readers and to situate the Spanish experience within the theo-
retical framework of the reform of criminal procedure in the civil law
countries of continental Europe.
H. A Brief History of the Spanish Jury
The authors of the Spanish Jury Law of 1"995 saw jury trial as
a constant m the history of Spanish constitutional law; every period of
liberty has signified the consecration of trial by jury- in the Constitu-
tion of Cddiz of 1812, m those of 1837, 1869 and 1931, on the con-
trary, every epoch of regression in public liberties has seen the elimi-
nation or considerable limitation of this instrument of participation of
the citizenry.
19
Trial by jury was introduced on the European continent in the wake of
the French Revolution and was patterned after the early French statutes. It
was considered to be an instrument in the hands of the bourgeois class and
a counterweight to royal arbitrariness and judicial absolutism.:2° The Stat-
ute of Bayonne of 1808 and the 1812 Constitution of Cfdiz proposed in-
troducing trial by jury in Spain according to the French model; a discus-
sion focusing on a new law for the trial of press crimes in the Cadiz
parliament referred to the "necessary difference between judges of fact and
law.
21
18. During research sojourns in Spain in the summers of 1996 and 1997, the author
observed the first trials in Palma de Mallorca, Valladolid, Granada and C6rdoba, and
conducted numerous interviews with the presiding judges, public prosecutors, lawyers,
and other court personnel who participated in the first year of jury trials, from May 27,
1996 until June 1, 1997. The author has also collected and analyzed pertinent trial
documents (pleadings, verdicts, judgments, etc.) from the overwhelming majority of the
seventy-five to eighty cases subject to thejury law, in which a jury was actually selected.
19. Exposici6n de Motivos, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1, at 19 [here-
inafter "EM-LOTJ"]. (All translations of laws, texts and newspaper articles by author).
20. ERNESTO PEDRAZ PENALVA, Sobre el significado y vigencia del Jurado, in
CONsTITUci6N, JURISDICCi6N Y PROCESO 69 (1990). It was also the result of the Enlight-
enment's reaction to the horrors of the Inquisition. See FERRAJOLI, supra note 13, at 589.
21. JUAN ANToNIo ALEJANDRE, LA JUSTICIA POPULAR EN ESPARA 79-84 (1981).
[Vol. 21:241
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The first laws providing for jury trial in Spain were included in laws
concerning the press and were limited to prosecutions for libel and other
related crimes. Promulgated in 1820, the first of these laws provided for
an accusatory jury of four citizens and, if an indictment was returned, a
petit jury of seven to try the offense.n Restricted to crimes concerning the
press, trial by jury flourished only sporadically, at the whim of the political
moment. A special Press Court replaced jury trials in 1844 during the
reign of Isabel II. An 1855 decree restored jury trial, but it was suspended
again shortly thereafter. Trial by jury again was available in cases involv-
ing the press from 1864 to 1867."
The first successful efforts to introduce trial by jury in normal crimi-
nal cases took place in the wake of the "Glorious Revolution" of 1868,
which put an end to the thirty-five year rule of Isabel II and ushered in the
sexenio revolucionarto. On December 22, 1872, a Provisional Law on
Criminal Procedure was promulgated by royal decree, sections 658-785 of
which provided for trial by jury in certain criminal cases.2 4 Initially,
prosecutors and defense alike greeted the jury of twelve citizens, presided
over by three professional judges with enthusiasm. However, civil war and
the restoration of the Bourbons-Alfonsians in 1874 led to the suppression
of the nascent institution, which had also been criticized for its arbitrary
acquittals and findings of unjustified mitigation.2
Spain's most sustained experience with trial by jury began with the
parliament's promulgation of a new Jury Law introduced by Minister of
22. ALEJANDRE, supra note 21, at 87-92.
23. Id. at 103-09. The impetus for implementing trial by jury in cases involving the
press certainly has its roots in the Spanish liberal reformers' knowledge of the famous
English seditious libel trials of the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in which the
jury's law-finding powers were touted. Id. at 87, 90. For an excellent discussion of the
English precedents, see Thomas A. Green, The English Criminal Trial Jury and the Law-
Finding Traditions on the Eve of the French Revolution, in THE TRIAL JURY IN ENGLAND,
FRANCE, GERmANY, supra note 8. In the early nineteenth century, liberals from Baden
and other parts of Germany sought the introduction of trial by jury in press cases as a
tool against the strict censorship of the times. Landau, supra note 8. Trial by jury in
Mexico is still restricted to press crimes in accordance with this tradition. SERGE1O
GARciA RAMIREZ, CURSO DE DERECHO PROCEsAL PENAL 581-82 (1983); Jos6 Ovalle Fa-
vela, Los Antecedentes del Jurado Popular en Mdico, 39 BoLEIN MEXICANO DE
DERECHO COMPARADO 751-63 (1980).
24. Art. 658-785, 806-808, Real Decreto de 22.12.1872, disponiendo la publicaci6n
de la Ley provisional de Enjuiciamiento criminal i que empiece a regir desde cl 15 de
enero pr6ximo en ]as Peninsulas e Islas Baleares y Canarias [hereinafter "LECr. (prov.)
of 1872"].
25. ALEANDRE, supra note 21, at 119-39.
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Justice Alonso Martinez on April 20, 1888.26 The law provided for trial by
a jury of twelve, again attended by three professional presiding judges, and
was designed to coalesce with Europe's most adversarial criminal proce-
dure statute, enacted in 1882. This criminal procedure law introduced the
accusatorial principle and the oral trial, which is still in force today, albeit
with numerous amendments.27 The law remained in effect throughout the
realm until it was suspended in 1907 in the provinces of Catalonia and
Gerona for terrorist crimes. The assassination of the ex-governor of Bar-
celona in Valencia later led to its complete suspension in Barcelona. Fi-
nally, a Royal Decree in 1923 suspended the law in all of Spain.28
Criticisms of the Spanish experience with trial by jury between 1888
and 1923 essentially mirror those associated both with Russia's experience
from 1864 until 1917, and France's experience prior to its abolition in
1941. Sittingjuries were criticized for being uneducated and unable to un-
derstand the proceedings; more wealthy, well-educated candidates used
their influence to be eliminated from jury lists or to be excused for haid-
ships.29 Moreover, juries were criticized for their "scandalous acquittals"
and lenience, usually in murder and other violent "crimes of passion," but
proved to be severe in cases of crimes against property.30 Finally, whether
due to fear of reprisals or honest sympathy with revolutionaries and anar-
chists, juries often acquitted or returned lenient verdicts in cases of assas-
sination or other political crimes.31
26. Ley de 20.4.1888, estableciendo el juicio par jurados para determinados delitos
[hereinafter "J of 1888"].
27. ALEJANDRE, supra note 21, at 165-84.
28. Id. at 210-14.
29. Id. at 189-91. On the experience in Russia, see N.P TIMOFEEV, SOD
PRIsiAzHnYKH v RossII. SUBEBNYE OCHERKI 86 (1881). The same seems to have been true
in nineteenth century America. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 11, at 879-82, who
quotes Mark Twain: "[w]e have a jury system that is superior to any in the world, and its
efficiency is only marred by the difficulty of finding 12 men everyday who don't know
anything and can't read." Id. at 881.
30. ALEJANDRE, supra note 21, at 202. On France, see FRAN oisi.s LOMBARD, LES
JURtS. JUSTICE REPRASENTATIVE ET REPRISENTATIONS DE LA JUSTICE 236 (1993). On Rus-
sia, see A.M. BOBRISHCHEV-PUSHKIN, EMPimIcmsKiE ZAKONY DEIATEL'NOSTI RUSSKOGO
SUDA PRiSLAZHNYKH 340 (1896). On Germany, see Landau, supra note 8, at 287-88.
31. ALEJANDRE, supra note 21, at 203-04. The trial of Manuel Posfi for the at-
tempted assassination of Maura became a podium for revolutionary ideas in which the
justice of such assassinations was proclaimed. Id. In Russia, as well, the revolutionary
movements used the jury court in similar ways and the acquittal of Vera Zasulich in 1878
for the attempted murder of a Tsarist official was a cause cel6bre in the annals of Russian
jurisprudence. See SAMUEL KUCHEROV, COURTS, LAWYERS AND TRIALS UNDER THE LAST
THREE TSARS 65 (1953). Due to the particular lenience of juries in Murcia (according to
some, due to the fact that they were easily bought!), the slogan: "Mata al rey y yen a
[V/ol. 21:241
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In a last ditch effort to show its democratic credentials and ward off
the republican movement, the monarchy lifted the suspension of trial by
jury on April 11, 1931. Three days later, however, the monarchy fell and
the Republic was proclaimed. A Republican decree of April 27, 1931 rein-
stated trial by jury, but reduced the number ofjurors to eight and removed
the question of guilt from its province.32
With the onset of the Civil War in 1936, the jury in the republican-
controlled areas became an institution of partisan repression. A decree of
August 23, 1936, created a "special tribunal" to decide cases of rebellion
and sedition. The tribunal consisted of three 'judges of the law" and
fourteen "judges of the facts," i.e., jurors, who were now chosen by the
parties that made up the Popular Front and by the trade unions. At the
same time, "emergency juries" consisting of one professional judge and
two jurors were created to handle minor cases involving disruption of the
war effort. Civil War juries used an abbreviated "summary" procedure and
were considered a weapon against the forces under Franco.33 However,
trial by jury was suspended in the areas conquered by Franco. Ultimately,
Franco's victory in 1939 extinguished jury trial throughout Spain.3
Murcia" ("Kill the King and Come to Murcia") became popular. ALPjANDRF, supra note
21, at 196. The acquittal of Mikel Otegi of the murders of two Basque policemen on
March 6, 1997, in San Sebastidn (SS-2), has called into question the propriety of trial by
jury in the troubled Basque Country. See discussion supra Part VI.F.
32. ALEJANDRE, supra note 21, at 226-29.
33. Id. at 239-43. After acquitting Republican soldiers, one presiding judge re-
marked: "[e]very day I am prouder to preside in this popular tribunal, which knows to be
inexorable with the traitors of the Republic and has a soul filled with justice and piety for
those who are not." Ict at 243. The conversion of the classic jury into a lay tribunal sub-
servient to the program of the ruling party was preceded by its conversion into a "mixed
court" in Russia (1917), see Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 67, and Germany
(1924), see Markus Dirk Dubber, The German Jury and the Metaphysical Volk From
Romantic Idealism to Nazi Ideology, 43 AM. . OF CoMi. L. 265-67 (1995). But the con-
stant tinkering with the qualifications for jury duty and the system of creatingjury lists in
nineteenth-century France can only be understood in the context of political struggles
between the liberal bourgeoisie and monarchists. LOMBARD, supra note 30, at 185-93,
210. The politics of racism in the United States can also be seen as the cause of the sys-
tematic exclusion of African-Americans from jury lists and the consistent acquittals of
white Americans when charged with crimes against African-Americans. See Alschuler &
Deiss, supra note 11, at 890-95.
34. ALEJANDRE, supra note 21, at 244.
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I. Classic Jury or Mixed Court: Legislative Initiatives and
Debate (1978-1995)
The Constitution of 1978 ("CE") provided for jury trial in Article 125
under the following formulation: "[t]he citizens will be able
to.. participate in the Administration of Justice through the institution of
the jury, in the form, and with respect to those criminal trials, as deter-
mined by law.""
3
The institution of the jury was seen as a key in the democratic reform
of criminal justice following the Franco dictatorship, 36 much as Russian
reformers saw the jury as a vehicle to strengthen the independence of the
judiciary which had served local party bosses in "judicially" executing
Communist Party policy since 1917.37
In the years between 1978 and 1995, however, many Spanish jurists
questioned the propriety of the classic jury as a catalyst for criminal justice
reform. Three groups of commentators emerged: (1) those who saw the
constitutional prescription as merely a nonbinding declaration of princi-
ples; (2) those who interpreted the provision to allow introduction of lay
participation in the criminal trial in the form of the mixed court, or court
with lay assessors; and (3) those who claimed that Article 125 of the CE
mandated the introduction of the classic jury.
35. Constitucon Espailola [CE] art. 125.
36. See Nicolfs Gonzflez-Cu61lar Serrano, Porfin, eljurado, ACTUIAUDAD JURIDICA
ARANZADI, Year IV, No. 151, May 26, 1994, 1, at 2; cf. supra text accompanying note
20. Indeed, in nearly all continental European countries, the introduction of trial by jury
coincided with liberal reforms, and its abolition with the installation of dictatorial or to-
talitarian regimes, i.e., Bolshevism in Russia (1917), Fascism in Italy (1931), the Vichy
Regime in France (1941). The only exception was Germany, in which the democratic
Weimar Government abolished the classic jury, albeit in an undemocratic manner, by the
Emminger decree of 1924. See Ellison Kahn, Restore the Jury?, 108 S. AR. L.J. 672,
678 (1993). See also C. GANZENMOLLER ET AL., GuIA PRACTICA DE LA LEY DEL JURADO.
COMENTARIOS Y EsQuEmAS 32-37(1996).
37. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 66-69. It remains to be seen whether the
jury could play a similar role in the aftermath of the Cold War and the democratization of
Soviet and U.S. client states in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America as well as
elsewhere in the Third World, as it did in the transition from absolute monarchy to bour-
geois democracy in continental Europe. Nicaragua recently returned to trial by jury fol-
lowing its suspension by the Sandinista government. See C6digo de Instrucci6n Criminal
de Nicaragua (BITECSA) §§ 22-27 (1993) (Nicar.). El Salvador's new Code of Criminal
Procedure has stayed with the classic jury for the trial of homicides and certain other
crimes. Constituci6n y Leyes Penales con Reformas Incorporadas §§ 315-90 (1994) (El
Sal.).
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The proponents of optional classic jury introduction s seized on the
technical language of "will be able to participate" (podrdn participar) as
indicating the non-mandatory nature of the constitutional prescription.2
Furthermore, some lay participation opponents stated that the constitu-
tional provision authorizing trial by jury was itself unconstitutional, vio-
lating the rights to equal protection, to a "lawful judge," and to "judicial
security.
' A0
Although the prevailing view among commentators was that Article
125 of the CE was clearly mandatory in its language,41 and that the crea-
tion of the jury court would not violate the right to one's "lawful judge"
under Article 24.2,42 a number of influential scholars advocated the insti-
tution of the "mixed court" with lay assessors (tribunal de escabinado
38. A dubious precedent for the "optional" nature of constitutional commands can be
found in the current Argentine Constitution, which was enacted in 1858 and included a
right to trial by jury which has never been implemented by legislation. RIcARDO J.
CAVALLERO & EDMUNDO S. HENDLER, JusTIcA Y PARTiCEPACt6N. EL JUIClO POR JURADOS
EN MAERiA PENAL 43-63 (1988).
39. See FERNANDO GOMEZ DE LwAo GONZALEZ, EL PROCESO PENAL ANTE EL TRBUNAL
DEL JURADO 17 (1995). For a summary of the positions of these commentators, see
AGUSnN-J. PRaz-Ctuz MARTIN, LA PARTICIPACI1N POPULAR EN LA ADMINISTRACI6N DE
JUSTICL : EL TRIBUNAL DEL jURADO 245-46 (1992) [hereinafter "PREZ-CRUZ MARTIN, LA
PARTICIPACIN"].
40. Article 14 CE guarantees "equality before the law." Article 24.2 CE guarantees
the "right to a regular judge predetermined by law" and Article 9.3 CE the right to "judi-
cial security." Constitution Espaffola [CE] arts. 14, 24.2, 9.3. All these rights would
arguably be violated by allowing for juries to act as judges of the facts in only limited
types of criminal cases. Leonardo Prieto-Castro y FerrAndiz, Aspectos procesales de la
Ley del Jurado, in JORNADAS CONMEMORATIVAS DEL CENTENARIO DE LA LEY DEL JURADO
21, 32 (1988).
41. See PEREZ-CRUZ MARTIN, LA PARTICIPAC16N, supra note 39, at 246-48 (summa-
rizing the arguments and supporting a mandatory interpretation); see also JUAN-Luis
GOMEz COLOMER, EL PROCESO PENAL ESPECIAL ANTE EL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO 17 (1996).
The Consejo General del PoderJudicial (General Council of the Judicial Power, "CGPJ"
or "Judicial Council"), the organ ofjudicial self-government, also emphasized the man-
datory nature of the constitutional command in its critique of the draft law in 1994. In-
forme del Consejo General del Poder Judicial al Anteproyecto de Ley OrgAnica del Tri-
bunal del Jurado, y votos particulares concurrentes (Pleno del 13 de abril de 1994),
Boletin de Informaci6n del CGPJ no. 117, May 1994, [hereinafter "Informe CGPJ"] re-
printed in FRANCISCO MAR.s ROGER & JOst-ANToNIo MORA ALARCON, CoMENTARIOS A
LA LEY" DEL JURADO 531 (1996) [hereinafter "MAPs ROGER & MORA ALARtN"].
42. Indeed, the Spanish Constitutional Court in its Decision 147/1983 had indicated
as much. See PEREZ-CRuz MARTIN, LA PARTCiPACi(N, supra note 39, at 51-52; GOMZ
COLOMER, supra note 41, at 71.
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from the German Schoffengericht) as a means of remaining consistent with
the constitutional mandate.43
Pointing to the virtual extinction of the classic jury in favor of the
mixed court in continental European countries such as France, Italy, Ger-
many and Portugal, all of which have similar legal traditions, opponents of
the classic jury claimed that it is not an indispensable constitutive element
of a democratic society. 4 Characterized as "the most modem form of lay
participation," '' the mixed court itself resulted from the perceived inability
to separate questions of law from questions of fact which plagued nine-
teenth century European theorists. The mixed court was also arguably the
only form of lay participation allowing for reasoned judgments in criminal
cases, which were mandated by Article 
120.3 of the CE. i 
While advocates of the mixed court conceded that the classic jury best
reflects the universally recognized principals of orality, immediacy, pub-
licity, and the equality of arms in the criminal trial,47 Spain did not need
the classic jury as a catalyst to introduce these principles. These univer-
sally recognized principles and others, such as the presumption of inno-
cence and the right to adversary procedure that had developed in the Eng-
43. For a summary of the proponents of this point of view, see PAREZ-CRUZ MARTIN,
LA PARTICIPAC16N, supra note 39, at 33-36, 243, 251-53; see also Pedraz Penalva, supra
note 20, at 62 (interpreting the constitutional language as leaving the "form" ofjury up to
the legislator). See also Informe CGPJ, supra note 41, at 531-32; VICENTE GIMENO
SENDRA & JosE GARBERI LLOBREGAT, LEY ORGANICA DEL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO.
COMENTARIOS PRaCTICOS AL NUEVO PROCESO PENAL ANTE EL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO 101
(1996) [hereinafter "GuItENO SENDRA, CoMENTARIos"]; G6MEZ COLOMR, supra note 41,
at 16. While noting that discussions preceding the enactment of Art. 125 CE never ex-
plicitly mentioned the tribunal de escabmnado, Professor Fairdn Guillin attributed this to
the fact that several countries such as France and Italy have transformed their classic jury
into a "mixed court" while keeping the name jury or corti d'assise. VICTOR FAIRN
GUILL'N, Los TRIBUNALES DE JURADos EN LA CoNsTITucI6N ESPAIROLA DE 1978, 111
(1979) [hereinafter "FAIRtN GuiLLN, Los TRmuNALEs"]. Another reason for using the
term jurado, another protagonist of the "mixed court" asserts, is that the framers of the
constitution did not want to use the term tribunal popular, tarnished by its history dur-
ing the Civil War. ANTONIO NARVAEZ RODRIGUEZ, EL JURADO EN ESPAIA: NOTAS A LA
LEY ORGANICA DEL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADo 5 (1995).
44. Pedraz Penalva, supra note 20, at 124; AUGUSTIN PEREZ-CRUZ MARTIN ET AL.,
COMENTARIOs SISTEMATICOS A LA LEY DEL JURADO Y A LA REFOIMA DE LA PRII6N
PREVENTIVA 22-23 (1996) [hereinafter "PAREz-CRUZ MARTIN, COMENTARIOS"].
45. Victor Fair~n Guill~n, Comentarios al 'Anteproyecto de Ley del Jurado, 2
REVISTA DE DERECHO PROCESAL 431, 434 (1994) [hereinafter "Fairdn Guill~n, Comen-
tarios"].
46. PAREz-CRUzMARTIN, LAPARTICipACI6N, supra note 39, at 102-07.
47. See PtREz-CRUz MARTIN, LA PARTICIPACI6N, supra note 39; at 71; Fairdn Guil-
16n, Comentarios, supra note 45, at 24; GOMEz COLOMER, supra note 41, at 76.
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lish criminal courts, had already been enshrined in the 1978 CE and
strengthened by rulings of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts. Inas-
much as Spain lacks the tradition of evidentiary rules tailored to a court
sitting with jury, such as the Hearsay Rule, the mixed court would arguably
be a more appropriate solution.
48
Finally, critics of the classic jury claimed that it would not help to
remedy the huge case backlogs and lack of funds in the Spanish criminal
justice system, but would instead complicate and slow down criminal tri-
als 9 In addition, they stressed the cost of trial by jury in an era of budget-
ary crisis °
Despite the trenchant criticism from proponents of the mixed court
with lay assessors, the proponents of the classic jury won the day. They
had emphasized that "our jury is not Anglo-Saxon, not French, not Ger-
man, not Italian, it is Spanish, like our olives."51 The classic jury would
provide the deepest popular participation and would bring the "mysterious
abstraction" of Spanish law closer to everyday life. 5 It was a more demo-
cratic institution than the mixed court, and provided for a "secularization"
of the sanctified rituals of the courts.
5 3
IV. Legislative Initiatives to Implement the Citizen's Right to
Participate in the Administration of Justice, 1983-1994
In 1983, the Basque Parliamentary Group submitted the first draft law
implementing Article 125 of the CE in the Spanish Parliament.m The
48. Joan Verger Grau, Algunas observaciones al Proyecto de Ley Orgdnica del Tri-
bunal del Jurado de 20 de abril de 1994, 3 JusTICIA 527, 529-32 (1994).
49. Pedraz Penalva, supra note 20, at 76; Informe CGPJ, supra note 41, at 534.
50. PEREz-CRuz MARTIN, LAPARTIC[pACI6N, supra note 39, at 115-17.
51. See PEREz-CRuz MARTN, LA PARTICIPACI6N, supra note 39, at 249 (quoting one
of the main proponents of the classic jury, lawyer Gustavo L6pez Mufioz y Larraz from a
1983 newspaper article).
52. MARns ROGER ETAL., supra note 41, at 33-34, 39.
53. A.moNIo MARIA LORCA NAVARRETE, EL JURADO ESPAI OL. LA NuEVA LEY DEL
JuADo 26-27 (Dykinson ed., 2d ed. 1996). Navarrete saw the military tribunals during
the Franco regime as being constituted similar to continental European "mixed courts."
Id.
54. Proposici6n de Ley Orginica del Jurado (presentada par el Grupo Parlamentario
Vasco), (B.O.C.G. Congresso, II Legislatura, 1983, Seri B no. 54-4) [hereinafter "Basque
Draft"]. For a summary of the draft, see PAREz-CRUz MARTIN, LA PARTICIPACIfN, supra
note 39, at 278-86. The Basque parliamentary group was urged to prepare this draft by
the President of the Pro-Jury Association (Asociacidn Pro-jurado) Gustavo L6pez-
Muffoz y Larraz in a letter of April 8, 1983. GusTAvo L6PEz-Muroz Y LARRAz,
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Basque Draft called for a classic jury consisting of nine "judges of guilt"
presided over by three "judges of the law." A majority of six juror votes
would be needed for a guilty verdict, and the jury court would have juris-
diction in all cases punishable by more than three years in prison. 55 The
Basque Draft did not make it to the debate stage in Parliament.
56
Over eight years later, the Parliamentary Group of the Centro Demo-
crdtico y Social ("CDS") submitted a second draft to the Spanish Senate.
57
The CDS Draft also proposed a classic jury court, this time composed of
eight jurors and with one professional presiding judge; it would exercise
jurisdiction in all cases in which a prison sentence would be possible. A
majority of five jurors would have been required for a guilty verdict.58 The
Senate rejected the CDS draft.59
In addition to these submitted draft laws, professors and other jurists
prepared a number of proposed versions of lay participation before the
legislative drafts of 1994 which were a prelude to the current law. A draft
law prepared by pro-jury lawyer Gustavo L6pez-Mufioz y Larraz proposed
a court with a jury of seven and one presiding professional judge and with
jurisdiction in all criminal cases punishable by more than a six year sen-
tence. This draft clearly envisioned the jurors determining guilt and miti-
gating circumstances as well as factual questions in each case. 60 Professor
Vicente Gimeno Sendra prepared another draft; it took the form of a mixed
court with six lay assessors and two professional judges.61 Although he
was a proponent of the mixed court, Professor Victor Fairen Guill6n wrote
a draft law with a classic jury to be presented in conjunction with the Gi-
meno Sendra draft.62
These three drafts were discussed at a meeting of jurists in Chinch6n,
near Madrid, on February 1-2, 1986; another draft law arose from this
COMENTARIOS A LA LEY ORGANICA 5/1995 DEL TRmUNAL DEL JURADO 15-16 (Dykinson
1995) [hereinafter "L6PEz-MURioz Y LARRAz, CoMENTARIos"].
55. PtREz-CRuz MARTIN, LA PARTICiPACiON, supra note 39, at 279,282.
56. Id. at 286.
57. Proposici6n de Ley Orgdnica del Jurado (presentada por el Grupo Parlamentarlo
CDS), (B.O.C. Senado, IV Legislatura, 1990, num. 3(a)). For a discussion of the CDS
Draft, see PEREZ-CRuz MARTIN, LA PARTICiPACi6N, supra note 39, at 286-93 [hereinafter
"CDS Draft"].
58. PtREZ-CRUZ MARTIN, LA PARTICipACi6N, supra note 39, at 287, 292.
59. Id. at 293.
60. See Gustavo L6pez-Mufiloz y Larraz, Anteproyecto del Texto Arliculado de la
'Ley Orgdnrca del Tribunal del Jurado, in JORNADAS SOBRE EL JURADO 81-98 at arts. 1,
5, 37 (Umv. ofExtremadura ed., 1989) [hereinafter "L6pez-Mufioz y Larraz Draft"].
61. Discussed m PREz-CRuz MARTIN, LA PARTICiPACI6N, supra note 39, at 294, 296
(unpublished) [hereinafter "Gimeno Sendra Draft"].
62. See Fairdn Guilldn, Comentarios, supra note 45, at 435-36.
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meeting. It called for a jury of six, presided over by two professional
judges. The Chinch6n draft proposed that the jury's verdict be accompa-
nied by written reasons and that the professional judges could enter the
jury room when requested by the jury to aid in reaching a verdict. The jury
and professional judges would deliberate together on the question of sen-
tence. 63
Finally, on March 11, 1994, the Minister of Justice, Juan Alberto
Belloch of the Socialist Government of Felipe Gonzalez, presented a Draft
Jury Law to the Spanish Parliament. Immediate criticism arose for its lack
of an "exposition of reasons," 64 among other things. On May 20, 1994, the
government submitted an amended draft with an "exposition of reasons"
which then became the subject of intense parliamentary and scholarly de-
bate.
65
On May 22, 1995, Parliament passed legislation, based on the Ministry
of Justice draft, to be effective on November 24, 1995, that would revive
the classic jury court for a select number of criminal offenses.66 The LOTJ
was amended on November 17, 1995,67 before it went into effect, to correct
a number of imprecise details which were heavily criticized after its en-
actment.68 Finally, the enactment of a new penal code on November 24,
63. L6PEz-Mu~oz Y LARRAz, COMENTARIOS, supra note 54, at 16. For a summary of
the draft, see PEREZ-CRuz MARTIN, LA PARTICIPAcION, supra note 39, at 294, 297, 317
[hereinafter "Chinch6n Draft"].
64. For a discussion see Fairdn Guilldn, Comentarios, supra note 45, at 435 & n.5
[hereinafter "LOTJ Draft 1"].
65. Proyecto de Ley Orginica del Tribunal del Jurado, Proyccto de Ley 121/000050
(authored by Ministry of Justice of Spain), (B.O.C.G. Congreso de Diputados, 1994, 173)
[hereinafter "LOTJ Draft 2"].
66. See supra text accompanying notes 1-2.
67. Ley Orgdnica 8/1995, de 16 de Noviembre, por la que se modifica la Ley Or-
gfnica 5/1995, de 22 de Mayo, del Tribunal del Jurado, (B.O.E. 1995, 275; correction of
errors In BOE, of November 21, 1995) [hereinafter "LO 8/1995"].
68. The first draft was criticized for its imprecise legal terminology, as well as for its
perceived substantive shortcomings. Although the changes were lauded, critics were
quick to point out that the LOTJ was the first law in which the amendments went into
effect before the provisions of the actual law which they purported to amend. The
amendments went into effect on November 18, 1995, six days before the text of May 1995
was due to go into effect. See LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1, at 17-18; G6MEZ
COLOMER, supra note 41, at 15-16. For calls for even further reform of the new law, see
PER.z-CRuz MARTiN, CoMENrAPaOs, supra note 44, at 10; Vicente Gimeno Sendra, La
segunda reforma urgente de la ley deijurado, in EL TREBUNAL DEL JURADO 25, 27 (1996)
[hereinafter "Gimeno Sendra, La segunda"].
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1995, necessitated a further amendment of the LOTJ to comport with the
changes in the substantive crimes subject to the new procedure.
69
Supported by the left-leaning "Judges for Democracy" and pushed by
then Minister of Justice Juan Alberto Belloch, the new Spanish Jury Law is
considered by some as the "parting shot of the Socialist government" be-
fore it lost power amid accusations of corruption and the use of death
squads to counter Basque terrorism.70 Initially, opponents claimed that the
LOTJ's passage protected Socialist members now facing criminal investi-
gations by allowing for trial by jury in most such cases and, thus, limiting
the power of investigating magistrates. 7' At present, most opponents now
realize the importance of making the new law function smoothly.
This Article will provide an analysis of the new Spanish Jury Law,
and will attempt to ascertain its character as a vehicle in reforming Spanish
criminal procedure. It will refer, where informative, to earlier Spanish
legislation, the draft laws elaborated since the enactment of the right to
trial by jury in the 1978 Constitution, and the legislation and jurisprudence
of other countries. The conclusion will discuss new reform proposals trig-
gered by the shocking acquittal in the Otegi case (SS-2) on March 6, 1997.
V. An Analysis of Spain's New Jury Law
A. The Jury Court's Jurisdiction and Composition
1. Jury Trial as a Participatory Right of the Citizenry, Not a
Criminal Defendant's Waivable Right
In section 1 of the LOTJ, involving the "jurisdiction of the jury
court," the Spanish legislature makes it clear that the new court is an "in-
stitution for the participation of the citizenry in the administration of jus-
tice." Trial by jury will not only implement article 25 of the CE, but is
also inextricably connected with the citizen's right to participate directly in
public affairs, guaranteed by Article 23.1 of the CE, and the right to a law-
69. Ley Orginica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre, del C6digo Penal, (C. P. (Ist ed.
Civitas 1996) 1995, 281) [hereinafter "CP 1995"]. Final Disposition § 2 of the CP 1995
implemented these amendments to the LOTJ.
70. Justin Webster, Jury Trials Return to Spain 57 Years On, EUROiEAN, June 6-12,
1996.
71. Miguel Bajo Fernindez & Carlos Sudrez Gonzfilez, ACTUALIDAD PENAL, No. 37,
Oct. 10-16, 1994, at 687.
[Vol. 21:241
Spain Returns to Trial by Jury
ful judge, guaranteed by Article 24.1 of the CE. Nowhere iti the Spanish
Constitution or in the Jury Law is the criminal defendant guaranteed the
right to trial by jury, a right seen by the common law as an "inestimable
safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge"73 and in nineteenth century conti-
nental Europe as protection for the incipient bourgeoisie against ajudiciary
subservient to monarchic interests.74 This is made explicit by the legisla-
ture m the expostci6n de motivos, when it states that the jury
.. fulfills a function necessary for due process, but does it from a dis-
tinct perspective from that attributed to it during its reception in the
liberal bourgeois State; there is here no reticence in relation to the pro-
fessional judge; it is not a question of installing an alternative Justice
parallel to, much less, in opposition to the career judges and magis-
trates referred to m Article 122 of the Constitution, but to establish
some procedural norms which satisfy at the same time and in a parallel
fashion all of the exigencies of criminal trials with the right-duty of the
citizenry to participate directly in the constitutional function of judg-
ing.
75
By describing trial by jury as a participatory right of the citizenry and
not a procedural right of the criminal defendant, the Spanish legislator has
effectively precluded a defendant from waiving the right to jury trial in a
prosecution for one of the crimes subject to its jurisdiction.76 The prevail-
72. EM-LOTJ I, supra note 19. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution as giving citi-
zens the right to be represented equally on junes in relation to their race and sex. Cf.
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (referring to the earlier case of Swain v. Ala-
bama, 380 U.S. 202, 224 (1965) which talked of giving Afican-Americans "the same
right and opportunity to participate in the administration of justice enjoyed by the white
population").
73. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
74. Jury trial advocates in Russia intended the new institution to protect criminal
defendants against the discredited Soviet-Russian judiciary, which had been subservient
to the dictates of Soviet Communist Party policy, thus leading to a constitutional gura-
rantee of trial by jury, especially in capital cases. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note
5, at 66-68, 77.
75. EM-LOTJ I, supra note 19, at 21.
76. In the United States, the defendant may waive the right to trial by jury and be
tried by a single judge. In some states the prosecutor must also agree to the waiver
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEaOLD H. ISRAEL, CUMINAL PROCEDURE 961 (2d ed. 1992). In
Russia, the defendant may choose between trial by jury, trial in the Soviet-era court with
two lay assessors, or trial by a three-judge panel, an innovation introduced by the Rus-
sian jury law. The danger of making the jurisdiction of the jury court optional, as in
Russia, means that assorted institutional pressures on the defendant to waive the right
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ing view m Spanish jurisprudence is that allowing a criminal defendant to
freely choose the composition of the trial court violates Article 24 of the
CE, which guarantees equality before the law and the right to a lawful
judge." Dissenting voices have criticized the mandatory nature of the jury
court's jurisdiction and advocated an "escape valve" to allow circumven-
tion of a procedure they deem to be cumbersome and expensive.78
Deprived of the "escape valve" of a defendant's preference for a court
trial,79 Spanish prosecutors can still manipulate the charging of cases and
avail themselves of the Spanish variation of plea bargaining, called con-
formidad, to avoid impaneling a jury in all cases subject to the jury court's
jurisdiction.
80
2. Crimes Subject to the Jurisdiction of the Jury Court
The Spanish legislature could have determined the jurisdiction of the
jury court m relation to: (1) the severity of the crime charged, as reflected
in the length of imprisonment which could be imposed;81 (2) the traditional
may be exerted by criminal investigators, prosecutors, judges and defense counsel them-
selves. This partially contributed to the fact that roughly 83% of Russian defendants
"waived" their right to jury trial in 1994, despite the more lenient verdicts returned by
Russianjuries. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 85-88.
77. G6mEz COLOMER, supra note 41, at 69; GimENo SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra
note 43, at 99. While the Council of Judges believes the CE does not preclude making
trial by jury optional, it supports prohibition of waiver of the jury court due to the small
number of crimes subject to its jurisdiction. Informe CGPJ, supra note 41, at 541-42.
As to the defendant's power to choose between court or jury trial in the United States,
see Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 ("If the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of
a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge, he
was to have it.").
78. See Fafren Guilldn, Comentarios, supra note 45, at 442; 1,6PEz-MuRoz Y
LARRAZ. COMENrARIOS, supra note 54, at 99. On the parliamentary debates regarding
waivability of the right to jury trial, see LORCANAVARRETE, supra note 53, at 116-17.
79. In PM-i, the defendant told the author that he did not trust the jury and would
have preferred a trial before professional judges. After he was acquitted, he agreed that
juries might be preferable after all where the credibility of police officers was crucial to
the outcome. Interview with Lothar Gerhard Schtltze, defendant, Palma de Mallorca
(May 27, 1996) (PM-1). After this trial the author participated in discussions critical of
requiring a costly jury trial in a case which could be punished only by a fine (such as in
PM-1). L. Erviti, Thaman ve en el veredicto un problema de losjuicios con jurado en
Espafia, LEVANTE. EL MERCANTIL VALENCIANO, May 30, 1996, at 6; Elena Aguilar, Un
experto estadounidense piense que el juicio con jurado no debe ser obligatorio,
CASTELLON DiAmUo, May 30, 1996, at 9.
80. See discussion infra Part IV.G.
81. For instance, the right to jury trial in criminal cases in the United States adheres
if the defendant is threatened by a punishment in excess of six months imprisonment, re-
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competence of the particular court in which jury cases would be tried; 8 or
(3) the nature of the crime charged, irrespective of the threatened punish-
ment. 3
At an early stage, it appeared as if Spain would opt for a model man-
dating trial by jury for all crimes punishable by a certain minimal length of
imprisonment, as well as for certain other types of crimes regardless of the
threatened punishment. This was the model adopted in the 1872 Ley de
Enjuiciamiento Criminal ("LECr. (prov.)")84 and appeared to be followed
in the majority of the early draft jury laws.85 According to the Organic
Law on the Judicial Branch (Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial), passed in
1985, the jurisdiction of the jury court would be determined by "the nature
of the crimes and the amount of punishment provided for the commission
thereof.
8 6
The Spanish legislature, however, opted to condition the jurisdiction
of the jury court only on the nature of the charged crimes, and specified the
following categories of crimes when it first enacted the Jury Law in May
of 1995: " (a) crimes against human life; (b) crimes committed by public
officials in the exercise of their duties; (c) crimes against honor, (d) crimes
gardless of whether the crime is tried as a felony or misdemeanor. See Baldwin v. New
York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 (1970).
82. In Russia, for instance, the jurisdiction of the new jury court is identical to that
of the second-level courts of original jurisdiction. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5,
at 85.
83. The restriction of trial by jury to press crimes in the early nineteenth century
Spanish legislation is a good example of this model. See discussion supra Part I.
84. The LECr. (prov.) of 1872 continued the Spanish tradition of trial by jury for
press crimes regardless of the threatened punishment, but extended the right to jury trial
to serious common crimes punishable in excess of "presidio mayor." AI.JANDRF, supra
note 21, at 121; PERFz-CRuz MARTIN, LAPARTICiPACI6N, supra note 39, at 147.
85. The following early drafts recommended jury trial: (1) Basque Draft, (2) CDS
Draft, and (3) L6pez-Mufloz y Larraz Draft. The Basque Draft recommended jury trial
for crimes punishable by more than three years imprisonment, in addition to those against
the security of the state, against fundamental rights, media crimes, and so forth. Basque
Draft, supra note 54, §5; PERnz-CRuz MARTIN, LA PARTICIPACI6N, supra note 39, at 279.
The CDS Draft recommended jury trial when any deprivation of liberty was threatened,
in addition to state security crimes. CDS Draft, supra note 57, § 4; Ptamz-CRuz MARIN,
LA PARTICIPACI6N, supra note 39, at 288. The L6pez-Muiloz y Larnaz Draft recom-
mended jury trial for crimes punishable by more than six years imprisonment in addition
to all crimes against the democratic form of government, such as rebellion, sedition, es-
pionage, treason, and so forth. L6pez-Mufiloz y Larraz Draft, supra note 60, at 82 & §5.
The Gimeno Sendra Draft and the Chinch6n Draft suggested similar formulae. Gimeno
Sendra Draft, supra note 61; Chmch6n Draft, supra note 63; PtREz-CRuz MARTIN, LA
PARTICIPAC16N, supra note 39, at 299-301.
86. Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial, el uno de Julio, 1985, § 83(2)(d), In En-
juciamiento Criminal (L.E.CRIK, 16th ed.(Civitas) 1995) [hereinafter "LOPJ"].
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of failing to render aid; (e) crimes against privacy and the home; (f) crimes
against liberty; and (g) crimes against the environment." ' When the Jury
Law was amended in November of 1995, the phrase "crimes against human
life" was replaced by "crimes against persons" and subsections (d) through
(f) were replaced by "crimes against liberty and security" and "arson."
88
Each version of the law also included specified articles of the Penal Code
("CP") which would fall under the general rubrics. The law had to be
amended with the passage of the 1995 CP in November 1995 to conform to
the numbering and organization of the new Penal Code.8 9
In limiting the jury court jurisdiction to a select number of crimes
within the competence of the Provincial Courts, the Spanish legislature ad-
hered to the 1888 Jury Law model, which not only included homicide, ar-
son, and various crimes of public officials and bribery, but also treason,
"crimes of citizens committed during the exercise of individual rights
guaranteed by the Constitution," crimes relating to religion, mayhem, rape,
crimes of dishonesty, kidnalping, false imprisonment, and the obligatory
crimes concerning the press."
Crimes were selected which "lack excessive complexity or in which
the integral normative elements are especially apt for the evaluation of citi-
zens without professional judicial training.' '91 The -legislature chose to
group the crimes under categorical rubrics in order to facilitate future ex-
87. § 1(1) la Ley Orgdnica 5/1995, de 22 de Mayo, del Tribunal del Jurado
(L.E.CPiM., 16th ed. (Civitas), 1995) (Ley Orgdnica 5/1995 refers to subsequently
amended sections in the original text) [hereinafter "LO 5/1995"]. It is odd that § 5(1)
LO 5/1995 purported to condition the competency of the jury court on the "punishment
in the abstract which corresponds to the alleged criminal act." Id. at 786. This language
was later removed.
88. § 1(1) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
89. LO 5/1995 and LO 8/1995 still listed sections of the 1973 Penal Code (C.P.
1973). The final version specified the following offenses listed in C.P 1995: homicide
(§§ 138-140), threats (§ 169.1), failing to render aid (§§ 195, 196), trespass in a dwelling
(§§ 202, 204), arson of forest lands (§§ 352-354), mishandling of official documents (§§
413-415), bribery (§§ 419-426), influence peddling (§§ 428-430), embezzlement of pub-
lic funds (§§ 432-434), fraud and illegal levies by public officials (§§ 436-438), prohib-
ited negotiations by public officials (§§ 439-440) and mistreatment of prisoners (§ 471).
§ 1(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. The new Penal Code went into
effect just three days before the first jury trials commenced, causing large-scale amend-
ments of pleadings dependent on whether the provisions of C.P 1973 or C.P 1995 were
more favorable to the defendant. All citations from the C.P 1973 will be from C6DIGO
PENAL. C6DIGO PENAL (12th ed. (tecnos) 1995) [hereinafter "CP 1973"]. All citations
from the C.P 1995 will be from CODIGO PENAL Y LEGISLACI6N COMPLEMENTARIA.
C6DIGO PENAL Y LEGISLACION COMPLEMENTARIA (1 st ed. (Civitas) 1996).
90. § 4 LJ of 1888, supra note 26, at 167-68.
91. EM-LOTJ II, supra note 19, at 23.
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pansion of the list of criminal offenses within the designated rubrics "in
light of experience and the social consolidation of the institution."' 2 In the
end, however, following the amendments and the passage of the 1995 CP,
the LOTJ ended up containing rubrics devoid of enumerated offenses, and
others which no longer related to the categories of the new penal code.93
The Spanish legislature's final selection of crimes triable by jury has
met with considerable criticism. The Council of Judges ("CGPJ") regret-
ted the exclusion of the "classic political crimes," precisely those for
which trial by jury was supposedly introduced, such as crimes against the
security of the state, against democracy, against fundamental rights and so-
cial and communitarian interests.94 The CGPJ also criticized the inclusion
of petty crimes committed by or in relation to public officials that would be
too complicated for jurors or necessitated "technical legal evaluations."95
The State Prosecutor's Office has criticized the LOTJ's failure to
specify which "crimes against honor" should be subject to the jury court's
jurisdiction, yet concedes that this failure has removed them from consid-
eration for the time being.96 The inclusion of "crimes against honor" has
been praised because the plural composition of a jury would better inter-
pret differing moral standards reflected in such crimes than a panel of
judges.97 Other commentators feel these honor crimes are too petty to
waste the jury court's time and resources.
98
92. Id. The LOT Drafts 1 and 2 only included rubrics, without specifying the con-
crete criminal offenses as was later done in the LOTJ. LOTJ Draft 1, supra note 64;
LOTJ Draft 2, supra note 65; G6MEz COLOMER, supra note 41, at 25-26.
93. For instance, no "crimes against honor" are listed in section 1(2) of LOTJ, and
the rubric "crimes against persons" does not jibe with any categories in C.P. 1995.
G6MEZ COLOMER, supra note 41, at 25-26.
94. Informe CGPJ, supra note 41, at 538-39. Note that similar crimes were included
in the Basque Draft, the CDS Draft, and the L6pez-MudIoz y Larraz Draft. See sources
cited supra note 85. The LJ of 1888 also included crimes of this category. See L of
1888, supra note 26.
95. Informe CGPJ, supra note 41, at 538-39. This critique has been echoed by
PEREZ- CRUZ MARTIN, COMENTARIOS, supra note 44, at 37-39; G6MEZ COLOMER, supra
note 41, at 29; Gimeno Sendra, La segunda, supra note 68, at 28 (specifying crimes of
mishandling of government funds, illegal levies or fraud).
96. Circular 3/1995, de la Fiscalla General del Estado sobre cl proceso ante el Tribu-
nal del Jurado: su Anbito de aplicaci6n, reprinted in GIMENO SENDRA, COMENTARiOS,
supra note 43, at 437-97, 444 [hereinafter "Circ.3/1995, FGE"].
97. GnAiENo SnENRA, COMMTARIOS, supra note 43. Several judges in the first trials
have echoed this opinion. Cf. Interview with Bernardo Donapetry Camacho, Public
Judge of Section 3, Oviedo (June 9, 1997) (0-2).
98. PEREZ-CRuz MARTIN, COMENTARiOS, supra note 44, at 39. Allowing juries to
determine guilt of "crimes against honor" has also been seen as threatening to protection
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Economic criticism was also leveled against the inclusion of the
crimes of trespass m a dwelling and threats as being too trivial to justify
the expense of a jury trial.99 This criticism was reiterated after two of the
first trials which involved trespasses by disgruntled former boyfriends in
their ex-lovers' homesOO Similar criticisms have been aimed at the inclu-
sion of the setting of forest fires, 1 1 and the failure to render aid, which
usually involves hit-and-run accidents.102 On the other hand, the failure to
include rape and other "crimes against sexual liberty" has been universally
criticized. 10
Section 1(3) of the LOTJ also excludes all cases with oiiginal juris-
diction in the National Court (Audiencia Nacional). While this provision
has been praised for its elimination of terrorism trials which would demand
"citizen-heroes" as jurors,104 the provision has elicited criticism for its
elimination of other crimes arguably more appropriate for trial before a
jury, such as economic crimes, fraud, and drug trafficking.1
05
Although the LOTJ expressly limits the jury court's jurisdiction to
completed crimes (thus eliminating prosecutions for attempts, solicitations,
and so forth), it allows non-specified crimes to be tried before a jury if they
are connected in their commission with a designated crime. Severance of
of freedom of speech. Cdndido Conde-Pumpido Tour6n, annotations in ARNALDO
ALcuBrLLA ET AL., MANUAL DEL JURAno 43 (Abella 1 996).
99. Gimeno Sendra, La segunda, supra note 68, at 28; Conde-Pumpido Tour6n, su-
pra note 98, at 44; cf. Jos6 M. Palomino Martin, El Veredicto. La Sentencia. Los Recur-
sos., in EL TRIBUNAL DEL JURADO, supra note 68, at 126 (treating "crimes against honor"
as petty offenses unworthy of the jury court).
100. For an understanding of the costs of V-1 and B-i, see discussion infra Part VI.D.
In Madrid, a jury was needed to resolve a minor threat case in which defendant received
a suspended sentence and a 15,000 peseta fine. Interview with Javier de Frutas, Head of
the Office of the Jury in Madrid Provincial Court, Madrid (June 13, 1997).
101. In Pontevedra, it cost 500,000 pesetas to try an arson of foresilands case, in
which the prosecutor was only requesting a 15,000 peseta fine. This imbalance was criti-
cized in the press. Santy Mosteiro, El primer jurado popular de Galicia lnvirti6 mas de
dos horas para emitir un veredicto de culpabilidad, DIARIO DE PONTEVEDRA, Oct. 9,
1996 (PO-1). However, the trial judge, Luciano Varela Castro, who happens to be the
main author of the LOTJ, justified the result. Interview with Luciano Varela Castro,
Author of the Draft Jury Law, President of Pontevedra Provincial Court and Presiding
Judge, Pontevedra (June 11, 1997) (PO-1).
102. For failure to render aid cases, see Appendix I at A-5, AV-1 and PO-5.
103. PEREZ-CRUZ MARTIN, CoMENTAmios, supra note 44, at 40; Gimeno Sendra, La
segunda, supra note 68, at 27; L6PEz-Muloz Y LARRAZ, COMENTARIOs, supra note 54, at
50; and G6MEz COLOMER, supra note 41, at 33-34 (expressing that crimes against sexual
liberty, liberty of expression and property, which "preoccupy society" should all have
been included).
104. GIMENO SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 62.
105. G6MFZ COLOMER, supra note 41, at 23.
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connected crimes otherwise not subject to the jury court's jurisdiction is
encouraged if it does not "break the continuity of the trial.'"
An Alicante judge refused to impanel a jury to try joined charges of
trespass in a dwelling and robbery, concluding that the trespass "merged"
with the non-jury offense of robbery. The Superior Court of Justice of
Valencia reversed, however, holding that the 1995 CP had made the two
charges distinct as to their elements. 17
All commentators agree that homicide should be within the jury
court's jurisdiction and it has, indeed, been the subject of an overwhelming
majority of first cases tried.108 After the first cases, prosecutors and in-
vestigative judges have successfully avoided bringing many minor offenses
to trial in the jury court.1°9
3. The Composition of the Jury Court
The Spanish jury court consists of nine citizens with a single presid-
mg professional judge of the Provincial Court. Two alternate jurors are
106. § 5 LOT, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Thus, a charge of at-
tempted murder was joined with murder charges in LU-2 and a theft charge with a threats
case in TE-1, whereas in SE-I counts charging assault against a policeman and infliction
of injuries were severed from the murder prosecution. Miguel Carmona Ruano & Jos6
Manuel De Pafil Velasco, Informe sobre Las Causas Juzgadas por el Tribunal del Jurado
29 (1997) (unpublished draft commissioned by CGPJ, on file with the author). For an
opinion against allowing joinder of non-jury offenses, see Juan Josd L6pez Ortega.
L:neas generales del procedimiento ante el Tribunal del Jurado. Aproximaci6n a algunas
cuestiones problemiticas 2 (1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
107. In contrast, under the C.P. 1973 committing a crime in a dwelling constituted an
aggravating factor in a robbery prosecution, this provision was eliminated in the C.P.
1995. Sara Velert, Un tribunal popular de Alicante juzgard un delito no previsto en la
ley deljurado, EL PAIs, Mar. 12, 1997, at 7.
108. Fifty-seven of the first seventy-seven cases of which the author is aware. See
generally Appendix I. While the Russian Jury Law provides for jury trial for a small
number of non-capital crimes, seventy-seven of the first 109 cases which proceeded to
judgment were capital murder trials. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 135.
109. A secretary of one Salamanca investigative court told the author of the courts'
attempts to induce prosecutors not to charge threat cases so as to avoid the jurisdiction of
the jury court. Interview with Carmen Vicente, Secretary of Juzgado de Instrucci6n No.
2, Salamanca (May 20, 1996) (SA-1). The Chief Prosecutor of Madrid Provincial Court
has also avoided the jury court's jurisdiction in minor bribery and burglary cases by of-
fering plea agreements ("conformidad) or using abbreviated procedure. Interview with
Joaquin Sdnchez Covisa, Chief Prosecutor of Madrid Province, Madrid (Sept. 20, 1996)
(M-1). On this "flight from the jury" in cases of threats, trespassing in a dwelling and
failure to render aid, see Carmona Ruano & De Pa6l Velasco, supra note 106, at 15. On
the use of conformidad to resolve these minor cases, see discussion infra Part V.H.
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selected in each case.110 As was noted previously, all of the proposed draft
laws in the period 1978-1995 rejected the classic European jury court
composition of twelve jurors and three professional judges, which was in-
cluded in the 1872 LECr. (prov.) and the 1888 LJ."' Although the LOTJ
Projects 1 and 2 (described m notes 65-66) called for a jury of seven, the
legislature ultimately opted for nine, inspired by the number of "jurors" in
the French cour d'assises.1
2
In cases involving conflicts of interest among local prosecutors or the
bench, or in which certain public figures are the defendants, the LOTJ pro-
vides for trial by jury at the Superior Court of Justice (Tribunal Superior
de Justicia ("TSJ")) of the Commune of which the province is a part."3 In
the first year of jury trials, only one case, m which a Valladolid prosecutor
was charged with having allegedly taken bribes from a local lawyer, had
been earmarked for the special procedure and had been calendared in the
TSJ of Castilla y Le6n.1 4 Commentators have criticized the; LOTJ's lack
of procedure for selection ofjurors m these special cases.1
5
110. § 2 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
111. §§ 658-660 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24; § I LJ of 1888, supra note 26.
However, the number of jurors was reduced to eight, by a decree of April 27, 1931.
PAREZ-CRUZ MARTIN, LA PARTICipACI6N, supra note 39, at 163. The new Russian law
retained a twelve-person jury as in the nineteenth century, presided over by only one in-
stead of three professional judges, as was formerly the case. Thaman, Resurrection, su-
pra note 5, at 86. While juries in England, most U.S. states, and the federal courts are
still composed of twelve jurors, the U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted the U.S. Consti-
tution as allowing flexibility in this area. See Williams v. Florida, 199 U.S. 78, 86
(1970). However, at minimum the jury must consist of six persons. See Ballew v. Geor-
gia, 435 U.S. 223, 245 (1978).
112. GNmmo SENDRA, COmENTARiOS, supra note 43, at 69.
113. For an understanding of the special aforamiento procedures, see § 2(1) LOTJ,
reprinted in LEY DEL JURADfO, supra note 1. Spain's fifty provinces are divided up into
seventeen Communes: Andalucla, Arag6n, Asturias, the Balearic Islands, the Canary Is-
lands, Cantabria, Castilla La Mancha, Castilla y Le6n, Catalufla, Extremadura, Galicia,
Madrid, Murcia, Navarra, Pais Vasco, La Rioja, and Valencia.
114. Pleadings against Antonio del Hoyo Soler were filed on January 21, 1997, in the
TSJ of Castilla y Le6n, and the case was pending in June 1997 with the lawyer attempt-
ing to get his case severed and tried in Valladolid Provincial Court. Interviews with Jos6
Luis de Pedro Mimbrero, President of the TSJ of Castilla y Le6n, and .os6 Luis Garcia
Ancos, Chief Prosecutor of the TSJ, Burgos (June 5, 1997).
115. See Conde-Pumpido Tour6n, supra note 98, at 126; GimENo SENDRA,
COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 64-65 (admitting, however, that this will not present a
problem in the umprovincial Communes ofAsturias, Cantabria, Madrid, Murcia, Navarra
and La RiPoja).
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B. The Jurors
1. Legal Status of the Spanish Juror
Participating in the criminal justice administration as a juror in Spain
is simultaneously a fundamental constitutional right, guaranteed by Article
125 of the CE, and a mandatory duty to be performed absent a valid excuse
or incompatibility.11 6 The right to be ajuror has been deemed to be as fun-
damental as the citizen's right to privately initiate a criminal prosecution
(accien popular). Thus, the illegal exclusion of a citizen from a jury list
could be initially challenged with a writ of amparo before the Council of
Judges, and then before the Constitutional Court.17 It is a duty because
the conscientious failure to exercise it would lead to the violation of a
criminal defendants' rights to an "effective procedure" and to a "speedy
trial." ' This "inexcusable duty of a public and personal character" is
subject to general labor and civil service regulations, n 9 and is remunerated
at a rate equivalent to the per diem salary of a criminal law judge.
120
2. Qualifying to be a Spanish Juror
Any Spanish citizen over eighteen years of age who can read and
write and resides in the adjudicating province may be ajuror as long as she
is in full exercise of her political rights and does not suffer from any physi-
cal or mental disability that would impede the exercise of the right.'
2 1
The minimum age requirement for Spanish jury service has been criti-
cized for being substantially lower than that required for lay judges in the
116. § 6 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
117. GIMENo SENDRA, CoMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 99-100.
118. Constituci6n Espafiola [CE] art. 24; GIMENO SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra note
43, at 101. Such failures to appear or other omissions by jurors are subject to fines; see
mfra note 211.
119. § 7(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
120. Section 7(1) of LOTJ leaves the amount of remuneration to be set by regulations.
A memorandum of the Ministry of Justice has set the daily remuneration of jurors at
1,270 pesetas per hour or around 10,160 pesetas per day (approximately S81 per day) in
addition to transportation and other expenses. GIMNO SENDRA, COMENTAMOS, supra
note 43, at 105. The Russian Jury law set jury compensation at one-half the pro-rata
compensation of a judge. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 83. In comparison, a
juror, for instance, in the State of California is guaranteed only five dollars per day com-
pensation. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 215. Non-payment ofjurors under the LECr. (prov.)
of 1872 led to a high rate of absenteeism and was the reason for the provision for juror
remuneration in Disposici6n Especial No. 2 of the I of 1888. IJ of 1888, supra note
26; GImENo SENDRA, COMENTARiOS, supra note 43, at 104.
121. § 8 LOTJ, reprintedn LEYDELJURADO, supra note 1.
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"mixed courts" of other European countries and thus allowing people to
judge who lack ajudge's life experience or "civil courage."'22 At the other
end of the spectrum, Gimeno Sendra would set a maximum age at seventy,
the mandatory retirement age of professional judges, deeming it illogical to
allow untrained lay judges to sit longer than their professional counter-
parts. 123 In their Draft Jury Laws, Gimeno Sendra and Fair~n Guill6n both
suggested the creation of three subpanels of the jury, each to be made up of
jurors of different age groups in order to render a fair cross section of the
population.I
24
The LOTJ creates three categories- of otherwise eligible jurors who
are disqualified from serving and a fourth category which may request ex-
clusion from jury duty. 125 First, those who have unexpunged convictions
for intentional felonies or who are charged with or standing trial for the
commission of a felony are deemed to "lack capacity" to serve as a juror.
This category also extends to those who have been detained pending trial
or are serving their sentences for any felony, and those who have been sus-
pended from public employment for a criminal conviction, as long as the
suspension remains in effect.126 Second, a large group of public officials,
including the King and his family, members of the executive and legisla-
tive branches of the national and communal governments, members of the
judiciary, the prosecutor's office, the judicial police and certain diplomats
are deemed to be "incompatible" with jury duty. 127 Finally, citizens are
122. See G6mEz COLOMER, supra note 41, at 44 (noting that the minimum age fluctu-
ates from 23 in France, to 25 in Sweden, Germany and Portugal, and 30 in Belgium and
Italy). Section 8(1) LJ of 1888 required jurors to be 30 years of age. LJ of 1888, supra
note 26; cf. Fairdn Guilldn, Comentarios, supra note 45, at 439-40. The minimum age
for jurors in the United States is usually 18. The new Russian Jury Law set the minimum
at 20 years of age. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 83.
123. GiMENO SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 108, 135 (referring to Ley Or-
gdnca del Poder Judicial, el uno de Julio, 1985, § 386.1 (L.E.CRIM. (Civitas) 1995)).
124. A first group from 18 to 30 years, a second from 31 to 50 years and a third from
51 to 70 years. Fairdn Guilldn, Comentarios, supra note 45, at 440-49.
125. The categories referred to in the text closely follow those of sections 10-13 of LJ
of 1888. §§ 10-13 LJ of 1888, supra note 26. It must be remembered that the right to be
a juror in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, like the right to vote, depended on
one's social class. Thus, the right to serve on a jury was then restricted to those who
were head of a family, had academic or professional status, or a minimum level of in-
come. § 8 LJ of 1888, supra note 26. Those who suffered bankruptcy, were in debt to
the state or had been declared to be paupers "lacked capacity." § 10(6)-(8) LJ of 1888,
supra note 26.
126. § 9 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
127. § 10 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. It is interesting that a
proponent of the "mixed court" with lay assessors favors excluding lawyers from jury
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"prohibited" from sitting on a jury in a particular case for the same reasons
of actual bias which would lead a judge to excuse herself from sitting on a
case, such as being a party to the case, being related to a party, having an
interest in the case, and so forth.
28
A fourth group of prospective jurors may petition to be excluded upon
a showing of qualification for one of seven categories of "excuses." Four
of the categories are relatively straightforward and uncontroversial: people
over sixty five years of age, people who have participated as a juror within
the last four years, people who live abroad, and professional soldiers on
active duty.'12 The last three "excuses" could be characterized, to borrow
the words of the Exposici6n de Motivos, as "generous excuses" within the
court's discretion.13? Thus, potential jurors who "suffer a serious distur-
bance due to family matters" or perform "work of relevant public interest,"
whose replacement would cause important prejudice to jury service, may
petition to be excused.13 ' Finally, an omnibus escape clause allows the
judge to excuse other prospective jurors due to "any other cause which
would seriously hamper the fulfillment of the function of a juror."'32 To
some critics, these latter three "excuses" could open the door to massive
evasion ofjury duty and lead to difficulty in assembling sufficient jurors to
try cases.
3. Preparation of Jury Lists
During the last fifteen days of September in every even numbered
year, provincial delegations of the Office of the Electoral Census compile
lists of prospective jurors from registered voter lists in each Spanish Prov-
ince. Within three days of this selection, the number of prospective jurors
is determined by multiplying the number of cases the Provincial Court pre-
siding judge estimates will be tried in the ensuing two years by the number
fifty. This list is then posted for seven days in the town halls of all the re-
spective provincial municipalities.134 Within seven days of publication, the
duty because of the excessive sway professional judges have over lay assessors. GMENo
SENDRA, CoMENTARios, supra note 43, at 124-25.
128. § 11 LOT, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
129. § 12 (1), (2), (5), (6) LOT, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
130. EM-LOTJ II, supra note 19, at 24.
131. § 12(3), (4) LOTJ, reprinted in LEYDELI JURADO, supra note 1.
132. § 12(7) LOTS, reprinted in LEYDELJURADO, supra note I.
133. GtMEZ COLoMER, supra note 41, at 48, 51-52.
134. § 13(1), (2) LOTS, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Intending to
make jury duty a "school of citizenship and democracy," the Spanish followed the French
model of random selection of prospective jurors from the ranks of registered voters, re-
jecting a politicized selection model like that used in Germany for the selection of its lay
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list may be challenged before a special session of the Provincial Court.
The challenge must be decided before the fifteenth of October. The final
lists are then returned to the town halls for publication, and prospective ju-
rors on the lists are notified and advised of the various factors which could
disqualify them from jury duty.1
35
Prospective jurors, who lack the basic qualifications for jury duty,
who are unsuitable due to an incapacity or incompatibility, or who may
allege one of the statutory "excuses," must petition to be excluded from the
jury list during the first fifteen days of November. These petitions, as well
as challenges on similar grounds brought by ordinary citizens against the
inclusion of listed jurors, are heard by judges in the lower level municipal-
ity courts, and decided before November 30.136 While the final lists are
assessors. GIMENO SENDRA, COMENTARios, supra note 43, at 140. While most U.S. ju-
nsdictions rely on random selection from lists of registered voters supplemented by other
official lists, a few states still permit the "key man" system, whereby political and civic
leaders choose prospective jurors from among persons they know. LAFAvE & ISRAEL,
supra note 76, at 962-63.
135. § 13(3), (4) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note I.
136. §§14, 15 LOTJ, reprinted in LEYDEL JURADO, supra note 1. The first jury list in
Pontevedra consisted of 3,750 out of a census of 719,204 Pontevedrans. The granting of
excuses reduced the list to 3,038 citizens. Nearly all the potential jurors over the age of
65 (385 out of 405) asked to be excused. Eighty-five excuses were granted for physical
or mental infirmities, sixty for family disturbances, 40 for not knowing how to read or
write and 84 under the omnibus clause due to work, pregnancy, transportation difficul-
ties, and so forth. Sixty-two percent of the persons on the list had not finished school,
898 had finished high school, and only 497 of the 3,035 had a college education. Santy
Mosteiro, El 95% de las personas mayores de 65 ahos rechazaron participar en los ju-
rados populares, DLARIO DE PONTEVEDR.A, Dec. 16, 1995. A list of 15,000 potential ju-
rors was compiled in Madrid for the 1997-1998 term: 73.7% of these were successfully
notified. However, 3,412 persons (22.74% of the total) moved to be excluded and 1,753
(80.68%) of the excuses were granted, leaving 12,247 potential jurors on the list. There
were 578 claims for lack of the prerequisites and 479 of these requests were granted.
Eighteen claimed lack of capacity and all such claims were accepted. Also, 216 alleged
incompatibility and 211 were excused. Of the 2,600 who requested to be excused, 2,047
did so successfully. When the first jury list was prepared in late 199.5, 11,250 were on
the list, 2,940 requested to be excused (26.1%) and 2,319 were actually excused. Memo-
ra 1996. (Audiencia Provincial de Madrid. Oficina del Jurado. Madrid. 1996, 91-92 (on
file with author). In the small Palencia Province, 200 of the 500 jurors on the initial list
were excused. Joaquina Prades, Juicio at Jurado, EL PAls, June 8, 1997, at 1. In
Almeria Province, 660 of the original 2,350 jurors were excused during the initial proce-
dures. Letter from Hemrndez, Jury Administrator, to Almeria Provincial Court, (Mar.
25, 1997) (AL-1). In the Province of Alava (Victoria) granting of excuses reduced the
original list of 750 to 563. A.M., El primerjurado popular de Alava saldrd de una lista
de 20 hombres y 26 mujeres, EL CORREO (Apr. 2, 1997) <http://www.diario-elcorrco.es>
(VI-1)
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valid for a period of two years from January 1, jurors may petition for ex-
clusion during this period if a disqualifying condition arises.Y
37
The selection of a panel of prospective jurors for a particular case be-
gins at least thirty days before the trial date when the Secretary of the jury
court m public session makes a computerized random selection of thirty six
prospective jurors from the corresponding provincial jury list. 3 ' These ju-
rors are then notified and sent a questionnaire which must be completed
and returned within five days to the Provincial Court. Within five days of
the court's receipt of the questionnaires, the parties may formulate chal-
lenges for cause due to incapacity, incompatibilities or prohibitions based
on the submitted information, and are foreclosed from reiterating such
challenges during jury selection at trial. 39 The presiding judge then sets a
hearing to decide on challenges made by the parties and any petitions by
prospective jurors to be excused or disqualified. 40 If as a result of chal-
lenges the number of prospective jurors falls below twenty, the Secretary
will be directed to begin a new selection process following the same pro-
cedure.141 The Otegi case (SS-2) presented the only serious chance that
137. § 16 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
138. § 18 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. The author witnessed
the computerized selection of the 36 candidates in the second Madrid Case (M-2) on
September 20, 1996, in Madrid Provincial Court. The fact that two of the same jurors
were selected from the list of 8,897 prospective jurors as had been "randomly" selected
in the first case (M-1), led the presiding judge to doubt the reliability of the computer
program. Interview with Francisco Javier Vieira Morante, Presiding Judge of Madrid
Provincial Court, Madrid (Sept. 20, 1996) (M-2).
139. §§ 19-21 LOT, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. A Lugo judge
claimed that defects in the census had led to less than 36 prospective jurors appearing in
this second stage ofjury selection. Interview with Remigio Conde Salgado, President of
Lugo Provincial Court, Lugo (June 10, 1997).
140. § 22 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
141. § 23 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Nine of 12 who sought
exclusion in LP-1 were successful. Some were students with examinations. Another was
excused due to inability to read and write. Un tribunal popular juzga hoy un caso de
asesinato en laAudiencia de Las Palmas, DIARIODEAvisos, July 3, 1996. Elevenjurors
were excused in preparation for M-1, some on motions by the parties. Among them, one
student had moral objections to service and a female student said she would not be able
to prevent herself from crying during the trial and would be afraid to walk the streets and
run into the defendant. Josd A. Hern.ndez, Una sala de la Audiencia se reforma para
que eljurado pueda ver al acusado en el prmerjuiclo, EL PAlS, Oct. 6 1996. In CS-I,
the judge excused seven jurors in preparation of the trial, including a woman who
claimed her dignity prevented her from judging anyone, but if she were obliged to do so,
she would. The judge excused her under the omnibus exception of section 12(7) of
LOTJ, feeling it would be unjust to force a juror to exercise her "right" to be a juror.
This, in his opinion, could lead to a failure of the institution. Angeles Durdn, Losjueces
admiten la objeci6n de conciencia para no ser jurado, EL PAls, Nov. 16, 1996, at 25;
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twenty eligible jurors would not qualify In Otegi, twenty seven of the
thirty six candidates presented excuses to avoid sitting in judgment on a
young Basque nationalist accused of murdering two police officers. Most
claimed family or economic hardship and a few claimed they knew the de-
fendant or his family. The judge rejected most of the requests to be ex-
cused, and twenty five jurors were finally qualified.1
42
The procedure for compiling jury lists has been criticized as unneces-
sarily centralized m its initial stages, cumbersome and "judicialized" by
the control of the President of the Provincial Court, and too pervasive in
allowing prospective jurors three opportunities to seek exclusion from the
biennial list. 3 The court administrator responsible for jury selection in
Jur. Sel. Prot. (CS-i) (on file with author). Eight of the 36 prospective jurors were ex-
cused in 0-3, one due to a prior robbery conviction, one because he was a lawyer, and
another because he was dead. Jur. Sel. Prot. (0-3) (on file with author). Twcnty-thrce
percent of the 468 prospective jurors in the first 15 Barcelona trials asked to be excused.
The majority were over 65 years of age, but other common excuses were family and eco-
nomic hardship. Francesc Peir6n, Law mayoria de los barceloneses que ha ejercido
comojurado repetivia la experiencia, LA VANGUARDIA, Oct. 29, 1997.
142. Comenz6 elijucio per el caso Itsasondo tras elegirse el Jurado, ABC, Feb. 25,
1997, at 23 (SS-2). Prospective jurors called their lawyers to find ways to get off the
jury, in fear of judging the young man who was called a hero by the terrorist group ETA
and its sympathizers HB, KAS and Jarrai. Pablo Ordaz, Miedo a hacerjusticea, EL PAlS,
Feb. 9, 1997, at 10. According to jurors interviewed after the Otegi trial, it was suffi-
cient to say some barbarity about the Ertzainiza (the Basque police) or to say anyone
who smelled of an abertzale (a Basque separatist) should be shot to get off the jury.
Those who succeeded in getting off told their secret to those who were waiting to be
questioned. Carmen Gurruchaga & Juan Carlos Escudier, La ca6tica acluacidn delju-
rado del <<caso Otegi>>, EL MUNDo, Apr. 22, 1997, at 6. While Gurruchaga & Es-
cudier reported that three panels of 36 had to be summoned in the Olegi cise, Otegi's
defense lawyer indicated that only one panel was summoned. Interview with Miguel
Castells Arteche, defense counsel in Otegi case, San Sebastifin (June 6, 1997). In con-
trast, only four prospective jurors sought to be excused in SS-1, the trial of a narcotics
addict who murdered two people after a barroom fight in which there were no political
overtones. Pedro Gorospe, La.mitad de los candidatos al jurado se excusa para evitar
juzgar a! presunto homicida de dos 'ertzainas', EL PAls, Feb. 3, 1997; J.L. Barberla,
Habrd jucto par el asesinato de dos 'erizamnas' tras hallar 20 jurados aptos, EL PAS,
Feb. 18, 1997, at 15.
143. GnmeNo SENDRA, COMENTARIOs, supra note 43, at 140-41. Gimeno Sendra
would prefer non-judicialized "jury commissions," typical of other European countries,
which include members of the prosecutor's office, the bar, and other officials, for the
compilation of the lists is an administrative and not a jurisdictional act. In this context,
the prosecutor's office should participate in its capacity as protector of constitutional
rights. Id. at 141, 146-47. He further feels that using lists encompassing the entire
province could lead, for instance, to a predominantly rural jury deciding cases commit-
ting in the urban provincial capitals, where most of the crime problems exist. Gimeno
Sendra, La segunda, supra note 68, at 28-29. However, Fairdn Guilldn criticizes the
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Madrid favors eliminating the first two stages ofjury selection and instead
proceeding to the third step of summoning a larger pool of jurors on the
day of trial, as is done in the United States.
144
C. Pretrial Procedure in Cases Before the Jury Court
1. A Move to an Adversarial Criminal Investigation
In addition to reintroducing trial by jury, the LOTJ manifested a sig-
nificant alteration of the procedures to be followed in the preliminary in-
vestigation and screening of criminal cases subject to its jurisdiction.
When the majority of continental European countries introduced jury trial
for serious criminal cases in the nineteenth century, they left intact their
inquisitorial investigative procedures under the tutelage of an investigative
judge. Duty-bound to ascertain the truth, the investigative judge interro-
gated the suspect and witnesses in a secret proceeding where the suspect
had no participatory rights, collected physical evidence, ordered forensic
analyses and other studies by expert witnesses, and compiled an exhaustive
"dossier," which served as the basis for the trial. The trial was often oral,
public, and before a jury with the defendant represented by counsel. How-
ever, the dossier of the preliminary investigation weighed heavily in the
evidentiary process; often, the trial was reduced to a "checking" of the va-
lidity of the dossier's findings, while the witnesses' testimony merely af-
firmed, qualified, or rejected their prior statements reduced to writing.
Many have criticized the Spanish legislature for changing the prelimi-
nary investigation procedures in a law aimed at introducing lay participa-
tion at the trial stage of the criminal proceedings.145 But the decision was
based on an analysis of the contradictions noted above between the Span-
principle of vicinage, feeling that jurors could be manipulated by their friends or enemies
in the community. See Fairdn Guilldn, Comentarios, supra note 45, at 450.
144. Interview with Javier de Frutas, supra note 100.
145. As Gimeno Sendra notes, the Law on Criminal Procedure was introduced on the
heels of the Jury Law in the LECr. (prov.) of 1872 and is adequate to deal with a reim-
plantation of the jury. GINENO SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 162; cf. De la
Oliva Santos, Separate Opinion, in Informe CGPJ, supra note 41, at 591; Fairin Guilldn,
Comentarios, supra note 45, at 462. The Russian Jury Law made no changes in the
largely unreformed inquisitorial preliminary investigation inherited from Soviet times
and many of the first trials have contained allegations of confessions beaten or otherwise
coerced from suspects by police or the legal-trained criminal investigators while in pre-
trial detention. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 105-06. It has been noted that
the totalitarian states of Europe, Italy, Germany and the Soviet bloc were notable for the
"purely inquisitorial" structures of their criminal procedures. COMWSSION JUSTICE
PENALE ET DROITS DE L'HOmME, RAPPoRTS: LA MISE EN tTAT DES AFFAIREs PENALEs 25-27
(1991), [hereinafter "La mise en dtat"].
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ish "summary proceeding" (sumario) in the form of the preliminary inves-
tigation often lasting months, if not years, and the dominance of the inves-
tigative dossier in the "plenary session" or "oral trial" (plenario, juicio
oral) which often lasted no more than a matter of hours:
Some have proclaimed that any procedural innovations should com-
mence at that point where the jury intervenes, that is, at the trial phase.
They have maintained, that if the jury's intervention is limited to the
trial, there is no need to modify the formal or mixed accusatory model
of the Law of Criminal Procedure.
This opinion has ignored certain obligatory considerations: (a) The
current procedural system based on professional judges is based on
normative premises that are difficult to translate to a trial before a jury,
and to maintain them could result m the failure of trial procedures us-
ing non-professional citizens
Alonso Martinez (the author of the 1888 LJ) complained of the habit
which was so rooted m our judges and courts, to ascribe little or no
weight to the evidence in the plenary session, and to seek the truth
principally if not exclusively m the summary investigations conducted
behind the back of the accused. The current Law intends that trial by
jury should result m the complete eradication of this procedural de-
formity through the presentation of the entirety of the evidence before
the jury. 146
Although some continental European countries have turned criminal
investigations over to the prosecutor's office 147 or severely reduced the
power of their investigative judges, 148 Spain's "Law of Criminal Proce-
dure" still provides for an investigative judge (juez instructor) to preside
146. EM-LOTJ. III(1), supra note 19, at 25. This priority attributed to evidence-
taking by the investigative judge over that at trial has been called "instrucc16n-mania" or
even the "eroticism of the investigative power" because of the tendency to detain a per-
son and "investigate, investigate, investigate" ad nauseum. L6pez-Mufoz Y LARRAz,
COMENTARIOS, supra note 54, at 87. Another author calls the sumario a "ritual panto-
mime." LORCANAVARRETE, supra note 53, at 255.
147. Germany (1974), Portugal, and Italy (1988). See Hans-Heinrich Jescheck,
Grundgedanken der neuen italienischenStrafproze8ordnung in rechtsvergletchender
Sicht, in FESTSCH IF FOR ARTHUR KAumAN zum 70 GEBURTSTAG 659, 661-64 (1993).
148. The 'Yuge d'instruction" in France is in charge of only 3% of all criminal trials,
and even in those cases the prosecutor initiates the charge, has access lo the dossier at
any time, orients the investigations of the investigative judge and can demand his or her
replacement. The police actually consider the prosecutor to be their interlocutor during
the investigation, not the 'Yuge d'instruction." La mise en etat, supra note 145, at 128.
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over the criminal investigation.149 The LOTJ, however, has significantly
reduced the powers of the investigative judge in jury cases as was done in
1988 reforms introducing "abbreviated procedures" in a wide range of
criminal cases. 150 If interpreted literally, the LOTJ reduces the role of the
investigative judge to that of a neutral evaluator of the existence of prob-
able cause necessary to hold a suspect for trial, and neutral executor of the
investigative requests of the parties in the criminal case, which should be
limited to those items of evidence which cannot be repeated in court at the
time of the jury trial. The aim was not only to strengthen speedy trial
rights by shortening the time of the preliminary investigation and leaving
the formal evidence presentation to the trial as is customary in Anglo-
American law,151 but also to extend the adversarial participation of the
parties deeper into the criminal investigation than in any country in
Europe.152 Critics have voiced concern over equal protection, inasmuch as
some accused of serious crimes-rape, terrorism, and so forth, which are
not subject to the jury court's jurisdiction-would be subject to the tradi-
tional, more inquisitorial procedure before the investigative judge;
149. See §§ 299-324 Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal. Promulgated by Royal Decree
on September 14, 1882 [hereinafter "LECr."] (all citations from Enjuicamdiento CrImi-
nal, supra note 86).
150. See §§ 779-799 LECr., supra note 149. Such a move to expedite the resolution
of criminal cases and relieve the burden at both the investigative and trial levels can be
evidenced in the introduction of summary proceedings in certain cases. Examples are
the "penal orders" in Germany and the new Italian abbreviated procedures. Jescheck,
supra note 147, at 670-74.
151. Luciano Varela Castro, annotation in MANUAL DEL JtiRADO, supra note 98, at
186.
152. This applies to the United States as well. Despite the informal, non-
jurisdictional nature of U.S. criminal investigations, the virtual exclusion of the defense
from the official gathering of evidence prior to indictment in the trial court makes the
U.S. criminal investigation, with its maintenance of the classically inquisitorial grand
jury, one of the most inquisitorial pre-trial systems in the West. It would be interesting
to parallel the grand jury's gradual transformation from an independent citizen body to a
mere "rubber stamp" for investigations conducted by the prosecutor's office to the
transformation of thejuge d'instruction in France to an adjunct of the prosecutorial and
police functions (or was it converted from a police function to a judicial function, never
having left these trappings behind?) On the contrary, the Spanish investigative judge
appears to still have relative autonomy in its investigations, thus leading to criticism that
the LOTJ is merely replacing the investigative judge with the prosecutor rather than con-
verting to a pure accusatorial system as was done in Italy. Fairdn Guilldn, Comentario,
supra note 45, at 461-63. Indeed, early drafts of the LOTJ suggested the abolition of the
investigative judge. G6mEz COLomER, supra note 41, at 82. Critics of this trend claim
that while the replacement of the investigative judge with the prosecutor has worked in
other countries, it will not work in Spain due to the peculiarities of the system. G6MEz
DE LL4jo GONzALE7, supra note 39, at 57.
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whereas, those within the purview of the LOTJ would benefit from an ad-
versarial proceeding with more guarantees for the defense.1
53
Pre-trial procedure under the LOTJ consists of (1) a preliminary re-
view of the criminal complaint by the investigative judge, followed by a
series of adversary hearings presided over by the investigative judge prior
to trial court referral, which I shall call the "preliminary judicial in-
quest,"' 54 and (2) a subsequent "preliminary hearing" (audiencia prelimi-
nar) also under the supervision of the investigative judge, at which new in-
vestigative measures may be undertaken, and the evidence to be presented
at trial is screened.
2. The Preliminary Verification of the Complaint
Spanish criminal prosecutions begin either with a report of a crime by
the police or a citizen (denuncia),155 or a complaint by a victim of a crime
(querella) pursuant to the victim's right to privately prosecute criminal
cases. 156  As soon as the investigative judge ascertains that the crime
charged is subject to the jury court's jurisdiction and has "evaluated the
credibility" (verosimilitud) of the allegations, an order initiating proceed-
ings under the Jury Law is issued, which triggers the "adversarialization"
153. GIMENo SmNDRA, ComEiNTARios, supra note 43, at 165-66.
154. G6MF.Z COLOMER, supra note 41, at 85.
155. Sections 259-269 of LECr. legally compel citizens to report crimes (unless they
are related to the perpetrator) to the local investigative judge and section 262 of LECr,
compels police officers to do the same. §§ 259-269, 262 LECr., supra note 149. Section
24(2) of LOTJ provides that the provisions of the LECr. related to the preliminary inves-
tigation remain in force to the extent they are not in contradiction with the provisions of
the LOTJ. § 24(2) LOTJ reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. In using the LECr.
to "fill the obvious holes" in the LOTJ, GnIMENo SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra note 43,
at 169, one should, according to the State Prosecutor, begin by looking at the paragraphs
relating to the normal procedure, and only then at those relating to abbreviated procedure
if the former are not applicable. Circular 4/1995, de la Fiscalla General (lei Estado sobre
el proceso ante el Tribunal del Jurado: Las actuaciones en el juzgado de instrucci6n
[Memorandum 4/1995 of the State Prosecutor on trial by jury: Actions in the Investiga-
tive Courts], reprinted in GIMENO SENDRA, CoMENTARIos, supra note 43, at 461, 461-62
[hereinafter "Circ.4/1995 FGE"].
156. Under LECr., citizens who are victims of crimes may not only file a complaint
with the investigative judge, but may also initiate a private criminal prosecution (acci6n
particular) and an attached civil suit for indemnification (acczdn civil) which are then
heard along with the public prosecution. §§ 100, 101 LECr., supra note 149. Any citi-
zens may initiate criminal proceedings regardless whether they have been offended by the
crime (acc1dn popular). Id. §§ 270-281. As will be seen, the strong role of the victim in
the role of private prosecutor, and to a lesser extent, the role of other groups and gov-
ernment agencies as popular prosecutors have already made their mark in the first Span-
ish jury trials.
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of the investigation."17 This preliminary verification was intended by the
law's authors to be a brief procedure, primarily aimed at identifying those
who were to be charged; because once the investigation focused on a par-
ticular individual, the neutrality of the investigative judge risked being
compromised.
158
Despite the gradual recognition of the right to counsel and increased
defense participation during the criminal investigation in many post-
inquisitorial continental European countries, a window usually provides
the police and investigative authorities an opportunity to perform the in-
quisitorial measure par excellence: the interrogation without aid of coun-
sel.159 In France, this period of garde a vue is regulated by statute, and
consists of twenty four hours in normal cases, with extensions available in
narcotics and terrorism cases. 16° Critics have maintained that this prelimi-
nary stage to verify the complaint has provided the investigative judge with
such a window. Nothing in the law prevents the judge from holding a case
for an unlimited time before initiating jury proceedings and informing the
parties, thus resurrecting the unlimited power of the investigative judge
criticized by those advocating its abolition. 61 The possibility of extended
investigative measures conducted by the investigative judge without noti-
fying the suspect could result in less protection than the usual procedure,
delineated in section 118 of the LECr., which provides for immediate noti-
fication of the suspect upon admission of a complaint or report which
could result in the accusation of a crime.
162
157. § 24(l) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
158. Varela Castro, supra note 151, at 183.
159. Interrogation in this post-arrest, pre-charge interval should be distinguished from
necessary emergency measures which police or investigative authorities are authorized to
take in all systems. Examples of such include protection of victims, collection and pres-
ervation of evidence, identification and arrest of suspects, §§ 13, 334-339 LECr., supra
note 149; view of the scene, id. §§ 326-333; autopsies, id. §§ 343-355; and other meas-
ures which cannot be postponed, zd §§ 448-449.
160. La mise en etat, supra note 145, at 38-39. The "necessary police investigative
measures" must be conducted in Spain within 24 hours. See supra note 159. Thereafter
the investigative judge must be informed. §§ 282-296 LECr., supra note 149.
161. GPMANo SENDRA, COMENTARiOs, supra note 43, at 166-67. The express language
of section 24 of LOTJ, referring to initiation ofjury court proceedings against "identified
persons," must be interpreted to allow a suspension of proceedings until at least one of
the suspects has been identified. Circ.3/1995, FGE, supra note 96, at 455.
162. Verger Grau, supra note 48, at 578-79; cf. G6MEZ DE LLAio GONZALE, supra
note 39, at 66-67. Indeed, prosecutors and judges have admitted that acceleration of the
preliminary investigation desired by the authors of the LOTJ has not always been
achieved, because many investigative judges continue to do things in the old way. Inter-
view with Fernando Mena, Public Prosecutor of Burgos, Burgos (June 5, 1997); Inter-
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3. The Preliminary Judicial Inquest
After the preliminary verification of the complaint, the investigative
judge notifies the public prosecutor (mmisterio fiscal), the accused, any
victims (ofendidos), and any others who suffered loss due to the crime
(perjudicados) about the jury court proceedings' initiation, sends them a
copy of the report or complaint, and sets a hearing within five days. At
this first appearance, the accused must be represented by counsel of choice
or by a court appointed lawyer. If the aggrieved private parties appear at
the hearing without counsel, they are advised of their right of private
prosecution (acusaci6n particular), and if they are indigent, of their right
to court-appointed solicitors (procuradores) and banisters (letrados) to
represent them.1
63
The preliminary judicial inquest provided for in section 25 of the
LOTJ has as its goal the "concretization of the accusatory pleadings," and
to this end the parties may request that the judge order supplemental in-
vestigative measures.16 The scope of the "supplemental investigation"
which may be carried out under the supervision of the investigative judge
is a source of dispute. While the investigative judge in normal cases is
duty-bound to investigate and determine "the perpetration of the crimes
with all of the circumstances which can influence in their qualification and
the guilt of the criminals, while securing their persons and their pecuniary
responsibilities,"'165 the LOTJ appears to limit such investigative measures
to subject matter crucial to the probable cause determination in order to
bind the accused over for jury trial-i.e., evidence of corpus delicti and
authorship--and requires any other evidence to be adduced at the prelimi-
nary hearing or at trial. 66 Critics claim that postponing crucial evidence to
the preliminary hearing or the trial may make it more difficult to adduce.
1 67
view with Fernando Lacaba Sd.nchez, Presiding Judge in Girona Provincial Court, Girona
(June 26, 1997). Other authors have also attributed the slowness to the investigative
judges' artificially prolonging some investigative measures to avoid the time constraints
of the LOTJ. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106 (manuscript at 76). It
took seven months to complete the preliminary investigation in simple trespassing cases
in LU-2 and MA-2 and 15 months in a Sevilla case that ended in a guilty plea (conforml-
dad). Id. at 71.
163. § 25(1), (2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1; § 119 LECr., su-
pra note 149.
164. § 25(3) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
165. § 299 LECr., supra note 149.
166. § 27 (1-3) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
167. G6mez Colomer makes this point, while agreeing with Gimeno Sendra that all
evidence normally included in section 299 of LECr. should be adducible at the prelimi-
nary investigation in jury cases. G6MEz COLOMER, supra note 41, at 91-92; GIMENO
SENDRA, COMENTAPios, supra note 43, at 181. The State Prosecutor has argued that ex-
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The provisions relating to the "preliminary judicial inquest" have also
been criticized for replacing the inquisitorial principle of material truth
with the civil law notion of "pleaded justice," or "formal truth," depriving
the investigative judge of the right to pursue investigative leads sua sponte
and restricting him or her to areas complementary to those requested by the
parties, and thereby compromising the efficiency of the investigation.lez
Before or after conducting supplementary investigations, the investi-
gative judge may entertain a motion to dismiss the charges with prejudice,
where there is no rational evidence that the criminal act has been commit-
ted, or without prejudice when the evidence is merely insufficient to show
either that the crime was committed or that the accused was the perpetra-
tor.
169
Upon completion of any supplementary investigation, the investiga-
tive judge gives the parties five days to formulate their provisional plead-
ings (escritos de conclusiones provisionales).170 The result of the prelimi-
nary judicial inquest is the solidification of the accusatory pleadings of the
public' 7 ' and private prosecutors 172 and the defense pleadings. Defense
pert psychiatric testimony going to a complete or partial excuse due to mental illness
would not be relevant to the charging decision and should be reserved for trial. How-
ever, the testimony of witnesses should be taken at the preliminary hearing, whether or
not relevant to the charging decision, so as to prevent it from getting stale, or memories
from fading. Circ.4/1995 FGE, supra note 155, at 475-76.
168. GnmNo SENDRA, COMEmTARiOS, supra note 43, at 182-83; cf. Andrds Tagliavia
L6pez, Preparacidn deljuicio oral. Escrito de acusacidn y defensa. Audiencia Prelimi-
naria, in TRMUNAL DEL JURADO, supra note 68, at 209-13. G6mez Colomer sees this as
another example of the "privatization of the criminal law." G6MEz COLOMER, supra note
41, at 86-87. Another author has noted that some investigative judges have stopped in-
terrogating witnesses and suspects themselves and have made the proceeding completely
adversary by turning questioning over to the parties. L6pez-Ortega, supra note 106
(manuscript at 4).
169. § 26(1) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1; § 637, 641 LECr.,
supra note 149. In B-2, criminal charges of failure to render aid had been brought by the
private prosecutor against the city of Barcelona on the theory that the taxi driver stabbed
by the defendant would have survived had a city ambulance promptly arrived. These
charges were dismissed with prejudice during the preliminary judicial inquest, because
the investigative judge determined that the victim would not have survived the knife
wound. Francesc Peir6n & Domingo Marchena, La lentitudy el espectdculo marcan el
segundojuicio conjurado en Barcelona, LA VANOUARDIA, Sept. 17, 1996, at 23.
170. § 27(4) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
171. While the pleadings of the public prosecutor at this stage are termed a "escrito de
solicitud dejuicto orar' (motion for the setting of the trial), it has the identical format of
the accusatory pleading in normal criminal cases as laid out in section 650 of LECr.: it
must include a description of the criminal acts, the legal qualification of those acts, the
character of the accused's participation in those acts, any circumstances which aggravate
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pleadings in the Spanish criminal trial assume the same form as the accu-
satory pleadings and allow the allegation of "fallback" or alternative theo-
ries of the case.173 This purely adversarial and reciprocal exchange of de-
tailed pleadings in criminal cases in Spain parallels that in civil cases and
is in stark contrast to the United States' practice where the indictment or
information often consists only of a skeletal recitation of the crime charged
and a perfunctory defense pleading of "not guilty," regardless of the theory
of the defense.
1 74
In their pleadings, the parties may request the administration of fur-
ther investigative measures at the preliminary hearing, 175 and may even re-
quest that the criminal offenses be qualified as offenses not subject to the
jury court's jurisdiction. 176 This mechanism could be used to reduce minor
burglaries or threat charges to infractions in order to avoid the costly jury
procedure, as is done in France and England. 177 Commentators have pres-
aged that this stage will also be propitious for the resolution of the case
or mitigate the accused's responsibility, or negate criminal guilt, and finally the punish-
ment sought. § 29(1) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
172. The pleadings of the private prosecutor also include the amount of damages
sought in restitution and the names of any third-party civil defendants arguably liable
therefor. § 650 LECr., supra note 149.
173. § 29(2), (3) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1; §§ 652, 653
LECr., supra note 149. For examples of fallback pleadings, see P1. Def. (CO-I) (on file
with author); Pl. Def. (MU-7) (on file with author).
174. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 76, at 810, 932. In LP-1, however, the defense
pleadings merely maintained that the facts alleged did not constitute a criminal offense
without revealing the details of the defense position. Def. P1. (LP-1) (on file with
author). Such "bare bones" defense pleadings have not been uncommon. For instance,
in MA-2 the defense pleaded its "lack of conformity" with the public prosecutor's
pleadings "because my client is not responsible for the acts for which he stands accused."
Therefore, "no type of responsibility must be imposed on Francisco Javier Mufloz
Sedeflo." Def. Pl. (MA-2) (on file with author).
175. § 29(3) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. In V-l, the defense
objected to the public prosecutor's request to set the case for trial, and requested that ex-
pert analysis be performed at the preliminary hearing to determine whether the window at
the alleged burglary victim's house was broken from the inside or from the outside. The
defense also requested that the communion lists from a local parish be subpoenaed, so
the defendant could prove he was the father of the victim's two girls. Interview with Fe-
lisa Alcntara Barbany, Public Prosecutor of Valencia, Valencia (May 30, 1996) (V-I).
176. § 29(4), (5) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
177. GIMsNo SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 190-91. A French practice of
amending charges to avoid the cour d'assises, in favor of the tribunales correctionels,
called correctionalisation dates back to the nineteenth century. LOMBARD, supra note
30, at 230. In England "either-way" offenses, those subject either to the jury court or the
non-jury Magistrate's Court can be kept in the latter with the consent of the defendant.
THE ROYAL COMMisSIoN ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT 87 (London, HMSO, 1993)
[hereinafter "RCCJ Report"].
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through a guilty plea and acceptance of the prosecutor's reduced charges
and sentence application, i.e., through a conformidad.178
4. The Preliminary Hearing
Continental European criminal procedure doctrine places great im-
portance on an intermediate phase of the criminal prosecution, often called
a "preliminary hearing." This results of the criminal investigation are
evaluated to determine whether the accused should be bound over for trial.
Minimally, the "preliminary hearing" serves as a "screening" mechanism
to weed out unsubstantiated charges' 79 and a procedure for verifying which
witnesses and evidence will be presented at trial. The "preliminary hear-
Lug" is the point at which a criminal prosecution proceeds from the in-
quisitorial or investigative stage, to the adjudicative phase, or trial. Euro-
pean commentators stress the need to separate the accusatory-investigative
powers (prosecutor, investigative judge, police), from the judicial func-
tion.
180
The preliminary hearing is set once the investigative judge has re-
ceived the defense pleadings in answer to the public prosecutor's "motion
for the setting of trial" and once any investigative acts requested at the
conclusion of the preliminary udicial Inquest have been performed.' 8' The
investigative judge presides... over the hearing which ultimately can be
178. GnmriNo SENDRA, CoMENTARIos, supra note 43, at 193. The procedure of arriv-
ing at a conformidad will be discussed more thoroughly later. See discussion infra Part
V.H. The Head Prosecutors of Madrid and Palencia Provinces have admitted their pref-
erences for using conformidad to avoid jury trials on minor bribery and burglary cases.
Interview with Sdnchez Covisa, supra note 109 (M-1); Interview with Manuel Martin-
Granizo, Chief Prosecutor of Palencia Province, Palencia (June 5, 1996).
179. This function is similar to that of the preliminary hearing in many U.S. jurisdic-
tions. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 76, at 655-56. The grand jury, an accusatory body
of anywhere from five to 23 citizens used to screen felony charges in many U.S. jurisdic-
tions, was used briefly in France and Spain in the early nineteenth century, but is irrele-
vant to European jurisprudence, having also been abolished in its birthplace, the United
Kingdom. CHARLES H. WHrrEBREAsD & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
546-49 (Foundation 3d. ed. 1993).
180. Klaus Tiedemann, 13 Thesen zu enem modernen menschenrechtsorientierten
Strafprozefi, 1992 ZErrscHRir FOR REczrrsPOLrmn. 107, 108. By introducing a type of
preliminary judicial inquest and hearing in which the prosecution is responsible for sub-
mitting the accusatory pleadings, thus leaving the investigative judge in a neutral role of
arbiter, the Spanish legislator sought to separate the accusatorial, inquisitorial, and judi-
cial functions. See EM HI(2), LOTJ, supra note 19, at 27-28.
181. § 30(1) LOTI, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
182. The Spanish legislature chose to have the investigative judge preside over the
preliminary hearing rather than the trial judge, as is the practice in Germany and in the
new Russian jury trial legislation, see Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 88-89, in
1998]
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waived by the accused.183 It is an adversary proceeding in which the par-
ties may propose evidence taking and performance of investigative meas-
ures, which are either crucial to the judge's decision to refer the case for
jury trial or which cannot be reproduced at trial. The preliminary hearing
can thus be viewed as an extension of the preliminary judicial inquest, pre-
senting similar disputes as to the types of evidence adduced which must
await the trial.'"
Once rulings have been made on the proposed investigative measures
and testimony, the investigative judge hears further argument as to whether
and on what charges the accused should be bound over for trial." 5 The in-
order to avoid "inquisitorial contamination" of the trial judge. IiMENO SENDRA,
COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 186-87. The Spanish legislation eschewed the even
more radical approach of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1988, which en-
trusted the preliminary hearing to a magistrate unrelated to both the criminal investiga-
tion and the trial court, the giudice per le indagini preliminari. See Stephen P. Freccero,
An Introduction to the New Italian Criminal Procedure, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 345, 364-65
(1994). One author has questioned the neutrality of the investigative judge in ruling on
the holding order due to the conflation of investigative and "screening" functions. L6pcz
Ortega, supra note 106 (manuscript at 3).
183. Thus the accused is tacitly agreeing to be bound over for trial. § 30(2) LOTJ,
reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Waivers have been common in the first tri-
als. L6pez Ortega, supra note 106 (manuscript at 6). In BU-1, the defendant waived the
preliminary hearing in his defense pleadings. Pl. Def. (BU-1) (on file with author).
Waivers of preliminary hearings are permissible and frequent in the United States often
as part of plea bargains. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 76, at 666-67. A similar practice,
called "paper committals;" exists in the magistrate's courts of England and Wales. See
RCCJ Report, supra note 177, at 89-90.
184. See discussion supra note 168. L6pez Ortega believes that investigative judges
should try to leave all testimony for the trial. L6pez Ortega, supra note 106 (manuscript
at 7-8). However, on March 17, 1997, a preliminary hearing in a Salamanca homicide
case included the testimony of seven witnesses and two forensic specialists called by the
defense to substantiate an aspect of its self defense claim. J. S., Pidenjuiclo porjurado
para el 'caso de Portales de Camifias,' TRIBUNA DE SALAMANCA (Mar. 18, 1997)
<http://www.tribuna.eurart.es>
185. § 31 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. The parties must them-
selves subpoena and present evidence and may not rely on the investigative judge to do
so. GiMENo SENDRA, ComENTARios, supra note 43, at 196. The Spanish preliminary
hearing is not a "minitrial" in which the prosecution must show "probable cause" that a
felony was committed, and the accused is guilty thereof. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note
76, at 667-68. Rather, the preliminary hearing is meant to correct defects in the accusa-
tory pleadings and assess the weight of the evidence collected in the criminal investiga-
tion. It has been criticized for opening the door to repetitious motions for new investi-
gative measures, giving rise to repeated adjusted pleadings, and so forth. Gimeno
Sendra, La segunda, supra note 68, at 31-33; G6mEz COLOMER, supra note 41, at 96.
No new evidence is presented at the Russian preliminary hearing. Though the proceed-
ing is "adversary" in nature, all motions and arguments refer to the dossier of the pre-
liminary investigation. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 88.
[Vol. 21:241
Spain Returns to Trial by Jury
vestigative judge has three days to decide whether to dismiss the case or
hold the defendant to answer. 1 6 The holding order must contai, a recita-
tion of "the justiciable fact or facts among those which were the object of
the accusation and in respect to which it would be proper to order a trial,"
the names of the persons held for trial, and the legal foundations for the
holding order.18 7 Commentators have surmised that the peculiar language
specifying the form for the investigative judge's holding order leaves the
door open for reduction of charges so as to induce pleas of guilty in "con-
formity" with the new charges.
The final act of the investigative judge is to order the parties to appear
in the Provincial Court for trial within fifteen days, 8 9 and to dictate the
contents of the accompanying "trial file." With respect to the institution of
a "dual file" procedure, the Spanish Jury Law has borrowed the most from
the procedures of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1988.190 The
"trial file" may only contain the pleadings of the parties and the documen-
tation of investigative acts which cannot be reproduced at trial, or which
must be ratified at trial, and the holding order.' By law, the investigative
judge must also transfer the physical evidence related to the investigation
to the trial court, so that "the parties may request at any moment evidence
of interest to them for their ultimate utilization at the trial."''
The aim of eliminating the investigative dossier from the trial court
was to increase the orality and immediacy of the trial, and prevent the ex
186. § 32 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADo, supra note I.
187. § 33 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
188. Fairdn Guilldn, Comentarios, supra note 45, at 465; G6MEZ COLOMER, supra
note 41, at 98. In the Italian Coldice diprocedurapenale (criminal procedure code), it is
at the preliminary hearing that some of the new forms of plea or sentence bargains are
most often applied. Thus, one-third reductions in the maximum sentence can be
achieved through submitting the case on the basis of the preliminary investigation dossier
at the preliminary hearing (abbreviated trial), § 438 C.P.P. (Ital.), or through a "sentence
upon motion of the parties," § 444 C.P.P. (Ital.). Jescheck, supra note 147, at 671-74.
For more on the Italian forms of consensual resolution of criminal cases, see discussion
infra Part V.H.
189. § 35(1) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
190. Many commentators concede that the Spanish preliminary hearing was inspired
by the udienza preliminare of sections 416 et seq. of the Coldice di procedura penale.
Fairdn Guilldn, Comentarios, supra note 45, at 421-23; G6NMEz COLOMER, supra note 41,
at 95. Some think, however, it is a "poorly sketched copy" of the Italian model. Gimeno
Sendra, La segunda, supra note 68, at 31-33; Jos6 Antonio Diaz Cabiale, Prueba, Vere-
dicto, Deliberaci6n y Sentencia, in COMENTARIOS SISTEMATICOS A LA LEY DEL JURADO Y A
LA REFORMA DE LAPRISON PREVENTIVA, supra note 44, at 276, 290.
191. § 34 (1) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
192. § 34 (2), (3) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
1998]
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officio examination of investigative documents. The only evidence from
the preliminary investigation which may be used in court are public and
private documents which can themselves implicate the accused in the
commission of a crime, documents or evidence which emanate from the
crime itself, such as police reports and photographs, or documents that
cannot be reproduced at trial, such as video recordings of visits to the
scene, line-ups, evidence of fingerprints, and so on. The only testimony to
be made part of the record are preliminary investigation depositions of
witnesses, who will not be available at trial, as long as the opposin ,party
has had a chance to confront and examine them at the deposition. ' By
reducing the scope of the preliminary judicial investigation to probable
cause determinations necessary to hold the accused to answer in the jury
court, and by increasing adversary party participation in the -various inves-
tigative measures undertaken at the preliminary judicial inquest and pre-
liminary hearing, the new Spanish legislation has clearly increased the im-
portance of the trial as the arena in which "truth is ascertained" and the
ultimate decisions regarding the fate of the accused are reached.
The new concentration of evidentiary activity into the trial is reminis-
cent of Anglo-American procedure, and the elimination of the "dictator-
ship of the dossier" creates positive effects on the orality and immediacy of
the trial and the objectivity of the presiding judge, who will juridically
qualify the jury's verdict and pass sentence at some point. Both of these
developments constitute a valiant attempt to rid the continental European
trial of its endless pretrial investigation, the monotony of its reading of in-
vestigative documents, and the "pre-determined" quality of the ensuing
judgments.
193. Giim'No SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 208. Despite the new provi-
sions, confusion prevails as to the types of documents which can be included in the trial
file. Parties continue the old practice of requesting the inclusion of "all the folios of the
investigative dossier" in the trial file. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note
106 (manuscript at 76-77). In B-I, the trial was delayed because the investigative judge
certified the entire preliminary investigation dossier to the trial court in violation of sec-
tion 34(3) of LOTJ. The trial judge had to return the case to the investigative court after
himself refusing to cull the file to determine what was admissible and what not. He
maintained this would compromise his "objective impartiality" required by the new law.
Order Returning Case to Investigative Judge. (B-I) (on file with author) The same situa-
tion occurred in MA-I, MA-2, PO-I and SE-I. Critics of this strict rule have inquired as
to how the trial judge can make rulings on the admissibility of evidence at trial, when
they cannot refer to the documentation from the preliminary investigation to make their
assessment. The complete insulation of the trial judge makes little sense, since he or she
does not participate in the decision as to guilt or innocence. Carmona Ruano & DePa6l
Velasco, supra note 106 (manuscript at 72).
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D. Preliminary Proceedings in the Trial Court
The first appearance in the Provincial Court is the venue for party at-
tacks on the investigative judge's decisions during the pre-trial proceed-
mngs. Four types of motions may be entertained by the parties: (1) motions
attacking the jurisdiction of the jury court; (2) motions alleging the viola-
tion of a fundamental right during the preliminary proceedings; (3) motions
to add or delete justiciable facts from the investigative judge's holding or-
der; and (4) motions to exclude evidence or propose the hearing of new
evidence at the trial.
194
A motion alleging a violation of a fundamental right during the pre-
liminary investigation was first introduced m trials using the abbreviated
procedure.195 This second type of motion may be tantamount either to a
motion to dismiss due to denial of significant, participatory defense rights
during the various adversarial stages of the preliminary investigation, or to
a motion to suppress evidence, which could lead to case dismissal or evi-
dence exclusion from the trial, as in a U.S. jurisdiction.19 Although mo-
tions alleging violations of fundamental rights are made orally in trials us-
ing the abbreviated procedure, the LOTJ requires that they be written,
similar to motions in limine in normal criminal trials.1
9 7
Two procedural hindrances to holding effective motions to suppress at
the initial appearance may arise. First, the trial judge could have difficulty
ascertaining the scope of violations, inasmuch as he or she is limited to the
scant "trial file" information pursuant to section 34 of the LOTJ 9 1
194. § 36 (1) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
195. § 793(2) LECr., supra note 149.
196. § 36(1)(b) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1; GImENO SENDRA,
ComnrAuos, supra note 43, at 213. These motions could be based on any of the fun-
damental constitutional rights dealing with the rights of the accused listed in Articles 14-
29 CE. Constituci6n Espafiola [CE] arts. 14-29; GMl.z COLOMER, supra note 41, at
101. This would include the following violations: equal protection (Article 14 CE), right
to life, physical integrity, and freedom from torture or inhuman treatment (Article 15
CE), right to liberty and security, including limitations on preventive detention (Article
17 CE), right to privacy, inviolability of dwelling, correspondence (Article 18 CE), due
process rights to a fair trial, to counsel, to be notified of charges, to a speedy and public
trial, pnvilege against self-incrimination, right to present evidence, presumption of inno-
cence, and so forth. (Article 24 CE), and prohibition against expostfacto laws (Article
25 CE). Id
197. § 36(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note I (referring to §§668-
677 LECr.); cf GO Mz COLOMER, supra note 41, at 102.
198. GOMEz COCLOmER, supra note 41, at 99. If the trial judge were to overrule the
investigative judge's decision to suppress or admit a particular piece of evidence, some
critics hold that the case would have to be returned to the investigative court for further
proceedings. Antonio Del Moral Garcfa, La fase intermedia ante el Tribunal del Jurado,
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Moreover, no provisions for taking oral testimony exist. Thus, it appears
that Spanish judges will often have to hear such motions during the trial,
after the pertinent testimony has been adduced. 99
Motions to suppress evidence for constitutional violations have
scarcely played a role in the first Spanish jury trials.200 In contrast, mo-
tions to suppress have been frequent in the new Russian jury trials, and
have been directed both at statutory violations of procedure during the
preliminary investigation and constitutional violations, such as the privi-
lege against self-incrimination. 20 1  This difference may result from the
Spanish practice of early and active defense counsel participation in the
preliminary investigation and a higher level of professionalism among
Spanish criminal investigators.0 2
Critics fear that these new opportunities for the parties to further
"concretize" their pleadings, by moving for the admission of new evidence,
will prompt the parties to keep their theories of the case secret during the
preliminary proceedings in order to surprise the opposing side at trial when
pleading adjustments are no longer permissible.
in COMENTARIOS SISTEMATICOS A LA LEY DEL JURADO Y A LA REFORIMA DE LA PRIsI6N
PREVENTiVA, supra note 44, at 163, 173.
199. Del Moral Garcia, supra note 198, at 173-74. However, L6poz Ortega cautions
that, if a motion to suppress is granted after the taking of the evidence, the jury would
have to be instructed to disregard the wrongfully admitted evidence. L6pez Ortega, su-
pra note 106 (manuscript at 9). If already suppressed evidence were unlawfully admit-
ted, a mistrial should be declared.
200. To the author's knowledge, none has been heard to exclude fruits of illegal
searches and seizures or illegal confessions. In its appeal in VA-1, the defense unsuc-
cessfully argued that a denial of its motion to include testimony from the preliminary in-
vestigation in the trial file violated the constitutional right to a defense. A similar motion
was made in MA-1. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106 (manuscript at
71, 77). In the opinion of one judge, the lack of motions to suppress based on search and
seizure violations is partially due to the jury court's lack of jurisdiction over narcotics
violations. Those cases with such jurisdiction do not frequently involve searches or
wiretaps. Interview with Manuel Torres Vela, President of the Mfilaga Provincial Court,
Mfilaga (June 17, 1997).
201. Motions to suppress are heard both on the basis of the dossier of the preliminary
investigation during the preliminary hearing and on the basis of live testimony at trial.
Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 90-94. In the United States, motions to suppress
evidence are heard either during the preliminary hearing or in the trial court. They are
nearly always based on live testimony of the police officers involved in the alleged con-
stitutional violations. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 76, 499-501, 674-77.
202. Repeated complaints of confessions coerced by use of violence, threats and
promises, as are common in Russia, have been virtually non-existent ia the first Spanish
jury cases. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 105-06.
203. NARvAEz RODRIGUEZ, supra note 43, at 119-20; GiMENO SENDRA, COMENTARIOS,
supra note 43, at 213-16. In ruling on evidentiary motions, however, the trial judge
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After the evidentiary rulings, the trial judge formulates a "ruling on
the justiciable facts" (auto de hechosjusticiables) which must include the
following: (1) a list of the facts alleged by the prosecuting parties and the
defense in support of their theories of criminal liability or the lack thereof,
and the quality of the defendant's alleged participation therein; (2) a de-
termination of the crime or crimes which the facts would constitute if
proved; and (3) a ruling on the motions to exclude or admit evidence at the
trial.
204
Many of the first "rulings on justiciable facts" have been subject to
criticism for having merely restated the pleadings of the parties and in-
cluding narrative or descriptive facts irrelevant to the juridical qualifica-
tion of the charged offenses.205 This criticism is not entirely appropriate.
The document should contain the alleged facts, which would pertain exclu-
sively to the judge's sentencing decision or the assessment of civil dam-
ages, but which should be left out of the verdict form20
6
This "provisional qualification" of the defendant's criminal liability
both as to the specific statutory offenses and the level of participation at
the start of the trial is a novelty, not only for Spanish criminal law, but for
European criminal procedural on the whole.21 This provision has been
criticized for being useless, except for its pedagogical value in laying out
the substance of the parties' pleadings for the benefit of the jury. Another
danger lays in its potential to compromise the trial judge's neutrality and
the accusatory principle, since the provision requires the judge to assert, in
the pre-trial stage, a qualification of facts not yet proved.108
Both of the nineteenth century Spanish jury laws provided for pleas of
guilty during the first appearance before the three-judge panels prior to
selection of the jury and, in the event of the defendant's insistence on a
jury trial, the resolution of the evidence and witnesses to be called by the
various parties.2 9
should deny the inclusion of new facts if they were not investigated at the preliminary
hearing. Id. at 222-23.
204. § 37 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
205. This was the case, for instance, in AV-1, and in VA-I, where the document was
10 pages long. Carmona Ruano & DePail Velasco, supra note 106 (manuscript at 30,
36); L6pez Ortega, supra note 106 (manuscript at 9).
206. Carmona Ruano & DePail Velasco, supra note 106 (manuscript at 78).
207. Verger Grau, supra note 48, at 580.
208. GIMENO SENDRA, COMENTARIOs, supra note 43, at 220-21.
209. §§ 716-723 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24; §§ 35-41 LJ of 1888, supra
note 26. The more inquisitorial 1872 law provided for "interrogation" of the accused by
the presiding judge as to whether he or she admitted the charge alleged in the accusatory
pleadings. § 718 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24.
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E. Selection of the Trial Jury
1. Voir Dire and the Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
On the day of trial, those prospective jurors who were not excused or
challenged preliminarily pursuant to the procedures laid out in sections 18-
23 of the LOTJ2 10 are summoned to court and constitute the panel from
which the trial jury is selected. If at least twenty of the original panel of
thirty six do not appear, a new summons is issued within ensuing fifteen
day periods until the requisite number respond.1 While no documented
trial has yet been postponed because less than twenty jurors have appeared
on the day of trial,212 critics foresee problems in this regard and believe the
law should have provided for a larger panel.1
The LOTJ has instituted a two-stage procedure of juror questioning
which in some ways is similar to the voir dire practiced in many U.S. juris-
dictions.214 At the first stage, the judge again interrogates the prospective
jurors with regard to the existence of incapacity, incompatibility, prohibi-
tion or excuses listed in sections 8-12 of the LOTJ, and then allows the
parties to directly question the jurors in relation to challenges for cause.
215
210. See discussion supra Part V.B.3.
211. §§ 38(1), 39(1), (3) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JIRADO, supra note 1. Jurors
who do not respond to the first summons are fined 25,000 pesetas (approximately $200)
and those who fail to respond to a second summons may be fined between 100,000 and
250,000 pesetas. § 39(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
212. The numbers have ranged from a low of 21 in AL-1, see Interview with Juan
Rufz-Rico Ruiz-Mor6n, President of the Almerla Provincial Court and Presiding Judge,
Almeria (June 18, 1997), to a high of 32 in CO-1. Manuel Guerrero. El primer tribunal
ciudadano, compuesto por seas hombres y tres mujeres, DIARIO C6RDOBA, July 9, 1996,
at 3. The low number (23) in V-1 was caused in part by the death of three of the original
36. Sara Velert, Eljurado de Valencia condena a! acusado de allananaento de Morada,
EL PAls, May 29, 1996, at 30.
213. For an opinion that a panel of 75 would prevent cases from being postponed and
also provide more diversity among the prospective jurors, see G6MEZ COLOMER, supra
note 41, at 63. For leaving it to the discretion of the trial judge, Informe CGPJ, supra
note 41, at 551. Russian jury trials have by and large succeeded with an identical mini-
mum of 20 prospective jurors, even though Russia has a 12 person jury with two alter-
nates. This is compensated to some extent by the fact that each side has only two per-
emptory challenges. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 95-97.
214. In the United States, some state judges allow the attorneys to do most of the
questioning of jurors directly, while in others and in the federal courts the judge has the
power to do all of the questioning, though he or she may agree to ask questions submit-
ted by the parties in writing. LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 76, at 971. The Spanish sys-
tem is more similar to the former.
215. § 38(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Some critics find this
questioning superfluous after the preliminary culling and would restrict it to reasons for
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Despite the preliminary culling of the panel, some jurors persisted in
seeking to be excused from jury service in the first Spanish cases.
2 16
In the second stage, the parties are again allowed to question the ju-
rors directly before exercising the four peremptory challenges allotted
them in the LOTJ.2 17 Jury selection has, with few exceptions, been in
closed session,218 and each prospective juror has been questioned by the
excuse that have since arisen. Gustavo L6pez-Mufloz y Larraz, Seleccidn de losjuradosy
constituci6n del Tribunal del Jurado, in PIEZ-CRUZ MARTIN, COMENTARIOS, supra note
44, at 119-20 [hereinafter "L6pez-Muffoz y Larraz, Seleccidnl].
216. In B-i, a dentist claimed there was an emergency at her office. The court sent
someone to check and it was determined that it was only a ploy to avoid jury service.
Francesc Peir6n, Siete mujeres y dos hombres hacen historta aljuzgar un caso de vio-
lencia domdstica, LA VANGUARDIA, May 30, 1996, at 27 (B-1). In the second Palencia
trial, a homicide prosecution, a prospective juror was excused because his brother had
been murdered, and another because his wife was undergoing an operation. Another had
been shot in a street brawl and had memory problems. Further, a farmer pleaded hard-
ship because he had to pay someone to guard his stable. Another farmer was excused
because he frequented the village where the charged murder took place. Finally, the
judge excused a student with exams, a woman with young children, and a person who
said she could not judge anyone. Prades, supra note 136, at 2. On the other hand, no
one sought to be excused in VI-1. R.C., Tiempo de veredicto, EL CORREO (May 8, 1997)
<http://www.diano-elcorreo.es >.
217. § 40 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Sections 726 and 730 of
the LECr. (prov.) of 1872 and section 56 of the lJ of 1888 originally allowed an unlim-
ited number of peremptory challenges (the only limitation being that 14 jurors had to re-
main to constitute thejury and alternates). §§ 726, 730 LECr. (prov) of 1872, supra note
24; § 56 LJ of 1888, supra note 26. This provision was criticized both as facilitating an
accommodating and impressionable jury and as allowing the parties to excuse their influ-
ential friends who had better things to do than sit on a jury. This section was amended in
1931 to allow two peremptories for each of the prosecutorial and defense parties as the
jury was reduced from 12 to 8. ALEJANDRE, supra note 21, at 229-30; Saldafla, Q. Ley
del Jurado Comentada, 1935 MADRID, 214-15. In contrast, the prosecution in the U.S.
federal courts has six peremptory challenges and the defense has 10 in non-capital cases.
FED. R. Cium. P. 24(b). Most states allot a like number to both sides. LAFAVE & ISRAEL,
supra note 76, at 978. The peremptory challenge was abolished in England and Wales in
1988. Raymond J. Broderick, NWhy the Peremptory Challenge Should be Abolished, 65
TEMP. L. REv. 369, 373 (1992). It has opponents in Spain as well. Davo Escrivia. F. El
Tribunal del Jurado. Reflexiones acerca de su desarollo consticuclonal, MADRID 11
(1988).
218. In the author's knowledge, the only exception was in V-1. However, the presid-
ingjudge has indicated he would do otherwise in future cases. Interview with Juan De la
Rua Moreno, President and Presiding Judge of Valencia Provincial Court, Valencia (May
30, 1996) (V-i). Though the law is silent as to this issue, Spanish judges made this deci-
sion to protect the privacy of thejurors. Interview with Gariel Coullaut Ariflo, President
of Palencia Provincial Court, Palencia (June 5, 1996) (PA-I).
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parties and the judge individually, not in open court as is usual in the
United States.219
Unlike Russia, where the parties may only submit written questions to
prospective jurors through the judge and jury selection has been rapid and
uneventful,2 0 Spanish lawyers have taken advantage of direct voir dire to
winnow out jurors antipathetic to their cause and to educate them to the
merits of their pleadings m the best tradition of U.S. voir dire.
221
In V-i, involving an alleged trespass by the defendant at his ex-
girlfriend's house, the prosecutor hired a psychologist to compose a list of
twenty questions which were posed to each of the prospective jurors. The
prosecutor wanted the psychologist to help her find jurors "who take re-
sponsibility upon themselves and do not look for justification for their acts
in others. A person extreme m their beliefs in justice who believes that
when one commits a crime he or she should be found guilty., 222 The pri-
vate prosecutor, who consulted psychological treatises, friends who were
psychologists, and jury questionnaires used in England and the United
States in advance of trial, sought a jury of homebodies who would accom-
modate their opinions to those of the other jurors. The defense counsel
sought a jury who would not be influenced by expert witnesses and who
"respected the principle of reasonable doubt. , Voir dire was conducted
in open court, and the judge departed from Spanish tradition in allowing
the parties to stand and approach the jurors during questioning, in the
219. Although not specified in the law, individualized vor dire has been suggested by
commentators. See GO6MEz COLOmER, supra note 41, at 62. An observer of PA-1 felt that
this procedure contributed to an unnecessary waste of time. Gustavo L6pez-Mufloz y
Larraz, Cr6nca del Primer Juzcio ante el Tribunal del Jurado celebrado en Palencia, el
27 de mayo de 1996 despuis de 60 aiios de suspens16n, in OTRosi XIII (July 1996).
[hereinater "L6pez-Mufioz y Larraz, Cr6mca"]. Individualized voir dire has been used
in some U.S. jurisdictions, mainly in capital cases, with the goal of prompting more hon-
est answers to questions involving prospective juror' attitudes towards the death penalty.
See Hovey v. Superior Court, 616 P.2d 1301, 1354 (Cal. 1980). Article 15 CE, which
guarantees the right to life, also abolished the death penalty, thus eliminating any need
for such "death-qualification" of jurors as exists in the United States. Constituci6n
Espaflola ICE] art. 15.
220. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 95-97
221. For a discussion of the official and tolerated goals of voir dire in U.S. jury trials,
see LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 76, at 969.
222. Interview with Felisa Alcntara Barbany, supra note 175 (V-I). Psychologist
Elisa Alfaro phrased their criteria in a different manner: "[w]e were looking for neutral,
impartial profiles-without radical inclinations." Salvador Enguix, Juicio al Jurado, LA
VANGUARDiA, June 2, 1996, at 4-5.
223. Enguix, supra note 222.
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words of one journalist, "just like Demi Moore in the film 'The Juror."'
2 4
The questions revealed a thoughtfulness uncommon even in seasoned U.S.
trial lawyers.2  The defense has employed psychologists to aid in jury se-
lection in some other cases, but there is no indication that it has helped.226
224. Juan Carlos De la Cal, Ustedes son la Justicia, EL MUNDO, May 28, 1996 (V-1).
225. Public Prosecutor's Questions in VA-i: (1) 1 saw in your questionnaire that you
allege no reason for not being a juror. Why? (2) In your opinion, of every 100 persons
who are on trial, would you say that around 75 are guilty? (3) Do you think the opinion
of an expert in a trial -is almost always correct? (4) Do you think it is better to free five
guilty people than to incarcerate one innocent person? (5) If a defendant in a case has a
history of various accusations, would you say it is clear that he is not innocent? (6) Do
you think there is always an important reason for which a person commits a crime, and
that one must be understanding before condemning him? (7) Do you think that many of
the accused in trials are sick, rather than genuine criminals, and thus must be helped
rather than being incarcerated? (8) Do you believe a good driver will never have an
automobile accident? (9) Is the only way to do important things in life to take advantage
of the opportunities which offer themselves? (10) Do you think the reason that people
get the things they want is that they apply themselves? (11) Do you believe the police
make mistakes? (12) Do you trust the police? (13) Do you think, in getting a good job,
being in the right place at the right time is more important than one's qualifications?
(14) Do you arrive late for work? (15) When you promise to do something, do you al-
ways do it, even if it is not in your best interests? (16) Have you ever been caught in a
lie? (17) In a game, do you mind whether you win or lose? (18) Are you a person inter-
ested in being abreast of things and intent on knowing important news? (19) What do you
know about the case you are about to judge? (20) Through what means did you receive
the information relating to this case?
The Private Prosecutor's Questions: (I) If a policeman tells you something, do
you immediately believe it, or do you wait to have proof before believing it? (2) Are you
a homebody, or do you like to go out a lot? (3) Do you prefer to go to your friends'
house more than having friends come to your house? (4) Do you forgive a friend for eve-
rythmg? (5) Do you believe everything a good friend would tell you? (6) Have you been
the victim of any crime, no matter how minor?
Defense Counsel's Questions (not to all jurors): (1) If doubts existed, would you
convict? (2) Assume there were two identical twins. You know that one committed the
crime, but you don't know which one. Would you convict both? (3) (To a widow of 20
years) Have you had other relatinships after you were widowed? (4) (To married peo-
ple) Do you get along well with your wife or husband? (5) (To single people who live
with their parents) Do you get along well with your parents? (6) Would you blindly be-
lieve the opinion of an expert? (7) Do you believe what people tell you, or do you want
to see it for yourself? Enguix, supra note 222.
226. In both B-3 and 0-2, psychologists were used by the defense but the jury re-
turned verdicts that were more severe than the professional judges would have. Inter-
view with Miguel Angel Gimeno Jubero, Presiding Judge of Barcelona Provincial Court,
Barcelona (June 25, 1997) (B-3); Interview with Bernardo Donapetry Camacho, supra
note 97 (0-2).
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While the prosecutor asked no questions during voir dire in PA-1,227
the defense counsel also consulted a psychiatrist and prepared three ques-
tions relating to the presumption of innocence and the prospective jurors'
attitudes towards mental illness, including its relation to criminal responsi-
bility.228 Questioning in B-1 revolved around the various issues of racial
prejudice due to the fact that defendant was a naturalized immigrant from
Gambla, 229 common law relationships m that he had been living out of
wedlock with the victim, and domestic violence which pertained to the al-
leged trespass by defendant of the victim's residence.
230
227. Enguix, supra note 222. Neither party asked any questions in PM-1. 1
TRmtuNALES DE JusTiciA 42 (1997) (PM-1). The prosecutor also asked no questions in
SE-2. Interview with Antonio Gil Merino, Presiding Judge of Sevilla Provincial Court,
Sevilla (June 16, 1997).
228. The defendant was relying on a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity in the
slaying of his brother. Because insanity and diminished capacity have often been issues
in the first trials, see discussion infra Part V.K.5, jurors have frequently been questioned
as to their attitude toward these excuses. In GI-l, the prosecutor asked if insane people
should be left free to walk the streets, or be treated like everyone else. Interview with
Fernando Lacaba Sdnchez, supra note 162. In M-I, jurors were asked the following
questions: (1) Have you, or any close friend or relative, had psychiatric traatment? (2)
Where should an insane person who commits a crime go, once he is cured? (3) Are in-
sane people who commit crimes simply criminals, or are they in a special category? The
defense excused a waiter who answered that they were nevertheless criminals, and two
others who felt they should go to jail after they were cured. Jos6 Hemaidez, Primer dia
de nuevejueces sin toga, EL PAfS, Oct. 8, 1996, at 1, 3 (M-1). In B-2, in which a young
man claimed to have been under the influence of alcohol and the drug ecstasy when he
stabbed a taxi driver to death after an altercation, jurors were asked whether they be-
lieved use of intoxicants should mitigate one's criminal responsibility. Francesc Peir6n
& Domingo Marchena, supra note 169 (B-2).
229. Jurors were asked: (1) Are you a racist? and (2) Would you agree to your daugh-
ter marrying a person of the black race? Carmen Mufloz, EIjurado d? BCN tuvo que
pasar unfiltro antiracista, EL PERI6DICo, May 30, 1996, at 28 (B-1). Questions about
racial prejudice also were asked in other cases involving non-ethnic-Spanish defendants,
such as an Algerian, see Interview with Juan Rufz-Rico Rulz-Mor6n, supra note 212
(AL-1), or Gypsies, see Interview with Benito Gilvez Acosta, Presiding Judge of Almerla
Provincial Court, Almeria (June 18, 1997) (AL-2), and Moroccans, set! Interview with
Lacaba Sdnchez, supra note 162.
230. A large percentage of the homicide, trespassing and threats cases involved family
or domestic disputes, often giving rise to questions about family relationships that can be
quite intimate. Questions about family relationships were asked in a case of a father
killing his son. See Interview with Jos6 Maria Alvarez Seijo, Presiding Judge of Oviedo
Provincial Court, Oviedo (June 9, 1997) (0-1). The prosecutor and judge in PA-1 stated
they were opposed to such intimate questions and the judge indicated he would not allow
such questions in his court as they violate the juror's constitutional right to privacy. En-
guix, supra note 225; Interview with Martln-Granizo Santamarla, supra note 178; Inter-
view with Coullaut Ariflo, supra note 218 (PA-1). Supporting this view, see ANTONIO
NARvAEz RODRIGUEZ, supra note 43, at 142-43. The judge in PM-I would allow inti-
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In CS-1, which involved a situation of mutual combat and alleged self
defense, jurors were asked how they would react to violent acts and
whether they would take justice into their own hands. However, the judge
prevented the private prosecutor from asking a long series of questions he
had prepared to probe whether the prospective jurors were liberals or con-
servatives. The guilty verdict in CS-1 was overturned on appeal, and in the
retrial the new judge allowed the questions.231
Selection of the jury has lasted anywhere from thirty minutes232 to
nearly seven hours in BI- 1. 33 While the parties usually exhaust most or
all of their peremptory challenges, there have been exceptions. 2
2. Jury Composition in the First Spanish Trials
Although the peremptory challenges in the Spanish system are sup-
posedly designed to ensure diversity on the jury, it is difficult to assess
whether such challenges have contributed to achieving this goal. Slightly
mate questions, but only if vow dire was in closed session. L6pez Ortega, supra note
106, at 11.
231. The private prosecutor asked the jurors' opinions about divorce (which was an
issue in the case), and about the death penalty, Gypsies and abortion (which were not).
He wanted to excuse extreme right-wingers, believing they would apply a loose defini-
tion of self defense which would lead to the defendant's acquittal. He and the public
prosecutor were also looking for marred women who were heads of families, believing
such women would construe self defense strictly. They felt they had the "perfect juror"
in a female teacher, but later found out she was a psychologist who led the jury to acquit
in the retrial. Interviews with Eugenio Ponz Nomdedeu, private prosecutor of the Trillo
case, and Antonio Gastaldi Mateo, Public Prosecutor of Castell6n Province, Castell6n
(June 20, 1997) (CS-I, CS-1*).
232. In 0-1, see Interview with Jos6 Maria Alvarez Seijo, supra note 230; in LU-1,
see Interview with Remigio Conde Salgado, supra note 139.
233. Javier Mufloz, Una sola punalada y la mate, carambal, EL CORREO (Apr. 8,
1997) <http://www.diano-elcorreo.es> Jury selection has averaged two hours in Ali-
cante. Interview with Carmen Galapienso Catalayud, Secretary of Section 1 of the Ali-
cante Provincial Court, Alicante (June 19, 1997). In Madrid, it has averaged 2.5 hours,
Interview with Javier de Frutas, supra note 100, and in Girona it has averaged 3-4 hours.
Interview with Fernando Lacaba Sfinchez, supra note 162.
234. Both sides abstained from the use of peremptory challenges in GR-1. Interview
with Fernando Tapia L6pez, President and Presiding Judge of the Granada Provincial
Court, Granada (July 5, 1996). The prosecutor abstained in CO-I. Manuel Guerrero, La
Audienca de Cdrdoba celbra hay su primer juicto con jurado y el segundo de An-
dalucia, DiAmo C6RDOBA, July 8, 1996, at 41.
235. G6MEZ COLOMER, supra note 41, at 61. In comparing Spain with the United
States, however, the President of Salamanca Provincial Court said that because Spain
was not a multicultural country, it made no difference who you selected on the jury. In-
terview with Fernando Nieto Nafria, President of Salamanca Provincial Court and Pre-
siding Judge, Salamanca (June 12, 1997).
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more men than women have served as jurors.236 The average age of a juror
seems to be between thirty-five and forty-five years.237 Juries generally
appear to be made up of housewives, students, manual workers, public
service employees, and the unemployed, with only a few businessmen,
doctors and nurses.z s In many provinces there have been complaints about
the low educational and cultural levels of the jurors.
239
236. Of the 50 juries for which the author has information, 29 had majority of men,
although the balance of the sexes was roughly equal; perhaps only 20 more men served
than women. In the first 15 Barcelona cases, however, slightly more women served.
Peir6n, supra note 141.
237. The jury member's ages in the Otegi case ranged from 25 to 50. Javier Peyalba,
Eljurado, en el lugar del crimen, DiARIo VASCO (Feb. 25, 1997) <http://www.diario-
vasco.com> (SS-2). Median age for jurors was given as 44.7 years in PA-I. L6pez-
Mufloz y Larraz, Cr6nica, supra note 219, at II. It was 40 years in GR-1. Ines Gal-
lastegui, El primer jurado andaluz dicta un veredicto de condena contra una muier que
mat6 a su vecina, IDEAL, July 5, 1996, at 5. The median age in VA-I was 35 years. Juan
Carlos Le6n, Siete hombres y dos mujeres dictardn el veredicto en el prmer juicio con
jurado, ELNoRTE DE CASTILLA, June 4, 1996, at 3. Younger juries sat in VI-1, where the
median age was 25-35. R.C., Tiempo de veredicto, supra note 216. This was also true in
SE-1, where eight of the nine jurors were in their twenties. Interview with Miguel Car-
mona Ruano, President and Presiding Judge of Sevilla Provincial Court, Sevilla (June
16, 1997). The average age in the first 15 Barcelona cases was between 37 and 41.
Peir6n, supra note 141.
238. The average juror in Almeria, on the other hand, is 40 years old, rural, and of a
low cultural niveau. Interview with Francisco Hernddez, Jury Administrator of Almeria
Provincial Court, Almeria (June 18, 1997) (AL-1). In Barcelona Province, the great
majority hail from the capital city, and workers and housewives are represented in large
numbers. Peir6n, supra note 141.
239. In VA-1, no juror had a higher education. Inigo Arrue, Uno de los miembros del
jurado era el tendero de la fallecida en Medina, EL MUNDO DE VALLADOLID, June 7,
1996. Only four of the jurors in CS-I*, Interview with PonzNomdedeu, supra note 231,
and only five in PA-1, L6pez-Mufioz y Larraz, Crnica, supra note 219, at II, had the
equivalent of a high school education. In LU-1, only one of 30 prospective jurors had a
university education. Six of the jurors who sat had only a primary education, and the
remaining three had only a secondary education. Jos6 Manuel Freire, El primerjurado
declara mnmputable al perturbado que asfixu6 a su madri, EL PROGRESO, Nov. 6, 1996,
at 25. The prosecutor who successfully prosecuted the double murders in SS-I partially
attributed his success to the fact that his jury was of a higher cultural niveau than in the
disastrous Otegi prosecution. Interviews with Jesfis Maria Izaguirre Guerricagoitia,
Public Prosecutor of San Sebastian Province, San Sebastian (June 6, 1997) (SS-1). Gra-
nadan judges also attributed "good" results to juries with a "high cultural niveau." Inter-
view with Carlos Rodriguez Valverde, Presiding Judge of Granada Provincial Court,
Granada (June 18, 1997) (GR-4). They attributed bad results to juries with a "low cul-
tural niveau." Interview with Carlos Bellver Garcfa-Alix, Presiding Judge of Granada
Provincial Court, Granada (June 18, 1997) (GR-2). In the first 15 Barcelona cases, the
majority of thejurors, however, had a mid-level education. Peir6n, supra note 141.
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In order to address this diversity problem, proposals have been voiced
advocating different ways of assuring a balanced jury, for instance, re-
quiring a five to four division between men and women, between people
with higher education and those without, and among age groups. 240 As
discussed above, some scholars advocated a specific scheme for grouping
jurors by age, but Spanish procedure has yet to be amended to reflect di-
versity proposals.
Finally, for historical and analytical purposes, it is important to under-
stand the composition of the Otegjury (SS-2) as well as the reasons why it
was so constituted, to discover how it was able to return the shocking ac-
quittal of a young Basque for killing a police officer. Nearly all of the
Otegi jurors tried to avoid jury duty by alleging bias, either for or against
the police or the separatists. However, almost all of the excuses were re-
jected by the trial judge during the preliminary pre-trial selection proce-
dure.241 During voir dire, Otegi's defense counsel, who had also partici-
pated in SS-1, employed a fellow attorney to observe the facial gestures
and body language of the prospective jurors, moreover, he avoided antago-
nizing any of them by conceding to their desires to be excused if they so
wished. 2
The Otegijury was finally composed of the following members: (1) a
thirty-one year old unemployed nurse, married with two children, who had
tried to avoid jury duty by claiming she preferred good health services to a
police force, and by saying she had two children who had no one to take
care of them; (2) a thirty-one year old official in the Basque government
who lived in a town with radical Basque influence and tried to avoid jury
duty due to her job, and the fact that she had had contact with the families
of the police and the families of Otegi's victims; (3) a thirty-two year old
240. G6MEZ COLOMER, supra note 41, at 64-65. The LJ of 1888, as amended in 1931,
provided for an even quota of six men and six women in cases in which the motive was
arguably love, jealousy, fidelity and other aspects of sexual relations or cases in which
defendant and victim were of different sexes. ALEiANDRF, supra note 21, at 230. The
possibility of ensuring the participation of a member of a minority group on a jury in
which that minority group was involved as victim or defendant was discussed by the
British Royal Commission on Criminal Justice in its recent reform proposals. RCCJ Re-
port, supra note 177, at 133-34. The new Russian jury law provides for a challenge of
the final jury panel if its composition is not sufficiently representative. Thaman, Resur-
rection, supra note 5, at 97.
241. See text accompanying note 144. One could conjecture that the trial judge was
more concerned with not reducing the jury pool to less than twenty, thereby having to
summon a new panel, than by granting what were perhaps justified reasons for being ex-
cused.
242. Interview with Miguel Castells Arteche, supra note 142 (SS-2).
1998]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
cook in a cultural center, who was once an electoral candidate for the sepa-
ratist Heri Batasuna ("HB") political party and was married to a mayor in
the separatist political coalition, though she did not mention the latter fact
during voir dire; (4) a forty-nine year old housewife with a son who was a
conscientious objector; (5) a forty-one year old factory worker linked to
the radical Basque left, who tried to avoid jury duty by claiming he was a
member of HB; (6) a fifty year old unemployed widow with three children
from a rural town who could hardly understand Spanish; (7) a fifty-two
year old Castillian housewife, married to a television repairman, who had
lived m the Basque country for thirty years; (8) an eighteen year old from a
town with radical Basque influence; and (9) a twenty-eight year old, un-
employed, recently married daughter of immigrants to the Basque coun-
try.43
F. The Presentation of the Evidence
The taking of evidence in jury trials follows the same rules in the
LECr. for ordinary criminal proceedings, as long as these ordinary rules do
not contradict with the new provisions added by the LOTJ.244 This section
will briefly describe the Spanish procedure and highlight the innovations
introduced by the LOTJ: (1) provision for opening statements of the par-
ties; (2) division of labor between judge and jury during the presentation of
the evidence; (3) changes m the role of the judge during the evidentiary
portion of the trial; (4) changes in the rules of evidence, especially related
to admissibility of prior statements taken during the preliminary investiga-
tion.
1. Pleadings and Opening Statements
The Spanish jury trial begins with the reading of the accusatory and
defense pleadings by the Secretary of the court.245 As noted above, these
243. Gurruchaga & Escudier, supra note 142 (SS-2). See infra Part V.L.6 for a dis-
cussion of the deliberations of the Otegi jury.
244. §§ 24(2), 42(1) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note I. The Russian
legislature used similar language in its jury law. Thaman, Resurrection, supra 5, at 94.
Indeed, the current LECr., which dates from 1882, is the heir of the LECr. (prov.) of
1872, which first introduced trial by jury in ordinary criminal cases. LECr. (prov.) of
1872, supra note 24. Thus, according to Gimeno Sendra, the provisions of the LECr.
will recuperate their original significance with the reintroduction of the jury. GIMNo
SENDRA, COmENTARIOS, supra 43, at 245.
245. § 45 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1; §701 LECr. supra note
149. Earlier drafts of the LOTJ omitted the reading of any of the pleadings at the open-
ing of the trial. GOMEZ COLOMER, supra 41, at 105. Some critics have maintained that
the trial judge's "ruling on justiciable facts" as well as the holding order of the investi-
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pleadings, refined and "concretized" in the various pretrial hearings, list
the "punishable acts" (hechos punibles) allegedly committed by the defen-
dant(s), the "legal qualification" of these acts, i.e., the criminal offenses
which they allegedly constitute, and the acts ascertained at the preliminary
investigation constituting partial or complete excuses or justifications for
the commission of the offense or mitigating or aggravating circumstances.
Finally, the parties recommend the punishment they deem appropriate if
the defendant is convicted, and the public and private prosecutors allege
the amount of damages sought.2 46
Following the reading of the pleadings, the parties give an opening
statement to explain the pleadings' contents and the results they believe the
evidence will substantiate. In the opening statement, the parties may ask
the judge for permission to introduce new evidence or testimony during the
trial. 47 One of the main reasons for this innovation was to enable the par-
ties to explain to the jurors, in everyday language, the numerous legal
technicalities couched m legal jargon in the parties' pleadings. u ' Whereas
the opening statements were often concise and added little to the content of
gative judge should also be read. Cf MARPS ROGER & MORA ALARC6N, supra note 41, at
312-13. Others feel the pleadings of the parties could be omitted in favor of the trial
judge's "ruling" which is nothing other than a summary of the pleadings. GuiENo
SENDRA. COMENTARios, supra note 43, at 253; Ignacio Serrano Butragueflo, Eijulcio
oral ante del Tribunal del Jurado, in PAEz-CRuz MARTIN, COMENTARIOS, supra note
44, at 216.
246. §§ 650-653 LECr., supra note 149. Pursuant to section 61 of the LI of 1888,
the secretary omitted the parties' pleadings on punishment in jury trials. § 61 LJ of
1888, supra note 26. The accusatory pleadings in both U.S. and Russian trials omit any
mention of the desired sentence, Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 102-03, and the
defense and other parties present no formal pleadings.
247. § 45 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. There was no provision
for opening statements in the nineteenth century Spanish jury laws. MARts ROGER &
MORA ALARC6N, supra note 41, at 313. An attempt to enact such an innovation in the
Russian law was defeated. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 103. Opening state-
ments by the prosecution and defense are allowed in all U.S. jurisdictions. LAFAVE &
IsRAEL, supra note 76, at 1035. Although the law does not indicate the sequence of
opening statements, courts have universally allowed the prosecuting parties to first pres-
ent their statements, as is the practice in the United States. Spanish commentators have
recognized that this is most consistent with the allocation of the burden of proof. MAR.s
ROGER & MORAALARC6N, supra note 41, at 314.
248. GIMaNO SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 254; MAxtS ROGER & MORA
ALARC6N, supra note 41, at 313. In this spirit, as the author observed, the judge in CO-1
exhorted the lawyers before their opening statements to "give life to the literal coldness
of the documents." See also Manuel Guerrero, El dificil entorno del parricida de la
Moreras centra elprmerjuicio con jurado en Cdrdoba, DJARIO C6RDOBA, July 9, 1996,
at 1,3.
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the pleadings, 249 a few lawyers waxed eloquent about trial by jury itself 250
or exploited this new opportunity to rouse the hackles of the presiding
judge. In B-2, the lawyer representing the victim's family as private
prosecutor was an eloquent former television presenter who used toy cars
in his opening statement to show how the traffic accident happened. The
accident led to the fatal fight between the defendant, who the lawyer called
the "Terminator," and a taxi driver, whom the lawyer called "the Incredible
Hulk." The judge interrupted this private prosecutor and told him to ad-
dress the parties as "the defendant" and "the taxi driver." The judge fur-
ther admonished the lawyers not to turn the trial into a "market of
Calaf."251
While the opening statement has seldom been used in the first trials
for proposing the introduction of new evidence,252 the provision allowing
for such use has been criticized because the parties are enabled to circum-
vent the open, adversary gathering of evidence during the preliminary in-
vestigation, and surprise opponents with previously undisclosed evidence
at trial. Thus, parties would be prevented from effective impeachment of153
the undisclosed evidence at trial. To prevent jury contamination by pro-
249. As the author observed, this was the case in VA-1, GR-I and CO-i, and appar-
ently also in PA- 1, where the public prosecutor was criticized for merely pontificating
about the separation of powers and not addressing the case, and the defense was criti-
cized for failing to structure the awaited evidence through the prism of his mentally ill
client's "tortured personality." L6pez-Mufioz y Larraz, Cr6nica, supra note 219, at II,
XIII-XIV
250. The public prosecutor in PM-1, as the author observed, told the jury of his
"pride, happiness, fear, goosebumps, and nerves" at participating in one of the first jury
trials, and of his strong support for this "most democratic form of the administration of
justice" and finished by telling the jury "[y]ou are Justice," a phrase which served as the
headline in several of the articles about the first jury trials. See Andreu Manresa, La
vista de Palmafue una clase de Derecho, EL PALs, May 28, 1996, at 27 (PM-1).
251. Francesc Peir6n & Domingo Marchena, supra note 169 (B-2).
252. In PA-1, the defense asked to admit the testimony of a new expert witness.
L6pez- Mufloz y Larraz, Cr6nica, supra note 219, at II. In CS-1, the private prosecutor's
request to have the jury visit the scene was rejected by the court. Tr. Prot. (CS-1) (on
file with author).
253. It is suggested, therefore, that only genuinely new evidence that could not have
been presented at the preliminary judicial inquest or the preliminary hearing should fall
within this provision. Serrano Butragueflo, supra note 245, at'218; GIMENo SENDRA,
CoMENTARIOs, supra note 43, at 254-55. The U.S. Supreme Court has allowed preclu-
sion of relevant defense testimony which was not disclosed in advance of trial in viola-
tion of a discovery statute just to prevent the defense from gaining an unfair advantage
from surprise witnesses. See Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 411-12 (1988); see
LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 76, at 836-42, for a discussion of the trend from almost
complete non-disclosure of evidence under the Common Law, to the enactment of com-
prehensive discovery statutes providing for disclosure by prosecution and defense of the
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posals of new evidence which is later ruled to be inadmissible during the
opening statement, commentators have suggested judicial intervention to
stop parties from proposing new evidence until its admissibility can be re-
viewed in limine or at a "side-bar" conference.m
2. Defendant and Witness Testimony: the Inadmissibility of Prior
Statements to Prove the Truth of their Contents and Other
Rules of Evidence
As is customary in continental European criminal trials, evidence
taking in Spain begins with the questioning of each of the defendants as to
whether they are guilty of the crimes charged in the accusatory plead-
ings.255 While the LECr. provides for a type of guilty plea, the conformi-
dad, at the beginning of the evidentiary portion of non-jury trials, the
LOTJ only explicitly provides for it at the conclusion of the evidence.2'
The defendants are then advised of their privilege against self-
incrimination and given an opportunity to give a voluntary statement. If
the defendant wishes to testify, he or she is first interrogated by the public
prosecutor, then by the private and popular prosecutors (if the rights of
acusaci6n particular and acci6n popular have been exercised), and finally
by defense counsel.' 7 Notwithstanding the constitutional right to remain
silent, defendants in the first Spanish jury trials have always testified at the
outset m response to questioning by the public prosecutor.
bulk of their evidence. The federal system, however, still provides only for a minimum
of mandatory discovery. FED. R. CPm,. P 16.
254. MAREs ROGER & MORA ALARCON, supra note 41, at 314; DIaz Cabiale, supra
note 190, at 281-82; GImENo SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 254; for intro-
ducing the vehicle of "sidebar conferences," see LOPEz-MUROZ Y LARRAZ,
COMENTARiOS, supra note 54, at 124.
255. §§ 688-700 LECr., supra note 149.
256. The procedure will be discussed mnfra Part V.H.
257. In relation to the Russian jury trial, which follows a similar procedure, the author
has questioned whether taking the defendant's plea before the jury and interrogating him
first is consistent with the presumption of innocence, the burden on the prosecution to
prove guilt and the privilege against self-incrimination. Thaman, Resurrection, supra
note 5, at 106. The Spanish procedure also seems to be a vestige of an inquisitorial logic
that still survives an otherwise pronounced accusatorial and adversarial trial procedure.
In the United States, the defendant may wait not only until the end of the prosecutor's
case, but until all other defense evidence has been presented, before deciding whether or
not to waive the privilege against self-incrimination and testify,. See Brooks v. Tennes-
see, 406 U.S. 605, 611-12 (1972).
258. This was also the case in Russia, where it appears as if only one defendant in the
first 114 trials refused to give a statement. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 105.
Article 24(2) of the CE guarantees the right to remamn silent. Constituci6n Espaffola
[CE] art 24(2).
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It became evident in the first trials that prosecutors had experienced
substantial difficulty in using the examination of the defendant to their ad-
vantage. A new evidentiary rule introduced by the LOTJ provides an ex-
planation for such difficulties:
The public prosecutor and the lawyers for the accusation and the de-
fense may interrogate the defendant, witnesses and experts about con-
tradictions which they believe exist between their testimony at the trial
and that given at the preliminary investigation. However, they may not
read the previous declarations in court, although the prior statements
may be filed m the court dossier.
With the exception of "anticipated evidence," (i.e., evidence taken in
adversarial fashion which cannot be repeated at trial), declarations
made during the preliminary investigation may not be introduced to
prove the truth of the contents stated therein."
This virtual ban on prior testimony as proof of the matter stated is a
product of the "two-file" strategy aimed at enhancing trial orality and im-
mediacy, and making the trial the forum where truth is determined before
the very eyes of the jury-
the exclusion even of the physical presence of the dossier of the
preliminary examination from the trial will avoid undesirable confusion
of cognitive sources and help stress the scope and fiality of the evi-
dence introduced at the trial.
The orality, inmediacy and publicity of the evidence which must re-
but the presumption of innocence has prompted the Law to call into
question one of the most polemical questions, that of the probative
value of the evidence adduced during the preliminary investigation or
otherwise pretrial, and to prohibit its admissibility in the text of the
law.
260
259. § 46(5) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
260. § IV(3) E-M LOTJ, supra note 19, at 33. On the "two-file system", see Part
V.C.2. In non-jury trials in Spain, prior inconsistent statements may be read to the court
before the witness or the defendant is confronted therewith. § 714 LECr., supra note
149. In the United States, prior statements of defendants, regardless of whether given to
police in informal conversations or formal interrogations, are admissible for the truth of
the matter stated whether or not the defendant chooses to testify. See FED. R. EVID.
801(d)(2). Prior statements given by testifying witnesses (or defendant,) may be read to
the jury and used to impeach trial testimony, and are usually admitted for the truth of the
matter stated in the out-of-court declaration. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1)(a). For opinions
favoring the admissibility of legally-obtained confessions of the defendant. L6pez Or-
tega, supra note 106, at 13; Verger Grau, supra note 48, at 571-72. In the first Russian
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As with the "two-file" system, the provision prohibiting admission of
prior inconsistent statements for the truth of the matter stated has its source
in the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure of 1988. The Italian Code pro-
hibited not only the introduction of prior inconsistent statements for the
truth of the matter stated, but also subjected prior statements taken by po-
lice officials to a complete testimonial ban. In 1992, however, the Italian
Constitutional Court ruled both of these provisions unconstitutional in
cases in which the prior statements were the only proof of guilt. The Court
reasoned that the provisions violated the right of equal protection (state-
ments of police were given less protection than those of other citizens) and
the principles of the preservation of evidence and material truth.261
As long as section 46(5) of the LOTJ survives constitutional scrutiny,
a jury which finds the trial testimony to be untrue must nevertheless base
its verdict on evidence other than the more credible pretrial testimony.2 62
This could also constitute a violation of equal protection for prior state-
ments would be admissible to prove guilt in non-jury trials, but not in cases
subject to the LOTJ.
2 63
It appears as if defendants were aware of the difficulties prosecutors
would encounter in impeaching them when they testified in the first Span-
ish jury trials. In several of the first murder trials, three of which were ob-
served by the author, the defendants claimed lack of memory as to the bulk
of the details in killings they admitted having committed. Because the
prosecutors could not read prior statements made by the defendants at the
trials, defendants were often confronted with their pretrial statements, which were read
from the investigative dossier and admitted into evidence. In this and other ways the dos-
sier played a major role in the Russian trials both as a source of impeachment and of
documentary evidence. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 106-07.
261. Section 195(4) of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, which prevented po-
lice testimony as to statements they had taken was held to be unconstitutional in Corte
costituzionale. Decision 24, Jan. 31, 1992, reported in GIURISPRUDENZA COsTITuZIONALE
1992, 129. Section 500(3) of the Italian C.p.p, which allowed only prior inconsistent
statements for impeachment, not for the truth of the matter stated, was ruled unconstitu-
tional in Corte costituzonale. Decision 255, June 3, 1992, reported in GiRsPRUDENZA
COSTITUZIONALE 1992, 1961. For an excellent discussion of these developments, see AI-
lessandro Honert, Der italienische Strafprozefl: die Fortentwicklung einer Reform, 106
ZErrscRwFr FOR DIE GESAM E STRAnRcrrswissENscHAFr 427, at 434-36 (1994). For
introductions to the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, see William T. Pizzi & Luca
Marafioti, The New Italian Code of Criminal Procedure: the Difficulties of Building an
Adversarial Trial System on a Civil Law Foundation, 17 YALE J. INTL LAW 1- (1992);
Freccero, supra note 182.
262. GnAmNo SENDRA, CoMENARIos, supra note 43, at 259-60. The Spanish Consti-
tutional Court has upheld convictions based on prior statements to the police, even when
they were not ratified by the witness at the trial. Verger Grau, supra note 48, at 571-72.
263. Diaz Cabiale, supra note 190, at 296-97.
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prelimmary investigation, the jury had great difficulty gaining anything
useful from the testimony of what should have been the most crucial wit-
ness m the case.2c'
The problem of utilizing contradictory prior testimony was illustrated
in the retrial of CS-1. The jury rejected the defendant's plea of self defense
and convicted him of homicide in the first trial. On retrial, he changed his
testimony, denying he had first taken out his knife, and being much more
equivocal as to whether he was engaged in "mutual combat" with the vic-
tim, a fact which would defeat his self defense plea. The prosecution was
completely hamstrung m any attempts to use the prior contradictory state-
ments, for defendants in criminal trials are not under oath and have no duty
to tell the truth, and the reversal of the first trial rendered it a "nullity" for
all purposes, including using the prior testimony.
265
Notwithstanding the new evidentiary restrictions and the "two-file"
procedure, old habits die hard. Thus, the judge in CO-1 allowed the prose-
cutor to read the prior statement of a witness to the defendant's fatal stab-
bing of his father, who failed to appear for the trial, despite the fact that no
inquiry was made into the reason for the failure to appear or the efforts
264. As the author observed, this was true in VA-1, GR-1 and CO-I, as well as in LP-
1, B. Hernfindez, Dos mujueres y siele hombres decidrdn si un anciano de 82 allos es
culpable de homicidio, DIARIO DE Avisos, July 4, 1996, at 20, 0-1, Tr. Prot. (0-1) (on
file with author), and in SS-2. Javier Peyalba. DiAmIo VAsco (Feb. 26, 1997)
<http://www.diario-vasco.com> In all of these cases, the defendant has claimed loss of
memory as to the details of the killing and a defense of temporary insanity. The Chief
Prosecutor of Valladolid Province, who prosecuted VA-I, said that the inability to use
the prior statements and the inveterate lying of the defendant made it the most difficult
examination of his career. Interview with Luis Maria L6pez Delgado, Chief Prosecutor
of Valladolid and Public Prosecutor, Valladolid (June 4, 1996) (VA..1). Indeed, testi-
mony indicated that the defendant, nicknamed Pato, was so notorious for his lack of
honesty in the town of Rueda, that the town quip was: "you're more of a liar than Palto."
Inigo Arrue, Palto anuncz6 a su companer de residencia que su ex mujzr 'no comerla ese
aho el turr6n,' EL MUNDO DE VALLADOLID, June 5, 1996, at 9 (VA..1). In AL-2, the
public prosecutor began reading the prior statement of one of the defendants which con-
tradicted his trial testimony regarding possession of the gun used in the homicide. Only
thereafter did the judge caution him and the jury that the statement could not be used for
the truth of the matter stated. Tr. Prot. (AL-2) (on file with author); Interview with Be-
nito Gdlvez Acosta, supra note 229 (AL-2).
265. Interview with Antonio Gastaldi Mateo, supra note 231 (CS-I *). Despite the
difficulties presented by section 46(5) LOTJ's restrictions on the use of prior statements,
several trial judges support the limitations. Interview with Luciano Varela Castro, supra
note 101 (P0-i); Interview with Benito Gflvez Acosta, supra note 229. So does at least
one prosecutor, who "would not let judge or jury see one piece of paper from the dos-
sier" for fear the jury would not listen to what the witnesses have to say at trial. He
claimed prosecutors needed to change their mentality, they needed in his words, a "new
chip." Interview with Fernando Mena, supra note 162 (BU-1).
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made by the prosecution to locate him. This was the only statement which
corroborated the theory of the prosecution and the autopsy doctors that the
stabbing was intentional and not accidental, as the defendant insisted.2"
Spanish law prohibits argumentative, leading or irrelevant questions,
but hearsay is admissible as long as the witness specifies the originator of
the information and the person to whom the declaration was made.2 67
Whether the presence of ajury will breed comprehensive rules of trial evi-
dence, as it did in Anglo-American procedure, remains to be seen. Com-
mentators have stressed the need for arguing evidentiary motions out of the
presence of the jury268 and for borrowing from Anglo-American procedure
the right to object to a broader range of testimony, including certain types
of hearsay, allowing leading questions on cross-examination, and provid-
ing for sanctions for merely asking objectionable questions in order to get
inadmissible evidence before the jury.
3. Expert Testimony
Expert testimony was presented in all of the murder trials in the form
of forensic medical experts testifying to cause of death and psychiatrists or
psychologists testifying to alleged mental illness or disorder. Normally,
266. The prosecutor was aware of the statement's importance and got it admitted un-
der section 730 LECr., which allows the reading of evidence gathered in the preliminary
investigation which "due to causes independent of the will of the parties cannot be re-
produced at the trial." § 730 LECr., supra note 149; Telephone interview with Jesis
Narmand Aparicio Pdrez, Public Prosecutor, C6rdoba (June 12, 1996) (CO-i). This is-
sue was not even brought up on appeal by the defense. Dec. TSJ (CO-i) (on file with
author). Commentators, however, have maintained that the LOTJ has preempted this
section. Diaz Cabiale, supra note 190, at 297. The judge in SE-2 also rejected a claim
of the defense that section 736 LECr. was superseded by § 46(5) LOTJ, and admitted the
testimony of two non-appearing eyewitnesses to the homicide. In so doing, however, he
emphasized that defense counsel was present during both statements, with the hypotheti-
cal possibility of examining them. Tr. Prot. (SE-2) (on file with author). The prior abil-
ity of the party opposing the introduction of out-of-court statements of non-appearing
witnesses to cross-examine is crucial to their admissibility in U.S. trials. FED. R. EviD.
804.
267. §§ 709, 710 LECr., supra note 149. As a result of decisions of the European
Court of Human Rights and the Spanish Constitutional Court, convictions may not be
based on hearsay alone. Verger Grau, supra note 48, at 574-75.
268. MAREs ROGER & MORA ALARCON, supra note 41, at 314; Diaz Cabiale, supra
note 190, at 281-82.
269. One author also favors eliminating the "open narrative" form of questioning al-
lowed by § 436.3 LECr. in favor of shorter directed questions used by U.S. lawyers.
Verger Grau, supra note 48, at 567, 575-76. Open-ended questions in the first Russian
trials often led to inadmissible evidence being presented to the jury. Thaman, Resurrec-
tion, supra note 5, at 106-07.
1998]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
teams of two official experts testified on each issue, often 'confronting one
or two defense experts. 0 Spanish law requires that the expert witnesses
testify together at trial.271 In GR-1, the two autopsy docto:rs and two psy-
chiatrists were seated next to the defendant as they testified to the cause of
death and the defendant's mental state.272 Six forensic medical experts
testified in B-2 as to whether the victim could' have lived had he been
quickly taken to a hospital. The two who performed the official autopsy
said that he could have lived no longer than ten minutes, but the four ap-
pointed for the private prosecutor and the defense claimed that he would
have survived. These experts also quarreled as to whether the mixture of
alcohol and "ecstasy" taken by the defendant would have affected his
mental state; as.one journalist described, the experts were "throwing re-
proaches at each other, including disqualifications, camouflaged as Flor-
entine courtesy" The presiding judge had to intervene several times.273 In
CO-i, the judge allowed all five expert witnesses (two autopsy doctors,
two psychiatrists and a psychologist) to respond to any question they
wished, which led C6rdoba's chief autopsy expert, who had no training in
psychiatry, to adamantly claim that the defendant's emotional disorder did
not in any way lessen his legal responsibility for killing his :ather.
27 4
The Otegi case prosecution's reliance on the head of the San Sebas-
tidn forensic laboratory to testify as an expert on the cause of death of the
two police victims and Otegi's intoxication, as well as on the defendant's
temporary insanity could have contributed to the jury's decision to accept
the opinions of defense experts. The defense called two independent ex-
270. When an expert opinion is needed at the preliminary investigation, Spanish law
requires that two experts be appointed. § 459 LECr., supra note 149. At least nine ex-
pert witnesses (autopsy experts, experts in blood-alcohol testing, and psychiatrists) testi-
fied in the Otegi Case. Javier Peyalba, Los familiares de los dos erizainas ilaman
asesino a Mikel Otegi y abandonan la sala, DLARIO VAsco (Mar. 4, 1997)
<http://www.diario-vasco.com>; Ivan Ono, Familiares de los erizainas laman 'asesino'
al acusado y abandonan la sala, EL CoRREo (Mar. 4, 1997) <http:/www.diario-
elcorreo.es> (SS-2). Seven expert witnesses (two autopsy doctors, four psychiatrists and
a criminalist) testified in PA-I. L6pez-Mufloz y Larraz, Cr6nca, supra note 219, at III-
V, and from four to six in the VA-1, GR-1, CO-I, M-1, CS-1 and B-2.
271. § 724 LECr., supra note 149.
272. Author observation in GR-I.
273. Carmen Mufloz, La .fscalpide una pena menor par la muerte de taxista, EL
PER16DICO, Sept. 20, 1996, at 26 (B-2).
274. The author observed that the young court-appointed defense lawyer did not ob-
ject to these opinions without foundation, although she tried to highlight the doctor's
lack of expertise in cross-examination. Often the public prosecutor would just read a
conclusion favorable to his case to the panel of experts and get no response, other than a
nod of a few heads.
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perts to testify on the cause of death, two others on the blood-alcohol
question, and two psychiatrists on the question of the defendant's cognitive
and volitional state at the time of the killings.7 5
The presence of the jury also affected the presentation of expert tes-
timony. Jurors in PA-1 noticed how the lawyers strived to get their expert
witnesses to speak in language understandable to lay persons, 6 and in
Valencia and C6rdoba judges intervened to urge the experts to, in the
words of the Valencianjudge, "talk in plain Spanish" ("en cristiano").m
4. Role of Judge, Jury and the Parties in the Presentation of
Evidence
Both the inquisitorial and adversarial modes of criminal procedure
proclaim the ascertaining of the truth as their goals 78 In the Spanish
criminal trial, the presiding judge "directs the trial, taking care to impede
275. Peyalba, supra note 270; Ivan Orio, supra note 270 (SS-2). The presiding judge
himself criticized the prosecutors for not calling independent psychiatric witnesses to
rebut the defense experts. Javier Mufloz, El juez del caso Itsasondo reconoce que el ve-
redicto del jurado ha creado alarma social, EL CORREO (Mar. 8, 1997)
<http://www.diano-elcorreo.es> (SS-2). The judge also emphasized the defense psy-
chiatrists interviews of the defendant in the native Basque tongue, euskera, weakened the
prosecution, which required interpreters. Javier Mufloz, El juez del caso Itsasondo
afirma que Mikel Otegi merece ser condenado por doble hoicidio, EL CORREO (Mar. 12,
1997) <http://www.diario-elcorreo.es> (SS-2).
276. Blanca Cia, Juezpor un dia, EL PAls, June 3, 1996, at 32 (PA-I).
277. Manuel Guerrero, Los forenses descartan el accidente como causa del crimen de
las Moreras, DIARIO C6RDOBA, July 10, 1996, at 5 (CO-I). Interview with Juan Luis De
]a Rua Moreno, supra note 218 (V- 1). The judge in 0-1 told the experts to use the most
colloquial and vulgar terms possible and himself kept asking the jury whether they un-
derstood, sometimes himself explaining the terms. Interview with Jos6 Maria Alvarez
Seijo, supra note 230 (0-1).
278. The extent to which the U.S. adversary model seeks "material truth" as opposed
to "procedural fairness" has always been hotly debated. See generally Marvin E.
Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975);
Monroe H. Freedman, Judge Frankel's Search for Truth, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1059 (1975);
H. Richard Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth, and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge
Frankel's Idea, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 (1975); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Lmyers, Clients,
and the Adversary System, 37 MERc R L. REV. 647 (1986); Gary Goodpaster, On the
Theory ofAmerican Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J. CRIM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 118 (1987);
Thomas L. Steffen, Truth as Second Fiddle: Reevaluating the Place of Truth In the Ad-
versarial Trial Ensemble, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 799. Damaka claims that assertions by the
U.S. Supreme Court that criminal trial is a "search for truth" should "not be taken at face
value" but only as a response to characterizations of the U.S. adversary model as a
"sporting theory ofjustice." DAMAAKA, EvIDENcE LAW, supra note 6, at 123.
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impertinent discussions that are not conducive to the clarification of the
truth, without denying the defense its necessary freedom. 279
Although the judge begins the questioning by asking each witness to
identify herself and reveal any relation to the accused, questioning is then
turned over to the proponent of the witness and followed by cross-
examination. Only then may the judge ask questions "conducive to clear-
ing up the facts about which they testify.
2 0
Regarding the jury's new role, the authors of the LOTJ noted:
An aspect which merits special consideration is the participation of the
jury in the evidentiary proceedings. In the same way as our LECr has
opted for a procedure between the principles of party-controlled proofs
and official investigation, authorizing the court to contribute to the
presentation of evidence at the trial, this possibility is transferred to the
jury, who now unmistakably has the responsibility to achieve a proba-
tive evaluation of the veracity of the charge.
281
The primary means for the jury to influence the fact finding process is
their power to question the witnesses, experts and defendants. They are
required to submit their questions in writing to the judge, who, after de-
claring the questions relevant, and "conducive to determination and clarifi-
cation of the facts at issue," poses them to the witness or defendants.
282
The jurors, who are given pencils and paper to take notes and formulate
questions,283 generally ask few if any questions, and, in the first cases,
were often not explicitly advised of their right to do so. 2 84 The nineteenth
279. § 683 LECr., supra note 149. The judge may also alter the sequence of evidence
taking if it would be conducive "to a better clarification of the facts or a surer discovery
of the truth. Id. § 701 & para. 6. The new Russian law has chosen very similar language
in its attempt to replace the judge's official duty to ascertain the truth as it exists in non-
jury trials. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 98.
280. § 708 LECr., supra note 149.
281. § IV(3) EM-LOTJ, supra note 19, at 33.
282. § 46(1) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. It has been ques-
tioned whether the presiding judge, who has no "probative inititiative," should be able to
rule irrelevant the questions of those judges who do-the jury. Although the parties have
a remedy if a question is not allowed, the jury does not. Diaz Cabiale, supra note 190, at
281.
283. Although it is generally held that juror note-taking and questioning is within the
court's discretion in the United States, LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 76, at 1042-43, it is
still discouraged and treated as an abuse of discretion in certain jurisdictions. See United
Rtates v. Ajmal, 67 F.3d 12 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Thompson, 76 F.3d 442 (2d
Cir. 1996).
284. As the author observed, the jury did not ask questions in PM-i, VA-1, GR-1,
CO-1. This was most likely partially due to the judges' failure to ask the jury for ques-
tions at the end of the parties' examinations of each witness. The jury in BU- I asked no
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century Spanish jury laws allowed jurors to ask questions directly and
vested them with the same inquisitorial duty to seek the truth.28 5
Some juries did make use of their questioning power, and in CS-1, the
young foreperson stood up and directly asked the defendant questions
which one journalist characterized as "very interesting." The judge toler-
ated the direct questioning, but reprimanded the defendant who, after be-
coming angry, addressed the juror with the informal "tu." He also told the
jury to "ask questions, but don't give opinions! 2 86 In SE-1, the jurors
asked at least twenty one questions, many concerning the details of the
fight which led to the stabbing, and others to the expert witnesses relating
to alleged mental defenses . 28  In SE-2, the jury asked at least thirteen
questions, all of which the judge approved and permitted, many related to
some questionable blood on the knives of the defendant and the victim, and
the effects of drugs on both. 288 In GI-2, the jury submitted questions to the
questions, Interview with Juan Sancho Fraile, President of Burgos Provincial Court and
Presiding Judge, Burgos (June 5, 1997); 0-1, Interview with Josd Maria Alvarez Seijo,
supra note 230; 0-2, Interview with Bernardo Donapetry Camacho, supra note 97; LU-2,
Interview with Edgar Armando Fernindez Cloos, Presiding Judge, Lugo (June 10, 1997);
AL-1, Interview with Ruiz-Rico Ruiz Mor6n, supra note 212; and AL-2, Interview with
Gdlvez Acosta, supra note 229. It has been suggested that the jury should be informed
prior to the examination of witnesses of their right to ask questions, a provision con-
tained in the 1888 law. § 63, para. 2, LJ of 1888, supra note 26. See Diaz Cabiale, supra
note 190, at 285. It has also been suggested that the jury should be asked for questions at
the conclusion of each witness's testimony and that the foreperson be named earlier to
better facilitate the channeling of questions to the judge. GIMENO SENDRA.
COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 258. Furious note-taking has been noticed by observers
of PA-1, Blanca Cia, Puedes tener problemas de conciencia, EL PATS, May 28, 1996, at
26; of GR- 1, El primerjurado andaluz condena a una homicida de 74 arios y se opone a
que se le conceda el indulto, EL PA s-ANDALUCiA, July 5, 1996, at 5; and of CS-1, Durin,
Los jueces, supra note 141.
285. Much like lay assessors in modem mixed courts, the jury under the law of 1872
enjoyed "all of the faculties and duties" accorded the court by the LECr. § 736 LECr.
(prov.) 1872, supra note 24; cf § 63 LJ of 1888, supra note 26; Diaz Cabiale, supra note
190, at 285 n.10. On the passivity of U.S. jurors and reluctance of U.S. courts to let the
fact-finders ask questions, a practice which "bruises deeply imagined continental legal
sensibilities," see DAMA9KA, EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 6, at 91.
286. Durn, Losjueces, supra note 141.
287. For example: "[c]an a person affected by a mini-psychosis remember 10 or 15
minutes later what he had done and ask with tranquillity about the victim in the case?"
Or, "[iun the case of amnesia produced by this mini-psychosis, after a week or a month
passed, could he not be able to remember what had happened?" Copy of Questions
Asked by the Jury (SE-2) (on file with author).
288. For instance: "[is slimness a sign of drug addiction?" Or, "[c]ould drug addic-
tion have affected his conduct on the day of the killing?" Tr. Prot. (SE-2) (on file with
author). Many good questions were also asked by the jury in MA-1, interview with
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defendant after all of the evidence had been taken. The judge allowed the
questions, and the defense later claimed that this was erroneous during
their appeal. While reversing the conviction on other grounds, the Cata-
lufia TSJ held that permitting the questions at the close of the evidence did
not violate the LOTJ because nothing in the law limited the timing of such
questions.289 When the prosecutor in VA-1 neglected to ask a witness an
important question and submitted it in writing to the judge requesting per-
mission to reopen his direct examination, the judge turned the tables by
submitting the question to the jury and allowing them to make the deci-
sion.
290
In addition to the power to question witnesses, the LOTJ has also
given juries the right to examine the "books, documents, papers and other
pieces of evidence" which may be viewed by the professional bench in a
bench trial.291 To facilitate showing documents and other physical evi-
dence, the Barcelona Provincial Court has installed video monitors in the
jury box and a system of closed-circuit transmission which enables the jury
(and the public) to view the evidence up close during the trial without
having to pass items from hand to hand.292 Under section 46(5) of the
LOTJ, however, the jury is denied access to the investigative dossier, in-
cluding those investigative documents which would hell? explain the
physical items the jury does have a right to see.293 The LOTJ also provides
that jury "visits to the scene of the crime" may be conducted at the court's
discretion.294
Manuel Torres Vela, supra note 200; GR-2, Interview with Carlos Bellver Garcia-Alix,
supra note 239; and in GR-4, Interview with Carlos Rodrfguez Valverde, supra note 239.
289. Dec. TSJ (GI-2) (on file with author).
290. "For they are the ones who decide guilt or innocence," he remarked. Interview
with Josd Miflambres Fl6res, Presiding Judge of Valladolid Provincial Court, Valladolid
(June 4, 1996) (VA-I).
291. § 46(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note I (referring to § 726
LECr.).
292. Author observation in Barcelona Provincial Court (June 25, 1997). The former
President of the court, who was responsible for the technological outfitting of the two
magnificent jury courtrooms said the televisions were necessary "because the jury intro-
duced publicity into the trial and the testimony should always be 'public' and never just
among the participants." Interview with Gerardo Thomas Andreu, former President of
Barcelona Provincial Court, Barcelona (June 25, 1997) (B-I).
293. MARts ROGER & MORA ALARC6N, supra note 41, at 319; G3IMENO SENDRA.
COMeNTARIOS, supra note 43, at 258-59; G6MEZ COLOMmE, supra note 41, at 109-10.
294. § 46(3) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JuRADO, supra note 1. Mares Roger and
Mora Alarc6n feel thatthe protocol for the scene visit taken pursuant to sections 326-333
LECr. should be read during the trial visit to call attention to changes which might have
taken place. This could be justified as evidence which cannot be reproduced at the trial
under section 730 LECr. MAREs ROGER & MORA ALARC6N, supra note 41, at 320, A
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Judges in the first Spanish trials have asked the defendant and the
witnesses few if any questions, allowing the parties to elicit virtually all of
the probative facts. 295 The judge in VA-1 said he could not ask any ques-
tions because he had no access to the investigative dossier to aid him in the
endeavor.
296
The presence of a jury has had an impact upon the treatment of wit-
nesses in a few cases. In AL-2, an order was issued to protect the identity
of witnesses because the case involved a police homicide victim and suspi-
cions of drug-trafficking against the Gypsy defendants. The witnesses were
isolated so that the jury and the court could see them, but the defendant
and the public could not.297 Also, in B-3 the defense hired a psychologist
to aid in jury selection, and another to prepare the witnesses to speak be-
fore an audience. In the trial judge's opinion, this strategy did not work
because the defendant's family members "came off much too prepared,
like a play, as if they had rehearsed their testimony," and the jury rejected
it all and returned a more severe verdict than the judge would have.? °
The parties' presentation of the evidence often left much to be desired
in the first trials, but this has sometimes inured to the defendant's benefit
by leaving room for reasonable doubt.
29
visit to the scene of the murder of two Basque policemen was conducted in the Otegi
case upon the request of the defense. Not only did the judge, lawyers, jury and the de-
tained defendant visit the defendant's farmhouse in a remote Basque hamlet, but the de-
fendant recreated the situation which led to the double homicide. The visit and recreation
of the crime was videotaped and attached to the record. Ivan Ono, Eljurado presencla
en el caserfo de Otegi la reconstrucci6n del crmen, EL CORREO (Feb. 26, 1997)
<http'//www.diarior-elcorreo.es > (SS-2).
295. As the author observed, none were asked in PM-I and VA-1, and few in GR-1
and CO-1. None were asked in V-I, Interview with De la Rua Moreno, supra note 218;
and few in CS-1. Tr. Prot. (CS-I) (on file with author). In SE-2, an example of the
minimal intervention of Spanish judges occurred when, after the victim's wife had testi-
fied she did not know if her husband was right- or left-handed (diestro o zurdo), the
judge clarified that the witness did not know the word zurdo, but did indicate the victim
took things with his right hand. Tr. Prot. (SE-2) (on file with author).
296. Interview with Miflambres Fl6res, supra note 290 (VA-I). A majority ofjudges
in the first Russian jury trials maintained their inquisitorial stance by engaging in active
questioning, facilitated by their knowledge of the investigative dossier. One judge who
took a passive role and allowed the parties to do the questioning, noted that their inexpe-
rience in direct and cross-examination prompted the jury to engage in more creative
questioning. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 106.
297. Interview with Gilvez Acosta, supra note 264 (AL-2).
298. Interview with Miguel Angel Gimeno Jubero, supra note 226 (B-3).
299. Thejudge in PM-1 found that the sketchy presentation of evidence led to thejury
confusion during deliberations. Interview with Juan Jos6 L6pez Ortega, President and
Presiding Judge of Palma de Mallorca Provincial Court, Palma de Mallorca (May 28,
1996).
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G. Modification of the Pleadings
After the evidence has been taken the judge asks the parties whether
they ratify their original pleadings or wish to modify them to conform to
the facts adduced at trial.50° Two points are of interest with respect to such
modifications. First, the LOTJ appears to leave open the possibility of not
only charging a different criminal offense, but also one in which "there is a
more serious level of participation or execution (of the crime) or circum-
stances which aggravate the punishment. ' 's Although § 793.7 of the
LECr. would allow the defense a ten-day continuance to present probative
or exculpatory evidence addressed to the new charges, critics have won-
dered what the jury would do during this break in the trial. Despite the
confusing reference in the LOTJ, it is generally conceded that the law does
not permit the pleading of new facts or circumstances in aggravation not
foreseen in the initial pleadings and that if it did, the case would have to be
returned to the preliminary investigation stage to test the facts giving rise
to the new charges. °2 Second, the LOTJ provides that upon amendment of
the pleadings to charge only crimes not subject to the jurisdiction of the
jury court, the jury will not be discharged and will render its verdict none-
theless.
30 3
In the first trials, the author knows of no prosecutor who has either
amended the pleadings to eliminate all charges subject to the jury court's
300. § 48(1), (2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL. JURADO, supra note I (referring to §
793.6 LECr.). Where such "variances" arise between the indictment or information and
the proof in U.S. trials, courts will usually ask whether it affected "the substantial rights"
of the accused. LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 76, at 830-34.
301. § 48(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note I (referring to § 793.7
LECr.).
302. GimENO SENDRA, COMENTARiOS, supra note 43, at 267-68. Section 746.6 LECr.
authorizes suspending a case to conduct further criminal investigation following unex-
pected revelations or retractions of testimony. § 746 LECr., supra note 149. Section
737 of the LECr (prov.) of 1872 prohibited modifications of the pleadings to charge more
serious offenses. § LECr. (prov.), supra note 24. The potential disruption of such a sus-
pension for a sitting jury is obvious. Russian judges used a similar provision to take the
case from the jury when the prosecutor's case was irreparably undermined by a surprise
in the testimony. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 100-01.
303. § 48 (3) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. This provision has
been criticized as violating the principle of procedural economy. G6MEZ COLOMER, sU-
pra note 41, at 33. Section 65 LJ of 1888 gave the defendant a choice of whether to pro-
ceed with the jury or with the panel of professional judges in such a case. § 65 LJ of
1888, supra note 26. It also allowed for defendants to opt for a jury trial in a non-jury
case in which the charges were amended to bring the case within the jury court's juris-
diction. The Prosecutor's Office would support this latter option under the current law.
Circ. 3/1995 FGE, supra note 96, at 458-59; cf L6prz-MuRoz Y LARRAZ, COmENTARIOs,
supra 54, at 126-27.
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jurisdiction or attempted to charge a more serious offense. What amend-
ments there have been have either reduced the level of charge or the re-
quested punishment. The bulk of the modifications were necessitated be-
cause the CP 1995 went into effect just three days before the first jury
trials commenced, and the prosecutor was obligated to compare the provi-
sions of the CP 1973 with that of the new code to determine which were
more beneficial to the defendant. 304 In only one case did the public prose-
cutor move to dismiss after the taking of the evidence?"S In B-2, the pri-
vate prosecutor modified his pleadings from murder to attempted murder,
and requested a sentence of ten instead of thirty years; this act was clearly
a tactical move to improve the chances of the victim's family to recover
fifty million pesetas in damages from the city government and the taxi
company by claiming that the victim's death was not caused by the stab-
bing, but by the failure to send an ambulance promptly.3°6
The modification of the pleadings following the taking of the evi-
dence are also extremely important, because it is at this stage of the pro-
ceedings that the LOT makes the only express provision for resolving the
case without a jury verdict through the defendant's expressing his or her
"conformity" (conformidad) with the prosecutors' (amended) pleadings.
H. Consensual Resolution of the Case: the Spanish Institution of
conformidad
A logical extension of an adversarial model of criminal procedure,
which obligates the prosecution and the defense to formulate and modify
their own pleadings and present their own evidence and witnesses, is to
allow the parties to attempt to resolve the case. The move on the European
continent from classic inquisitorial procedures to an accusatorial, adver-
sarial system has opened the door to the introduction of informal, consen-
sual resolution of criminal cases that would have been anathema to defend-
304. As the author observed in PM-I, the original pleadings under the CP 1973 were
amended in accordance with the CP 1995 resulting in an elimination of the possibility of
any incarceration. Amendment of the charges to conform with CP 1995 resulted in a re-
duction of the requested sentence in CO-I from 24 to 13 years, Manuel Guerrero, Elfis-
cal aplica el nuevo C6digo Penal y pide 13 aflos de cdrcel para el parricida de Las
Moreras, DIARiO C6RDOBA, July 11, 1996, at 4, and in B-2, from 27 to 16 years.
Francesc Peir6n, Enfrentamrento entre medicos al explicar ante eljurado la muerte del
taxista, LA VANGUARDLA, Sept. 20, 1996, at 24.
305. In B-9, the prosecutor dismissed against defendant Mayor and proceeded to ver-
dict against co-defendant Rodriguez. The case ended in an acquittal. Judg. (B-9) (on file
with author).
306. Carmen Mufioz, La fiscal pide una pena menor par la muerte del taxista, EL
PER16DICO, Sept. 20, 1996, at 26 (B-2).
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ers of the principles of legality, official investigation, and material truth.
Even in Germany, where these principles still reign supreme, mechanisms
for consensual resolutions of minor cases have been implemented, and
critics are calling for a "reprivatization of the criminal law."3" 7 This idea
would replace the traditional inquisitorial principles with a model for con-
sensual resolution of criminal cases based on an adversarial preliminary
investigation with full participation and discovery rights for both defendant
and victim."' 8
The most elaborate system of consensual disposition of criminal cases
on the European continent was introduced in the 1988 Italian Code of
Criminal Procedure. One of the two most important such forms is the gi-
udizio abbreviato, patterned after the English "summary trial" and akin to
what in the United States is sometimes called a "slow plea" or "submitting
a case on the transcript," which consists of the defendant submitting the
case for decision on the basis of the investigative dossier. The defendant
may request to be interrogated by the judge, but no other evidence will be
admitted. The defendant is entitled to a one-third reduction. of the sen-
tence; the procedure applies to criminal cases other than those punishable
by life imprisonment.3" Closer to the Spanish conformidad, however, is
the "application of punishment upon the request of the parties" (applicazi-
307. See Albin Eser, Funktionswandel von Prozefimaximen, 104 ZEITscHRiFr FOR DIE
GESAMTE STRAFREcHTsWissENscHAFr 361, 377 (1992).
308. German proponents of consensual forms for resolving criminal cases see them
not as inherently coercive solutions for overcrowded dockets, as is the case in the United
States, but as modes of dispute resolution aimed at re-establishing social peace, ensuring
restitution and resocializing the defendant into society. A guilty plea would follow a
thorough criminal investigation in which the defendant and victim had full participatory
rights, full discovery, and full opportunity to have their own evidence evaluated. The
trial would be a last resort for difficult-to-resolve cases, but all evidence taken in the
preliminary investigation with full participatory rights of the parties would be admissible.
See Thomas Weigend, Die Reform des Strafverfahrens, 104 ZEITSCHRIFT FOR DIE
GESAMTE STRARECrTswissENscHAFr 486, 496-511 (1992); Jtlrgen Wolter, Aspekte einer
Strafprozefireform bis 2007, in MuNIcH, 65-91 (1991). For extreme examples of the
threats and punishments which are constitutionally permissible to induce pleas of guilty
or punish those who arguably breach their provisions in the United States, see Borden-
kircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978) (permissible to reprosecute and sentence to life
imprisonment for failure to accept a five year sentence for an $88.30 forgery); Ricketts v.
Adamson, 483 U.S. 1 (1987) (permissible to reprosecute and sentence to death in lieu of a
20 year sentence for refusal to testify for a second time in the retrial of defendants' ac-
complices).
309. §§ 438-443 C.P.P. (Ital.). For discussions of this procedure, see Freccero, supra
note 182, at 372-74, and Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 261, at 23-26. For an opinion
against this undermining of the "legality principle," see FERRAJOLI, supra note 13, at
573-74.
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one dellapena su richiesta delle parti), which applies in cases with a pos-
sible three year sentence. A one-third discount is then allowed. No guilty
plea is entered and the judge can acquit the defendant after reviewing the
investigative file.31°
As early as 1872, Spanish law provided for jury trial only if the ac-
cused did not "admit his responsibility according to the conclusions of the
pleadings." 311 Today, the Spanish LECr. allows a defendant in a non-jury
case subject to the normal procedure to stipulate conformity with the
prosecution's most serious charges and desired sentence sought at the end
of the preliminary investigation; the defendant is then sentenced, and the
punishment cannot exceed the maximum level of a "correctional" sen-
tence.312 A conformidad may also be reached before the taking of evidence
according to the "abbreviated procedure" so long as the agreed punishment
does not exceed six years.
313
The LOTJ explicitly provides for reaching a conformidad only after
the taking of the evidence and the modifications of the pleadings. The
judge discharges the jury and pronounces the sentence if the defendant ac-
cepts the facts as stated in the accusatory pleadings and the highest charge,
punishment, and damages (whether pleaded by the public prosecutor or the
private prosecutor), so long as the punishment does not exceed six years 1 4
310. §§ 444-448 C.P.P. (Ital.). For discussions of this procedure, see Freccero, supra
note 182, at 374-76; Pizzi & Marafioti, supra note 261, at 21-23. In the first half of
1991, this procedure, also called the patteggiamento (bargain) was utilized 5,167 times
during the preliminary hearing and an additional 8,137 in the trial court. Jescheck, supra
note 147, at 672.
311. § 720 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24. In Russia, both before the October
Revolution, and under the new jury law, a plea of guilty is considered only another piece
of evidence which nonetheless must be submitted to the jury, which may, and sometimes
does, acquit. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 103-04.
312. § 655 LECr., supra note 149. Under the CP 1973, a conform(dad was allowed
when the punishment pleaded was six years or less, whereas under the CP 1995 the
maximum sentence will be three years. G5MEz COLOmER, supra note 41, at 107-08.
313. § 793.3 LECr., supra note 149. The State Prosecutor's Office has issued an
opinion that a conformidad would be possible even in excess of six years under the
summary procedure. See Circular de la Fiscalla General del Estado 1/1989, de 8 de
Marzo, sabre cuestiones relacionadas con el procedimento abrevlado ntroducido par
la Ley 7/2988, de 28 de Diciembre, reprinted in ENJUIC[AMIE CRMNAL, supra note
86, 889, 910-11 [hereinafter "Cir. 1/1989 FGE"]. On the absurdity of allowing guilty
pleas for up to six years and more in summary trials, but only up to three years in normal
trials governed by the CP 1995, see GOMnz COLOMER, supra note 41, at 107-08.
314. § 50(1) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Restricting plea
agreements to after the taking of the evidence would constitute a waste of resources and
would discourage pleas of guilty at earlier stages, prompting defendants to test the trial
evidence before deciding whether to plead guilty. See GnMENO SENDRA, COMENTARIos,
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Most commentators believe that although the LOTJ mentions conformidad
only at the conclusion of the trial, a defendant can still take advantage of
the general statutory provisions allowing conformidad at earlier stages of
the proceedings.315
Indeed, most resolutions of potential jury cases through conformidad
have been handled before trial, and judges have routinely cited section 655
of the LECr. and section 24(1) of the LOTJ in justifying this practice. One
judge pointed out that it would be absurd in an adversary system to submit
facts not in dispute to the jury Any other interpretation "would bring us to
the absurdity of constituting a court in order to immediately dissolve it,
without it having exercised any function, and we cannot believe that that
was .what was desired in the law, because then it makes no sense to put the
defendant m the dock. 316 Other judges have indicated that impaneling a
jury only to reach a conformidad would "violate the most elemental princi-
pal of procedural economy."
317
The overwhelming majority of pretrial plea resolutions have come in
relatively minor cases like trespass, threats, failure to render aid, bribery,
and setting forest fires.318 This confirms the widespread opinion that con-
formidad is used to avoid the costly, time-consuming jury procedure in
trivial cases.319 Thus, of the roughly seventy-seven cases in which juries
supra note 43, at 273, who would restrict conformidad to the pre-trial stage and allow the
legality principle to prevail at trial. Id. The judge in SE-2 echoes this opinion. Inter-
view with Gil Merno, supra note 227. Defense counsel in PM-I opined that there would
be less pleas of guilty for defendants would want to try to convince a. jury. Interview
with Miguel Feliu Bordeu, Defense Counsel, Palma de Mallorca (May 28, 1996).
315. A conformidad may be agreed to in the defense pleadings prior to assignment to
the trial court in both the ordinary and summary procedures, §§ 655, 791.3 LECr., supra
note 149, and at arraignment in the trial court. Id. §§ 688, 793.3. See G36MEZ COLOMER,
supra note 41, at 106-07. The complementary provisions of the LECr. proclaimed in
section 24.2 of LOTJ should open the door to plea agreements at earlier stages of the
proceedings. GIIENo SmNDRA, COMENTARios, supra note 43, at 191-92; Carmona Ruano
& DePai1 Velasco, supra note 106, at 81. In cases in which a conformidad is likely,
judges in Sevilla have set hearings following the preliminary hearing to resolve the case
before it goes to the trial court. Id. at 71.
316. Judgment in Case of Victor Antonio Miras Mallo, Sentencia No. 183/97, Oviedo
Provincial Court (Apr. 24, 1997) (on file with author).
317. Judgment in Case of Emilio Fernfindez Martinez, Sentencia 56/97, Madrid Pro-
vincial Court (Feb. 26, 1997) (on file with author).
318. The limitation of this procedure to cases in which a sentence of six years or less
is pleaded eliminates most homicide cases.
319. As was stated by the Chief Prosecutor of the TSJ of Castilla y Le6n, "you can go
into another's home, sit down, and say I'm not leaving. That is a trespass and it is a little
ridiculous to include this in the ambit of trial by jury." Interview with Garcla Ancos, su-
pra note 114. The President of M6laga Provincial Court expressed a similar opinion,
Interview with Torres Vela, supra note 200 (MA-1).
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were selected, only twenty were for crimes other than homicide.320 Despite
the fact that conformidad is designed to be a form of pleading "as
charged," there has been evidence of "plea bargaining" resulting in a low-
ering of the prosecutor's requested sentence before the plea agreement.
321
Even if both the public prosecutor and the defense are willing to resolve a
minor case, however, an obstinate private prosecutor could insist on a jury
trial by demanding a more severe punishment.
322
In homicide prosecutions, which constitute the vast majority of Span-
ish jury cases, the use of conformidad has been confined mainly to cases in
which there is convincing evidence of the defendant's mental illness that
precludes or mitigates criminal responsibility.32 Some courts have dis-
320. There were 10 trespass trials, five threats trials, three trials for failure to render
aid, and one each for bribery and setting forest fires. See Appendix I. In Madrid, seven
of its 11 cases (as of June 1, 1997) were resolved with a conformidad. Three of these
were attempted bribenes (all of them involve attempted briberies of police officers after
traffic arrests). Case of Fernndez Martinez, supra note 317; Case of Domingo Arribas
Garcia, Sentencia 24/97, (Feb. 5, 1997); Case of Angel Pastrana del Pozo, Sentencia
94/97-bis, (Feb. 20, 1997). Two were for trespassing: Case of Manuel Emilio Pablos
Sdnchez, Sentencia 256/97, (Apr. 9, 1997); Case of Pedro Tarazaga Mdrquez, Sentencia
513/96, (Nov. 28, 1996). One was for failure to render aid: Case of Fernando Gallego
Navajas, Sentencia 152/97, (Apr. 9, 1997), and one for threats: Case of Alejandro Garca
Martin, Sentencia 37/97, (Feb. 13, 1997) (all the judgments on file with author).
321. After the jury was selected in PO-2, the prosecutor reduced the pleaded sentence
from one year to six months and the defendant expressed his conformidad. El Segundo
jurado popular de Galicia se disolvi6 sin llegar a intervenar, DIARIO DE PONTEVEDRA,
Oct. 24, 1996. The pleaded fines were reduced in Madrid bribery prosecutions from
20,000 to 15,000 pesetas in the Ferndndez Martinez case, supra note 317, and from
150,000 to 100,000 pesetas in the Arribas Garcia case, supra note 320. In the failure to
aid case, the defendant stipulated to tie charges after the prosecutor reduced his demand
for deprivation of liberty from 18 to six months, and the driver's license suspension from
three to one year. Case of Fernando Gallego Navajas, supra note 320.
322. This was the situation in a threats case set for trial in September 1997 in Oviedo.
Interview with Evelia Alonso Crespo, Secretary of Section Three of Oviedo Provincial
Court, Oviedo (June 9, 1997) (0-2). But this should be a rarity for minor cases because
it is expensive for the victim to have counsel for the private prosecution. Interview with
Antonio Gastaldi Mateo, supra note 231 (CS-1).
323. There have been a few exceptions. In B-14, the defendant stipulated to a six year
sentence on an attempted homicide charge and his co-defendant was acquitted on homi-
cide charges. Judg. (B-14) (on file with author). After his conviction in CS-1 was re-
versed, the defendant offered to plead guilty to homicide with the mitigating circum-
stance of imperfect self defense, but the prosecution refused. He was acquitted on
grounds of perfect self defense at his retrial. Interview with Gastaldi Mateo, supra note
231 (CS-I*). In SA-1, the private prosecutor scotched a conformidad to the charge of
negligent homicide, which would not have been subject to the jury court's jurisdiction,
by insisting on what turned out to be an unsuccessful homicide prosecution. Interview
with Nieto Nafria, supra note 235. In M-2, the public prosecutor and defense agreed to a
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posed of such cases before trial, without going through the two stages of
jury selection.324 This was attempted in LU-1, the case of a twenty-eight
year old schizophrenic graphic designer who hugged his seventy-seven
year old mother to death, but the defense rejected a not guilty by reason of
insanity stipulation in a failed attempt to pursue another theory.
Pursuant to a strict reading of section 50 of the LOTJ, several courts
have determined that a conformidad in homicide cases can bi-, reached only
after all the evidence is taken. This happened first in M-1, where, follow-
ing the unanimous testimony of the psychiatric experts that the defendant
killed his wife of twenty-four years under psychotic delusions, the public
prosecutor and defense stipulated to a judgment of not guilty by reason of
insanity with commitment m a mental institution for fi:fteen years.326
Feeling compelled by the dictates of section 50 of the LOTJ, the court
acted identically in BI-2, a homicide charge against an eighty-two year old
man who killed his brother, chopped his body into nine pieces, and put it
into a fruit crate because he was "fed up." In the judgment, which imposed
the restrictive measure of outpatient psychiatric treatment in the custody of
his family, the trial judge strongly criticized the "celebration of jury trials
which are clearly lacking in content."327 Following the selection of the
conformidad in a case of fratricide in which the defendant was claiming accident, but
they then decided to let the jury decide the case anyway, and the defendant was acquit-
ted. Josd A. Hernndez, Declaramos no culpable a , EL PAls, Nov. 10, 1996, at 6.
324. For instance, in one case the prosecution and defense stipulated to a finding of
not guilty by reason of insanity in the case of a 56 year old man who, suffering from a
depressive disorder, leaped into the Mediterranean Sea with his mother, who was suffer-
ing from Alzheimer's disease, intending that they both die. He was saved by a bystander.
The defendant was committed to one year ambulatory psychiatric care. Case of Angel
Teso Fadon, Sentencia 2/96, Barcelona Provincial Court (May 20, 1996).
325. The jury determined that it had not been an accident, but that the defendant was
indeed insane. Interview with Conde Salgado, supra note 139 (LU-1).
326. Before accepting the conformidad, the trial judge had the parties research
whether a 15 year commitment in a mental hospital would be proper, bearing in mind the
six year statutory limit on conformidad. It was determined that the commitment qualified
as a "security measure" rather than a sentence to deprivation of liberty. Prot. conformi-
dad, Tr. Prot. (M-1) (on file with author). An observer complained that the same resolu-
tion would have been reached in 30 minutes in a non-jury trial, whereas it took 20 hours
ofjury selection and testimony in the Sanz case. Josd A. Hernndez, Eljuez disolvid el
primer jurado de Madrid al aceptar elparricida ngresar 15 aflos en un psiquitdrico, EL
PAls, Oct. 9, 1996, at 1, 5 (M-1).
327. "This conformidad saves the guaranties of proof and of adversary procedure for
the declaration of facts as grave as those before the court, but at an excessively high cost:
the constitution and celebration of a jury trial to the sole end of establishing undisputed
facts, and to make possible a debate about a penal consequence beyond the competence
of the jury, a security measure." Judg. (BI-2) (on file with author). See also Unjuez de
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jury and the taking of psychiatric testimony conformidad was also reached
in CS-2. The public and private prosecutors and the defense stipulated to a
homicide with mitigating circumstances of mental illness in the case of a
deaf mute who killed his cousin in an argument over a bicycle.
3? 2
In AB-2, the court left the level of criminal offense and the question
of insanity to the jury, even though both were not in dispute,2 9 and other
courts have submitted cases to the jury in which all parties agreed on the
defendant's insanity in order to have the jury decide the level of the crimi-
nal offense. Spanish law determines the maximum length of psychiatric
commitment to a closed facility by the maximum length of penal incar-
ceration.
330
The trial judge is not strictly bound to the terms of the accusatory
pleadings to which the defendant has acquiesced in the proposed confor-
midad. As with the Italian "application of punishment upon request of the
parties," the judge may impose a lesser sentence within the range provided
by law or even suspend the sentence or acquit.331 The LOTJ also allows
the judge to reject a conformidad if there is reason to believe that the
pleaded offenses were not committed, do not constitute a crime, or a de-
fense of excuse or justification exists. Under such circumstances, the case
Bilbao ptde que se eviten vistas con jurado sin contenido, EL CORREO (May 23, 1997)
<http://www.diano.elcorreo.es> (BI-2).
328. The deprivation of liberty requested by the private prosecutor was reduced from
14 to six years, so as to facilitate a conformidad. The defendant abandoned his not guilty
by reason of insanity plea. Judg. (CS-2) (on file with author). See also Vicente Cor-
nelles, El jurado no ntervno en el segundojuicto en Castelldn con este nuevo prodedi-
miento, EL MEDiTRRAEo, Nov. 26, 1996, at 10 (CS-2).
329. Judg. (AB-1) (on file with author). Carmona Ruano & DePa~il Velasco, supra
note 106, at 15.
330. Thus, in GI-1 both prosecution and defense were in agreement that the 32 year
old paranoid schizophrenic defendant was insane when he clubbed his mother to death,
but the defense insisted the crime be characterized as negligent homicide due to lack of
intent to kill. The jury did find that the acts constituted a negligent homicide and ac-
quitted due to the excuse of insanity. Pl. Def., Judg. (GI-1) (on file with author); Inter-
view with Lacaba Sdnchez, supra note 162 (GI-1).
331. GPMENo SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 276-77. Section 655 LECr.
provides that the judge must accept the facts as contained in the pleadings and must im-
pose a sentence "no greater" than that recommended by the prosecuting parties. § 655
LECr., supra note 149. Thus, if the judge determines that the facts do not constitute a
criminal offense, an acquittal would be in order. In a Barcelona case charging failure to
render aid in which the defendant struck a pedestrian with his motorcycle, the defendant
accepted a conformidad with a maximum sentence of six months in prison, but the judge
found that the facts pleaded did not constitute the offense and acquitted. Case of Jos6
Vinyals Vilaseca, Sentencia 6/97, Barcelona Provincial Court (Apr. 23, 1997) (on file
with author).
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will continue.332 Critics view the trial judge's power to nullify a conformi-
dad m favor of the defendant as a violation of the accusatory principle, in
that the judge would be in essence "pleading" exculpatory facts not
pleaded by the defense, thus compromising his or her neutrality and con-
ceivably harming the defendant if the jury rejects the exculpatory theory
and convicts.333 Clearly the better resolution in such a situation is for the
judge to enter a directed verdict of acquittal.334
I. Other Procedures for Resolution in Lieu of Submitting the Case to
the Jury
Following the prosecutor's closing argument, the judge, either on a
defense motion or ex oficio, may dissolve the jury and enter a directed ver-
dict of acquittal if he or she "believes that the evidence introduced at the
trial was insufficient to sustain the burden of proof necessary to convict the
defendant., 335 This section was patterned after Rule 29(a) of the U.S. Fed-
eral Rules of Criminal Procedure and was seen by the authors of the LOTJ
as a judicial guarantee of the presumption of innocence and a mechanism
for avoiding surprising guilty verdicts on insufficient evidence. 336 It has
been criticized because it necessitates the trial judge's evaluation of the
evidence, thus invading the jury's province.
337
332. §§ 50(2), (3) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
333. GImENO SENDRA, COMENTARIos, supra note 43, at 275-76.
334. G6M z COLONMR, supra note 41, at 108-09; L6pez Ortega, supra note 106, at 12;
Martin PallIn & Jos6 Antonio, La nueva Ley del Jurado: Analisis Critico, in TRIBUNAL
DEL JURADO, supra note 68, at 278-79. For discussion of the directed verdict, see discus-
sion infra Part V.I.
335. § 49 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. The defense unsucccss-
fully moved for a directed verdict of acquittal in GR-2. Interview with Garca-Alix, su-
pra note 239. On appeal, the TSJ of Andalucla reversed the conviction and entered a
verdict of acquittal. Un tribunal de Analucla revoca el veredicto de unjurado popular,
EL PAls, Mar. 6, 1997 (GR-2).
336. § IV(4) EM-LOTJ, supra note 19. According to Mares Roger and Mora Alarc6n,
this power attributed to the trial judge compensates for his or her inability to participate
injury deliberations as is possible in a "mixed court." MARES ROGER & MORA ALARC6N,
supra note 41, at 335-36.
337. See Diaz Cabiale, supra note 190, at 278-79, (criticizing the law's authors for
not allowing the other possibilities of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 29 (b),
(c), that of entering a verdict of acquittal notwithstanding the jury verdict, which would
preclude invading the jury's province. Gimeno Sendra shares this concern, claiming that
any jury verdicts based on insufficient evidence can be corrected on appeal. GiMENO
SENDRA, COmENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 270-71. L6pez-Mufioz y Larraz criticizes the
provision for undermining the judge's neutrality. LOPz-MuiRoz Y LARRAZ,
COMEMARIOS, supra note 54, at 128.
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Finally, the LOT provides that the jury will be discharged whenever
all prosecution parties ask for dismissal. This may occur at the end of the
trial, upon modification of the pleadings, or any time before.338 This con-
firmation of the priority of the accusatory principle over the legalit %prin-
ciple depends, of course, on the agreement of the private prosecutor.
J. Closing Arguments and the Defendant's Last Word
Following any modifications of the pleadings, the judge allows the
parties to summarize the facts they believe have been proved, the juridical
qualification of those facts, the character of the defendant's role in the
commission of the crime and any aggravating, mitigating, or exonerating
circumstances. The public prosecutor first addresses the jury, followed by
the private prosecutor, the defense lawyer, and the representative of any
civil third party defendants. The defendant then has an opportunity to ad-
dress the jury.140
It will take time for the Spanish lawyers to accustom themselves to
arguing before a jury, rather than to legally-educated peers on the bench. In
the cases observed by the author, the parties stood or sat at the counsel ta-
ble when delivering their closing arguments. In V-i, however, the court
allowed the parties to walk around the courtroom and approach the juryr tt
A strong defense closing argument in PM-1 most likely contributed to the
338. § 51 LOTJ, reprinted in LEYDEL JURADO, supra note 1.
339. The trial court may, in lieu of granting a motion to dismiss by the public prose-
cutor, return the case to the investigative courts, especially in the case where the interests
of the victim are not being represented. § 644 LECr., supra note 149. The Russian jury
law, which allows the victim to veto a motion to dismiss, is controversial because the
victim's representatives are seldom represented by counsel and it is questionable how the
case will proceed to verdict without the participation of the public prosecutor. In one
early Moscow trial, the judge avoided the problem by simply discharging the jury and
returning the case to the investigative stage. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at
100. When the public prosecutor refused to prosecute under the LJ of 1888, the presid-
ing judge would allow anyone present at the trial, including spectators, to continue the
prosecution! § 69 LJ of 1888, supra note 26.
340. §§ 734-736, 739 LECr., supra note 149.
341. The presiding judge was convinced to allow this freedom after speaking with the
jury after a mock trial performed in Palma de Mallorca. Interview with De la Rua Mo-
reno, supra note 218 (V-i). A pro-jury lawyer believes it should be within the judge's
discretion to allow the lawyers to approach the jury, so that they can "smell the jurors"
when "we throw all our meat into the oven." L6pez-Mufloz y Larraz, Crdnica, supra
note 219, at XII. In 0-1, the judge gave the lawyers the freedom to move around, but
they declined to exercise it. Interview with Alvarez Seijo, supra note 230.
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defendants' acquittal. 342 On the other hand, the private prosecutor in GR-1
deftly argued certain aspects of the seventy-three year old defendant's
courtroom demeanor and proclaimed amnesia as to the details of her al-
leged crime to convince the jury to reject the unanimous conclusions of
four psychiatric experts, the public prosecutor, and the defense that defen-
dant was not guilty by reason of insanity.343 While the defense lawyer in
CO-1 based her case on a sociological study of the poverty-stricken neigh-
borhood in which the young defendant and his alcoholic, abusive father
grew up and the pattern of child and spousal abuse which led to the defen-
dant's character disorders and psychiatric record, the prosecution took a
common sense approach, emphasizing that the defendant -was aggressive
and hostile, the father disliked him for those reasons, and that the defen-
dant was stronger than his decrepit father.344 In BI-1, after the prosecutor
emphasized that the defendant, while impulsive, was "a normal man, com-
pletely conscious of his acts," who had two prior convictions for infliction
of injuries, and had purchased the knife intending to return to the bar and
confront the victim and her husband, the defense asked for sympathy,
calling his client a "socially marginal individual" and the victims "sick
persons who had had enough." He stated that the jury should base its deci-
sion on the "Code" which governed in Las Cortes, the degenerate zone of
Bilbao frequented by thugs and drug addicts. He finished: "Remember, I
am not asking for a verdict of innocence, only of not guilty "3"
In the Otegi case (SS-2) the parties tried not to unduly arouse the
jury's possible prejudices. The public prosecutor thanked the judge for the
"tranquility" with which the trial was conducted,346 labeled the defendant's
342. As the author observed, the prosecutor asked the jury to "send a message" with a
verdict of guilty that "everything cannot be bought with money." Ile acknowledged,
however, that it was the first case of alleged bribery he had seen where the defendant
demanded a receipt. See also Javier E. Olivares, El jurado tard6 tres horas en emitir tn
veredicto absolutorto, DIARIO DE MALLORCA, May 28, 1996, at 9 (PM-I).
343. This occurred notwithstanding good arguments by both the prosecutor and de-
fense counsel. As the author observed, the latter cited a famous Spanish jurist in seeking
the jury's sympathy for his aged, paranoid client, claiming, "one must hate the crime but
love the criminal." Gallastegui & Ines Efe, supra note 237 (GR-1).
344. As observed by the author, the defense was also undermined by the defendant's
unlikely defense of accident-that the knife flew out of his sleeve and penetrated the fa-
ther's heart-and by the overtly pro-prosecution judge who interrupted her closing ar-
gument so he could relieve himself.
345. Javier Mufioz, El alegato de Tellechea, EL CoRREo, Apr. 12, 1997 (BI-1).
346. One incideiit did, however, occur while the autopsy experts were showing slides
of the slain policemen. One victim's mother began to cry, and she and other family
members screamed at the defendant, yelling "assassin" and "look what you have donel"
before being escorted out of the courtroom. The father of another victim pointed at de-
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act as "vile and cowardly" and told the jury to "forget the parties and
evaluate the case according to your conscience." The public prosecutor
alleged that Otegi was "motivated by the hatred he felt towards the ert-
zamtza, not because he was crazy, and that an acquittal would be giving
the defendant a "license to kill." Defense counsel concluded with the fol-
lowing request to the jury: "[i]f you consider that Otegi, a young man of
twenty-three years, a conscientious objector, a lover of Basque rock and
roll, got drunk with his friends (the gaupasa), lived anguished and accused,
and that he could take no more and lost control, then declare him not
guilty.j
347
It appears as if few of the defendants in the first trials have effectively
availed themselves of the opportunity provided by the "last word" to di-
rectly appeal to the jury's sympathy.3 ° Exceptions occurred in B-2, in
which the defendant tried to appeal to the jury's sympathy by apologizing
and explaining his conduct,349 and in BI-1, where the defendant stated, "I
am sorry for what happened, but I was responding to a provocation. I did
not decide the fate of Maria Jesls. It was already decided when she
hooked up with her boyfriend." 350
fense counsel and screamed: "those who defend him are the guilty ones." Javier Peyalba,
Los familiares de los dos ertzainas laman asesino a Mikel Olegi y abandonan la sala,
DLAMO VASCO (Mar. 4, 1997) <http://www.diano-vasco.com> (SS-2).
347. Javier Peyalba, Fue un acto 'ily cobarde ' movido por el 'odlo' de Olegi hacia
la Ertzaintza, afirman las acusaciones, DiARIo VASCO, Mar. 5, 1997, at 6; Ivan Orio, Las
acusaciones dicen que Otegi cometi6 un 'acto vii * por su 'odlo' hacla la ErIzalniza, EL
CoR rO (Mar. 5, 1997) <httpi/www.diano. elcorreo.es> (SS-2). In an interview afler
the trial, the private prosecutor indicated that the parties had made a "gentleman's
agreement! not to make declarations which could be interpreted as putting "pressure" on
the jury. He also eulogized the "exquisite" conduct of the defense lawyer. Javier
Mufioz, Hay datos para pensar que hubo miedo, EL CORREO (Mar. 9, 1997)
<http://www.diario.elcorreo.es> (SS-2).
348. As the author observed, in PM-1 and CO-I, the defendants said nothing, and in
GR-1, the 73 year-old mentally ill defendant just stood up and cried. In VA-1. the de-
fendant just said: "I did not intend to kill. I'm sorry." In V-i, the defendant reiterated
that he only wanted to demand a paternity test, which was irrelevant to the charges. Vel-
ert, supra note 212 (V-I). Otegi was planning to repeat his apology to the family of the
slain police officers until their outbursts in court, Mufloz, supra note 347, and thus he
gave no "last word." Interview with Castells Arteche, supra note 142 (SS-2). The de-
fendant in BU-1 was also silent. Interview with Fernando Mena, supra note 162.
349. Peir6n, supra note 216 (B-2).
350. Javier Mufioz, supra note 345 (BI-1).
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K. The Role of the Jury in Assessing Criminal Responsibility: Verdict
Form and Judicial Instructions
1. Introduction
"The jury is sovereign," remarked the judge in M-2 after the defen-
dant was acquitted of his brother's murder.3 1 But the degree to which ju-
ries should be "sovereign" was the subject of controversy throughout the
nineteenth century in the wake of continental Europe's importation of the
English jury after the French Revolution. By and large, continental Euro-
pean countries, including Spain, rejected the division of labor between
judge and jury favored m England and America, according to which the
jury returns a perfunctory verdict of "guilty" or "not guilty" following in-
struction by the court as to the law which must be applied in determining
guilt with respect to each charged offense, and which principles of criminal
procedure govern the evaluation of the evidence received. Continental
Europeans adopted a type of "special verdict" composed of an often long
and complicated list of questions relating to the defendant's alleged acts,
his intent, any circumstances which excused, mitigated or aggravated the
commission of the acts, and, in most jurisdictions, his guilt.
35 '
But that was not all. Europeans did not feel lay people could or should
"apply the law" to the facts, but that the bench, legally trained (as many
English and American judges were not) and imbued with the duty to seek
the truth and ensure the equal application of the law according to the rules
of legal "science," should do so. The French, following Montesequieu,
believed that the jury should determine only the "facts" and that the bench
should be responsible for applying the law to those facts to determine guilt
and punishment. However, the English tradition that the jury is the con-
science of-the community made it ideologically difficult to restrict juries to
the mere determination of "naked facts." Thus, most statutes allowed the
jury to decide the question of "guilt," but still attempted to protect the
bench's monopoly in applying the law. The difficulty in separating "ques-
tions of fact" from "questions of law" and thus delimiting the provinces of
jury and judge has long been recognized in the continental European dis-
cussion:
351. Hernndez, supra note 323 (M-2).
352. When the jury in Spain was restricted to press crimes, the law allowed a simple
verdict of "guilty or not guilty." § 78 Real Decreto de 2 de abril de 1852, reformando Ins
dispociones vigentes en materia de imprenta. The "question list" was first introduced
with the LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24; Manuel Marchena G6mez, annotations in
PARZ-CRuz MARTiN, CoMENTAnios, supra note 44, at 239.
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It is at the same time both clear and plausible that the historical com-
ponent of the factual question relating to guilt or innocence cannot be
separated from the legal, without turning the jury into a joke, which is
different from other jokes only because it is too serious a thing to be
laughed at. For if the jury is only asked whether certain facts laid be-
fore them are historically true or not, then the judges, appointed by the
overlord, are alone lords and masters over the guilt or innocence of the
accused, for the qualification of the deed always depends on their
judgment.353
The inability to separate questions of fact and law, and the European
unwillingness to adopt the Anglo-American verdict form, which allows the
jury to apply (and even nullify) the law in the secrecy of their delibera-
tions, gradually led to the consolidation ofjury and bench in the European
"mixed courts." Under this system, however, the division of labor between
lay and professional judges, and the precise manner of instruction as to the
law and its application are also cloaked in the absolute secrecy of the de-
liberations of the mixed court.
2. Description and Function of the Verdict Form
The following analysis of the verdict form and the accompanying ju-
dicial instructions will address the problem discussed above and the
LOTJ's attempted resolution. The law's authors were well aware of the
historical discussion, especially in relation to the nineteenth century Span-
ish jury laws, and the treatment of the verdict form in those laws will be
referred to when pertinent.
354
First, the authors of the LOTJ were consistent with continental Euro-
pean precedent in having the jury return a "special verdict" consisting of
"sequentially articulated" propositions, rather than the simple "guilty/not-
guilty" Anglo-American verdict.3 55 But instead of the list of "questions"
353. ANSELm FEuERBAC-, BETRACHTUNGEN OBER DAS GEscHwoRENEN-GERUCHT 170
(Landshut, 1813) (author's translation).
354. References will be made to the new Russian jury legislation, for it also rekindled
discussion of the same problems.
355. "That (the Anglo-American) formula is more consistent with a conception of the
law which is contrary to the full validity and supremacy of the legality principle. There,
where the jury can irresponsibly substitute a generic and apriori legislative criterium for
its conception in a concrete case, the apodictic verdict requires neither articulation nor
justification. In our system, the jury must subject itself inexorably to the legislative
mandate. And this is only susceptible to control to the extent the verdict exteriorizes the
course of the argument which justifies it" § V(1) EM-LOTJ, supra note 19, at 35-36.
The Anglo-American jury's "laconic 'guilty' or 'not-guilty"' verdict would not be con-
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which were submitted to the jury in the nineteenth century, 56 the Spanish
legislature opted for a written verdict form (objeto del veredicto) in which
the judge "narrates in separate, numbered paragraphs the facts alleged by
the parties, which the jury should declare to be proved or not, differentiat-
ing between those which are against the defendant, and those which are fa-
vorable."
357
Section 52(1) of the LOTJ provides that the verdict form should set
out the following propositions in order as to each charged crime and each
charged defendant: (1) the facts which prove the commission of the crime
(corpus delict) and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator;358 (2) the
defense allegations; (3) the facts which could completely jusify or excuse
the charged criminal acts; (4) a narrative of the facts that determine the de-
gree of execution or participation in the offense, or any statutory aggra-
vating or mitigating circumstances; (5) the "criminal act as to which the
defendant must be declared guilty or not guilty;" and (6) in the event of a
guilty verdict, the jury must be allowed to recommend a suspended sen-
tence (remisi6n condicional de lapena) or clemency (indulto).39
Before analyzing the efficacy of the Spanish verdict fbrm, it is im-
portant to understand its connection with the other pivotal procedural
documents in the case. The theses which compose the verdict form are
often taken verbatim from the "ruling on justiciable facts" (auto de hechos
sistent with Article 120.3 CE's requirement that all criminal judgments be supported with
reasons. GIM4wo SENDRA, CoMNTARios, supra note 43, at.281.
356. § 741 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24; § 70 LJ of 1888, supra note 26.
357. § 52(1)(a) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. The authors felt
the drafting of propositions gave the jury more flexibility than the questions of the nine-
teenth century, which required monosyllabic "yes" or "no" answers and would better re-
flect the "collective opinion of the jury." § V(1) EM-LOTJ, supra note 19, at 36. Im-
portant in this respect is the jurors' ability to change the formulation of the propositions,
which will be discussed in the next section. Despite the change in terminology, G6mez
Colomer refers to the new verdict form as a "question list" basically following the form
in the LJ of 1888. G6MEZ COLOMER, supra note 41, at 117. This article will also refer to
the "propositions" as "questions" (as is done in most of the newspaper articles).
358. In Spanish terminology this is called the "hecho principal" (principle fact). §
52(1)(a) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
359. § 52(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. While normally
based on the parties' pleadings, the judge may ex oficio add additional facts or pleadings
which resulted from the taking of evidence, as long as they do not worsen the position of
the defendant. § 52(l)(g) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Similar
provisions were contained in the old jury laws. § 747 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note
24; § 75 LJ of 1888, supra note 26. This provision, akin to instructing sua sponte on
lesser included offenses in U.S. trials, has been criticized for violating the accusatory
principle and the impartiality ofthejudge. G6mEZ COLOMiER, supra note: 41, at 116, 118;
Marchena G6mez, supra note 352, at 246; Palomino Martin, supra note 99, at 130;
L6pez-Mufloz y Larraz, annotations in MANUAL DEL JURADO, supra note 98, at 363.
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justiciables), reformulated to account for any new evidence presented at
trial and any modifications of the pleadings pursuant to section 48 of the
LOTJ. The "ruling on justiciable facts" is itself an amalgam of the accu-
satory and defense pleadings, which, as they came together during the pre-
liminary judicial inquest and the preliminary hearing, were reflected in the
investigative judge's order setting the case for trial." That this paper trail
of pleadings and judicial rulings often survive the solemnly-proclaimed
oral trial (juicio oral), with its principles of immediacy, and the jury's in-
time conviction to the judge's conclusions is truly amazing. Despite the
elimination of the investigative dossier's hegemony in the Spanish trial, the
pre-packaged pleadings are often repackaged into the verdict form in the
form of excruciatingly "leading" allegations for the jury's affirmation or
rejection.
The problem Spanish judges face in applying the LOTJ is the conver-
sion of the parties' pleadings, which often contain factual assertions not
necessary for the proof of the elements of the charged offenses, into ques-
tions which are both understandable to lay judges and sufficient vehicles
for determining the proof, or lack thereof, of the elements of the charged
offenses and of any circumstances which mitigate, aggravate, justify or ex-
cuse the crimes. The discussion of the Spanish verdict form will be broken
down into a discussion of the "principle fact question" related to the prose-
cution's proof of corpus delicti and authorship, the "defense allegations,"
i.e., its rendition of events tending to show the presence of an excuse, justi-
fication, or lack of criminal responsibility, and the questions of "guilt" and
the proof of any circumstances tending to modify guilt.
3. The Principle Fact Question (corpus delicti and authorship)
The verdict form is supposed to commence with a setting forth of the
facts which constitute the prosecution's proof of the corpus delicti of the
charged offenses and the defendant's identity as the perpetrator.3 62 As in
360. GIMENO SENDRA, COMEwTAmmOS, supra note 43, at 222-23, 282-83, traces the
genesis of the pleadings and procedural documents. Cf. Marchena G6mez, supra note
352, at 251.
361. The same problem occurs in the modem Russian jury trial, in which some judges
believed that every fact they refer to in their judgments must be decided by the jury.
Russian "question lists" and judgments often follow verbatim the language of the accu-
satory pleading (there are no defense pleadings or judicial rulings on justiciable facts).
See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 116. One Spanish judge has noted that the
less detailed the questions in the verdict form, the more time the jury needs for delibera-
tion. Interview with Gimeno Jubero, supra note 226 (B-3).
362. § 52(1)(a) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. In B-7, a trespass
case, the question list began with three questions favorable to the Cuban-born defendant,
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the LOTJ, the "principle fact" in jury trials under the LJ of 1888 could be
articulated in a number of questions to avoid confusing the jurors:
The principal fact will always be the object of the first question, but
with respect to it and the other questions in relation to which evidence
was presented in the trial, as many questions may be asked as are nec-
essary to facilitate a unified concept in the answers of the jurors and so
that facts are not accumulated in a single question, some of which
could be answered affirmatively and others negatively.
363
The analysis of the Spanish question list will refer chiefly to homicide
cases, the most typical and most complex cases tried in the new jury
courts. 3  The "principal fact" which must be proved in a Spanish homi-
cide case is that a homicide has occurred and that the defendant was the
perpetrator. 365 To prove a murder, a homicide must typically be accompa-
nied by one of two aggravating mental states: that of treachery (alevosia)
or excessive cruelty (ensaflamento).366 Because the identity of the perpe-
trator has seldom been at issue in the Spanish cases,367 it has rarely been
relating how she marred her Spanish husband, came to Spain, was forced into prostitu-
tion and ended up homeless. On appeal of her acquittal, the TSJ of Catalonia rebuked
the "confused, equivocal and incorrect form" in which the question list was prepared,
emphasizing that the prosecution should be allowed to first prove its case "to allow the
defense from the start to adopt a purely passive, contemplative position." The error was
deemed to be harmless, however. Obj. Ver., Dec. TSJ (B-7) (on file with author), In B.
11, a clearly pro-defense question list began with 13 questions favorable to the defen-
dant, sketching a classic battered woman's plight. The defendant was acquitted of the
murder of her male friend and apparently the case was not appealed. Obj.Ver. (B-I1) (on
file with author).
363. § 72 LJ of 1888, supra note 26.
364. The author has analyzed 49 question lists in homicide cases (those listed in Ap-
pendix I). Translations from seven of the question lists are reproduced in the Appendi-
ces. Appendix II contains all the Otegi documents, and Appendix III contains transla-
tions of the question lists from A-3, B-4, CS-I*, 0-3, SA-4, and VI-1.
365. Because most of the homicides took place while the CP 1973 was in effect and
all the trials took place after the CP 1995 went into effect, the cases refer to either stat-
ute, depending on which -would be more favorable to the defendant. Both homicide stat-
utes, punish anyone who "kills another human being." § 407 CP 1973, supra note 89; §
138 CP 1995, supra note 69. Although causation has only rarely been an issue in the
first cases, many courts formulate separate questions relating thereto.
366. Cf §§ 139(l), (2) CP 1995, supra note 69; § 406(1), (5) CP 1973, supra note 89.
In these sections, ensafiamzento is described as "deliberately and inhumanely augmenting
the pain of the victim." The aggravating factor of financial gain, , has not been charged,
§§ 139(2) CP 1995, supra note 69; 406 (2) CP 1973, supra note 89. Eighteen of the 49
homicide cases for which question lists have been examined have included murder
charges. The issue of intent to kill will be examined in Part V.K.5.
367. Carmona Ruano and DePafil Velasco attribute this fact to the "criminological
reality of our country" that homicides arise from fights or "crimes of passion," the char-
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necessary to separate the corpus delicti question from the authorship ques-
tion as must be done in most Russian trials.368 There have also been cases
where the proof of authorship has been dependent on proof of a chain of
circumstantial evidence. Commentators have disagreed whether, in such
cases, each piece of evidence needed for circumstantial proof of identity
would have to be submitted to the jury in the question list, or whether the
jury would be asked only about the conclusory fact.
369
The hecho principal has been formulated in a variety of ways in the
first trials. Short, precise statements of the alleged homicidal act without
unnecessary detail have been rare.370 However, Spanish judges have by
and large stuck to their "narrative tradition" and included circumstances
before and immediately after the crime as part of the "principle fact ques-
tion" even though such information is not necessary to prove corpus delicti
and perpetration. The Spanish judge wants to tell a story with the ques-
tions, rather than merely set forth propositions tailored to the elements of
the crime. At the end of the day, he or she must craft a reasoned judgment
based on a rendition of the stories told at trial, and the judge no longer has
the investigative dossier as a source of admissible evidence.
371
actenstics of which greatly simplify the proof of authorship. Carmona Ruano & DePa6l
Velasco, supra note 106, at 16. Indeed, of the 57 murders investigated, 25 were killings
of family members, six between unmarried couples, 12 involved killings of neighbors or
acquaintances, nine developed out of barroom altercations, and only four involved
strangers.
368. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 114. Authorship was at issue, however,
in GR-2, which focused on whether the father and grandfather of a little girl were respon-
sible for her death by drowning. The questions as to corpus delicti and authorship were
separated. Obj. Ver. (GR-2) (on file with author). They were also separated in B-10, see
infra note 383, and LU-1.
369. L6pez Ortega would only ask the jury as to deductions from circumstantial evi-
dence, not separately as to the proof of all facts necessary to make the deduction. L6pez
Ortega, supra note 106, at 15. For a contrary view, see Faustino Urquia G6mz, annota-
tions in MANUAL DEL JURADO, supra note 98, 387-89, who believes the jury should vote
on every piece of circumstantial evidence to make sure that the majority of the jury has
followed the same process of deduction.
370. An exception can be found in B-4, a murder case in which the "principle fact,"
articulating the theory of murder by treachery was articulated in the first two of the five
questions posed. See Appendix III-B. L6pez Ortega advocates a simple description of
the "principal fact" and avoidance of mere reformulation of the pleadings. Ldpez Ortega,
supra note 106, at 14. Marchena G6mez believes this question should be a nudofactum
without subjective additions and no other embellishments to qualify the conduct.
Marchena G6mez, supra note 352, at 250-51. Such additional aspects should be in sub-
sequent questions.
371. It could be said that Spanish juries are put in a "factual straitjacket" by the par-
ties' pleadings as concretized in the often detailed propositions proffered them in the
verdict form. Limited by the factual material laid out in the questions, they are not as
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Although judges attempted to formulate the hecho principal of homi-
cide in a single question in twenty one of the forty-nine homicide verdict
forms, the narrative urge to add surplusage was usually present. A mini-
mum of excess detail was present in the formulation in SA-1, which in-
volved spousal violence.3  More typical of the run-on variety of
"global ' 373 principal fact questions were those in GR-4, which included the
prehistory,374 and GR-2, which included both the prehistory and aftermath
of run of the mill rural tragedies in the Andalucian countryside. 3" Occa-
free as Anglo-American juries to discuss among themselves the various faictual permuta-
tions of the evidence in arriving at a "moral verdict" according to conscience. Anglo-
American juries, on the other hand, are confronted with both a procedural and a substan-
tive "legal straitjacket"" the facts at their disposal are limited by the rules of evidence,
and their interpretation is limited by the binding instructions on the law given by the
judge.
372. Obj. Ver. (SA-1) (on file with author); see Q1, Appendix III-E. Fairly concise
unitary "principle fact questions" were also present in Q1. Obj. Ver. (AB-I) on file with
author). The same was true with Q2. Obj. Ver. (GR-1) (on file with author).
373. The term "global question" was coined by Carmona Ruano & DePafl Velasco.
Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106, at 37.
374. QI: "Between 9 and 10:00 a.m. on September 19, 1996, at the country house El
Hoyo, a municipality of Montefro in the Province of Granada, the defendant, Domingo
Pdrez Gdlvez, upon seeing that his mother was not at home, went looking for her, and
found her hanged from an oak some 200 meters from the country house; he immediately
returned to his house, took a shotgun belonging to his brother-in-law Rafael Hurtado
Gamiz and went to the nearby country house, 30 meters distant, where Rafael Cano
Aguilera went every day to do field work, whereupon he called out to him, and when he
came out of the corral or stables, shot him at a distance of between two eand four meters
with the intent of killing him, and hit him in the chest, and when he fell to the ground, a
second shot penetrated his right lumbar region, hitting vital organs such as the heart,
liver and lung, which caused his death instantaneously." Obj. Ver. (GR-4) (on file with
author).
375. QI: "Around 4:45 p.m. on March 28, 1996, after arriving by car from Beznar, the
defendant Antonio Martos Rodriguez and his wife Carmen Prez Solier headed towards
their house in Los Acebuches, whereupon his wife went to the family house while he,
Antonio Martos Chaves and Isabel Rodriguez Molina, stayed with their daughters Anto-
nia, "Tofi," four years old, and Maria del Carmen, 7 year old, who were playing with
their cousin Rosa near the house.
"Around 5:00 p.m., the grandmother Isabel, for unknown reasons, pushed Tofi, who fell
to the ground and hit her head, losing consciousness.
"After trying to resuscitate her without success, the grandfather, thinking she was dead,
threw her over his shoulders and climbed above the village to a reservoir and threw her
into the water, causing her to drown by asphyxiation.
"All the while the father, Antonio Martos Rodriguez, omitting to perform a series of pa-
ternal duties, did nothing in opposition to what his father did, but, on the contrary, pre-
tending that his daughter had gotten lost, caused the organization of a search along with
the neighbors, conducting them initially to areas far from the reservoir, until around
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sionally, the hecho principal will be formulated in "global" form in one
question to include all aggravating and mitigating circumstances alleged by
the prosecution. 76 Many courts will juxtapose such a "global" fact-laden
hecho principal, prefaced as the thesis of the public prosecutor and in-
variably culled verbatim from the prosecution's pleadings, with the simi-
larly prefaced defense rendition of the fatal encounter taken from the de-
fense pleadings; this might include the entire defense theory3" or merely a
reiteration of the prosecution's theory without a crucial element, such as
intent to kill or treachery.378
Whether excess verbiage is included in a "global" principal fact ques-
tion or not, it is common in homicide cases in relation to the cause of
death. Although the cause of death is usually undisputed, it is often de-
scribed in minute detail, reproducing verbatim the precise medical de-
scriptions of the lethal wounds from the prosecution's pleadings, them-
selves taken from the forensic medical expert's autopsy report.
3 79
11:45 p.m. the girl was found floating in the reservoir in a prone position." Obj. Ver.
(GR-2) (on file with author).
376. See QA1; Appendix III-A. Note the "suddenness," an element of treachery
needed to prove murder, and the surrender to the police, evidence of the mitigating cir-
cumstance of remorse. See discussion infra Part V.I.5.
377. This was the case with Obj. Ver. (A-3) (on file with author); see also Appendix
III-A; see discussion infra Part V.K.4.
378. For instance, Question IA in 0-2 read: "According to the Public Prosecutor
(unfavorable): Around 12:00 noon on March 22, 1996, at the family home situated on
Conde Toreno Street, no. 25-1, in Gij6n, the defendant Luis Lastra Pirez was with his
toolbox in the bathroom trying to repair a minor problem, while his 25 year-old daughter
Ana Florinda Lastra L6pez, a deaf mute since birth, who was in the hall cleaning, asked
him to wait with the repairs until she had completed her cleaning, which request
prompted an argument between the two and mutual shoving, at which time Luis Lastra
Pdrez took a mechanic's ball hammer from his toolbox and, with apparent intent to kill,
hit Ana Florinda in the head and thorax, first in the dining room, then in her bedroom
into which the defendant had pursued his daughter, without ceasing to hit her with the
hammer in her head, and finally m the bathroom he hit her several more times, after
which the woman fell to the ground and died as a result of politraumatic shock and se-
vere hemorrhage, with the destruction of vital centers localized almost exclusively in the
cranium." Question 1B presented a shortened version of these eyents, omitting any intent
to kill. Obj. Ver. (0-2) (on file with author).
379. Examples are in Question 2 of MA-5, a "global" hecho principal which gives a
minute description of the 23 stab wounds inflicted by the defendant on his father, speci-
fying which were potentially fatal, which were not, and which were defense wounds.
The same was done in a separate question with regard to the 31 stab wounds in Question
9 of B-3. Obj. Ver. (B-3) (on file with author). The descriptions of the "hugging death"
accorded his mother by the defendant in Question 2 of LU-I are couched in medical
terms no one but a doctor could understand. Obj. Ver. (LU-1) (on file with author).
While Question 4A in 0-3 provides similar detail of the damage caused by the knife
wound the defendant inflicted on his father, the cause of death was at issue in that case
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Some courts have not only used lengthy formulations in the "principle
fact" question, but also in all questions relating to res gestae, whether oc-
curring before or after the killing. In BI-1, the stage for a deadly knifing in
a bar was set in a proposition containing five separate paragraphs, any of
which could have been affirmed or rejected by the jury.38° In CS-I*, the
judge used four lengthy questions taken nearly verbatim from the prosecu-
tion's pleadings to describe the events before a fatal encounter outside a
bar in Vila-Real. 381 Lengthy questions have also been employed economi-
cally, each being addressed to a crucial element in the prosecution's proof
or the defense strategy.
382
In several cases, Spanish judges have also chosen to express their
predilection for narrative (and often, irrelevant) detail in a multitude of
short factual questions, whether to address the necessary elements of cor-
pus delicti and authorship, to preserve the unities of time, space and plot,
or to provide the psychic and historical background material for an assess-
ment of the defendant's mental state. Of the sixty-six short factual ques-
tions posed in B-10, a murder case with two co-defendants, six of the first
and was eventually resolved to the defendant's benefit. See Appendix 1J1-D. In M-2,
defense counsel objected to inclusion of such medical terminology in the verdict form,
claiming that the jury was not qualified to decide these issues. The objection was over-
ruled, and the judge held that "it is relevant that the jury has an exact idea of the wounds
which the victim suffered," and that the medical terms were precise and not confusing.
Prot. of Discussion of Obj. Ver., Obj. Ver. (M-2) (on file with author). The same issue
arose in the first Russian jury trials. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 116 n. 342.
380. Question 1: "Around 7"45 p.m. on January 30, 1996, Mr. Jos6 Ignacio Tellechea
Arias entered the Pub Harlem at Cortes Street, No. 19 in this city, accompanied by Mr.
Josd Antonio Montes Garachana.
"Mr. Josd Ignacio Tellechea came to this place to the end of resolving a dispute he had
with the waiter in said pub, Mr. Antonio Romero Moriano. This dispute related to a
quantity of 15,000 pesetas demanded by the former.
"Mr. Jos6 Antonio Montes accompanied him to try to mediate the dispute between him
and said waiter.
"Mr. Jos6 Ignacio Tellechea carried a concealed kitchen knife 20 centimeters in length.
He bought this knife around 7:30 p.m. at the hardware store "Losil" at No. 22, San Fran-
cisco Street. He had wrapped this knife in a newspaper and had placed it in the left part
of his pants, between the belt and the waist, covered by his jacket.
"At the moment they entered the pub, the aforementioned Mr. Antonio Romero Moriano
and his wife Ms. Maria Jesfis Ulloa were in the pub. Moments later, Mr. Juan Carlos
Araujo Carrasco also entered." Obj. Ver. (BI-1) (on file with author).
381. See Q1-4, Appendix III-C. In the first trial of the same case, CS-I, the hecho
principal was even wordier, was phrased in five questions, and reproduced the prosecu-
tion's pleadings verbatim. Obj. Ver. (CS-1) (on file with author).
382. For instance, in B-6, seven rather detailed factual questions were posed, but were
directed at proof of the hecho principal and the crucial issues of treachery, diminished
capacity, duress and heat of passion. Obj. Ver. (B-6) (on file with author).
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were aimed at proving the hechoprncipal.3  The first twenty-three of the
thirty piecemeal factual questions in B-8 were unfavorable to the defendant
and were designed to depict what led up to the "False Romeo of Terraza's"
murder of his girlfriend and his attempts to portray it as a bungled double-
suicide.3 4
Clear alternatives were postulated in a short-sentence format in VI-1,
a case in which the bouncer at a bar caused the death of an alcoholic by
throwing him down on the sidewalk. The verdict form began with a sec-
tion entitled "[u]nfavorable facts narrated by the Public Prosecutor" which
contained seven questions. The second section was entitled "[u]nfavorable
facts narrated by the Private Prosecutor" and included five questions, one
of which was a verbatim repetition of one of the public prosecutor's ques-
tions. Finally, a section entitled "[f]avorable facts narrated by the De-
fense" included nine questions.385 The most outstanding examples of ver-
dict forms with a plethora of short factual assertions are those in VA-1
(fifty-four factual questions) and the Otegi case (ninety-one factual ques-
tions), to be discussed in more detail below. The judges in Oviedo Provin-
cial Court have attempted to spare the jury the task of affirming a welter of
383. Question 1: "Around 10:00 a.m. on May 14, 1996, at a lookout in Litoral Park in
Sant Adri& del Bes6s, Francisco Lacera Rodriguez . . was stabbed with a knife." Ques-
tion 2: "He was stabbed 29 times in the head, neck, thorax, abdomen and extremities, six
of them being of great profundity which caused a severing of the pericardial sack, tearing
of both lungs and a cutting of the great omentum and the intestinal openings." Question
3: "Immediately after being stabbed, and as a result of the stab wounds, Francisco suf-
fered hemorrhagic shock which caused his death." Question 4: "The person who stabbed
Francisco did it with the intention of killing him." Question 5: "This person, at the same
place, before stabbing Francisco, hit him with a 'gypsy' club (thicker at the end with
tacks stuck in it) repeatedly all over his body, principally in the thoracic zone and the
head, causing him to fall to the ground." Question 13: "The person who hit and stabbed
Francisco, as stated above, was Luis Miguel Ugal Montero .... ." Obj. Ver. (B-10) (on
file with author). A similar small-sentence format was used in LU-I: Question 1 af-
firmed the death of the mother, Question 2, the exception, providing a long, medical de-
scription of the wounds; Question 3 posited the fact that the wounds were caused by a
forceful compression of her thoracic abdominal zone; Question 4 asserted that there was
no human intervention in the death; and Question 5 stated that it was indeed the son who
intervened to kill his mother. Seven short questions were used to cover the hecho prin-
cipal in B-12, B-14, and VI-1, see Appendix III-F, and six in SS-l. Objs. Ver. (B-12, B-
14, VI-1) (on file with author).
384. Obj. Ver. (B-8) (on file with author). In TE-1, twenty-four short factual ques-
tions were formulated in a threats prosecution and 13 in a simple case of failure to render
aid in AV-1. Objs. Ver. (TE-1, AV-1) (on file with author).
385. See Appendix I-F.
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sometimes undisputed facts by allowing the parties to "stipulate" io undis-
puted facts, removing them from the jury's consideration.
3 6
4. The "Defense Allegations"
The "defense allegations," which follow the "principle fhct question,"
should relate ideally to something other than the facts concerning justifi-
cation, excuse, mitigating or aggravating circumstances alluded to in sec-
tions 52(1)(b) and (c) of the LOTJ. A clean separation of these three types
of questions3 7 has, however, been made difficult by the narrative and often
verbose tendencies of the judges described above. Were the "principal fact
question" to precisely depict only the minimum and necessary elements of
homicide, i.e., fact of an unlawful killing and the defendant's authorship, a
defendant's response would often be unnecessary The LOTJ has provided
some guidelines for phrasing prosecution and defense allegations so that
they do not confuse the jury. First, the judge "shall not include favorable
and unfavorable facts in a single paragraph, or facts, some of which could
be deemed proved and others not."388 Second, "if the simultaneous consid-
eration of (the prosecution's and defense's) allegations is impossible with-
out contradiction, only one proposition should be included. '31'9
Thus, if the defense pleads alibi, or insufficient proof of authorship,
the defense need not present affirmative allegations. If the jury refuses to
affirm the question dealing with authorship in the hecho principal, an ac-
quittal is already forthcoming. The same holds true for a defi,nse of lack of
proximate cause. If the jury determines that the allegatiorL of causation
was not proved, that issue has been decided without a further question.
Where, however, the act and authorship component of the homicide are not
disputed in the abstract, but mental state is at issue, and some variations in
386. In 0-1, involving a father's killing of his son, the parties stipulated to the diffi-
culties in the defendant's relationship with his, and that the defendant had spent the night
in an outbuilding on their farm, and returned to the house around 9:30 a.m. on the day of
the killing. Obj. Ver. (0-1) (on file with author). See Appendix III-D (stipulations);
QC9, Appendix Ili-A (regarding the issue of spontaneous remorse).
387. In formulating the verdict form, the judge must achieve a "logical fragmentation
of the content of the respective accusatory and defense proposals, to the end of parceling
out its juridical value for thejury." Marchena G6mez, supra note 352, at 243.
388. § 52(i)(a) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. § 72 LJ of 1888,
supra note 26, contained similar limitations. Note how many of the "global" questions
listed in the previous section seem to violate this rule, i.e., Question I in BI-1, supra note
380.
389. § 50(1)(a) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. This provision
also existed in § 742 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24 and § 71 LJ of 1888, supra
note 26.
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the act component pleaded by the prosecution are alleged by the defense,
then the defense must inject the issue through an alternate formulation re-
lating to the hecho principal. Therefore, if the defendant claims that a
killing was not intentional, asserting the complete excuse of accident, or
responsibility for a crime of gross or simple negligence, questions must be
formulated dealing with intent to kill, recklessness and negligence.3 9 If
self defense is raised, questions relating to any prior aggression by the vic-
tim, proportionality of means, mutual combat, and so forth must be raised.
Such facts are necessarily entwined with the facts surrounding the homi-
cidal act, and judges have struggled in the first cases over how to formulate
and where to situate these facts in the verdict form.
Where the judge has chosen a lengthy "global" single-question for-
mulation of the hecho principal, it has been common to follow it with a
"global defense allegation" usually gleaned from the defense pleadings.
This necessitates repetition of many of the facts alleged in the prosecu-
tion's version and clear instructions that the two questions are to be con-
sidered as alternatives, i.e., that an affirmative answer to the first precludes
answering the second. An example is the defense allegation of an accident
scenario in A-3.391
Where the judges have chosen to pose a series of question explaining
how the argument or fight started which culminated in the fatal incident,
they have chosen several patterns. In CS-I*, the first four questions de-
picting the prosecution's rendition of the events before the killing were
followed by seven "favorable" propositions from the defense pleadings
giving the defense rendition of the fatal encounter.392 The verdict form
does not tell the jury that, for instance, an affirmative answer that the de-
fendant intended to kill in Question 5 would of necessity preclude an-
390. The question list in SA-1, which follows this model, is in the author's opinion,
perhaps the most successful attempt at concisely formulating the hecho principal and
providing the factual underpinnings for the defense in this case of accident. See Appen-
dix IlI-E.
391. See QA2, Appendix HI-A.
392. See Q5-11, Appendix HI-C. In CS-1, the defense position vis-A-vis the hecho
principal was couched in three run-on propositions plucked from the defense pleadings,
which, as in CS-I*, did not alert the jury to the impropriety of answering the defense
questions if the prosecution's theory was affirmed. While the jury in CS-1 answered all
of the first seven questions m the affirmative, they included no explicit contradictions.
This was not the case in the retrial, in which the jury affirmed all of the prosecution and
defense propositions as to the hecho principal some of which were contradictory. This
has been alleged as an error in the appeal of the private prosecutor. Obj. Ver., Appellate
Brief of Pvt. Pros. (CS-I*) (on file with author).
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swering the accident thesis presented in Question 8."' In AL-2, which in-
volved charges against two brothers m a homicide, one as he perpetrator
and the other as the accomplice, the verdict form begins with "Part A," en-
titled "[flact of the death of Jos6 Lara Fuentes and the intervention therein
of the ,defendant Baldomero Amador Amador." It then poses a lengthy
prosecutorial version of the events leading up to the shooting as "Fact 1,"
followed by the defendant's rendition, entitled "alternative to Fact 1."
"Fact 2" follows with another "alternative," and finally, "Fact 3," which
addresses the prosecution's version of the shooting, is followed by "first
alternative to Fact 3," outlining an accident defense, and "second alterna-
tive to Fact 3," outlining a negligence defense.394 As noted above, the
judge in VI-1 formulated three separate alternatives composed of groups of
questions, first the thesis of the public prosecutor, then that of the private
prosecutor, and finally that of the defense.395 Finally, some judges have
chosen a purely chronological narrative style, intermingling unfavorable
prosecution facts with favorable defense facts depending on when they oc-
curred in the events before the killings.396 This becomes the most confus-
ing method when the judges have used short questions relating to every
succinct detail of the facts before the homicides.
In VA-1, the public prosecutor charged the defendant with murder by
treachery and using exceptional cruelty The defense pleadings empha-
sized numerous incidents in the relationship between the defendant and the
victim, his ex-wife, which arguably contributed to the mitigating circum-
stance of heat of passion, and each drink consumed by the defendant oi the
day of the killing to prove the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness.
The Valladolid judge, wanting to include every assertion in the pleadings
of both prosecution and defense which could support their theories of the
case, concocted a verdict form including fifty-five factual questions. The
first eighteen questions (fifteen of which were unfavorable to the defen-
dant) addressed facts dealing -with the marriage between the defendant and
the victim, how many children they had (and their names), the fact that a
sister lived with them in the past, where the victim worked, how the mar-
riage deteriorated, how they saw marriage counselors, how they separated,
how the defendant was evicted from the house, how he lived with a doctor,
how his wife was seeing another man and he thought they had an intimate
393. See Appendix III-C.
394. Obj. Ver. (AL-2) (on file with author).
395. See infra text accompanying note 427.
396. Gimeno Sendra suggests that the defense's proposed "favorable facts" could ei-
ther be intermingled chronologically with the prosecution's pleadings, or collected to-
gether under a separate rubric. GimENo SENDRA, CoMENTARIos, supra note 43, at 285.
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relationship, and so on.397 Another eleven questions dealt with the various
bars in which the defendant drank and how many drinks he had in each. 98
In the Otegi case (SS-2), the verdict form began with two succinct
"principle fact questions" addressing the killings of the two police officers,
both including intent to kill as pleaded by the prosecution parties. Fol-
lowing these questions were seventeen short unfavorable questions ad-
dressing details of the shootings, the allegation of treachery, and elements
relating to civil damages and the victims' profession, that of police offi-
cers. Next were forty-nine questions favorable to the defense, relating in
short propositions everything Otegi did the evening and morning before the
killings, all prior incidents which led him to feel he was being harassed by
the Basque police, the fact that he was unconscious when he fired, and that
he later felt remorse.3
The problems illustrated by these verdict forms of asking too many
questions, or of cramming too many facts into one question, were also
common in Spanish jury trials before 1936. The Spanish Supreme Court
criticized the tendency to ask superfluous questions which did not pertain
to the critical issues to be decided by the jury in opinions at the beginning
of the century.400 And despite the statutory caveat of section 72 of the LI
397. Obj. Ver. (VA-I) (on file with author). Critics called the verdict form "far-
ragoso" (cumbersome) and impossible for the public to understand. Ingio Arrue, Elju-
rado dice que Paito mat6 a su mjer en estado de embriaguez, con sana y premedilacidn,
EL MUtNDo DE VALLADOLID, June 8, 1996 (VA-i). After the trial, the judge himself
apologized, calling it excessive, but insisted that he included everything because "it was
in the pleadings." Juan Carlos Le6n, Eljurado nos libera de una responsabilidad, EL
NORTEDE CASTILLA, June 16, 1996, at 10-11 (VA-i).
398. The jury had to try to fathom whether the defendant drank copiously in the Bar
Madrid on Nov. 26, 1995, while lamenting the bad example his wife was setting for his
children, whether he had a drink with breakfast at the Bar Leones the morning of Nov.
27, 1995, another at the Bar Tejo and two more at the Bar Kiko, whether he had a
chorizo sandwich with wine at the Bar Madrid thereafter, and another drink of cognac at
the Bar Tejo after that, whether he returned to the Bar Madrid, again went to the Bar
Kiko, and whether he drank two or only one drinks there. Obj. Ver. (VA-I) (on file with
author).
399. See Q 1-68, Appendix II.
400. In a July 9, 1901 opinion, the Tribunal Supremo ruled that the presiding judge
did not need to ask "those questions which do not effectively influence the ability to as-
certain the qualification of the facts and circumstances." On July 9, 1907, the Supreme
Court ruled that the presiding judge need not ask questions "related to all the facts in the
pleadings of the parties, but only those which m an effective way can influence the ju-
ridical qualification of the crime, its circumstances and the participation of the culpable
persons." These opinions are cited in Marchena G6mez, supra note 352, at 266. For a
similar interpretation of the LOTJ which would eliminate "collateral" or "innocuous"
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of 1888, judges m pre-civil-war Spain were criticized for formulating
question lists that were "too complex, because they include various facts,
in relation to which distinct opinions could be formed, or were too con-
fusing or obscure.
'40 1
5. The Questions Relating to Guilt, Justification, Excuse,
Mitigating andAggravating Circumstances
The LOTJ's authors were aware of the nineteenth century controver-
sies over the division of labor between jury and judge in determining the
defendant's guilt and sentence. They sought to make clear that the jury's
power to determine "guilt" would not consist of a juridical evaluation of
the facts. That would be left to the professional judge.
Alonso Martinez (author of the LJ of 1888) understood, that to extend
the (jury's) competence to include the nomenjuris of the crime was a
manifestation of the confusion between fact and law and, in addition,
presupposes an invasion by the jury into the province of the legislator.
The latter cannot easily.be accommodated, nor is it easy to separate the
historical from the normative m the criminal prosecution. On the other
hand, systems organized around the jury which allow citizens alone to
return the verdict have been constantly criticized because the verdicts
are not supported by reasons.
The Law offers a prudent response to both objections. On the one
hand, the facts should not be conceived from a reductionist, naturalistic
perspective, but specifically and exclusively only with respect to their
juridical relevance. A fact, m the concrete situation of its multifaceted
fortuitousness, can be deemed proved only to the extent it juridically
constitutes a crime.
To deprive the jury of considering this inseparable link between the
historical configuration of data and its normative consequence, is, on
the one hand, futile, for the trial has already notified them of the con-
sequences of their decision regarding the proclaimed truth and they
questions having no impact on the verdict. GIMENO SENDRA, COMENTARIOs, supra note
43, at 284.
401. Criticisms of Supreme Court prosecutor, Juan de Aldana y Carvajal, from his
1894 annual report, in Marchena G6mez, supra note 352, at 252-53. Russian judges
wrestled with exactly the same problems, either of asking questions not necessary for the
jury to determine guilt or aggravating and mitigating circumstances, or of including un-
necessary surplusage in the questions themselves. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5,
at 116-17.
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may not omit references to such consequences in their supposedly
merely factual verdict.
402
The Spanish have wrestled with the formulation of the guilt question
throughout their experiments with jury trial. Thejury law of 1872 required
the direct positing of the guilt question in a statutorily prescribed format:
"M.N. is guilty of the crime of... (add description of the offense)." 0 3
However, the 1888 law subtly changed the nature of the question to ex-
clude the nomen iuris of the offense.4°4 A subtle change was also made in
the way the presiding judge should instruct the jury. Under the 1872 law,
the judge was required to "explain to the jury at length thefijridical nature
of the facts under discussion and which determine the circumstances con-
stituting the crime" before the court.40 5 The 1888 law uses virtually the
same language, but eliminates the adjective 'Yuridical.',406 The LOTJ has
copied the formulation of the 1888 law by requiring the judge to "explain
at length, in a form which they can understand, the nature of the facts un-
der discussion which determine the circumstances constitutive of the crime
charged.'"407 Why would the bench instruct the jury as to the "nature" (i.e.
elements) of the charged crimes if not to aid the jury in applying the lm to
the facts they have found to be true in the questions describing corpus de-
licti and perpetration, and so forth? Despite this apparently logical as-
sumption, jurists argued in the past about the nature of the guilt question.
An anonymous 1874 commentator wrote that "the technical name of the
crime should never escape from the lips of the court until after the ver-
dict,''o° and the Spanish Supreme Court, in interpreting the L of 1888,
held that the jury's declaration of guilt did not grade by itself the degree of
402. § V(1) EM-LOTJ, supra note 19, at 35. Thus, Saldalla, in his commentary on the
LJ of 1888, following its 1931 amendments, emphasized that even the "principle fact"
(hecho principal) was not a purely factual question, but was "mixed, ambiguous, half
alluding to the fact-the action-and half to the law--to guilt." Saldafla, supra 217, at
90.
403. § 750 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24.
404. "The formula for the questions is the following: 'N.N. is guilty .... ' (Here the
fact or facts which serve as the foundation for the definitive pleadings of the prosecution
and defense. . should be described with precision and clarity in the questions deemed
necessary)." § 76 LJ of 1888, supra note 26.
405. § 740 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24.
406. § 68 LJ of 1888, supra note 26.
407. § 54 (2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
408. Marchena G6mez, supra note 352, at 256.
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the defendant's liability or inalterably define the juridical character of the
facts at issue.40 9
While recognizing the difficulty of separating questions of law and
fact,410 the LOTJ's authors rejected suggestions in some of the draft jury
laws that would have had the jury pronounce directly on the guilt or inno-
cence of each defendant "with respect to each crime before the court.
' 411
Even the LOTJ Draft 2 would have had the judge "specify the crime as to
which the defendant must be found guilty or not guilty."4 When the
LOTJ finally passed through the Spanish parliament, however the lan-
guage had been changed to read "criminal act" (hecho delictivo)4 3 instead
of crime (delito) to emphasize the factual, rather than legal nature of the
finding.
In most of the first homicide trials, judges have tried to keep the guilt
question "factual" by requiring the jurors only to affirm that the defendant
was "guilty" of having "caused the death" or "killed" the victim.414 In PA-
1, the guilt question read: "The defendant, Angel Antolin Reguero, is
guilty of the criminal offense consistent with having killed Manuel Antolfn
Reguero."415 In a few cases, the question of factual authorship was for-
mulated as being synonymous with that of guilt, for instance, in LU-3,
409. STS, June 11, 1895, cited in Marchena G6mez, supra note 352, at 259. While
both the pre-revolutionary and modem Russian jury laws provide for an express finding
of guilt and judicial instructions to the jury in relation to the principles of criminal law
relating to the charged offenses, the highest courts in both eras have nevertheless inter-
preted the laws to restrict the jury to merely "factual" assertions of guilt, leaving the ju-
ridical evaluation to the professional bench. See Stephen C. Thaman, Das neue russische
Geschworenengericht, 104 ZErrscHPiFT FOR DIE GESAMTE STRAFRECHTSWISSENSCHAFT
191, at 205-06 (1996) [hereinafter "Thaman, ZSTW"].
410. Some modem commentators have held that it is possible to separate factual from
legal questions, and point to notions of double jeopardy and principles of cassation in
which factual and legal questions are separated. Mor6n Palomino, Manuel, in TRiBUNAL
DEL JURADO, supra note 68, at 39, 43.
411. See L6pez-Mufioz y Larraz Draft, supra note 60, at § 39. For a critique of the
Chinch6n Draft, supra note 63, for not having taken into consideration the inseparability
of factual and legal questions, see PLAEz-CRuz MARTIN, LA PARTICIPA(I61N, supra note
39, at 315.
412. See § 50(1)(d) LOTJ Draft-2, supra note 65, at 645.
- 413. § 52(1)(d) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
414. Obj. Ver. (LP-1) (on file with author); Obj. Ver. (VA-1) (on file with author);
Obj. Ver. (MU-I) (on file with author); Obj. Ver. (BU-1) (on file with author). The term
usually used is dado muerte. The language used for simple homicide (homicido) in the
penal code is: "anyone who kills (matare) another." § 407 CP 1973, supra note 89; §
138 CP 1995, supra note 69.
415. Obj. Ver. (PA-1) (on file with author). A similar formulation was used in Ques-
tion 4A. Obj. Ver. (0-1) (on file with author).
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"Jos6 L6pez Gandoy is the author of the death of Elisa L6pez Garcia pro-
duced by stabbing her with a kitchen knife with a blade often centimeters
and which penetrated her heart."416 Some courts have phrased the guilt
question referring to the acts charged, at times referring to the question de-
scribing those acts.417
In some cases, however, the court has invoked the nomenjuris in the
guilt formulation. For instance, m BI-1 the guilt question read, "The acts
which took place, and which have been the object of this trial, constitute a
crime of homicide, codified and punished by article 407 of the Penal Code
(1973 edition)."418 A similar form was used in a "not guilty by reason of
insanity" question" in LU-1, which stated, "[t]hat the acts constitute the
crime of homicide, but the defendant is not guilty due to his mental illness
(favorable fact).'4 19 In a few trials, some of them for minor offenses, the
guilt question has been phrased directly using the legal name for the
crime.
420
416. Obj. Ver. (LU-2) (on file with author). Compare the formulation in Question II
of MU-i: "Determine if the acts were directly carried out by the accused, thus being
guilty of causing the death of his brother." Obj. Ver. (MU-I) (on file with author).
417. The verdict form in AB-I culminated in the following proposition: "Finally, the
President of the court wants the jury to return a verdict as to whether, based on what was
declared proved, they consider the defendant Matias Correa Arenas guilty or not-guilty
of the death of Carmen Arenas Fraile." Obj. Ver. (AB-1) (on file with author). For in-
stance, in MA-2 the guilt questions related to trespassing and threats charges were for-
mulated in the following way: Question 12 asked whether the defendant was "guilty of
having penetrated into the dwelling of his neighbor, Manuel Jiminez Cabello, in the form
described in Questions 2 and 3;" and Question 13 asked whether he was "guilty of hav-
ing told Manuel Jimdnez Cabello he was going to kill him, while holding a knife, as re-
lated in Questions 4 and 6." Obj. Ver. (MA-2) (on file with author).
418. Obj. Ver. (BI-1) (on file with author). The verdict form then asks the jury to find
the defendant guilty or not guilty. Compare Question 13 of Obj. Ver. (CS-1) (on file
with author): "Jos6 Trillo Muro is guilty of killing Miguel Garrido Sanchez and his act is
constitutive of the crime of homicide." In B-7, the guilt proposition in the trespassing
trial used the nomenjuris but explained its elements: "The acts charged constitute two
crimes of trespassing in a dwelling, which consists in remaining in another's dwelling
against the will of its occupants, using threats to this end." This was followed by "[t]he
jurors should pronounce in the sense of whether the defendant is or is not guilty." Obj.
Ver. (B-7) (on file with author).
419. Obj. Ver. (LU-1) (on file with author). There was no "guilt' question, per se,
because both prosecution and defense agreed the defendant was insane.
420. For instance, Question 6 of Obj. Ver. (GR-1) (on file with author), asked if the
defendant were "guilty of the crime of homicide in having killed Virtudes Zarzas Aguil-
era." In MA-3 the jury was asked if the defendant was guilty of "the crime of homicide
of which he stands accused." Obj. Ver. (MA-3) (on file with author). The MAlaga
judges were criticized for using the word "crime" (delito) instead of "criminal act"
(hecho delictivo) also in MA-2. Carmona Ruano & DePaM Velasco, supra note 106, at
1998]
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Many courts have phrased questions in legal terms, or used the nomen
Zuris, in addressing aggravating and mitigating factors. This has been done
in murder cases which call for the proof of either treachery (alevos(a) or
exceptional cruelty (ensafiamento). For instance, in B-13 the treachery
question was as follows: "[w]hen the defendant Domingo Ortega Prez,
after grabbing the knife, stabbed Maria Angeles Campoy Garcia, he did it
with treachery, that is, in a completely sudden and surprising way, without
any risk to himself, not giving Maria Angeles any possibility to defend
herself or to escape, assuring in this way the achievement of the mortal re-
sult he was pursuing." 21 The court then formulated two guilt questions,
one asking simply whether the defendant "caused the death" of the victim,
and the second adding "with treachery" in reference to Question 6.422 In
the treachery question, it appears that the court was coupling the verdict
proposition with an instruction as to the elements of the aggravating factor,
for which the statute does not necessarily provide.
423
An example of a "treachery" question phrased only in factual terms,
was MA-1, which simply alleged that the defendant had killed his father
"while he was sleeping, in the manner described in Question 11," thus pro-
viding a factual basis for the finding of treachery.
424
66. In PM-i, Question 3 was as follows: "The jury finds Lothar Gerhard Schtatze guilty
of the commission of the crime of bribery (unfavorable fact)." Obj. Ver. (PM-I) (on file
with author). After the trial, the judge claimed he had erred and should have only asked
factually what the defendant did and not used the legal term "bribery." Interview with
L6pez Ortega, supra note 299 (PM-1). In A-i, the jury was directly asked if the defen-
dant was guilty or not guilty of the "crime of trespassing in a dwelling" and the "crime of
inflicting injuries." Obj. Ver. (A-1) (on file with author).
421. Obj. Ver. (B-13) (on file with author).
422. Id. Other Barcelona courts have expressly used the nomenjurts in dealing with
this aggravating factor in the guilt question. Objs. Ver. (B-3, B-4, B-5, 13-6, B-8) (on file
with author). In all but B-3, an alternative guilt question for simple homicide was for-
mulated. In B-3, the only guilt question read: "The jury declares that David Llopis
Marn is guilty (seven votes) or not guilty (five votes) of having caused the death of
Esther Garcfa Garcia with treachery, so she could not defend herself, and showing ex-
treme cruelty (ensaiiandose) in the realization of the deed, to augment her suffering in an
inhumane way." Obj. Ver. (B-3) (on file with author).
423. See discussion infra Part V.K.7. A similar form was used for the treachery and
exceptional cruelty questions in Question 19 of SE-I: "Does the jury consider that the
defendant Mr. Juan Antonio Corro Martinez caused the death of Mr. Francisco Ro-
driguez YAflez under conditions that impeded any possibility of defense on the part of the
victim?" Question 20 read: "Does the jury consider that the defendant Mr. Juan Antonio
Corro Martinez caused the death of Mr. Francisco Rodriguez Yd.flez in a way which de-
liberately and inhumanely augmented the pain incurred?" Obj. Ver. (SE-1) (on file with
author); see also Q92, Appendix II, (similar example from the Olegi case).
424. Obj. Ver. (MA-i) (on file with author). Question 11, referred to in the guilt
question, describes how the defendant waited until his father fell asleep, donned surgical
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Difficulties have arisen in the first homicide cases under the new law
when intent to kill has become an issue because the defense pleaded acci-
dent, criminal negligence, or unconsciousness. In SA-1, where accident
and negligence were at issue, the judge made a special effort to group the
various possible guilt questions together in a systematic way so that the
jury would know exactly which options were available. He told the jury
that they could answer only one of the three questions, which dealt with
the private prosecution's theory of intentional murder, the public prosecu-
tion's theory of negligent murder, and the defense theory of acquittal be-
cause of accident. Interestingly enough, a reference to "guilt" is made only
with the accident theory.42
In cases in which the defendant has denied intent to kill and claimed
accident or negligence, some courts have merely formulated a question re-
lating to intent to kill (sometimes as part of the guilt question, sometimes
as a separate question) and if it was not proved by the jury, returned a
judgment for negligent homicide.426 Others formulated alternative propo-
sitions, one asserting the defendant's intent to kill, the other its absence.
427
In many of the first cases, judges presented questions relating to intent to
kill (dolo directo) and accident or negligence, but did not present the jury
with the alternative of reckiess, non-intentional murder (dolo eventual).42
gloves to avoid leaving fingerprints, and stabbed him in the neck while he slept, finishing
him off with nine knife wounds after he fell on the floor.
425. See Q13A-3, Appendix III-E.
426. In MU-1, the only question related to intentionality was Question 13, which
read: "Determine if the accused had the intention of causing the death of his brother."
Obj. Ver. (MU-I) (on file with author).
427. This was the case in B-2, in which the two variants were couched in lengthy
prosecution and defense alternatives of the hecho principal in Questions 6 and 9, Obj.
Ver. (B-2), and in the Otegi case (SS-2), in which the "principle fact questions" included
assertions of intent to kill, and defense questions posited its absence. See QI-2, Appen-
dix II.
428. These non-intentional murders are called reckless murder, see MODEL PENAL
CODE § 210.2, or "depraved-heart" or "implied malice" murder. See WAYNrE R. LAFAVE
& AusnN W Scowr, JR., CRINAL LAW 616-21 (2d ed. 1986). The judge in SA-1
would have included a dolo eventual question had it been requested. Interview with
Nieto Nafnia, supra note 236 (SA-1). This was the case in B-13, in which it was undis-
puted that the defendant had stabbed his female companion seven times in areas of the
body containing vital organs. The TSJ of Andalucfa reversed defendant's conviction for
negligent homicide based on the judge's error in submitting an "intent to kill" question
where that issue was allegedly "not in dispute" due to the amount of stab wounds and the
places they were inflicted. Obj. Ver. (B-13) (on file with author); El TSJC anulda otro
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The President of Seville Provincial Court, Miguel Carnona Ruano,
was aware of the importance of giving juries the option of dolo eventual
because of the "grave difficulties" they have in confronting the psycho-
logical fact of intent in cases involving mutual combat and family kill-
ings.429 He formulated a question in SE-1 as an alternative to a preceding
question positing intent to kill, using phrasing reminiscent of a judicial in-
struction on "reckless murder" in a U.S. court: "[t]he defendant Mr. Juan
Antonio Corro Martinez, while stabbing Mr. Francisco Rodriguez Yfifiez,
knew that it was very probable that he could thereby cause his death, with-
out him desisting in his action for this reason."430 In SE-1, no guilt ques-
tion phrased in terms of reckless murder was formulated. In SE-2, factual
questions relating to intent to kill, reckless murder and intent to injure were
formulated,431 but unlike SE-1, each of the potentially guilty mental states
had its parallel guilt question, including that of dolo eventual: "[d]oes the
jury consider Francisco to be guilty of having caused the death of Manuel,
because he stabbed him despite knowing that as a consequence it was very
probable that he would die?4
32
In VI-1, in which a bouncer threw a drunk onto the sidewalk, causing
his death, the entire gamut of mental states-intent to kill, recklessness,
gross negligence, simple negligence, and accident-was posited in both
"factual" and "guilt" questions, clearly delineating which mental state each
party advocated.4 33 In BI-1, the judge formulated "factual" questions re-
lating to intent to kill, recklessness, and gross negligence, but then only
formulated a single guilt question using the simple nomen iuris of "homi-
cide.' 434  The single guilt question in M-2, a fratricide prosecution in
429. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106, at 68-69. Juries also often
acquitted under the LJ of 1888, not understanding that reckless and negligent mental
states were also guilty mental states. Urquia G6mez, supra note 369, at 405-06.
430. Obj. Ver. (SE-1) (on file with author). A criminal negligence postulation fol-
lowed, again dependent on a rejection of the dole eventual question, which posited only
"the intention to injure him, but he did in such a violent way and in areas so dangerous to
life that it caused his death, a result which was foreseeable." Obj. Ver. (SE-2) (on file
with author).
431. Only if Questions 5 and 6 concerning the more culpable mental states were re-
jected, should the jury proceed to Question 15: "Francisco stabbed Manuel in the left
side of the thorax. But Francisco did not want to kill Manuel, but only injure him in the
left arm; and he did not injure him in this arm, but in the thorax, because Manuel bent
over in the moment he was stabbed." Obj. Ver. (SE-2) (on file with author).
432. Obj. Ver. (SE-2) (on file with author).
433. See Questions 4-7, 11, 20, and the first four guilt questions in Appendix III-F.
434. After a question positing intent to kill, the court followed with two questions,
each beginning, "Mr. Jos6 Ignacio Tellechea Arias did not intend to directly cause the
death of Mrs. Maria Jesfis Ulloa Valcdrcel," and the first ending with "but was com-
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which the defendant claimed a defense of accident, included, over the ob-
jection of the prosecutor, the S panish equivalent of "maliciously," as well
as intent: "[i]s the defendant Angel Prez Barbera guilty or not guilty of
having maliciously (dolosamente), with intent, killed his brother Antonio
P6rez Barbera?" 43
The dispute over whether to allow the jury to apply the law or only
decide factual questions also pertains to other "factual-legal" issues, in-
cluding whether an admitted killing was justifiable or excusable, thus trig-
gering an acquittal, or whether the sentence may be modified because of
aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Again, the LOTJ uses language
that tends to focus the questions on the factual aspects of these legal issues,
referring to "the alleged facts" which could underlie a justification or ex-
cuse or "the narration of the fact" which could determine the "level of exe-
cution, participation," or aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
436
Nevertheless, the ultimate questions relating to pleadings of self-
defense437 in several of the first cases utilized explicit juridical terminol-
ogy. ,In the verdict form in MU-1, following a short factual question
pletely conscious of the grave risk to her life, due to the type of weapon used and the
area of the body attacked. Nevertheless, he stabbed her." The second question ended
with " ... and was conscious of the grave risk to her life, due to the type of weapon used
and the area of the body attacked, but was confident that it would not cause her death."
Obj. Ver. (BI-1) (on file with author). Depending on the jury's answers, it would be up
to the court at sentencing to qualify the homicide as either with dolo directo, dole even-
tual or as with gross negligence.
435. Obj. Ver. (M-2) (on file with author). The prosecutor preferred the simple "of
having killed" claiming the jury would be confused with juridical terms. No question
attempted to convey to the jury the meaning of dole eventual, which would be contained
in the concept "maliciously." Presumably, the jury was instructed as to what "mali-
ciously" meant.
436. § 52(1)(b), (c) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note I. Section 72 LJ
of 1888, supra note 26, was interpreted in a similar fashion in relation to the factual
questions which touched upon issues of justification, excuse or guilt-modifying circum-
stances: "The jury is never asked about the juridical concept.., the jury is only asked
about facts." Francisco de Asis Pacheco, La Ley del Jurado comentada, 1888 MADRID
722. The 1872 law, on the other hand, appears to ask the jury to answer such questions
phrased in the precise legal terms: "M.N. is exempt from criminal responsibility because
of . 9 (here the guilt-excluding circumstance should be explained in the same words
used by the Penal Code);" or "[i]n the commission of the crime, the mitigating circum-
stance of . ..was present." § 750 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24.
437. Self defense is a complete justification for a homicide. § 8(4) CP 1973, supra
note 89; § 20(4) CP 1995, supra note 69. Imperfect self defense can work to mitigate a
sentence upon a homicide conviction. § 9(1) CP 1973, supra note 89; § 21(1) CP 1995,
supra note 69. Under the LJ of 1888, supra note 26, the question of excessive force in
self defense was held to be a "question of law" for the bench, not one of fact for the jury.
L6PEz- Muroz Y LARRAZ, CoMENTARios, supra note 54, at 133 (citing a Supreme Court
decision of May 7, 1901).
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(Question 3) as to whether the victim had first assaulted defendant with the
olive branch during their argument, the judge asked the jury to "determine
if the defendant acted in self-defense against the initial aggression of his
opponent.' '438 In CS-I*, the judge inserted a question as to "mutual com-
bat," which would negate a self defense justification, and then, after for-
mulating defense questions containing the facts underlying its self-defense
theory, set forth three defense questions couched in explicit legal terninol-
ogy relating to whether the defendant was a victim of "illegitimate aggres-
sion," whether the weapon he used was "proportionate" to that used by the
victim, and whether the defendant had "provoked" the aggression.
439
Other courts have sought to better set forth a factual undergirding for
the inevitable legal conclusions of the elements of justified self-defense.
In M-2, two fairly concise factual questions were directed towards the self
defense issue, without using legal conclusions.44 0 In AL-1, lengthier fac-
tual questions were addressed to the "necessity" of the defendant stabbing
the victim m the neck with a pair of scissors and the "proportionality" of
the means used." 1 In B-11, factual questions painted a picture of the de-
fendant as a battered woman at the hands of her cocaine addict friend, who
beat and kicked her and later attacked her with a knife on the day of the
killing. The prosecution theory was that the victim attacked without intent
to kill, and the defendant, who grabbed the knife away from the victim, did
intend to kill, and thus use excessive force in self defense. The defense as-
438. Obj. Ver. (MU-1) (on file with author). In SE-1, Question 8 posited the defense
position that the victim had first attacked the defendant, and was followed by the defense
rendition in Question 9: "Mr. Juan Antonio Corro Martinez, feeling he was being stran-
gled, withdrew a knife he was carrying and stabbed Mr. Francisco Rodriguez Yfiflez to
defend himself against the attack he was suffering." Finally, Question 10 formulated in
legal terms the proportionality issue: "The defense was necessary and -the means em-
ployed was proportionate in relation to the attack suffered." Obj. Ver. (SE-i) (on file
with author).
439. See Q13-15, Appendix III-C.
440. Question 6 read: "At the beginning of the dispute, Antonio, the older brother
who had a very violent character, started butting Angel with his head." Question 7 read:
"Seeing that he was completely cornered and knowing his brother's aggressiveness,
Angel, in order to defend himself and stop his older brother from hitting him, grabbed
the kitchen knife." Obj. Ver. (M-2) (on file with author).
441. Question 14 read: "When David awoke and saw the defendant in his bedroom, he
got out of bed without saying a word, grabbed a blunt club and ran after Issiae, hitting
him in the back of the head, as a result of which he, seriously fearing for his life, deemed
it necessary, due to the forcefulness of the blows meted out by David, a man 1.80 meters
in height and with an athletic constitution, to defend himself against this aggression, us-
ing a pair of scissors as a proportional and adequate means with which he stabbed David
in the neck." Question 15 was very similar, but addressed to the "necessity" of the re-
sponse. Obj. Ver. (AL-1) (on file with author).
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serted that the victim intended to kill her, and that she killed either in self
defense or under the influence of "insuperable fear.
' " 2
As can be seen, the issues of mental state have been largely left to the
jury in the first trials. The jury has been asked to affirm or deny these
mental states in propositions using the legal definition of the offense, and
often the nomen iuris. The alternative would be to attempt to formulate
factual propositions relating to circumstantial evidence which would tend
to show or negate the mental state, and leave it up to the judge to draw the
proper inferences, or to merely try to set forth the mental state in lay jar-go 443
gon. 3
Mental illness, intoxication, and other emotional disturbance or char-
acter disorders, which can be alleged as either a complete excuse, negating
criminal responsibility, or as a mitigating circumstance, have been the de-
fense's centerpiece in a substantial number of the first Spanish homicide
trials. 4 Typically, the jury will first be asked whether the defendant suf-
fers from a mental illness or character disorder, or whether at the time of
the crime he or she was in a state of extreme emotional disturbance or
drunkenness. In cases of alleged mental illness, the questions are some-
442. Question 10 read: "In the case of Question 9 (relating to the actual stabbing)
Margarita acted with the intent of defending herself against the aggression on the part of
Rafael of which she was the object." Question 11 read: "In the same case (refcrring to
Question 9), Margarita acted under the impulse of a feeling of terror she could not con-
trol, motivated by the belief that Rafael Gonzilez Alarc6n would kill her in the continu-
ance of his aggression." Obj. Ver. (B-11) (on file with author). This form of duress is a
complete excuse. § 8(10) CP 1973, supra note 89; § 20(6) CP 1995, supra note 69.
443. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco reject the notion that intent to kill is a
"qualification for the professional judge" because "a psychological fact is a fact like any
other." Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106, at 69.
444. The Spanish criminal law is extremely liberal in completely excluding guilt upon
the showing of a complete annulment of the defendant's cognitive or volitional capacities
as a result of "any psychic anomaly or alteration," § 8(l) CP 1973, supra note 89; §
20(1) CP 1995, supra note 69, "congenital alterations in perception which gravely alter
one's consciousness of reality," § 8(3) CP 1973, supra note 89; § 20(3) CP 1995, supra
note 69, or "non-habitual drug or alcohol intoxication" not brought on for the purpose of
committing the crime. § 20(2) CP 1995, supra note 69 (under § 9(2) CP 1973, drunken-
ness was only a mitigating factor, not a complete excuse). If the cognitive or volitional
capacities were only partially annulled by these or "any other circumstance of analogous
significance" that fact would be a mitigating factor in sentencing. § 9(l), (10) CP 1973,
supra note 89; § 21 (1), (6) CP 1995, supra note 69. Heat of passion (arrebato) and ex-
treme emotional disturbance (obcecaci6h) are also mitigating circumstances of a parallel
character. §§ 9(8) CP 1973, supra note 89; 21(3) CP 1995, supra note 69. Prompted in
part by the liberal interpretation of "insanity," "temporary insanity," and "diminished ca-
pacity" in Spanish law, a variant of one of these defenses has been pleaded in at least 36
of the 57 homicide cases investigated.
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times in simple conclusory terms.445 However, the jurors will often be
called upon to name the illness in psychiatric medical terms, such as by
deciding whether the defendant "suffered from a delirious disorder of a
somatic type, characterized as a psychosis which completely nullifies his
volitional and intellectual faculties, ' 46 or "has a delirio paranoide secun-
dario and an organic disorder with a depressive state congruent with the
delirium and her situation, a mental illness, which gave rise to a total nulli-
fication of her mental faculties of intelligence and will""4 7 or, finally, "suf-
fers from a dissociated personality disorder, included in the Tenth Revision
of the International Classification of the World Health Organization and
the D.S.M. IV.''8 The Spanish reluctance to let jurors decide legal issues
apparently does not extend to deciding psycho-legal issues. Indeed, the
Spanish Supreme Court, in a 1931 opinion, characterized the issue of in-
sanity as being a "factual issue," while in a later opinion it decided that the
issue of drunkenness as it affected criminal responsibility was a question
of law." 9
A defendant may claim the complete or partial nullification of his
cognitive and volitional capacities, because of "psychic anomalies" that
cannot be classified as a full-blown mental illness, which are at times com-
bined with other causes such as intoxication.450 The defense of the eighty-
two year old killer in LP-1 depended on proof that at the time of the kill-
ing, and "as a result of his peculiar personality, his advanced age, his ten-
dency to feel himself the object of scorn and his deafness, was suffering
from a complete annulment of his mental faculties.' 51 Mental defenses
445. See Q4, Appendix II1-B.
446. Obj. Ver. (PA-1) (on file with author). Question 5 allowed the jury a compro-
mise position, that the mental illness "diminished without nullifying" the defendant's
faculties.
447. Compare this with Question 4 in (GR-1). Obj. Ver. (GR-l) (on file with author).
Question 5 allowed the jury a compromise position, that the mental illness "notably di-
minished" the defendant's faculties. Compare Question 7 in (LU-1): "That the defendant
at the moment of committing the act was deprived of consciousness and will due to his
suffering an acute psychotic episode of paranoid schizophrenia." Obj. Ver. (LU-i) (on
file with author).
448. Obj. Ver. (MA-1) (on file with author).
449. Verger Grau, supra note 48, at 554 n.l 14 (referring to STS, Jan. 31, 1931; STS,
Feb. 27, 1936). Under the new Russian jury law, questions of insanity are not within the
jury's province and the judge must dissolve the jury if such issues are raised. Thaman,
Resurrection, supra note 5, at 127.
450. Note that the questions related to Otegi's defense of drunkenness, his impulsive
character, and a feeling of being harassed by the police. See Q69-70, Appendix II.
451. Obj. Ver. (LP-1) (on file with author). Questions 7-9 repeated the same lan-
guage, except for alleging as fallback theones: (I) "a notable diminution;" (2) "a mild
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have also been based on allegations of "light mental retardation '4 2 and
"severe deafness since infancy which gravely altered his conscience of re-
ality, completely eliminating his cognitive and volitional capacity."4 3 In
GR-4, the defendant based his plea of temporary insanity/diminished ca-
pacity on a heat of passion theory, articulated in the verdict form as fol-
lows: "Domingo P6rez Galvez, upon seeing that his mother had hanged
herself, and believing it had happened because Rafael Cano Aguilera had
been sexually harassing her, suffered a temporary mental disturbance
which totally annulled his intellectual and volitional faculties."
454
Finally, in at least fourteen of the fifty-seven murder cases investi-
gated, the defense alleged a alcoholic and/or drug intoxication to nullify or
mitigate criminal responsibility. As with mental disease or defect, the jury
was often asked first whether the defendant had drunk to excess on the day
of the crime, and then whether it annulled, greatly or mildly diminished his
intellectual and volitional capacities, or had no effect.45S Sometimes, the
questions relating to excuse or diminished capacity were prefaced by the
prosecution's posited negation of the defense: "[t]he defendant, despite
having ingested alcohol on the day of the crime, was completely conscious
of his acts at the time he committed them, having been examined by the
diminution;" and (3) no diminution of mental capacities." Question 10 then offered an
alternative scenario: "As a consequence of alcohol which he ingested and the peculiari-
ties of his personality, in the moment in which Juan Gonzlez Suarez caused the acts, his
mental faculties were completely annulled." Questions 11-13 then offered similar back-
up formulations as in Questions 7-9.
452. Obj. Ver. (MU-1) (on file with author). One defendant's argument in B-10 al-
leged a combination of"oligophrenia or mild mental retardation, with an I.Q. of 68 in the
WAIS test" along with "an easily influenced personality, his being an introverted subject
with problems of indecision, who lets himself be dominated by others, making it difficult
for him to control situations." Obj. Ver. (B-10) (on file with author).
453. Obj. Ver. (MU-1) (on file with author). Questions 20-21 provided backup posi-
tions alleging "notable diminution," and finally, an unfavorable fact, the lack of diminu-
tion.
454. Obj. Ver. (GR-4) (on file with author).
455. For instance, Question 20 read: "Jos6 L6pez Gandoy is a chronic alcoholic."
Question 21 read: "On August 4th, L6pez Gandoy was completely drunk, to the extent
that he was not conscious of what he did, nor did he comprehend what he accomplished."
Question 22 read: "L6pez Gandoy, when he began to drink that day, knew that he could
not control his drinking, and nevertheless, though able to resist, got drunk." Question 23
read: "The events which occurred on August 4th were committed by IUpez Gandoy due
to his grave addiction to alcohol, but his faculties of knowing and understanding were
not affected." Question 24 read: "At the moment the events took place, Jos6 16pez Gan-
doy was not drunk and suffered no impairment of his knowledge or will as a consequence
of alcohol." Obj. Ver. (LU-4) (on file with author).
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psychiatrist at Gregorio Marafi6n Hospital at 1:30 a.m. on the following
day, who found him to be lucid and coherent. '' s6
Although the questions relating to insanity and diminished capacity
were usually framed in conclusory terms, courts in a few cases submitted
individual questions to the jury relating to each element of the circumstan-
tial evidence presented by the parties, from which the fact of mental ill-
ness, intoxication or an otherwise diminished mental state could be de-
duced. Thus, in the Otegi case (SS-2), the bulk of the sixty-four questions
favorable to the defense (out of the ninety-one total) related to defendant's
drinking on the evening and morning before the killings, his prior encoun-
ters with the Basque Police (aimed at bolstering his allegation that he felt
harassed by them) and to an incident with an off-duty policeman shortly
before the killings, which tended to show his irrational state of mind.457
Finally, a common mitigating circumstance pleaded by the defense is
a type of spontaneous remorse signaled by the defendant's turning herself
m to the police and confessing responsibility.48 This has sometimes led to
multiple questions, some alleging the fact of the defendant going to the
police station, or submitting to arrest and confessing, and others attempting
to negate this intent.
459
456. Obj. Ver. (M-4) (on file with author). Questions then followed alleging that the
defendant ingested a large quantity of drinks before the killings which "notably dimin-
ished" his faculties, and finally alleging a complete nullification, based on the fact that
his alcohol blood content was "2.35 mg, much higher than the 1.82 mg which showed on
the blood alcohol test taken at the Gregorio Marafl6n Hospital at 1:00 a.m. the following
day." Obj. Ver. (M-4) (on file with author). A similar pattern was used in B-9, in which
Question 7 posited the fact that the defendapt was "an intravenous consumer of narcotic
substances for many years," followed in Question 8 with an assertion that this addiction
"did not in any way affect his consciousness or will in the moral aggression against An-
tonio Lobo." Obj. Ver. (B-9) (on file with author). The question lists in BU-I, GR-4
and MA-5 also allowed the jury to first decide whether the defendant was completely
conscious and in control of his actions, before reaching the diminished capacities issue.
Objs. Ver. (BU-1, GR-4, MA-5) (on file with author).
457. Obj. Ver. (SS-2) (on file with author). See Appendix II; cf discussion of ques-
tions in VA-i supra notes 398-99.
458. § 9(9) CP 1973, supra note 89; § 21(4) CP 1995, supra note 69.
459. For instance, Question 4 in LP-I read: "After committing the acts referred to in
the three preceding questions, Juan Gonzdlez Sufirez returned home, changed his clothes,
which were stained with blood as a consequence of the aggression against Inds Guill6n
GonzAlez, and went to the Civil Guard of Santa Maria de Gufa where he confessed to
having killed his spouse, and turned in the knife with which he had attacked her, all with
the conviction that, due to his age, he would not be arrested, nor have to go to jail." Obj.
Ver. (LP-1) (on file with author).
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Recidivism is an aggravating factor in Spanish criminal law.46 In the
few cases in which the defendants were charged with this aggravating fac-
tor, the jury was asked to verify the criminal record, including convictions
that had been expunged.4 61 On the other hand, the absence of a criminal
record has been included, sometimes in the "principal fact question! 462 and
sometimes in separate questions.463 Another notable issue is the "mixed"
factor of being related to the victim which was a frequent occurrence in the
first murder cases juries have heard.46' Although in some cases the jury
was asked only to determine whether the familial relation existed,4 S in
others the jury was asked to "determine if the family relationship and the
connected affection had deteriorated" so as to render the fact non-
aggravating.
In several cases, the court has posed questions for the jury which
could apply only to the assessment of civil damages, an issue beyond the
competence of the jury.467 For instance, in MA- 1 the jury was asked to
determine whether "[t]he deceased Antonio Mariano Torres Cid was un-
employed and supported himself and the defendant by his earnings from
460. § 10(15) CP 1973, supra note 89; § 22(8) CP 1995, supra note 69.
461. Thus, m B-10 four of one defendant nine of another's convictions were set out in
the verdict form, with date of conviction, nature of crime, and as to whether it had been
subsequently expunged. Obj. Ver. (B-10) (on file with author). In BI-l, defendant's six
prior convictions were set out, two of which were for inflicting injuries. Obj. Ver. (BI-
1) (on file with author). In A-I, in which trespassing and infliction of injuries were
charged, prior convictions for inflicting injuries and theft were submitted to the jury.
Obj. Ver. (A-i) (on file with author).
462. Obj. Ver. (B-2) (on file with author).
463. Obj. Ver. (B-12) (on file with author).
464. So-called parentesco can either be an aggravating or a mitigating factor. It ap-
plies if the victim is the spouse (or sharing a similar relationship), sibling (or adopted
sibling), child or parent of the defendant, as long as a "relation of affectivity" exists. §
11 CP 1973, supra note 89; § 21(6) CP 1995, supra note 69. The crime of parricide
(section 405 CP 1973) was eliminated in the CP 1995. CP 1995, supra note 89. Paren-
tesco was alleged in 23 of the 57 homicide cases.
465. Obj. Ver. (PA-1) (on file with author).
466. Obj. Ver. (MU-1) (on file with author). In MA-3, the jury was given three alter-
natives in relation to parentesco. Question 7 read: "The defendant killed his own father
and this is much more serious than killing a stranger." Question 8 read: "The defendant
did not like his father due to the great troubles he had with him, making it as if he had
beaten a stranger to death." Question 9 read: "Because of the lack of confidence in the
relationship with his father caused by the victim, that this circumstance mitigates his re-
sponsibility." Obj. Ver. (MA-3) (on file with author).
467. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco contend that no questions should be formu-
lated which touch upon pure sentencing criteria (such as the character of the defendant)
or on the assessment of the civil damages. Carmona Ruano & DePaOI Velasco, supra
note 106, at 79.
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doing craftwork m metals and with periodic help from his ex-wife, with
whom he maintained good relations, and from his mother, who also
counted three adult brothers as close relatives." 468 In A-i, questions ad-
dressed the monetary amount of damages to the victim's door and to her
glasses in a trespassing and injunes case.J 9
In each verdict form, the judge must also to submit to the jury the
"criteria" relating to the possibility of either recommending a suspended
sentence or recommending that the Spanish Government grant clemency.
470
This power to recommend lenience or clemency, designed to help avoid
unjust acquittals based on the jury's fears of excessive sentences, 47F should
not be overestimated. A suspended sentence may only be granted to first
offenders or to those whose sentence does not exceed two years, conditions
unlikely in homicide cases.472 Similarly, the petition for clemency is en-473
tirely dependent on the decision of the Spanish Government. Neverthe-
less, questions as to both recommendations have often been part of the
verdict forms, even where a sentence of less than two years was impossible
under the facts.474 Although the questions of suspended sentence and
clemency have usually been posed with little explanation as to their
meaning or the possibility of their affecting the defendant's sentence, the
court in TE-1, a prosecution for threats and theft, explicitly framed the
questions to inform the jury as to the effect of their recommendations. It
stated, as to a suspended sentence: "[i]n case the defendant Crist6bal An-
468. Obj. Ver (MA-1) (on file with author). In a similar vein, Question 14 in B-1I
emphasizes that the victim had "four children for whom he did not provide," Obj. Ver.
(B-1i) (on file with author), and Question 15 in B-12 points out that the victim is "the
mother of the defendant and three other children." Obj. Ver. (B-12) (on file with
author).
469. Obj. Ver. (A-i) (on file with author).
470. § 52(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JffRADO, supra note 1. For example, see
QI 1- 12, Appendix III-C.
471. MORAALLARC6N, supra note 41, at 391.
472. §§ 92, 93, 93(b) CP 1973, supra note 89; §§ 80, 81 CP 1995, supra note 69.
473. GmENo SENDRA believes the judge can completely ignore the jury's recommen-
dation. GmNoo SENDRA, ComENTARIos, supra note 43, at 292; see discussion infra Part
V.M. of the recommendation's impact on the sentence.
474. In M-2, the prosecutor unsuccessfully objected to the inclusion of the suspended
sentence recommendation on this ground. Prot. of Discussion of Obj. Ver. (M-2) (on file
with author). Some courts, however, have refused to submit these potentially mitigating
recommendations to the jury. For instance, in SS-1 and SE-1, only the possibility of
clemency was mentioned. Objs. Ver. (SS-1, SE-1) (on file with author); cf Carmona
Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106, at 50. Both recommendations have been
omitted, in addition, where all parties agreed on the defendant's insanity, such as in AB-
1, LU-I, and GI-1, and therefore no punishment would be forthcoming. Id. at 48-49.
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gui Dominguez is sentenced to a punishment of imprisonment of less than
two years, the jury deems that it should be suspended, on the condition that
he does not violate the law during a period between two and five years."
And as to clemency:
In case any of the two defendants is convicted, does the jury believe
that the punishments solicited by the prosecutor, which could be im-
posed by the presiding judge (125,000 pesetas fine for Virginia Garcia
Miravete; four months of detention for Crist6bal Dominguez as the in-
ducer of the theft and two years prison as author of the crime of
threats) is notably excessive in relation to the evil caused and the per-
sonal circumstances of the defendants, whereupon the jury considers it
appropriate that the Government be petitioned for total or partial clem-
ency for all or some of the punishments.
475
Although certain judges in the first Spanish jury trials have stressed
their role as impartial arbiters, committed to include all theories pleaded by
the parties in the verdict form and renouncing any sua sponte intitiative,
4 76
the LOTJ allows the presiding judge "in view of the evidence, to add facts
or legal qualifications favorable to the defendant, as long as they do not
imply a substantial variation of the justiciable fact, nor infringe on due
process rights of the parties. ' 477 In B-7, the prosecution appealed the ac-
quittal of the Cuban defendant of two counts of trespassing because the
judge on his own motion added a defense theory of necessity and included
"unfavorable" factual allegations absent from the prosecution's plead-
ings.478 The inclusion of questions related to implied malice (dolo even-
tual) in SE-1 were on the judge's own motion,479 and the fallback theory of
negligent homicide, eventually adopted by the jury, was introduced by the
475. Obj. Ver. (TE-1) (on file with author).
476. "I am only an arbiter. Those who play this game of cards are the parties." Inter-
view with Gimeno Jubero, supra note 226 (B-3). In SA-1, the judge left a question as to
dolo eventual from the verdict form because no one asked for it. Interview with Nieto
Nafria, supra note 235 (SA-1).
477. § 52(1)(g) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
478. For instance, Question HA read: "The determining reason in both cases that the
defendant refused to abandon the domiciles was due to her necessity of finding shelter,
her lack of a roof over her head." The TSJ of Andalucla found it harmless error that the
judge added unpleaded "unfavorable facts," i.e., that she performed voodoo rituals put-
ting sangre de la regla into the victim's food to make him crazy, and that adding the ne-
cessity defense was not error because the defense had been discussed throughout the
trial. Obj. Ver., Dec. TSJ (B-7) (on file with author).
479. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106, at 41-42.
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judge m BI-1 480 The judge in 0-1 introduced a question alleging that the
defendant was "mildly drunk, mildly diminishing his consciousness of his
acts," which was eventually adopted by the jury in lieu of the defense theo-
ries of personality disorder, extreme emotional disturbance, or complete
drunkenness.
481
Although the "principle fact question" and the guilt question are often
phrased in "factual" terms, questions relating to excuse, justification and
intent, the "inner fact element," have been by and large expressed in legal
jargon, often using the nomen iuris, thus allowing the jury to apply the law
to the facts they have declared to be proved. Judges in the first modem
Russian jury trials also fluctuated between asking questions phrased in the
terms of the penal code and asking fact laden "historical" questions to pro-
vide the basis for the judge's application of the law.482 In Russia, the Su-
preme Court has ended this practice and has declared a large number of is-
sues dealing with justification, excuse, mitigation and aggravation to be
"legal questions" for the judge based on the jury's answers to the "factual"
questions presented to them.
The ambiguous nature of the guilt question in the Spanish jury legis-
lation raises questions as to where it should stand in relation to the other
questions contained m the verdict form. First, if the jury has already de-
termined that the factual elements of the charged crime (corpus delicti) and
authorship have been proved, what does the "guilt question" add to the
equation?
48
Under the 1888 LJ, the "guilt question" was interpreted to be nothing
more than an affirmation that the defendant committed the charged of-
480. Interview with Picazo Blasco, President of the Bilbao Provincial Court, Bilbao
(June 4, 1997) (BI-1).
481. Obj. Ver. (0-1) (on file with author). Interview with Alvarez Seijo, supra note
230.
482. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 120.
483. On December 20, 1994, the Russian Supreme Court's Ruling No. 9 held that the
following issues were no longer for the jury: whether a murder was "negligent" or
"reckless," or whether an intentional murder was "with exceptional cruelty," due to
"hooliganistic motivation," "for personal gain," committed in the "heat of passion," or
"using excessive force in self defense." The terms: "rape" and "robbery" could also not
be used. See discussion in Thaman, ZSTW, supra note 409, at 205. Pleas of not guilty
by reason of insanity are also not subject to the Russian jury court's jurisdiction. Tha-
man, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 127.
484. Some commentators have deemed it to be superfluous and have called for its
elimination. GInANO SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 290-91. The now-
governing Popular Party (Partido Popular) tried to eliminate the guilt question from the
jury's competence during parliamentary debates when it was in the opposition. Conde-
Pumpido Tour6n, supra note 98, at 56-59.
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fense, i.e., it added nothing to the questions of corpus delicti and perpetra-
tion. According to an 1895 Supreme Court opinion, a declaration of guilt
did not by itself set the degree of responsibility, nor did it inalterably de-
fine the juridical character of the facts to which it pertained. Indeed, a per-
son could still be acquitted after a finding of "guilt" if the jury affirmed the
presence of a guilt-excluding justification or excuse in subsequent ques-
tions.
415
Thus it appears from the practice under the nineteenth century jury
laws that the "guilt question" should be asked prior to those questions
which modify guilt as to the "principle fact." Also, it certainly makes no
sense to answer questions relating to excuse, justification and aggravating
or mitigating circumstances until one has an affirmative answer to the piv-
otal guilt question. Nevertheless, the LOTJ appears to call for the posing
of this ambiguous "factual-legal" guilt question only after all of the other
questions related to excuse, justification, mitigating and aggravating cir-
cumstances have been decided; the judges in nearly all of the first cases
followed this procedure.
48 6
6. Challenging the Formulation of the Verdict Form
Before the question list is finalized, the parties may move to add
questions not included by the judge in the draft verdict form, or exclude or
reformulate those the judge has proposed. If any of the parties disagree
with the final formulation, they are permitted to object on the record, and
must do so if the issue is to be preserved on appeal!" t Formulation and
485. Marchena G6mez, supra note 352, at 259-60 (refemng to STS, June II, 1895).
When a Russian judge received a verdict form with a finding of "guilt" followed by the
affirmation of a complete justification on self defense grounds, the verdict form was
amended to prevent such a seemingly contradictory result. Thaman, Resurrection, supra
note 5, at 119-20. Martin Palln would support returning such a verdict for further delib-
eration. Martin Pallin, supra note 334, at 266. In CS-I*, the jury found the defendant
guilty of homicide after they had found him to have acted in perfect self defense. See
Q13-15, 17, Appendix HI-C.
486. Only in MU-1 did the judge pose the "guilt" question before addressing guilt-
modifying circumstances, such as self defense, mental excuse, diminished capacity and
parentesco. Obj. Ver. (MU-I) (on file with author).
487. § 53(1), (2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1; § 846bis c(a)
LECr., supra note 149. As noted, the public prosecutor in M-2 objected to a question
related to suspended sentence, and to use of the word dolosamente in the guilt question.
The defense objected to use of medical terms in describing the wounds in the "principle
fact question." Prot. of Discussion of Obj. Ver. (M-2) (on file with author). Although
section 77 LJ of 1888, supra note 26, provided for objections by the parties, this was
limited to preserving the issue on appeal and not aimed at changing the bench's draft
verdict. MARES ROGER & MORA ALARC(5N, supra note 41, at 353.
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discussion of the verdict form has taken longer than most commentators
predicted. In PM-1, the simple bribery prosecution which ended with a
verdict form containing only two factual questions, the preparation of the
verdict form took two hours, nearly as long as the taking of testimony.
488
In the Otegi case (SS-2), the discussion of the ninety-six questions sub-
mitted to the jury took a full five hours.48 9 On the other hand, the judge in
PA-1 surprised the parties by handing them the draft verdict form in the
presence of the jury and no changes were requested, nor was much time
lost.
490
7 The Verdict Form: Conclusion
The verdict forms in the first Spanish jury trials have run the gamut
from concise questions lists of less than ten fact and guilt questions in the
relatively uncontroversial cases involving clearly insane defendants491 to
piecemeal, multi-question approaches with as many as ninety-five ques-
tions.492 The number of questions is clearly dependent on the number of
excuse and justification theories and aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances pleaded m the case, and whether the judge opts for a conclusory
form of question, or a factual form based on proof of a chain of circum-
stantial evidence.493 Different courts appear to be developing their own
styles of verdict forms. In the Oviedo Provincial Court, the questions are
few and fact laden, with the public prosecutor's version clearly juxtaposed
488. Author observation in PM-I. The author perhaps contributed to this by partici-
pating in the discussion of its formulation. Gimeno Sendra predicted the procedure
should last no more than one or two hours. GImNo SENDRA, CoMENTARtos, supra 43, at
292. On June 26, 1997, the author witnessed discussions of the verdict form in the
fourth jury trial in Girona Provincial Court which lasted the entire morning.
489. Aurora Intxausti, Eljurado absuelve al acusado de matar a dos 'erizainas' por
creer que no era dueno de sus actos, EL PAls, Mar. 7, 1997, at 15 (SS-2).
490. L6pez-Mufioz y Larraz, Cr6nica, supra note 219, at XIV. To avoid such prob-
lems, commentators have advised holding proposed verdict form hearings out of the
jury's presence. MARts ROGER & MORA ALARC6N, supra note 41, at :154-55. In B-3,
this was done for precisely this reason. Interview with Gimeno Jubero, supra note 226.
491. For instance, only two questions were asked in GI-1. Obj. Ver. (GI-1) (on file
with author). Five questions were asked in AB-1. Obj. Ver. (AB-I) (on file with
author). Six questions were asked in GR-1, Obj. Ver. (GR-l) (on file with author) and
nine were asked in LU-1. Obj. Ver. (LU-1) (on file with author). In the uncomplicated
bribery prosecution in PM-i, only four questions were asked. Obj. Ver. (PM-I) (on file
with author).
492. Objs. Ver. (SS-2, B-10, VA-1) (on file with author).
493. In B-10, the author has attributed 16 questions to the proof of the recidivist alle-
gation against the two co-defendants and 10 to the proof of diminished capacity. Obj.
Ver. (B-10) (on file with author).
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with the alternative versions proposed by the other parties' 9 4 The Gra-
nada495 and Madrid4 96 Provincial Courts have also produced short lists.
The judges m Barcelona, on the other hand, have fluctuated between con-
cise lists in many of the earlier cases to more lengthy ones.4 The two
early trespassing cases in Valencia and Barcelona, which involved compli-
cated relationships between the defendant and the victim, resulted in ver-
dict forms containing sixteen and twenty questions respectively49S
The importance of the question list and the difficulties in its formula-
tion preoccupied nineteenth century commentators. It was called "a deli-
cate material, the keystone of the edifice, which is often brought down by
substantial defects, which are sometimes the result of a reasonable mistake,
and sometimes that which invariably accompanies the loud crash of injus-
tice."499 Violations of the complicated dictates of the 1888 I3 and its in-
terpretation by the Spanish Supreme Court led to numerous reversals.50°
Commentators also foresee that it will be one of the most difficult func-
tions attributed to the judge in the new jury procedure.
501
& The Judge's Jwy Instructions
After the verdict form has been settled, the judge hands it to the jury
and instructs them about the procedures they will follow in deliberation,
and the "nature of the facts under discussion, which determine the circum-
stances constitutive of the crime with which the defendants have been
charged, and those which refer to allegations of exclusion or modification
of guilt." This should be in relation to the facts alleged in the verdict
form. °2
494. There were only seven questions in 0-1, 11 in 0-2, 11 in 0-3, and eight in the
Case of Arturo Abadin, which was the fourth case in Oviedo that went to the jury. Objs.
Ver. (0-1, 0-2, 0-3, Case of Abadln) (on file with author).
495. In addition to the six question listed in GR-1, only five questions were formu-
lated m GR-2 and nine in GR-4. Objs. Ver. (GR-2, GR-4) (on file with author).
496. Only nine questions were formulated in M-2; there were ten questions in M-4,
which involved the killing of two people. Objs. Ver. (M-2, M-4) (on file with author).
497. There were seven questions in B-4, nine questions in B-5 and B-6, 19 questions
in B-2 and B-13, 24 questions in B-3, 25 questions in B-12, 31 questions in B-14, 33
questions in B-8 and 70 questions in B-10. Objs. Ver. (3-4, B-5, B-6, B-2, B-13, B-3,
B-12, B-14, B-8, B-10).
498. Obj. Ver. (V-i) (on file with author); Obj. Ver. (B-i) (on file with author).
499. Marchena G6mez, supra note 352, at 238 (citing Francisco de Asls Pacheco,
commentator of the LI of 1888).
500. Id.
501. Id at265.
502. § 54(1), (2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
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Despite the invitation to instruct the jury m regard to the facts under-
lying the specific charges, the instructions witnessed by the author were
remarkably short and, except for PM-1, 50 3 contained little or no detail
about the legal elements of the criminal charges. The judge in GR-1 even
told the jury, after explaining to them that "homicide is an act that causes
the death of another" and that "there is a causal connection" -which must be
proved, that "[y]ou need no knowledge of the law. You evaluate all the
evidence according to your conscience."50 4 The judge in CO-1 told the
jury that "the facts of the killing are clear," and then briefly explained the
defense of temporary insanity and the mixed modifying factor of paren-
tesco.505
The LOTJ also requires judges to instruct that "if after deliberation it
has not been possible to resolve the doubts which you have regarding the
evidence, you must decide in the manner most favorable to the defendant."
In connection with this instruction, the judge in PM-1 repeated the adage
that it is "better to acquit ten guilty persons than to convict one innocent
person.
,50 6
The judge must also admonish the jury not to attribute any probative
value to inadmissible evidence that may have been erroneously presented
to the jury 5 07 This provision was invoked in PM-1, when the judge told
the jury to ignore a hearsay remark attributed by a police witness to the in-
vestigative judge in the case that the money given by the defendants to the
police was a "bribe as big as a cathedral."5 B Several courts have given the
jury written instructions on the general rules of deliberation to be used
503. As the author observed dunng PM-i, the judge explained the elements of bribery
as follows: "Bribery is a crime against the public administration and involves the corrup-
tion of officials. There must be an intent to corrupt or dishonor an official. Where the
charge is giving money, it must be with the intent to corrupt the official."
504. Author observation during GR-1.
505. Author observation during CO-1. Several of the first trial judges insisted that
instructions should cover only the rules of deliberation and not principles of substantive
criminal law relating to the proof of the charges. Interview with Fem.ndez Cloos, supra
note 284 (LU-2); Interview with Gil Merino, supra note 227 (SE-2); Interview with La-
caba Snchez, supra note 162 (GI-1, GI-3).
506. Author's observatio; Manresa, supra note 250 (PM-1). The same judge also in-
sists that the notion of "reasonable doubt" should only be applied to the inculpatory
"unfavorable" questions posed by the prosecution parties, and not to the defense allega-
tions which may be proved by a standard of less than reasonable doubt. L6pez Ortega,
supra note 106, at 15.
507. § 54(3) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. The new Russian law
has a similar provision. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 123.
508. Author observation; Manresa, supra note 250 (PM-I).
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during deliberations, but have not included any special instructions con-
cerning the substantive law.509
It is clear, however, that many of the Spanish judges have been giving
detailed instructions regarding the substantive criminal law applicable in
the trials. 0 Judges have especially had difficulty instructing the jury in
cases in which the verdict form presented multiple culpable mental
states.511 Because the "most surprising verdicts" have, in some judges'
opinions, stemmed from a misunderstanding of criminal mental states, the
necessity of instructing on "the determinate elements of the applicability of
different offenses" has been emphasized, "especially in relation to intent to
kill, in which the explanation of the difference between dolo in its various
forms is unavoidable. 512
The LOTJ's authors wanted to allow instructions on the legal ele-
ments of the crime and modifying factors in order to aid the jury in its de-
liberations, but did not want to rob it of its "spontaneity" by allowing the
judge to summarize the evidence and the positions of the parties.513 as the
509. This was the practice in the Provincial Courts of Oviedo, Pontevcdra, and
Sevilla. Interview with Alvarez Seijo, supra note 230 (0-1); Interview with Julio C. Pi-
catoste Bobillo, Presiding Judge of Pontevedra Provincial Court, Pontevedra (June 11,
1997) (PO-5); Interview with Gil Merino, supra note 227 (SE-2).
510. For instance, the minutes in 0-1 read: "The presiding judge carefully explained
the quality of the facts, the circumstances which constitute the charged crime and which
relate to excuse or modification of responsibility. Tr. Prot. (0-1) (on file with author).
511. In VI-1, the judge discussed these difficulties in the judgment: "A question, emi-
nently technical, we tried to cover the entire scale which began with intentional killing to
end with the mere accidental killing, without the intervention of dolo or culpa (negli-
gence), and going from negligence in its respective grades from gross to simple, was
certainly an object which occupied a principal space in the instructions to the jury re-
ferred to m Article 54 of the LOTJ, paragraph 2, which took 45 minutes in the session of
May 7, with the members of the jury requesting an amplification of these instructions
which was done on the same day, where the differences between an intentional (dolosa)
and unintentional but criminal (culposa) homicide was again explained, and, with refer-
ence to the latter, the difference between gross and simple negligence." Judg. (VI-1) (on
file with author).
512. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106, at 80. Even the judge in
SE-2, who opposes detailed instructions on the substantive criminal law, see supra note
510, makes an exception for explaining the difference between dolo directo and dole
eventual. But he insists that the judge should use factual examples unrelated to the facts
of the case rather than conclusory formulations in legal terminology. He explained dolo
eventual by using an example of a person "shooting at a boat, with no reason to want to
kill anyone" but where he should have known this could happen. The instructions, due
to the use of such examples, lasted about one hour. Interview with Gil Merino, supra
note 227 (SE-2).
513. § V(2) E-M LOTJ, supra note 19, at 37.
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1872 and 1888 laws permitted.1 4 When the LJ of 1888 was amended in
1931, the judge's summary of the evidence and positions of the parties was
eliminated. The main criticism was that it was tantamount to an ultimate
accusation by the supposedly neutral bench at the end of the trial when no
response was afforded to the defense 15 Critics who favor the elimination
of the summation would also like to limit the "spontaneity" of the judge
further during instructions by adopting model jury instructions like those
used in the United States.
516
L. The Role of the Jury in Assessing Criminal Responsibility:
Deliberation and Verdict
1. Time, Manner and Place of Deliberations
After the judge's instructions, the jury immediately retires to the jury
room where its first task is to select a foreperson 5 17 Jurors are not allowed
to reveal the content of their deliberations or how they voted on particular
514. Section 740 LECr. (prov.) of 1872 and section 68 LJ of 1888 provided for such a
summary; both caution the judge to abstain from revealing his or her "own opinion." §
740 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24; § 68 LJ of 1888, supra note 26. The Basque
Draft and the CDS-Draft suggested allowing the judge to summarize the evidence as
well. § 26 Basque Draft, supra note 54; § 24 CDS-Draft, supra note 57; MARtS ROGER
& MORA ALARC6N, supra note 41, at 362. The Russian jury law provides for just such a
summary. Russian summations have been quite lengthy and have included meticulous
instructions as to the law, unlike those in the first Spanish cases. Thaman, Resurrection,
supra note 5, at 123-24.
515. Saldafila, supra note 217, at 225-26 (refemng to § 68 LJ of 1888 (as amended in
1931)). The legislative introduction to the 1931 amendment condemned the summation
for this reason. MAs s ROGER & MORA ALARCON, supra note 41, at 3:59. In a 1933
treatise, Nuflez de Cepeda asserted that "if the summation influences the decision of the
jury, it contradicts the law, and if it does not, it would be a redundancy." Marchena
G6mez, supra note 352, at 268. GonzAlez de Alba (1904) criticized the "monotonous
lullaby" of the presiding judge's summation, which usually put the jury to sleep,
prompting juries to prefer "comical" summations. Id.
516. MARts ROGER & MORA ALARC6N, supra note 41, at 363, 366. Lack of imparti-
ality injury instructions is grounds for appeal as long as a contemporaneous objection is
made on the record at trial. § 846bis c(a) LECr., supra note 149.
517. § 55 (1), (2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. The first juror
selected presides over this first decision. Section 79 of the LJ of 1888 provided that the
first juror randomly selected during jury selection would be the foreperson, unless a ma-
jority of jurors voted for another. § 79 LJ of 1888, supra note 26. The foreperson is
elected in the new Russian jury court immediately after jury selection. Thaman, Resur-
rection, supra note 5, at 97.
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questions.51s The jury must remain incommunicado until a verdict is
reached. If the deliberations take a long time and the jury needs rest, how-
ever, the judge can arrange for a recess, while maintaining the sequestra-
tion. 19 Although the LOTJ does not expressly allow the jury to take the
physical evidence mto the jury room, this has been routine in several tri-
als.5
20
During deliberations, the jury may request in writing that the judge
amplify or explain the instructions. In such a case, the judge reconvenes in
open court and delivers further instructions, if necessary, in the presence of
the parties.521 In PM-i, the jury asked for further instructions after about
ninety minutes of deliberations. They asked factual questions which indi-
cated that they had not understood the instructions and their duties. The
judge instructed them again, emphasizing reasonable doubt, and even
summarizing the evidence to a certain extent. He was criticized for having
induced the acquittal of the defendants through this interventionm
518. § 55(3) LOT, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. This secrecy could be
broken in the nineteenth century jury laws only after a verdict had been thrice returned
by the bench for corrections of inconsistencies, in which case the jury was orally polled
in court. § 781 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24; § 110(2) UJ of 1888, supra note
26. The extensive interviews of the Olegi jurors by the newspaper El Mundo has been
questioned as a violation of the law on the part of both newspaper and jurors. Juristas
afirman que eljurado en el caso Otegi ha delinquido al revelar la deliberaci6n, DIARIO
VAsco (Apr. 23, 1997) <http://www.diario-vasco.com> (SS-2).
519. § 56 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1; cf. § 757 LECr. (pray.)
of 1872, supra note 24; § 81 LI of 1888, supra note 26.
520. This has been criticized by Diaz Cabiale, who compared this omission with the
fact that under section 78(2) of the LJ of 1888, thejury could take the entire investigative
file into the jury room. Diaz Cabiale, supra note 190, at 319; § 78(2) LI of 1888, supra
note 26. Courts have allowed the jury to have a copy of the secretary's minutes of the
trial during deliberation. Interview with Sancho Fraile, supra note 284 (BU-1). In Bar-
celona and Girona, the jury is provided with cassette tapes of the evidentiary portions of
the trial to refresh their memory about the testimony. Interview with Thomas Andreu,
supra note 292 (B- 1); Interview with Lacaba Sfinchez, supra note 162 (GI-I, GI-3).
521. § 57(1) LOT, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note I. The old jury laws
only provided for written amplifications, not a public hearing. § 758 LECr. (pray.) of
1872, supra note 24; § 82 LI of 1888, supra note 26.
522. The prosecutor was convinced that the judge violated his neutrality and induced
the jury to change its vote from five to four for conviction of Schatze to a seven to two
vote for acquittal due to his intervention. Interview with Ladislao Roig, Chief Prosecutor
of Palma de Mallorca Provincial Court, Palma de Mallorca (May 28, 1996) (PM-I); cf
Olivares, supra note 342 (PM-I). The jury asked for further information about the rela-
tionship between the two defendants and also wanted to know why they gave the alleged
bribe money to the police and not someone else, why the police considered it to be a
bribe, and finally what the defendant's intent was. The judge told them they had to de-
cide on the evidence. It was difficult to determine whether the defendants had one moti-
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In CS-1, the jury sent a note to the judge requesting clarifications on
the terminology used in phrasing Question 11, dealing with whether the de-
fendant was guilty of using excessive force in self defense.5 3 The judge
then advised them without notifying the parties on how to interpret this
question. The defense appealed the defendant's conviction, alleging a lack
of confrontation and a violation of section 57(1) of the LOTJ, and the
judgment was reversed because of the error.524 In the Otegi case (SS-2),
the jury asked for further clarifications on whether they had to answer all
of the questions submitted to them. This question alerted the prosecuting
parties that an acquittal could be forthcoming.
525
The judge may, on his or her own motion, summon the jury back into
court if a vote has not been taken on the verdict questions after two days of
deliberations. At this time, he or she may inquire whether the jury under-
stands the verdict form and the procedure to be used to reach a verdict.
526
vation or another. The judge then told them they should only convict "if you are per-
fectly sure that there was only one intent, that of corrupting the officials. If you have
doubts, you must acquit." The judge acknowledged that he tried to avoid compromising
his impartiality in the initial instructions, but, when he saw they had doubts, he wanted to
convince them it was reasonable to have them. He characterized his final intervention as
being more akin to the participation of a professional judge in a "mixed court." Inter-
view with L6pez Ortega, supra note 299 (PM-1). In VI-1, the jury wanted to know if it
could modify the question list and wanted to be re-instructed on the different forms of
negligence. Cf inf!ra note 562; R.C., Eljurado declara culpable de homicidio impru-
dente al acusado del caso La Isla, EL CORREO (May 9, 1997) <http://www.diario-
elcorreo.es> (VI-1). In PO-1, the jury needed to be instructed in further detail about its
power to recommend clemency or a suspended sentence. Tr. Prot. (PO-I) (on file with
author).
523. In its verdict protocol (see discussion of section 61(1)(e) of LOT infra Part
V.L.4), the jury noted that its "vote on point 11 was realized based on tho interpretation
realized by the Illustrious Seffor Don Fernando Tintor6 Loscos, Presiding Judge, on re-
quest of the jury, due to the ambiguity in editing of the same." Prot. Ver. (CS-1) (on file
with author).
524. Dec. TSJ. (CS-1) (on file with author); Sara Velert, Anulado un juicio por una
consulta deijurado aljuez en la deliberaci6n, EL PAls, Mar. 12, 1997, at 22 (CS-1).
525. Intxausti, Eljurado, supra note 489 (SS-2).
526. § 57(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Although this provi-
sion apparently has not been used in the first year of jury trials in Spain, jury deliberation
has, on occasion, been quite lengthy. In GR-4, the jury needed two days to reach a ver-
dict. Interview with Rodriguez Valverde, supra note 239. One-and-a-half days were
needed in BI-1. J. Guillenea, Eljurado declara culpable de homicidio al hombre que
mat6 a una mujer en el barrio chino de Bilbao, EL CORREO (Apr. 16, 1997)
<http://www.diano-elcorreo.es> More than a day was needed in CS-I*. Interview with
Ponz Nomdedeu, supra note 231. This was also true in SE-1, Interview with Carmona
Ruano, supra note 237, and in VI-1, R.C., supra note 522, and one of the Mflaga trials.
Interview with Torres Vela, supra note 200 (MA-1). Nine hours were needed in SE-2,
interview with Gil Merino, supra note 227, and nearly a day in B-13. Judg. (B-13) (on
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Critics have interpreted this provision to allow a kind of"dynamite charge"
to the jur as given m U.S. courts to induce a deadlocked jury to reach a
verdict.5' Aside from this provision, there is no statutory limit on the time
ajury can deliberate.528
2. Voting Procedures
Voting is accomplished by each juror speaking in alphabetical order,
with the foreperson voting last. Voting is mandatory, and abstentions are
subject to a fine of 75,000 pesetas or possible criminal prosecution. Any
abstention is deemed a vote for the defense.
5 29
The labeling of each proposition in the verdict as "favorable" or "un-
favorable" to the defendant 3 is crucial because the law requires different
voting majorities depending on this characterization. A majority of seven
of the nine jurors is required to declare as proved a fact unfavorable to the
defendant, although only five of nine votes are needed for a fact favorable
to the defendant.531 The LOTJ's authors recognized that a rule of unanim-
ity was "the most adequate to compel the jurors to a richer debate," but
compromised in the interest of avoiding mistrials.
532
file with author). The shortest period of deliberation noted was around two hours in LU-
1. Interview with Conde Salgado, supra note 139. The juries in four of five Mflaga tri-
als deliberated between three and four hours. Torres Vela, supra note 200.
527. MARES ROGER & MORA ALARC6N, supra note 41, at 377. "Dynamite instruc-
tions" were upheld in Allen v. United States. See 164 U.S. 492 (1896). For a discussion,
see LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 76, at 1044-45. Gimeno Sendra, on the other hand,
urges judges to emphasize in dubzo pro reo, akin to the concept of reasonable doubt,
which appears to be what the judge in PM-i did. GIMENO SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra
note 43, at 315-316; cf Urqufa G6mez, supra note 369, at 387-89 (criticizing the limita-
tion on deliberations and emphasizing the complicated nature of the Spanish verdict in
comparison to that used in U.S. courts, where there is usually no limitation).
528. The Russian jury is instructed to try to reach a unanimous verdict for three hours.
After such time, they are allowed to decide by a simple majority, which results in juries
seldom deliberating for much more than three hours. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note
5, at 125.
529. § 58 LOTI, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. A similar rule was con-
tained in § 86 LJ of 1888, supra note 26.
530. See discussion of § 52(1)(a) LOTJ supra Part V.L.2.
531. § 59(1) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. The earlier Spanish
jury laws required only simple majorities for guilt and factual determinations adverse to
the defendant. § 761 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24; § 85 LJ of 1888, supra note
26. The new Russian jury law also allows the same. Thaman, Resurrection supra note
5, at 125.
532. § V(3) EM-LOTJ, supra note 19, at 38. Most of the draft jury laws opted for
qualified majority verdicts. Six of nine jurors were required in the Basque Draft, supra
note 54, and five of eight votes were required in the CDS Draft supra note 57, cited in
PEREz-CRuz MARTIN, LA PARTICipAcI6N, supra note 39, at 279, 283, 287, 292. The
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If the jury cannot achieve the required majority on a particular ques-
tion, they may make relevant changes in its phrasing to coirespond to its
perceived inadequacy and then vote on the newly formulated proposition.
The modification may not eliminate the fact proposed by the judge from
the verdict form, but it may "include a new or unsuggested paragraph, but
only if it does not constitute a substantial alteration or aggravate the liabil-
ity pleaded by the prosecution.5 3 The LOTJ's authors intended to give the
jury an added "flexibility, which allows them, without abdicating their
duty to answer the formulated questions, to introduce the clarifications or
additions which allow their verdict to approximate their conscience in the
examination of the facts." The hope was that this "flexibility" would also
help prevent "surprising verdicts of acquittal. 534
This provision has been criticized for violating the accusatory princi-
ple by compromising the impartiality of the lay judges.5" Critics charge
that an inability to reach a verdict would be better addressed by further ju-
dicial instructions, or by returning a verdict for further consideration.536 It
has also been criticized, despite its pro-defense language, because a "more
favorable" juridical qualification of the facts could prevent the defense
from responding if it does not have notice of the lesser charge.
537
The jury used their power to alter the verdict form several times in the
first trials. 538 For instance, in LP-1, the jury found the hecho principal ad-
dressing the defendant's mortal stabbing of his estranged wifb to have been
L6pez-Mufoz y Larraz Draft required five of seven votes. L6pez-Mufloz y Larraz Draft,
supra note 60, at 81, 93. The CGPJ pushed for requiring the jury to try to reach a
unanimous verdict for a given time, but then compromised in agreeing to sections 4 and
57 of the LOTJ Draft-2, which required six of the seven votes to prove facts unfavorable
to the defense. Informe CGPJ, supra note 41, at 549; §§ 4, 57 LOTJ Draft-2, supra note
65, at 636, 646.
533. § 59(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. This section is a re-
statement of section 3(1) of LOTJ, which lists as one of the functions of the jury to ren-
der a verdict in relation to the "justiciable facts" determined by the judge as well as in
relation to "other facts they decide to include in their verdict which do not result in a
substantial variance in it."
534. § V(1) EM-LOTJ, supra note 19, at 36.
535. Diaz Cabiale, supra note 190, at 327-28; GImmNo SFNDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra
note 43, at 312.
536. MORAALCAR6N, supra note 41, at 389-90.
537. Verger Grau, supra note 48, at 577.
538. It was used to effect minor changes in B-2, B-12, TE-I and MA-4. In SS-3, the
jury subdivided several arguably compound questions into shorter, more easily manage-
able assertions. This was done in relation to Questions 1, 4, 11 & 14. Prots. Ver. (SS-3)
(on file with author).
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proved, but eliminated the words "with intent to kill."5' 9 In A- 3, the jury
altered the hechoprincipal in Question Al to introduce the fact that defen-
dant "felt threatened" while aiming the gun, and "warned Pedro Juan Val-
16s Llobell, who after this continued threatening the defendant and threw
himself at the defendant Vicente Luis Blasco Gregorio, and out of fear he
discharged the gun."
540
If the necessary majority has been achieved on the "principal facts"
the jury then votes on the defendant's guilt on each charged "criminal act"
(hecho delictivo imputado). For a guilty verdict, seven of nine votes are re-
quired. A finding of lack of culpability requires five of the nine votes. 4 1
Some have criticized the requirement of five votes for an acquittal (or
for a fact favorable to the defendant) rather than just makinp a failure to
achieve the seven vote majority tantamount to an acquittal.54 Because of
the "factually binding" rather than "legally binding" nature of the guilt de-
cision, however, acquittal theories in the first Spanish homicide cases have
usually been couched in "defense questions," akin to what in U.S. juris-
prudence would be called "affirmative defenses." These require the juy to
affirm factual or conclusory statements showing self-defense, annulment of
cognitive and volitional capacities, and so forth by a simple majority of
five votes.543
539. Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver. (LP-1) (on file with author). Despite this finding, the judge
in the judgment qualified the homicide as "intentional." For a discussion of the judg-
ment, see infra Part V.M.
540. See Appendix III-A. Instead of using the word "voluntary" in Question C3, the
jury substituted "voluntary, but out of fear." The jury also modified the terms of an ag-
gravating circumstance, called "abuse of superiority," which entails taking advantage of
an inequality of strength or arms between the defendant and the victim. § 10(8) CP
1973, supra note 89; § 22(2) CP 1995, supra note 69. Question C7 was altered to read:
"The defendant found himself in a situation of physical superiority, but not psychic."
The guilt question was modified then to exclude the allegation of abuse of superiority.
Prot. Ver. (A-3) (on file with author).
541. § 60 (1), (2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Despite the pos-
sibility of majority verdicts, most of the Spanish guilt findings have been unanimous.
542. Diaz Cabiale, supra note 190, at 324-25; GMENO SENDRA, COMENTARIOs, supra
note 43, at 316. The avoidance of hungjunes is chief among the concerns here. In the
first year ofjury trials there were no hung juries, i.e., where the vote was six to three or
five to four for conviction.
543. The simple U.S. "not guilty" verdict does not reflect which of any defense led the
jury to this conclusion. Many U.S. jurisdictions put the burden of proof on the defendant
to prove affirmative defenses. This burden is usually, but not always, that of a "prepon-
derance of the evidence," which is duly imparted to the jury in the judge's instructions.
LAFAVE & Scorr, supra note 428, at 53-56. It is thus not dissimilar to a five to four
special verdict in a Spanish jury trial. In Spain, the defense has the burden of proof to
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The law is unclear, however, on whether lesser-included offenses or
mitigating circumstances which partially excuse criminal conduct should
be posed as "favorable" or "unfavorable" facts in the verdict form.
544
Some courts have characterized lesser-included offenses pleaded by the de-
fense as "favorable," thus paving the way for a criminal conviction with a
simple majority of five votes, while characterizing any guilt theory pleaded
by the prosecution as "unfavorable.""' In GI-1, the question incorporating
the prosecution's theory that the defendant's killing was homicide was
characterized as "unfavorable," while the defense theory that it was tanta-
mount to a negligent homicide was dubbed as "favorable." The jury found
the defense theory to have been "proved" by a mere five to four vote.
546
Similarly, mitigating circumstances pleaded by the prosecution have
been characterized as "unfavorable," such as the prosecution's allegation
that the defendant's mental illness only partially diminished his cognitive
and volitional capacities m PA-1, while the defense theory of complete ex-
cuse because of mental illness was, of course, characterized as a "favorable
fact." '547 In GR-1, on the other hand, both the theory of complete excuse
because of mental illness advocated by the defense and the public prose-
cutor and that of partially diminished capacity advocated by the private
prosecutor were characterized as "favorable facts."
548
The overwhelming majority of courts have characterized defense alle-
gations of the mitigating circumstance of diminished capacity (as opposed
to the complete excuse) as being a "favorable fact" requiring only five
show exculpatory or mitigating circumstances, but not to prove the non-existence of in-
culpatory facts. Diaz Cabiale, supra note 190, at 336 n.101.
544. G6mEz COLOMER, supra note 41, at 117-18 (discussing this ambiguity in the
law).
545. Thus, in PM-2 the theory of negligent homicide, pleaded by the defense and in-
corporated in one of the guilt questions (Question 8), was qualified as "favorable,"
whereas a minor attempted theft allegation of the prosecution in Question 9 was qualified
as "unfavorable." Obj. Ver. (PM-2) (on file with author). In accord with this approach,
see GvmmNo SENDRA, ComENTARPos, supra note 43, at 286-87, 289. In AL-1, the factual
question alleging that defendant stabbed the victim "with intent to injure him and without
the intent of killing him" as well as the guilt question for homicide with gross negli-
gence, pleaded by the defense were characterized as "favorable," requiring only five
votes. Obj. Ver. (AL-1) (on file with author).
546. Both parties agreed that defendant was insane. The effect of this finding was
only to set the outer time limit on defendant's internment in a locked p.sychiatric facility.
The presiding judge, while generally holding that any "guilt" finding requires at least
seven votes, felt that this finding of only "intent to injure" in the context of the case was
an exception. Interview with Lacaba Snchez, supra note 162 (GI-1).
547. Obj. Ver. (PA-1) (on file with author).
548. Obj. Ver. (GR-1) (on file with author).
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votes to prove.549 The judge in BU-1 differed with this opinion, however,
and qualified all mitigating circumstances not leading to an outright ac-
quittal as "unfavorable facts" requiring seven votes for proof.550
The better view on lesser-included offenses is that they should always
require the qualified majority of seven votes, whether pleaded by the de-
fense or the prosecution. The courts in SE-i and SE-2 took this position
by providing that both the factual questions alleging a mere intent to in-
jure, rather than kill, and all guilt questions, whether alleging the prosecu-
tion position of murder, or the defense position of negligent homicide, re-
quired seven votes to be proved.55'
At times, courts have been rather arbitrary in labeling peripheral facts
not directly related to the proof of corpus delicti, excuses, justifications or
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, as "favorable" or "unfavor-
able. ' 5 2 As long as the facts in such questions are irrelevant to questions
of guilt, little harm is done. But if, for instance, the factual underpinnings
of the defendant's alleged negligent conduct require only five votes for ap-
proval, while a guilty verdict based on the same facts requires seven, the
consistency of the verdict form will be undermined.
Recommendations to suspend sentence or submit a petition for clem-
ency to the Government must be decided by a simple majority of five
votes.
553
549. See Q4-5, Appendix HII-A; Q4-5, Appendix Il-B; Q2C & Q3B, Appendix IlI-D;
Q52, Q79, & Q80, Appendix If.
550. Interview with Fraile, supra note 284. Thus, Question 13 alleges a complete
nullification of the defendant's "faculties to understand and to will" as a "favorable fact,"
but the fallback allegation of only a "partial nullification" of his faculties was character-
ized as "unfavorable," and would have required two additional votes. Obj. Ver. (BU-1)
(on file with author).
551. Obj. Ver. (SE-1) (on file with author); Obj. Ver (SE-2) (on file with author).
The question positing guilt of negligent homicide in SA-2 was also characterized as
"unfavorable," requiring seven votes. Obj. Ver (SA-1) (on file with author).
552. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106 (manuscript at 38). Car-
mona Ruoano and DePafil Velasco have made this observation, in relation to the charac-
terization of facts m GR-1, such as, that the defendant and the victim "were alone in de-
fendant's house" or that immediately after the stabbing of the victim the defendant
"inflicted wounds on herself' as "unfavorable." Ida The same criticism was made in re-
lation to the verdict forms in MA-I, SA-I and SE-2. Id. (manuscript at 39, 41-42). Since
such facts are not easily susceptible to such pigeonholing, one author advocates their ex-
clusion from the verdict form. Urquia G6mez, supra note 369, at 397-98.
553. § 60(3) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
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3. Drafting and Giving Reasons for the Verdict
The LOTJ sets out the format which the jury should use in drafting
the verdict. The jury should state in a first paragraph the propositions in
the verdict form that it has found to be proved and indicate whether the
vote was unanimous or by a majority. A second paragraph should list the
propositions which were deemed not proved, again listing the vote count.
The propositions may be listed by number if the content is not altered. A
third paragraph begins: "[b]ecause of the aforementioned, the jurors by
(unanimity or majority) find the defendant guilty/not guilty of the crime
of..." The jury should also articulate their criteria with respect to appli-
cation of the benefits of a suspension of sentence or clemency."' A fourth
paragraph should begin with the words: "[t]he jurors have relied on the
following pieces of evidence in making the preceding declarations." The
jurors must then articulate "a succinct explanation of the reasons why they
have declared, or refused to declare, certain facts as having been
proved. ,55
The requirement that the Spanish jury give reasons for its verdicts is
perhaps the LOTJ's most remarkable innovation.5 56 It owes its inclusion to
554. § 61 (1)(a), (b), (c) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Interest-
ingly enough, the November 1995 amendments of the LOTJ did not remove the word
"crime" (delito) from this section and replace it with "criminal act" (hecho delictivo) as
was done in sections 52(1)(d) and 60(1) of the LOTJ. Ley Org.nica el 22 de Mayo, 1995
(B.O.E. 1995, 122), modificado por la Ley Orginica 8/1995, de 16 de noviembre, y Ley
Orgdnica 10/1995, de 23 de noviembre (B.O.E. 1995, 281). In the nineteenth century
laws, the jury was not allowed to reveal whether decisions were reached unanimously or
by majority vote. § 763(4) LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24; § 88 LJ of 1888, supra
note 26. In support of the nineteenth century approach, by which the jury is represented
as a "unitary bloc," see L6PEz-Murloz Y LARRAZ, COMENTARIOS, supra note 54, at 148,
The jury did not indicate the precise majority by which it answered the questions and ac-
quitted Mikel Otegi in SS-2, and this was originally seen as a possible grounds for rever-
sal. El fiscal dice que el juez instruy6 de forma inadecuada al jurado del caso ltsa-
sondo, DLhiuo VAsco (Mar. 22, 1997) <http://diario-vasco.com> (SS-2). The majorities
were also not indicated in AB-1 and GR-1. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra
note 106 (manuscript at 52).
555. § 61(1)(d) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Section 59(4) of
LOTJ Draft-2 allowed for dissenting jurors to give their reasons as well. § 59(4) LOT]
Draft-2, supra note 65. This provision was removed following critique by the CGPJ,
which maintained that it would violate the secrecy of jury deliberations. Informe CGPJ,
supra note 41, at 549. Nevertheless, in 0-3 the jury did include in the otherwise sketchy
reasons for its guilty verdict, the fact that one of the jurors affirmed "a mitigating fact
that he was not in control of his acts." Prot. Ver. (0-3) (on file with author).
556. The only other arguably similar provision is contained in section 331(e) of the
Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure, which allows the jury to write down reasons for its
verdict. § 331(e) StPO (Aus.). However, whether the reasons stated in the Niederschri?
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the authors' interpretation of article 120.3 of the CE which mandates that
"reasons shall be given for all criminal judgments."'  Although the jury's
answers to the numerous factual propositions in the verdict form certainly
provides the judge with a substantive basis for rendering judgment, critics
claim that a properly reasoned judgment also requires the jury to state its
reasons so that a reasonable appellate procedure can be facilitated and the
judge can properly determine that the presumption of innocence, guaran-
teed in article 24.2 of the CE and article 6.2 of the European Convention
on Human Rights, was properly rebutted.
558
There have also been differences of opinion on the ability of a panel
of nine lay judges to actually develop in a unified manner the reasons why
it answered the questions the way it did. Whereas some feel this will only
be a problem when the verdict is based on circumstantial evidence,5 59 oth-
ers question how it can be done at all: "[i]t is one thing to argue and then
vote and distinctly another to agree with the reason or reasons which led to
a certain verdict."56°
In fulfilling the statutory mandate, many juries have perfunctorily
mentioned the evidence on which they relied and failed to give any actual
may be used as a basis of attacking the factual findings of the jury is contested. See En-
hard Steininger, Die Anfechtung mangelhafler Taisachenfeststellungen im Gesch-
worenenverfahren, 47 0STERREIcHIscHE JURIsTENZETUNG 687, 688-91(1992).
557. This provision has been incorporated into § 248(2) LOPJ, supra note 86.
558. GIMENo SENDRA, COMENTARiOS, supra note 43, at 320-21; Diaz Cabiale, supra
note 190, at 329, 333. One author felt that the requirement of reasoned judgments made
the classicjury impossible in Italy. Amodio, supra note 9, at 13 & n.30. The Russians,
on the other hand, felt that the factual affirmations in the jury's answers in the question
list alone allowed for a reasoned judgment to be rendered by the judge. Thaman, Resur-
rection, supra note 5, at 116.
559. According to Gimeno Sendra, a jury would then be tested in its reasoning ac-
cording to the doctrine laid down by the Spanish Constitutional Court, where by the rea-
soning must show "an objective and logical nexus capable of exteriorizing a relation of
causality between the plurality of believable circumstantial evidence and the proof of the
principal criminal act." GIMENO SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 321 (quoting
from decisions S.T.C. 175 and S.T.C. 176); cf. Urqufa G6mez, supra note 369, at 412-14
(emphasizing that juries should give reasons for verdicts based on circumstantial evi-
dence).
560. Marts Roger, supra note 41, at 396; Palomino Martin, supra note 99, at 129-30;
cf. Diaz Cabiale, supra note 190, at 336. Indeed, it has often been argued that what mo-
tivates even professional judges to reach their decision is often different from the reasons
given in their judgment, which must be articulated so as to stand up on appeal. Marts
Roger, supra note 41, at 397; see FAIRfr GUulIN, Comentaros, supra note 45, at 76 &
n.484 (opposing a jury giving reasons, for fear a "yes" answer could, through its rea-
soned justification, turn into a qualified "no," or vice versa); cf DAMAKA, EvmrnNcE
Law, supra note 6, at 43-44 (noting that requiring jurors to make their verdicts transpar-
ent is democratically attractive, but practically undesirable).
19981
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
discursive "reasons" for their verdicts.561 In acquitting the defendant of
trespassing and threats in MA-2, the jury justified its verdict with one
word, a laconic "[w]itnesses. 562 Some judges have addressed the paucity
of the jury's reasons in their judgments but have deemed it to be harmless
by relying on the consistency of their answers and the detailed nature of
the questions themselves, which sufficiently indicated the jury's reasoning
process.
563
In other cases, juries have mentioned the witnesses upon whom they
relied in deciding each question in the verdict form,564 and have sometimes
emphasized the special importance of one witness's testimony 65 or of the
561. Carmona Ruano and DePafil Velasco found the following reasons given in MU-I
to be "minimal:" "Evidence which we took into consideration: (a) declaration of the de-
fendant; (b) witnesses' testimony; (c) expert testimony of the forensic doctors, psycholo
gist and members of the Judicial Police." Prot. Ver. (MU-1) (on file with author); Car-
mona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106 (manuscript at 54); cf. Prots. Ver. (0-1,
0-2) (on file with author) ("Testimony of witnesses and experts"); Prot. Ver. (B-4) (on
file with author) ("Defendant's own testimony and expert testimony"); Prot. Ver. (LU-I)
(on file with author) ("Testimony of defendant, testimony of witnesses"); Prot. Ver.
(MA-1) (on file with author) ("Evidence, experts, defendant's testimony"); Prot. Ver.
(MA-4) (on file with author) ("The evidence introduced in the trial and particularly the
testimony of the witnesses"); Prot. Ver. (AL-2) (on file with author) ("The testimony of
the witnesses, the expert evidence and the material proof presented in the courtroom");
Prot. Ver. (A-3) (on file with author) ("Due to the evidence and testimony at trial"); Prot.
Ver. (LU-2) (on file with author) ("We took into account the evidence introduced during
the trial").
562. Prot. Ver. (MA-2) (on file with author). Carmona Ruano and DePail Velasco
found this to be "non- existent" reasoning, along with five or more of the 17 jury verdicts
they analyzed. Carmona Ruano & DePail Velasco, supra note 106 (manuscript at 26-
27).
563. In BI-1, the judge calls the reasoning "sketchy" but points to the fact that the
verdict form was very detailed, and the fact that the jury answered all the questions and
even changed the wording of some, to compensate for the inadequate reasoning. Judg.
(BI-1) (on file with author). In PO-3, the judge bemoans the "too scanty description of
the proof presented by the jury" but finds it compensated by the fact that the extensive
number of eyewitnesses and the precision of the expert witnesses enabled the jury to
come to a "logical conclusion" as evinced by the "logical answers to each of the ques-
tions." Judg. (PO-3) (on file with author). If the question list is logically organized and
contains all the factual propositions necessary to address all theories of the case, and if
this will compensate for lack of sufficient reasoning, what is the purpose of adding the
requirement that the jury justify the verdict?
564. This was donb in Prot. Ver. (SS-1) (on file with author).
565. In A-4, a threats case, the jury mentioned "testimony," but emphasized in rela-
tion to its answer to the hecho principal: "We evaluated to a greater degree the testimony
of the complainant." Prot. Ver. (A-4) (on file with author). In M-3, the jury emphasized
that two witnesses were present during the argument, the alleged threats, and the shots
fired by the defendant. Prot. Ver. (M-3) (on file with author).
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contradictions or incredibility of the defendant's testimony.5" Occasion-
ally a jury will merely restate its verdict in conclusory terms, without giv-
ing any actual "reasons" for their conclusion.567 In GR-1, while attempting
to give reasons for rejecting the insanity defense advocated by the public
prosecutor and all the psychiatric witnesses in favor of a diminished ca-
pacity alternative offered by the private prosecutor, the jury provided "rea-
soning" which has been described as vacillating between the "tautological
and the unintelligible.5 68
In several cases, the jury has sought to give actual "reasons" for the
proof of each critical proposition in the verdict form. Sometimes, the "rea-
sons" amount to little more than summarizing in more detail what testi-
mony was relied on for the proof, or in the case of expert testimony, what
566. In A-I, the jury in A-I gave the following reasons: "Testimony of witnesses,
contradictions in the testimony of the defendant." Prot. Ver. (A-I) (on file with author).
In B-5, the jury mentioned the witnesses and added: "We found the defendant's testi-
mony not convincing as to how the knife got into the lavatory." Prot. Ver. (B-5) (on file
with author). Finally, in CS-i the jury gave reasons for each question: "Facts 1 and 7:
Declaration of Fernando, the owner of the pub; Facts 2, 3, 4, 5: Declaration of Esteban,
who lived on the street; Facts 9, 2: Expert testimony (characteristics of the knife and
declaration and reports of forensic experts); Fact 6: Testimony of Juana and Jos6 (the
defendant). In total, the testimony of Jos6, due to the numerous contradictions between it
and that of the majority of witnesses." Prot. Ver. (CS-1) (on file with author).
567. In PA-1, the jury said it relied on the defendant's testimony and that of the psy-
chiatrists, and then restated its conclusion that "the accused suffered from a delirious
disorder which forcefully influenced his decision to kill, but without nullifying com-
pletely his volitional and intellectual capacity." Prot. Ver. (PA-1) (on file with author).
Carmona Ruano and DePafil Velasco found such a restatement of conclusions in lieu of
"reasons" in seven of the 17 verdicts they analyzed. Carmona Ruano & DePa1 Velasco,
supra note 106 (manuscript at 27). In B-2, the jury "considered that the aggression was
not with intention to kill but to injure and that the victim would not have died had he
been transported and received the appropriate care." Prot. Ver. (B-2) (on file with
author). In MU-1, the jury "considered the defendant's lack of intent to cause an evil of
such magnitude." Prot. Ver. (MU-1) (on file with author). And in PP-1, the jury opined,
"[mI]ore than fear, we believe he lost his cool due to nerves and stress, and reacted in a
disproportionate manner." Prot. Ver. (PP-1) (on file with author). In M-3, the jury
pointed to "testimony of the sister and the medical and ballistics expertise" as justifica-
tion for its answers to seven of the questions, and in relation to the three questions deal-
ing with diminished capacity the jury stated: "we concluded that while the defendant's
problems with alcohol could have had a mild influence in the commission of the crime,
they did not incapacitate him and he was conscious of what he did in the moment of
committing the crime." Prot. Ver. (M-3) (on file with author).
568. Carmona Ruano & DePail Velasco, supra note 106 (manuscript at 6). The jury
considered the insanity proposition "not demonstrated in an irrefutable manner in rela-
tion to all the extremes on this point," whereas the proposition as to diminished capacity,
based on the same mental illness, was accepted "based on the level of scientific security
shown by the expert testimony." lt (manuscript at 26-27).
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the conclusions were.569 At other times, the deductions made by jurors
from circumstantial evidence to prove specific points were postulated.
Thus, in V-1, the jury explicitly pointed to the evidence which convinced
them that the defendant had indeed broken into the victim's house and was
not the innocent victim of an attack by third parties.570 In SA-1, the jury
ably explained why they believed the defendant was grossly negligent but
not willful m the shooting of his wife.571 In PM-2, the jury meticulously
described its response to each proposition in the verdict form.
5 72
569. This was the case in LP-I, where, among other things, the jury listed "the decla-
rations of the accused that he went to the house of his wife and stabbed her with the
knife," "the testimony of the psychiatrists that the defendant had a peculiar personality,
and so forth." Furthermore, elements deemed not proved were just stated in conclusory
terms: "taking into account the testimony of the witnesses and forensic medical experts it
was not proved that the defendant acted under the influence of alcohol." Prot. Ver. (LP-
1) (on file with author). According to Carmona Ruano and DePafil Velasco, the reasons
given in LP-1 could be considered a "model in some respects," having provided "ample
and precise reasons given for each factual pronouncements." Carmona Ruano & DePafil
Velasco, supra note 106 (manuscript at 53). The reasons given in LU-2 were of similar
quality. Prot. Ver. (LU-2) (on file with author). In SE-2, the jury returned its guilty ver-
dict without having provided reasons. The judge sent the jury back to the jury room to
correct their error, and they took four hours to compose three and one-half pages of rea-
sons, touching on each critical proposition in the verdict form. On the whole, these con-
sisted in repeating the crucial testimony rather than elucidating the jury's thought proc-
esses. Prot. Ver. (SE-2) (on file with author); Interview with Merino, supra note 227. In
VI-1, the lengthy reasons were also in most respects just repetitions of what the jury
found had been proved, rather than eiplanations of why they had considered it proved.
Prot. Ver. (VI-1) (on file with author).
570. The jury gave the following reasons: "(1) the manifestation by the agents of the
Guardia Civil that the defendant did not ask for their help against the supposed aggres-
sors, who waited within the house, and told them that no criminality of any kind had
happened, despite the fact that his face was bleeding; (2) the reports otr the doctor and
forensic expert that pieces of glass were found in the neck of the defendant (although
from this, one cannot deduce active or passive aggression), but the existence of such a
relatively minor wound, which the defendant apparently had, could not have been in-
flicted by an iron bar (the wound in the head was incredibly minor in relation to the in-
strument that allegedly caused it); (3) the existence of broken glass in the interior of the
house, when the accused came through the glass, predominantly in a position from out-
side to inside, and finally (4) the excessive aggressions against the automobile, which
seem more than necessary just to prevent its use, but intended to destroy it with inten-
tionality and malice." Prot. Ver. (V-I) (on file with author).
571. "(1) The declarations of the neighbors confirming the good matrimonial rela-
tions, as well as the lack of complaints of maltreatment made by the deceased; (2) Testi-
mony of the neighbor Gregorio Casimiro Bahia, with whom he argued. It was with him
that the defendant was angry and whom he wanted to scare with the shotgun; (3) The
testimony of the forensic experts who told of the trajectory of the pellets in the body,
which made it clear to us that the shot was not aimed at a vital organ; These three reasons
showed us the lack of intention on the part of the defendant to kill his wife; (4) Testi-
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Ironically, one of the most thoughtful and reasoned verdicts was re-
turned in GR-2, despite the fact that the verdict form, reformulated three
times, was a disaster, and the negligent homicide judgment was reversed
because of insufficient evidence:
First, we see no reason for the girl to decide to climb alone to the res-
ervoir, a place where she had never been; in addition, there are the
wounds in the back of the head of Antonia Martos Pdrez and semi-
lunar marks on her neck.
-- Contradictions in the testimony between the members of the family.
-The strange attitude and conduct of both defendants from the mo-
ment the absence of Antonia Martos Pdrez has been noticed and
throughout the search.
-Mr. Antonio Martos Chaves' incitement of some neighbors to lie to
the police as to the hour in which the search of his granddaughter was
initiated.
-The persistence of the father, Antonio Martos Rodriguez in saying:
'Someone killed my daughter' and 'They've done something bad to my
daughter' in just a short time after she was missing.
-Insistence on the part of the family of the defendants on the inability
of Mr. Antonio Martos Chaves to work, contradicting with the testi-
mony in this respect of the majority of the neighbors.
73
Although even the best attempts by juries to provide reasons for their
guilty verdicts do little to add to the reasoning and deductions implicitly
contained in a well-drafted verdict form, the jury's "reasons" can shed
mony of the experts which showed us the poor functioning of the shotgun, something the
defendant knew, which led us to think that, while the homicide was not intentional, it
was, according to our point of view a grave lack of imprudence [sic]. We also think it
was another gravely negligent act to leave the shotgun loaded and to exit with it if the
only reason was to scare someone." Prot. Ver. (SA-l) (on file with author).
572. Especially noteworthy are the reasons for rejecting an accident defense in the
mortal stabbing of a man from whom defendant demanded money to buy cocaine: "(d)
The number and type of wounds which convinced the jury that there was a struggle, and
that the wounds were mortal and thus the possibility of accident alleged by the defense
was consequently eliminated; (e) With the corpulence of the defendant and the lack of
corpulence of the victim it would have been possible to overcome the victim with other
means. The use of the knife and the type of wounds convince the jury as to the intention-
ality of the defendant's actions." Prot. Ver. (PM-2) (on file with author). In SS-3, the
jury also gave detailed reasons for their answers to each question. Prot. Ver. (SS-3) (on
file with author).
573. Prot. Ver. (GR-2) (on file with author).
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light on the situation when a jury returns a contradictory verdict (usually
due to a poorly constructed verdict form). Thus, in GI-2, a case ultimately
reversed by the TSJ of Catalonia because the jury had affirmed both ihe
prosecution's "unfavorable" formulation of the hecho principal and the de-
fense's "favorable" formulation, the jury gave the following "reasons" for
its defective verdict of guilt:
To reach these conclusions, the members of the jury, unanimously,
have based them m logic and common sense, understanding that there
were no conclusive proofs, but there was sufficient circumstantial evi-
dence and coincidences so that there could be no doubt of the partici-
pation of the defendant m the acts.
5 74
In CS-1*, in which the jury affirmed both the prosecution's and the
defense's slightly different versions of the prelude to the "mutual combat,"
found all elements of a perfect self defense, and found the defendant guilty
of homicide, its reasons seemed to show that it did not understand it had
acquitted the defendant.
5 75
In the reasons given for its guilty verdict in A-5, a prosecution for
failing to render aid, the jury revealed its own popular twist on an element
of the crime, requiring that the person injured be "defenseless" (desam-
parada). Despite the fact that the defendant credibly alleged that, after he
had struck the victim, passersby had come immediately to her aid, the jury
nevertheless found defendant "guilty of not having attended to the victim,
leaving her in a situation of medical defenselessness ....
In cases resulting in acquittals, juries have occasionally given well-
defined affirmative reasons for their decisions. In B-11, the jury listed a
number of facts which led them to believe that the defendant was "inno-
cent because the events developed at a moment when she felt fear and ter-
574. Dec. TSJ (GI-2) (on file with author).
575. The jury considered the defendant "guilty of the criminal act of homicide" due to
the "declarations of some witnesses who saw the end of the fight when Miguel left a
space of his body unprotected and Josd stuck him with the knife," and due to "expert tes-
timony of the forensic medical experts that showed that it was hardly possible that Mi-
guel fell on the knife due to the characteristics of the wound." Prot. Ver. (CS-I*) (on file
with author); see Appendix 111-C for the verdict form.
576. The jury further said the defendant, when he saw the passersby helping the vic-
tim in his rearview mirror, had not ascertained whether "the aid received by the pedes-
trian from the passersby was of a medical nature or not." Prot. Ver. (A..5) (on file with
author). This interpretation of the element of "helplessness" was supplied by the jury,
not constituting part of the recognized definition of the crime of failing to render aid.
Interview with Catalayud, supra note 233. The jury reached a similar conclusion in PO-
5, convicting despite the fact that a bystander took the victim to the hospital. Interview
with Bobillo, supra note 509.
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ror, and was trying to defend herself against the aggression of Rafael Gon-
zflez, and involuntarily caused his death., 577 In MA-5, the jury based its
verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity in a trial of a young man for the
killing of his father on the following:
The defendant has a strong genetic predisposition to mental illness in
both parents. He was raised in a family environment in which his ho-
mosexuality was never accepted by his father and severely punished.
He suffers from a schizoaffective disorder which, coupled with his
drug addiction, resulted in a complete annulment of his mental faculties
at the time he committed the act for which he stands accused and for
the commission of which he spontaneously expressed his remorse.
57 8
However, juries have more commonly grounded their acquittals on
the prosecution's failure of proof, i.e., in the presumption of innocence and
an honoring of the principal of in dubiopro reo. In PM-1, for instance, the
jury attributed its acquittal of bribery charges to the fact that "the evidence
presented did not convince the members of the jury that the facts were
proved for which the defendants Lothar Gerhard Schiltze and Juan Carlos
Alonso Martin were accused." The main reason for the doubts was that
"the declarations of the agents of the Guardia Civil, who did not agree in
their testimony, caused some contradictions which gave rise to an element
of important doubt for the members of the jury."579
Similarly, in M-2, in which the defendant claimed his brother had im-
paled himself on the knife he admittedly held, the jury claimed that "there
is no definitive proof to affirm the existence of intent or dolo in the act
committed, and therefore the jury considers the defendant not guilty."580 In
577. The jury further articulated: "Margarita left quickly to get help. She had no
weapon to injure Rafael when he returned to the house. Rafael only had one puncture
wound. The fact that it severed the aorta. She did not use economic means at her dis-
posal to escape." Prot. Ver. (B-Il) (on file with author).
578. Prot. Ver. (MA-5) (on file with author).
579. Prot. Ver. (PM-1) (on file with author). While deeming this "sufficient reasons
given for an acquittal," Carmona Ruano and DePa61 Velasco note that the contradictions
in the testimony of the police would have no effect on the crucial question in the case,
whether the 200,000 pesetas admittedly given to the Guardia Civil was a bribe, or a do-
nation to benefit children. Carmona Ruano & DePaoil Velasco, supra note 106 (manu-
script at 22, 55). In its detailed list of reasons, the jury in LP-2 gave as its reason: "por
in dubio pro reo" for 13 of the 20 questions in acquitting three members of the crew of a
ship of the deaths of two stowaways. Prot. Ver. (LP-2) (on file with author).
580. Prot. Ver. (M-3) (on file with author).
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acquitting the defendant m B-9, the jury noted the "lack o:f convincing
proof that the defendant participated in the death of Lobo." ''
There is also an important question as to whether the jury may be re-
quired to give reasons for a not guilty verdict or a proposition which re-
jects the prosecution's theory, for instance, why the jury believed a certain
witness or relied on a certain piece of evidence. This would violate the
principal of "free evaluation of the evidence," akin to the right to return a
verdict according to "conscience," 582 as well as the presumption of inno-
cence. The appellate court, when reviewing a jury's verdict, need only af-
firmn that objective elements of proof existed which could permit the jury to
reach a certain conclusion.583
It is necessary to compare the reasons given for the acquittal in the
Otegi case (SS-2) with the other "reasonable doubt" acquittals described
above while bearing in mind the supposed qualitative difference between
the reasons required to justify verdicts of conviction and acquittal. The
Otegi jury found that the four guilt propositions relating to the deaths of
the two Basque police officers were "deficiently proved" and that the jury
had "doubts" relating to the proof of the underlying circumstamces. In its
decision overturning Otegi's acquittal, the TSJ of the Basque Country
made the jury's lack of cogent reasons a centerpiece of its opinion:
Not one of the ninety-one facts which-divided into those fhvorable
and adverse to the interests of the defendant-appeared in the verdict
form, gave rise to the most minimal explication of the reasons for
which they considered them proved or not proved. On the contrary, the
jury attempted a type of pseudo-motivation or substitute global moti-
vation, which, m attempting to uselessly sanitize the enormity of this
omission, is out of place, being found in the passage related to the
declaration of guilt or innocence, more properly, the attribution of
criminal responsibility, provided for in article 61.1 of the law, which
does not require the giving of any reasons.
581. Prot. Ver. (3-9) (on file with author). In AV-1, a prosecution for failure to ren-
der aid, the jury acquitted the defendant and proffered similar reasons: "After we heard
all the testimony of witnesses and experts the evidence was not sufficient to declare the
defendant guilty." Prot. Ver. (AV-1) (on file with author).
582. Indeed, section 741 of the LECr. provides that the professional bench, in ren-
dering judgment in normal cases, must "appreciate according to its conscience the evi-
dence presented at trial," and use its "free discretion" (libre arbitrio) in qualifying the
crime and imposing judgment. § 741 LECr. (prov.), supra note 24.
583. Dfaz Cabiale, supra note 190, at 333-36, 340; MARts ROGER & MoRA ALARC6N,
supra note 41, at 398.
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The lack of any explication about the proof of the fhcts cannot be sup-
plemented with the supposed logical force of the connection between
the responses, which only affirm or negate the historical reality of these
occurrences.
The invocation of doubt and the references to that which the law re-
quires-with which the jury pretends to support its answers, which they
forgot to give reasons for before-reveal that the jury, camouflaging
with perplexity a psychological state which has nothing to do with se-
rious hesitation, invents the existence of a doubt which it gratuitously
prejudges, in order to use the prop of article 54(3) of the law. Armed
with the protection of this precept, the jury proclaims that it is plagued
by doubt that it finds it impossible to dissipate it and that, because of
it, it is resolving the issue in the sense most favorable to the defendant.
It does not describe from where the doubt arose, nor the magnitude
thereof, nor is any notion apparent of the force employed to overcome
the doubt or clear up the difficulties to which it has given rise.
4
It would be hasty to assume that the pronouncements of the Basque
appellate court should be interpreted as binding requirements for juries to
give exhaustive reasons when they acquit. The Otegi case is sui generis, a
"trial of the century" which unfortunately occurred in the first year of the
new institution, and which caused such an outbreak of outrage that the TSJ
of the Basque Country was under great pressure to overturn the acquit-
tal.5
85
So far, the requirement that juries give reasons for their verdicts on
and above the logic inherent in their answers to the special verdict forms
seems superfluous because the presiding judge must still give reasons for
the judgment rendered on the jury verdict. Most of the juries' attempts
have been perfunctory, merely conclusory, or, if indeed reflective of their
decisional processes, merely an interesting adjunct to their more difficult
work of answering the often lengthy, fact-laden, and confusing verdict
forms.
Occasionally, juries have given reasons for their recommendations for
suspended sentences or clemency petitions. In PO-1, the only prosecution
584. Aurora Intxausti, Mikel Otegi volver6 a serjuzgado por matar a dos 'erizainas
EL PAts, JUNE28, 1997, at I (quoting Dec. TSJ (SS-2)).
585. Otegi had ten days from the date of the decision, June 27, 1997, to appeal to the
Spanish Supreme Court. Id. It is unclear what the state of the case is, as Otegi has failed
to appear for a court date m a related case and has been declared a fugitive from justice.
Los jueces admited al fin que Otegi se ha fugado y ordenan su detenci6n, LA
VANGUARDIA, July 8, 1997 <http://www2.vanguardia.es> (SS-2).
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before a jury in the first year for setting forest fires, the jury recommended
a suspended sentence, claiming that the defendant "is not a pyromaniac
and was not premeditating" and a clemency petition, because "we consider
the punishments to be excessive in relation to the damage caused.5 86 In
PA-1, a suspended sentence was recommended because of the defendant's
"family and psychotic background." 58 7 In LP-1, a partial clemency was
recommended because of "the advanced age of the defendant, his lack of
prior criminal convictions, and the fact it is the first time he has committed
a crime." 588
The verdict must also contain a final section which should describe
any "incidents which happened during deliberations without making any
identification which would violate its secrecy 58 9  The only case to the
author's knowledge in which real "incidents" were noted under this rubric
was CS-1, in which the jury revealed that the judge responded ex parte to
their inquiries concerning the formulation of one of the verdict questions;
the jury also noted that they had had difficulties interpreting some provi-
sions of the LOTJ attributable to its poor drafting.
590
The foreperson is normally responsible for drafting the verdict and its
reasons, unless he or she is in the minority In that case, the jury should
designate someone else to complete this task.5 91 The LOTJ also permits
the foreperson to ask the judge to allow the court secretary or another 0ffi-
cial to enter the jury room to help the jury to draft their reasons for the
verdict.592 This provision has been criticized as being violative of the se-
586. Prot. Ver. (P0-I) (on file with author).
587. Prot. Ver. (PA-1) (on file with author).
588. Prot. Ver. (LP-1) (on file with author).
589. § 61(1)(e) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
590. Prot.Ver. (CS-1) (on file with author). See supra note 523 and accompanying
text. In SS-3, the jury used this section to complain strongly about the lack of food and
water given it during 10 hours of deliberation and the excessive heat of the jury room. It
labeled its jury protocol "acta liberaci6n," i.e. of "liberation," instead of "deliberation."
Prot. Ver. (SS-3) (on file with author).
591. § 61(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
592. § 61(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. This provision was
not in the LOTJ Draft-2 and was added by the parliamentary faction of the Partido
Popular (the current governing party). MARts ROGER & MORA ALARC6N, supra note 41.
In his critique of the LOTJ Draft-2, Fairdn Guilldn suggests the idea of creating the posi-
tion of "director of the jury," to be assumed by a lawyer, magistrate or other legally-
tramed person who would have the function of "technical counselor" to the jury. Fairdn
Guill6n, Comentarios, supra note 45, at 480-81. In CS-I*, the secretary of the court had
gone home at the time the jury asked for help in drafting the verdict, so a lesser official,
albeit with a law degree, substituted for the secretary in fulfilling this task. Interview
with Ponz Nomdedeu, supra note 231 (CS-I*).
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crecy of deliberations. Because the secretary is legally trained, he or she
could, in reviewing the jury's answers, be tempted to correct any possible
errors before the jury returns to court with the verdict 93 Indeed, in a few
of the first trials, the secretary has actually answered legal questions posed
by the jury. In 0-2, the jury called for the secretary and asked her to ex-
plain the recommendations of suspended sentence and clemency, and,
more importantly, to explain the difference between a complete excuse and
a partial excuse due to psychic disturbance.5 94 In GR-4, the jury sum-
moned the court secretary into the jury room and asked him if they could
remove the phrase "intent to kill" from their answer to the "principal fact
question." The secretary told them that if they did, the defendant would
not be guilty of murder. 5 The jury did not remove the phrase. In their
own recording of "incidents," the jury in SE-2 indicated they had called the
secretary into the jury room four times. One time was to explain the un-
clear formulation of two questions in the verdict form, concerning an alle-
gation that the defendant had bought poor quality heroin from the victim,
which caused him "grave psychic and physical effects" and that it was in
this state that he went looking for the victim. According to the jury, the
secretary "told them how they had to proceed." The secretary later spent
forty-five minutes with them to help draft their verdict.
596
Advocates of the superiority of the "mixed court" have seen the pro-
vision allowing the secretary to enter the jury room as "subliminally rec-
ognizing the great advantages of the court with lay assessors," 597 or, as the
593. MARns ROGER & MORA ALARC6N, supra note 41, at 399. L6pez-Muftoz y Lar-
raz, Crdnica, supra note 219, at XV
594. The Secretary in the case also admitted that "when we [Secretaries] leave the jury
room we know what the verdict will be." Interview with Alonso Crespo, supra note 322
(0-2).
595. The presiding judge insisted the Secretary answer such questions to "preserve the
confidentiality" of jury deliberations. Interview with Rodriguez Valverde, supra note
239 (GR-4).
596. The jury deliberated nine hours in all. Prot. Ver. (SE-2) (on file with author);
Interview with Gil Merno, supra note 227 (SE- 2); Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco,
supra note 106, at 56-57. The relative lengthiness of jury deliberations can partially be
attributed to the participation of the Secretary. The jury deliberated two hours in V-I,
one of the aforementioned cases in which elaborate "reasons" were given for the verdict
before asking the Secretary in for help. See infra note 626. But the jury did not reach
their final verdict for another three to four hours. Interview with AlcAntara Barbany, su-
pra note 175 (V-i). In PA-1, the jury deliberated 1.5 hours before asking the Secretary
for help, and did not return with their verdict for another 1.5 hours. Interview with
Coullaut Arifilo, supra note 218 (PA-1). The nine hours the jury in SE-2 deliberated can
be partly attributed to the four times the secretary intervened.
597. G6MEzCoLOMER, supra note 41, at 124.
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"first step to the court with lay assessors." 598 Not all juries have requested
the secretary's help 99 and most courts have restricted the secretary's role
to aiding in the verdict's drafting.600 However, the more substantive role
played by the secretary in 0-3, GR-4, and SE-2, and no doubt in other
cases signals a lack of antipathy toward giving Spanish juries the kind of
tutelage their cousins on "mixed courts" in other western European coun-
tries receive from the professional bench. Time will tell whether this por-
tends a slow transformation of the Spanish jury into such a "mixed court."
4. Judicial Control of the Verdict: the Prohibition of Jury
Nullification
Once the verdict has been reached, the jury returns to the courtroom
and delivers a copy to the judge. The judge, after reviewing it for errors,
hands the copy to the parties and the foreperson proceeds to read the ver-
dict aloud in open court. 601 Pursuant to section 63 of the LOTJ, however,
the judge must return the verdict to the jury before allowing it to be read if
it reveals any of the following shortcomings:
(1)(a) if no pronouncement was made as to the totality of the factual
propositions; (b) if no pronouncement was made as to the guilt or in-
nocence of each of the defendants with respect to the totality of the
charged crinmal acts; (c) if the requisite majority was not cbtamed in
any of the votes as to the various points; (d) if the diverse pronounce-
ments are contradictory, either between those relating to the facts
which have been declared as proved, or between the guilt pronounce-
ment and the declaration as to the facts proved; (e) if some error has
occurred in relation to the method of deliberation or voting.
(2) If an act is declared to be proved m the verdict which was not pro-
posed. by the judge and either constitutes a substantial alteration of
those proposed or fixes a more serious level of criminal responsibility
598. Gimeno Sendra suggests that one could just as easily allow the judge to enter the
jury room, asking, "[i]s he less pure than the Secretary?" Gimeno Sendra, La Segunda,
supra note 68, at 34-35. This would be similar to the Austrian system, in which the jury
may ask the judge to enter if they are having trouble reaching a verdict. Id.
599. The Secretary played no part in either of the two Almerla cases nor in BU-1 or
many other trials. Interview with Ruiz-Rico Rufz-Mor6n, supra note 212 (AL-1); Inter-
view with Sancho Fraile, supra note 284 (LU-2); Interview with Ferndndez Cloos, supra
note 284 (PO-5); Interview with Picatoste Bobillo, supra note 509.
600. In GI-1 and GI-3, the Secretary helped the jury draft the verdict on a computer.
Interview with Lacaba SAnchez, supra note 162. The Secretary did the same in all the
Mdlaga cases. Interview with Torres Vela, supra note 200 (M-1).
601. § 62 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
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than that which was charged, it will be treated as if it were not
proved.
602
On several occasions, the trial judge has returned the verdict to the
jury to remedy perceived inadequacies. In M-3, the jury had not initially
answered questions concerning the stage of execution of the alleged crime
and the level of defendant's participation, and even neglected to answer the
guilt question.60 3 Failure to answer required questions and a failure to
achieve the required majorities prompted a return of the verdict in CS-
1" .6 4 Contradictory answers to different factual questions have led the
judge to return the verdict to the jury to correct the discrepancies. 05
Section 63(1)(d) of the LOTJ characterizes the hypothetical co-
existence of affirmative answers to the "principal fact questions" relating
to corpus delicti and perpetration and a negative answer to the related
"guilt question" as a contradiction and requires the judge to return the ver-
dict to the jury for correction.06 This effectively prevents the jury from
engaging in one of the classic forms of jury nullification, that of acquitting
as a matter of "conscience," despite the fact that all of the elements of the
602. Section 63(1) and (2) of LOTJ takes as its model section 779 of LECr. (prey.) of
1872 and section 107 of LJ of 1888, which refer in more general terms to a failure to
"categorically answer any of the questions" or a "contradiction in the answers or a failure
of the necessary congruence," and finally to the "verdict containing a declaration or
resolution which violates the duty to give only categorical responses to the questions
formulated and submitted to the jury." § 107(1), (2), & (3) LJ of 1888, supra note 26.
Under the LJ of 1888, the judge had discretion not to return the jury for further delibera-
tions if the errors were deemed harmless and not amounting to grounds for reversal on
appeal. Marchena G6mez, title, supra note 352, at 379 & n.4. Under previous jury trial
legislation, the returning of the verdict for further deliberation could be on the judge's
own motion, or on motion of the parties. § 780 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24; §
108 LI of 1888, supra note 26.
603. Prot. on Return of Verdict (M-3) (on file with author). The jury promptly filled
the voids, resulting in defendant's acquittal.
604. Interview with Ponz Nomdedeu, supra note 231 (CS-I*).
605. This happened in V-I and in VA-I, in which the jury, after finding in Question
21 that defendant planned to kill his wife the day before, then mistakenly answered
Question 49, where they found that "the attitude of the victim (at the time of the assault)
produced in the defendant a state of obfuscation which mildly diminished his mental fac-
ulties." Peir6n, supra note 216. After being returned to the jury room to correct this
contradiction, the jury changed the formulation of Question 49 asserting that it was the
"attitude of the victim in general" that produced the obfuscation. Prot. Ver. (VA-I) (on
file with author). Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106, at 57. The Rus-
sian jury law allows for returning a verdict to correct contradictory answers to questions
and this has been done in many cases. Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 125-26.
606. Gimeno Sendra emphasizes the LOTJ's prohibition of such a verdict. GImENo
SENDRA, COMoETARIOS, supra note 43, at 314.
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crime were proved. This happened in MA-2, a prosecution for trespass
and threats, where the jury found that the "principle fact questions" were
proved, but returned a not guilty verdict. The judge dutifully returned the
verdict for "correction," explaining its supposed contradictions; the jury
blithely found the "principle fact questions" to be not proved and revali-
dated its acquittal.60 The authors of the new Russian jury law explicitly
allowed such jury nullification by splitting up the three "principal ques-
tions" to be answered by the jury into those of corpus delicti, the defen-
dant's alleged authorship, and guilt, and were aware of the historical
precedents m nineteenth century Russian jurisprudence.
60 8
Commentators have pointed to the virtual meaninglessness of the
"guilt question" and its redundancy if it may not contradict the affirma-
tions in the factual part of the verdict.609 It is another thing, however, when
the jury's answers to the factual questions indicate an acquittal, and the
jury nonetheless returns a verdict of "guilt." In the second jury trial in
Palencia, the defendant was charged with stabbing his brother to death af-
ter a fight over a football game. The defendant had a blood alcohol content
of .34. The jury found him "guilty of homicide," but in the factual ques-
tions asserted that he did not "intend to kill." The judge instructed them
that they had to acquit if they did not believe he intended to kill, and the
jury returned to the jury room, eliminated the reference to lack of intent to
kill, but recommended that the defendant should serve his sentence in a
center for the rehabilitation of alcoholics.61 In CS-I*, the jury returned
607. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106, at 7.
608. The 1878 acquittal of Vera Zasulich for the attempted murder of a Tsarist official
was a notorious example of the Russian's explicit differentiation among the notions of
"perpetration" and "guilt," which was deemed to contain a moral component not reduci-
ble to the mere "elements of the crime." One of the main proponents of this type of jury
nullification was the famous judge in the Zasulich trial, A.F Koni. See Thaman, Resur-
rection, supra note 5, at 114-15. The Russian Supreme Court upheld the acquittal of a
battered woman who was charged with murdering her alcoholic, abusive husband, in
which the jury had found the questions as to corpus delicti and perpetiation proved, but
voted "not guilty," despite the absence of any other affirmative defense such as self de-
fense. Stephen C. Thaman, Geschworenengerichte in Ost und West, 41 REcHT IN OST
UND WEST 73, at 79 n.66 (1997).
609. G6mez Colomer, after noting that it is not really necessary to have jurors vote
twice, once on proof of the criminal act, then on "guilt," nevertheless concedes that "le-
gal discourse is logical, and once an act is declared proved, guilt is not necessarily de-
rived therefrom, therefore one must vote again." See G6MEZ COLOMER, supra note 41, at
122.
610. On June 2, 1997, the trial in the Iglesias case began in Palencia and was reported
in Prades, Juicio al Jurado, supra 136, at 1. The jury's "compromi.;e verdict" would
have little impact, however, as noted by the Secretary of the court, Jos6 Luis G6mez-
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again to the courtroom after supposedly correcting the inadequacies of its
first verdict.611 This time, however, the judge, without presenting the par-
ties with a copy of the new verdict, read only the jury's guilt finding in
open court, "Jos6 Trillo Muro is guilty of having killed Miguel Garrido
Sdnchez, this act constituting the crime of homicide," and discharged the
jury. The case was continued to the next day for sentencing. Only after
the discharge of the jury did the parties realize that the jury had declared as
"proved" both the prosecution's and the defense's differing factual rendi-
tions of the events before the fight, and had declared that the defendant and
victim were involved in "mutual combat," but also found that all of the
necessary elements of perfect self defense were present. The judge entered
a verdict of not guilty the next day. The prosecution parties have appealed,
claiming that the judge should have returned the verdict a second time to
correct the evident contradictions, and erred in reading only the guilt por-
tion, rather than the entire verdict in open court as required by section 62
of the LOTJ before discharging the jury.
6 12
Although the nullification possibilities left open by the tripartite dis-
section of the guilt formula in the Russian law are absent in the Spanish
statute, a jury can still return a "scandalous acquittal" by answering in the
affirmative guilt-excluding factual propositions relating to an affirmative
defense, as was done in the Otegi case (SS-2). This is theoretically not
subject to correction pursuant to section 63(1) of the LOTJ. This was not
the case under the nineteenth century jury laws, which allowed the setting
aside of verdicts of guilty or not guilty upon a unanimous vote of the pre-
siding three judge panel.613
Before the Otegi reversal (SS-2), it was unclear whether a judge had
to return the jury to the jury to room because of inadequacies in the "rea-
sons" given for their verdict. In SE-2, the judge sent the jury back when
Rivera, "[b]ut where is this rehabilitative center where Leonardo should go? I don't
know any. Justice goes as far as it can go, and I fear it is not too far." Id.
611. See supra text accompanying note 604.
612. See Appendix HI-C; Prot. Ver., Appellate Brief of Pvt. Pros. (CS-I*) (on file
with author); Interview with Ponz Nomdedeu, supra note 231; Liria Erviti, El jurado
considera a Josi T. culpable de la muerte de un vecino de Villa-Real, LEvANTE, June 6,
1997, at 5; Eljurado considera a Trillo culpable de la muerte de un amigo en Villa-
Real, CASTELL6N DI Io, June 6, 1997, at 9 (CS-I*).
613. § 783 LECr. (prey.), supra note 24. Thus the court could effectively nullify any
jury's attempt to nullify the law in a particular case when it was "manifest, in the result
of the trial, that without there being a rational doubt contrary to the guilt of the defen-
dant, the jury declared him not guilty." § 112(2) .J of 1888, supra note 26. Under the
1888 law, any of the parties could petition the court to set aside the verdict on this basis.
Id. § 113.
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they had provided no reasons for the guilty verdict.614 But in no other case
was inadequacy of reasons considered a violation of section 63(1)(e) of
the LOTJ, the provision that "any defect relevant in the deliberation and
voting procedures" necessitates a return of the verdict.
If the verdict has not been sanitized of the alleged errors or contradic-
tions after redeliberation, the judge may order the jury to deliberate
again. 1 5 If the jury again returns the verdict without correcting the errors,
or if the necessary majorities are not obtained, the judge is to dissolve the
jury and set the case for trial with a new jury.616 If the second jury also
fails to reach a verdict, the judge must enter a directed verdict of acquit-
tal.617
This provision has been criticized from two viewpoints. Some find
that a better solution in the cases where a verdict has not been reached for
failure to achieve the required majorities would be to either lower the ma-
jority requirements or to simply enter an acquittal if the necessary majority
has not been reached.618 Other critics feel that there should be no statutory
limit on the amount of retrials, and that the question should be left to the
trial judge's discretion.619
Once the verdict has been read, the jury's functions terminate and
they are discharged.620
5. The Otegi Jury: the First Anonymous Jury in Spain?
At the beginning of the Otegi case (SS-2), the court and the parties
agreed to try to keep the jurors' identities secret.62 The court banned
614. See supra text accompanying note 570.
615. Each time the judge returns the verdict to the jury for further deliberation he or
she must state in open court in presence of the parties the reasons for the devolution of
the verdict and the form in which the errors should be corrected. § 64 LOTJ reprinted in
LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
616. § 65 LOTJ (1), reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. The provisions of
section 781 LECr. (prov.) of 1872, supra note 24, and section 110 LJ of 1888, supra
note 26, were nearly identical, with the exception that they called upon the bench to refer
the case to an investigative judge to the end of prosecuting the jurors who had caused the
mistrial.
617. § 65(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Once a second jury
was convened pursuant to the 1888 law, its verdict was final, without the parties or the
judge being able to set it aside. §§ 114, 115 LJ of 1888, supra note 26.
618. Gnwi-No SENDRA, COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 331.
619. L6PEz-Muoz Y LARz, COMmeNARIOs, supra note 54, at 155. See also In-
forme CGPJ, supra note 41, at 550. This is the general approach taken in the United
States. LAFAvE & IsRAEL, supra note 76, at 1070-72.
620. § 66 LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1.
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photographers from the courtroom. 622 The juror's names were never re-
vealed during the trial; further, the jurors asked the judge, just before the
verdict was read, to destroy all documents containing their names and to
delay the reading of the verdict until they had left the courthouse because
they did not want members of the Basque police or the victims' families to
be present when the acquittal was announced. The judge acceded to their
requests.
623
Although there is no express provision for the measures taken to pro-
tect the Otegi jury's anonymity, U.S. courts have recently impaneled
"anonymous juries" in trials involving organized crime or potential threats
to jury independence, and this practice has been upheld on appeal.624 Be-
cause the jury's anonymity in the Otegi case apparently did not succeed in
dispelling their fear of reprisals if they convicted the defendant, it is un-
clear whether this remedy for ensuring a fair trial in controversial cases,
especially in the Basque Country, will fend off critics who want to exclude
the Basque Country from the application of the LOTJ altogether.612  It is
also odd that after taking so much trouble to avoid having their identities
revealed during the trial, the members of the jury allowed themselves to be
interviewed by a national newspaper. Their names, occupations, political
leanings, and positions taken in jury deliberations were thus published
throughout the country.
6 26
M. The Role of the Judge in Assessing Criminal Responsibility: the
Judgment
Upon a not guilty verdict, the judge must render a judgment of ac-
quittal and immediately release the defendant.627 This provision reflects
621. It must be remembered that all but nine of the 36 pre-selected juror-candidates
tried to get excused from the case, most likely due to their fear of sitting in judgment of a
nationalist youth who admittedly killed two Basque policemen. J. L. Barberfa, Habrd
juicio por el asesinato de dos 'ertzainas tras hallar 20jurados aplos, EL PAls, Feb. 18,
1997, at 15 (SS-2). L6pez-Mufloz y Larraz has proposed that jurors names never be re-
vealed. L6PF-z-Mu1Roz Y LARRAZ. COMENTARiOS, supra note 54, at 114.
622. Peyalba, El jurado, supra note 237 (SS-2).
623. Javier Mufioz, Elijurado deja libre al autor de la muerte de dos ertzainasporque
no era dueno de sus actos, EL CORREO (Mar. 7, 1997) <http:J/www.diario-elcorrco.es>
(SS-2).
624. See United States v. Vano, 943 F.2d 236 (2d Cir. 1991); United States v. Krout,
66 F.3d 1420 (5th Cir. 1995); State v. Bowles, 530 N.W.2d 521 (Minn. 1995); State v.
Britt, 553 N.W.2d 528 (Wis.App. 1996); State v. Samonte, 928 P.2d 1 (Hawaii 1996).
625. See discussion supra Part VI.F.
626. Gurruchaga & Escudier, supra note 142 (SS-2).
627. § 67 LOTJ reprinted in LEY DEL JURADO, supra note 1. Immediate release was
not the case under the nineteenth century Spanish jury laws. As noted in the previous
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the intent of the LOTJ's authors that "for the proper functioning of the in-
stitution, the historically accepted possibility of returning the verdict due to
a discrepancy m its meaning has been rejected. 628  This provision has
been criticized because the LOTJ provides no mechanism to deal with the
attached civil action m cases in which the defendant has been found guilty
of committing the criminal acts but was acquitted for a legal excuse.
62P
Following a guilty verdict, the judge will set a sentencing hearing,
which normally takes place immediately after the return of the verdict and
discharge of the jury. During this hearing, the public and private prosecu-
tors, the defense, and any other civil parties can express their opinion as to
the precise qualification of the crime corresponding to the :factual affirma-
tions in the verdict as well as the punishment, damages and other civil re-
sponsibility. If the jury recommended consideration of a suspended sen-
tence, the parties should also discuss whether the legal prerequisites
exist.63
The judgment after a jury's verdict follows the same format as a nor-
mal trial. It must include, m order, a summary of the pleadings of the par-
ties, a summary of the facts proved at trial, an application of the law to the
facts found to have been proved, and the sentence.
631
section, the three-judge bench would retire to deliberate even after a verdict of not-guilty
and had the power to set aside such a verdict and order a new trial. §§ 767, 783(2)
LECr. (prey.) of 1872, supra note 24; §§ 93, 112(2) LJ of 1888, supra note 26. Though
a judgment of acquittal may be appealed in Spain, the acquitted defendant must be re-
leased pending appeal. GmENO SENDRA, COmENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 334. The re-
lease of Mikel Otegi after being acquitted of the murder of two Basque policemen
stunned the Spanish public. The judge and defense counsel accompanied him to the
prison to get his belongings and he was released to cheers of his comrades, and shouts of
"assassin" and "son of a whore" by others. Intxausti, supra note 489; Mufloz, supra note
623 (SS-2).
628. §V(3) EM-LOTJ, supra note 19, at 38. By allowing the bench to set aside not
guilty verdicts, the nineteenth century laws mistrusted the jury, robbed them of the exer-
cise of their proper jurisdiction and violated the principle of free evaluation of the evi-
dence. Dlaz Cabile, supra note 190, at 340. By characterizing a discrepancy between
affirmative proof of the "principle fact questions" and a finding of not-guilty as a "de-
fect" per section 63(1)(d) the LOTJ has, however, put certain constraints on the "free
evaluation of the evidence" to eliminate direct nullification of the law. See supra Part
V.L.5.
629. Verger Grau, supra note 48, at 581-82.
630. § 68 LOTJ,. reprinted in LEY DEL JJRADo, supra note I. G6mez Colomer finds
this hearing to be superfluous, for the judge alone will qualify the verdict and impose
sentence and the parties can always appeal. G6MEZ COLO MR, supra note 41, at 127.
631. Section 70(1) of LOTJ refers also to section 248.3 LOPJ, supra note 86, which
sets out the format for a judgment in normal cases. § 70(1) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DEL
JURADO, supra note 1.
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Normally, the judges have merely listed the questions found to have
been proved by the jury as the factual basis for proof of corpus delicti,
authorship and the presence or absence of excuses, justifications or miti-
gating and aggravating circumstances.632 The judge must then assess the
sufficiency of the evidence the jury found proved; he must "concretize the
existence of inculpatory evidence necessitated by the constitutional guar-
antee of the presumption of mnocence. ,6 33 The LOTJ's authors were con-
cemed not only with the presumption of innocence in requiring the judge
to give further reasons for the judgment beyond those inherent in the jury's
verdict and reasons, but also with problems relating to the separation of
fact and law:
It must be emphasized that the preoccupation in the law with the moti-
vation of the judgment requires the judge to give reasons, independent
of the reasons the jury gives for its evaluation of the evidence, of why
he considers that sufficient evidence exists to authorize the verdict.
With this, the law intends to counter the criticisms raised in relation to
the way the decision-making collegium has been separated, in relation
to the inseparability of fact and law, and in relation to the supposed ir-
responsibility which one says is inherent in this system, due to the lack
of reasons given for the verdict and judgment.
63
Thus, the judge's duty to reweigh the evidence, supposedly to protect
the defendant's privilege against self incrimination, is also linked to the
judge's juridical evaluation of the answers given to the factual and "quasi-
legal" questions m the verdict form. Some have argued that it is the
judge's evaluation of the evidence that will be reviewed on appeal, rather
than that of the jury.
635
632. This was done in all 19 of the judgments evaluated by Carmona Ruano & DePafl
Velasco, as well as in nearly all the judgments reviewed by the author. Carmona Ruano
& DePafil Velasco, supra note 106, at 58-64.
633. § 70(2) LOTJ, reprinted in LEY DE JURADO, supra note 1. As with section 49 of
LOTJ, which requires the judge to evaluate whether the prosecutor has sustained the bur-
den of proof before letting the case go to the jury, this post-verdict evaluation protects
against convictions based on evidence insufficient to overcome the presumption of inno-
cence and which constitute a ground for appeal per section 846bis c(e) LECr. Diaz Ca-
bile, supra note 190, at 344-45.
634. § VI EM-LOTJ, supra note 19, at 39.
635. Diaz Cabiale, supra note 190, at 344-45. Gimeno Sendra has also argued that a
judge could save an otherwise faulty jury verdict by relying on other evidence (for in-
stance, expert instead of lay witnesses). GimENo SENDRA, COMENTARiOS, supra note 43,
at 337-38. One can imagine a judge in a mixed court crafting ajudgment that will with-
stand appeal by similarly ignoring the "faulty" reasons given by lay assessors for their
finding of guilt.
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Many of the judgments in the first trials have included a lengthy ex-
planation of why the evidence was sufficient to overcome the presumption
of innocence, 63 while others have merely stated that the evidence proved
by the jury was presented in accordance with the law.637 Some judges,
however, have omitted any analysis of the sufficiency of the evidence.
63
In several cases, judges have complained about the difficulty of giving
cogent reasons for judgments with which they disagree.639 Although the
judges in B-3 and 0-2 were convinced that there was insufficient evidence
of "treachery" (alevosia) for murder rather than homicide, they felt pow-
erless to avail themselves of their power under section 70(2) of the LOTJ
and find that the burden of proof had not been sufficient to overcome the
presumption of innocence for this aggravating factor.640 In V-1, on the
other hand, the judge set aside the jury's finding of an aggravating circum-
stance that the defendant abused the confidence of his ex-companion 641 be-
cause the private prosecutor had proved the opposite, i.e., that any trust the
victim had in the defendant had long since vanished before the defendant
broke into her house.
642
The judge in the second C6rdoba jury trial vented his rage at being
compelled by the jury's verdict, which he characterized as "the sentiments
of the common people, struggling in the nadir of a long process of deca-
dence," to sentence a man to thirty years:
there are times when the soul is buffeted about by anxiety when the
knowledge of ancestral criteria of the technical application of the law
are brought down m an instant by simple inclinations of personal sen-
sibility, replete with honesty, but nevertheless deprived of the even the
simplest sense of legal culture.
643
636. Examples are MU-1, LP-I, MA-1, PO-I, SA-1, SS-1, SE-I, and V-I. Carmona
Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106, at 59-63.
637. This was done in B-2 and B-3. Id. at 58-59.
638. Examples are 0-1, PP-i and VA-1. Id. at 61-63.
639. Here we see a situation speculated about in connection with "mixed courts,"
while conceding its rarity in that type of system. See supra text accompanying note 17.
640. Interview with Gimeno Jubero, supra note 226 (B-3); Interview with Donapetry
Camacho, supra note 97 (0-2).
641. §§ 10(9) CP 1973, supra note 89; 22(6) CP 1995, supra note 69. The jury found
both that the defendant had maintained a relation of trust with the victim on the date of
the offense and that, as required by the law making this fact an aggravating circumstance,
he "had a greater facility to execute the offense due to his position of trust." Obj. Ver.,
Prot. Ver. (V-i) (on file with author).
642. Judg. (V-1) (on file with author).
643. Juez firma sentencia de un jurado por imperativo legal, IDEAL. June 8, 1997, at
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Although the judge in AL-2 did not disagree with the jury's guilty
verdict m a case involving the killing of a police officer and wounding of
another man, he had difficulty in justifying their decision because the an-
swers given in the verdict form did not fit well with the testimony. A
judge may not employ the kind of "sensitive, emotional, intuitive appre-
ciation of the witnesses" as did the jury. He had to supply "a different type
of reasoning" in drafting the judgment.644
Judges have used varied approaches to write judgments based on jury
verdicts they believed to be too lenient. In LP-1, the judge ignored the
jury's elimination of the reference to an intent to kill in the "principle fact
question" and found justification for such intent. He referred to Supreme
Court jurisprudence which allowed a finding of intent to kill based on cir-
cumstantial evidence similar to that found proved by the jury. The judge
concluded with the appraisal:
In the instant case, the weapon employed and the place in the body, to
which it was directed, show unequivocally the desire to kill harbored
by the accused, for it is a knife employed by agricultural laborers of
considerable dimensions, directed to vital parts of the body with suffi-
cient intensity to kill her, as shown in the report of the forensic medical
expert, Sefiora Meildn Ramos.
645
In B-13, the judge pedantically and meticulously expounded, in a
twenty-six page judgment, the overwhelming evidence that the defendant
had intended to kill his longtime companion and mother of his child, con-
centrating on the seven stab wounds all aimed at areas of her body con-
taining vital organs. He asked rhetorically, "[wihat explanation can one
give the public and private prosecutors? How can one give reasons for re-
jecting the pleadings of murder and homicide when they were so substan-
tially proved against Domingo Ortega Prez?... In the mind of the jurist a
certain pain emerges, from the point of view of judicial technique," when
one must justify a judgment of negligent homicide when the facts "collide
644. Interview with G lvez Acosta, supra note 229 (AL-2).
645. Judg. (LP-1) (on file with author). This should be compared with the judgments
in MU-i and B-2, in which the juries found the defendants had caused the deaths of the
victims, but without the intent to kill. In both cases the defendants were found guilty of
aggravated infliction of injuries, § 421(1) CP 1973, supra note 89, and n MU-3 of neg-
ligent homicide, zl §§ 407, 565, thus deferring to the judgment of the jury. (In B-2, the
jury had not found that defendant's stabbing of the taxi driver was the proximate cause of
his death). Obj. Ver., Judg. (MU-I) (on file with author); Obj. Ver., Judg. (B-2) (on file
with author).
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with the interpretative criteria which jurisprudence utilizes to determine
the intent of an agent."
646
Where the jury has found the defendant not guilty, judges have often
dispensed with giving any justification for the verdict, contenting them-
selves with listing the propositions in the verdict form which indicate the
lack of proof of corpus delicti or the proof of an excuse or justification.
647
However, judges who have disagreed with acquittals have not hesitated to
voice their criticisms of the jury in their judgments. Sometimes the criti-
cism has been veiled, as in MA-2, where the judge noted, '"[e]ven if it is
certain that the parties, both prosecution and defense, expressed their
agreement that the acts occurred, the jury did not accept them as credi-
ble."
648
In the Otegi acquittal, the judge expressed his opinion that there was
sufficient evidence to convict Otegi of the murder of the two policemen.
He affirmed, however, what he called a "deficit in the evidentiary presen-
tation of the accusatory parties, fundamentally in relation to the expert
psychiatric witnesses." In explaining his criticisms of the presentation of
the psychiatric testimony, the judge justified his lack of intervention, stat-
ing that it "would have presupposed the loss of his objective impartiality."
The judge also drew attention to the jury's failure to give reasons for its
acquittal. Despite the acquittal, the judge did order Otegi to pay damages
m the amount of thirty five million pesetas.649 Indeed, it appears that when
the trial judge (not to speak of the overwhelming majority of the Spanish
population) disagrees with a jury's acquittal, the judiciary suddenly dis-
646. Judg. (3-13) (on file with author); Francesc Peir6n, Un juez critica que un ju-
rado condene por imprudencia al hombre que mat6 a su esposa, LA VANGUARDIA (May
31, 1997) <http://www2.vanguardia.es>; Pere Rios, Un juez critica el veredicto de un
jurado que s6loconsider6 imprudencia matar a una mujer a punalada.r, EL PAlS, May
31, 1997 (B-13). The judgment in B-13 was reversed by the TSJ of Andalucla. El TSJC
anula otro juicto con jurado por emitir un veredicto contradictorio, LA VANGUARDIA
(July 29, 1997) <http://www2.vanguardia.es> (B-13).
647. AV-1 is an example of the former, AB-1 the latter. Judgs. (AV-1, AB-1) (on file
with author); Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106, at 58. In PM-I, the
judge merely stated a judgment of acquittal was forthcoming because "the crime of brib-
ery presupposes, as an essential element, to have intended to corrupt public functionaries,
a circumstance which in light of the facts declared proved cannot be deemed present in
this case, which leads to the acquittal with prejudice of both defendants." Juan Jos6
L6pez Ortega, Autos de la causa 1/1996 ante el Tribunal del Jurado de Palma de Mal-
lorca, 1 TRIBUNALES DE JusnciA 48 (1997).
648. Judg. (MA-2) (on file with author). Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra
note 106, at 60.
649. Judg. (SS-2) (on file with author).
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covers that the jury is obligated to give reasons for its decision, but in the
normal acquittal case, even judges do not feel they have to do so!
Judges have generally performed their role of impartial arbiter in an
adversarial system by respecting the sentence parameters pleaded by the
parties. Typically the sentence imposed has been at, or slightly below that
requested by the public prosecutor.650 An exception can be found in MA-
3, in which the parties first stated that the terms of the CP 1995 were more
beneficial to the defendant but later requested a combined application of
the CP 1973 and CP 1995 at sentencing in view of the jury's findings on
certain mitigating circumstances. The public prosecutor requested a sen-
tence of from five to eight years and the judge imposed a nine year sen-
tence, insisting that only the CP 1995 required uniform application, and
that the crime's brutality and the defendant's prior record (which was not
before the jury) justified exceeding the prosecution's requested sen-
tence.
651
The recommendations for a petition of clemency or a suspended sen-
tence have had little impact on the judge's actual sentence. The trial judge
has occasionally stated that a petition for clemency would be submitted to
the government as a result of the jury's recommendation. 652 The recom-
mendations for a suspended sentence have occurred in homicide convic-
650. For examples, in PA-1 the public prosecutor asked for eight years imprisonment
and the judge imposed six years and a day. Judg. (PA-1) (on file with author). In V-i,
the defendant was found guilty of trespassing. The public prosecutor asked for one year
impnsonment, a fine of 200,000 pesetas and restitution of 75,000 pesetas. The judge
imposed the same sentence, except for raising the fine to 300,000 pesetas. Judg. (V-I)
(on file with author). In B-i, the public prosecutor asked for one year imprisonment and
a fine of 1,000 pesetas per day for four months. The sentence imposed was for six
months imprisonment and a fine of 500 pesetas a day for two months. Judg. (B-i) (on
file with author). In VA-1, the judge followed the prosecutor's reduced request of 15
years imprisonment. Judg. (VA-1) (on file with author). In LP-I, the judge imposed i0
years imprisonment in lieu of the 13 years requested by the public prosecutor. Judg.
(VA-1) (on file with author). In CO-i, 12 years were imposed instead of the 13 re-
quested by the public prosecutor. Pimera revisi6n en Espana de la sentencla de unju-
rado popular, EL PAtS, Oct. 12, 1996, at 27 (CO-I). in MU-I, the sentence of six years
on the lesser offenses the jury found to be proved was identical to that requested by the
prosecutor. Judg. (MU-1) (on file with author). In SA-I, the judge imposed two years
instead of the four requested by the prosecutor. Judg. (SA-1) (on file with author). In
CS-1, the judge sentenced the defendant to 12 years imprisonment instead of the 13 re-
quested by the public prosecutor. Judg. (CS-1) (on file with author).
651. Judg. (MA-3) (on file with author). Serrano Butraguefto claims it deprives the
defendant of due process to allow the judge to sentence higher than the prosecution's
pleadings injury cases. Serrano Butraguefio, supra 245, at 361-62.
652. This was done in the judgments in B-I, GR-4, LP-I and PO-I, yet the recom-
mendation was ignored in B-5, GR-2, and LP-3.
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tions where the prerequisites were not demonstrated,653 but have also been
returned by juries in verdicts on lesser-included offenses to homicide like
negligent homicide or the infliction of imjuries 654 or in minor offense
casest 55 where a sentence of fewer than two years is possible. Neverthe-
less, the only cases in which it is clear that there has been a suspended
sentence were m P0-l, which involved setting forest fires, the failure to
render aid conviction in P0-4, and the negligent homicide conviction in
vi-i.65 6
N. Appellate Remedies
The LOTJ has amended the LECr to provide for two levels of appel-
late review of jury court decisions. Final judgments of the jury court as
well as pretrial rulings involving suppression or admission of evidence
pursuant to section 36 of the LOT may be appealed to the highest court of
the autonomous community of the province, the Supreme Court of Justice,
in a procedure called apelaci6n.657 An appeal under this provision may be
filed by the public prosecutor or any of the parties within ten days of the
pronouncement of judgment. 658 Within a maximum of ten days from the
notice of motion, a hearing is scheduled on the petition in apelaci6n and
judgment must be rendered by the panel of the Supreme Court of Justice
within five days.659 Sentences dictated by the Civil and Criminal Panels of
the Supreme Courts of Justice may be reviewed in cassation (casaci6n) as
may judgments of the Provincial Court following jury trials.
660
Grounds for petitions in both apelac16n and casaci6n are the court's
unlawful (1) denial of a motion to take additional evidence; (2) failure to
653. See examples in Prots. Ver. (B-5, GR-1, GR-4, PA-1, VA-1, MA-I, MA-5) (on
file with author).
654. Prots. Ver. (GR-2, SA-1, VI-1, 0-3) (on file with author).
655. Prots. Ver. (A-I, B-i, P0-I, P0-5, M-3, LP-3) (on file with author).
656. Judgs. (P0-i, P0-5, VI-4) (on file with author). In A-5, in a failure to render aid
verdict the jury had recommended to the judge not to sentence the defendant to six
months jail, but thejudge went ahead and did it anyway. Prot. Ver., Judg. (A-5) (on file
with author). In MA-5 the jury acquitted the defendant on grounds of insanity, but re-
quested a suspended sentence. Prot. Ver. (MA-5) (on file with author). In CS-I*, the
confusion of the jury, which had returned a guilty verdict and answers sustaining perfect
self defense, was accentuated by their recommendations of both a petition for clemency
and a suspended sentence. Prot. Ver. (CS-I*) (on file with author).
657. § 846bis a LECr., supra note 149. The Civil and Penal Chamber (Sala de lo
Civily Penal) is composed of three magistrates.
658. Id. § 846bis b.
659. Id. §§ 846bis d, 846bis e, 846bis f.
660. Id. § 847.
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summon any of the parties to court; (3) sustaining of objections to testi-
mony by witnesses which is important for the trial's resolution, or (4) fail-
ure to suspend the trial upon failure of one defendant to appear when there
is a valid reason to refuse to sever the trials."' Further grounds for a peti-
tion for appeal or cassation are violations of the law involving (1) a lack of
clarity or contradiction in the judgment in relation to the facts which were
allegedly proved, or a failure to relate the facts which were not proved to
those that were; (2) a failure to resolve all of the issues pleaded by the
prosecution and defense; (3) imposition of punishment for a crime more
serious than was charged in the accusatory pleadings; (4) participation of a
judge or juror who should have been disqualified, when the required ma-
jorities were not obtained in the verdict form.6
2
An apelaci6n appeal to the intermediate appellate courts may also al-
lege other violations of "procedural norms and guarantees" which impede a
party's opportunity to defend its interests, provided that a contemporane-
ous objection is made on the record, unless the denounced error implicates
the violation of a fundamental constitutional right. In addition to the rights
applicable to cassation, an appeal to the intermediate appellate courts may
claim defects m the verdict caused by either by a lack of objectivity in the
judge's instruction, an error in any of the propositions included in the ver-
dict form, or an unjustified failure to return the verdict for correction of
such defects.663
Like American practice, the application of Spain's "raise-or-waive"
rule for preserving appellate issues distinguishes between procedural er-
rors, for which there must be a contemporaneous objection, and errors of
constitutional magnitude, for which no such objection is necessary to pre-
serve the issue on appeal." For instance, in the appeal of the murder con-
viction in SE-1, the defense's assignment of error in the formulation of the
verdict form was rejected by the TSJ of Andalucia for a lack of contempo-
661. Id §§ 851, 846bis c(a).
662. Id §§ 851, 846bis c(a).
663. Id § 846bis c(a).
664. An issue will not be cognizable on appeal without there having been a contempo-
raneous objection, with the exception of "plain errors or defects affecting substantial
rights" in most U.S. jurisdictions. LA FAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 76, at 1158-59. No
duty of contemporaneous objection to preserve issues on appeal in Russia exists. Tha-
man, ZSTW, supra note 409, at 210 n.123. Indeed, the author's study of the Supreme
Court decisions of the Russian Federation has revealed that many grounds for reversal
have not been pleaded by any of the parties, but have been discovered by the judges
themselves.
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raneous objection.665 On the other hand, the Basque Country TSJ which
reversed Mikel Otegi's acquittal deemed the failure of the jury to state rea-
sons for its responses to the factual questions a "relevant defect in the pro-
cedure of deliberation and voting" which violated the prosecution parties'
due process rights; moreover, the TSJ states that the "violation implies,
even where there is no obligatory objection, that the parties may appeal on
the basis of the violation."
69
An appeal may also be granted if constitutional or statutory provisions
relating to the judge's legal qualification of the facts found true by the jury
or to imposition of punishment or other protective measures have been
violated. 67 If the judge erred, either in failing to discharge the jury fol-
lowing the taking of evidence if insufficient evidence existed to overcome
the presumption of innocence or in discharging the jury when sufficient
evidence existed, apetition in apelac6n will lie if a contemporaneous ob-
jection was made.66 Finally, if judgment is rendered based on a record
devoid of sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of innocence,
an "appeal" should also be granted.669
Allowing a three judge appellate panel to overrule a jury's determina-
tion that sufficient evidence exists to convict has given rise to some criti-
cism. Some argue that this procedure violates the tradition of the finality
of jury verdicts,67 0 and therefore, if it is permitted, it should be very nar-671
rowly construed. The remedy of apelaci6n has also been criticized be-
665. The TSJ reduced the conviction from murder to homicide, nonetheless, claiming
that a finding of "treachery" could not co-exist with a reckless homicide. Dec. TSJ (SE-
1) (on file with author).
666. Intxausti, Mikel Otegi, supra note 584 (citing Dec. TSJ (SS-2)). Gimeno Sendra
has observed that any error which impedes the rights of any party to defend its interests
would constitute a violation of Article 24(1) CE and therefore all such errors would be
constitutional and no contemporaneous objection is needed. GaiENo SENDRA,
COMENTARIOS, supra note 43, at 380. The Spanish term indicating a violation of the
right of a party to defend its interests is ndefensi6n. The concept of "due process"
seems to approximate this notion and has therefore been used.
667. § 846bis c(b) LECr., supra note 149.
668. Id. § 846bis c(c).
669. Id. § 846bis c(e).
670. See FAnitN GUIaLEN, Comentarios, supra 45, at 497 (noting that even the French
jury, in its current form of mixed court, does not allow this, and appeals from the Italian
mixed court must be heard by an appellate corle d'assisO.
671. The three-judge panel in apelac16n should only examine whether the evidence
was "capable of having occasioned in any way the incrimination of the accused for the
crimes charged." Reversal could only occur if (1) all means of proof evince a "notori-
ously exculpatory conclusion;" (2) if the inculpatory evidence was all obtained in viola-
tion of the law; or (3) if no direct inculpatory evidence exists, and the judgment based on
[Vol. 21:241
Spain Returns to Trial by Jury
cause it is not what it purports to be: a second opportunity to relitigate the
main factual and legal issues which are in controversy.
67
If an "appeal" is granted by the Superior Courts of Justice for viola-
tions of procedural norms or for an erroneous discharge of the jury, the
remedy is remand for a new trial. However, if the error was in the juridical
evaluation of the evidence or the failure to grant a motion for a directed
verdict of acquittal and to discharge the jury, the remedy would instead be
the entry of an acquittal or appropriate judgment.
673
Additional grounds for a reversal in cassation are the violation of a
substantive penal or other legal norm which should be observed in the ap-
plication of the criminal law, or "an error in the evaluation of the evi-
dence" discernible through review of the record. 674 The latter ground for
cassation reopens the door, shut in apelaci6n, to challenge the jury's
evaluation of the evidence, though only to the limited extent provided by
law.
675
It is too early to appraise how the Spanish appellate courts will inter-
pret the LOTJ and to what extent jury verdicts, whether of acquittal or
conviction, will be affirmed.676 It was egregious judicial error or conduct
circumstantial evidence lacks the type of reasoning required by the Constitutional Court.
GIAENo SENDRA, COME'NTAROS, supra note 43, at 384-86.
672 Id at 369. Gimeno Sendra has called it a "heterogenous legal configuration"
Id In civil law jurisdictions, the term "appeal" (appelation or apelacidn, as opposed to
Berufung in German) is meant to connote a kind of trial de novo, allowing introduction
of new evidence as to points in controversy, whereas review of the record of the trial for
strictly legal violations is usually termed "cassation," (Revision in German) and is stricter
in its scope. Russian reformers intended initially to introduce an "appeal" (appellalsila)
in early drafts of theirjury law, but settled on a one-level review in cassation. Thaman,
Resurrection, supra note 5, at 79, 127-29. The new apelaci6n provided in jury cases is
much more akin to a review in cassation, and less expansive than the apelacldn provided
to review judgments using the abbreviated procedure. GIMENo SENDRA, ComENTARIOs,
supra note 43, at 370-71. It also makes no provision for the taking of evidence. Id. at
391.
673. lId at 392. A negligent homicide verdict against the father and grandfather in the
drowning death of a four year-old girl was reversed by the TSJ of Andalucia based on
insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption of innocence, and the defendants were
acquitted by the appellate court Un tribunal de Analucla revoca el veredicto de unju-
rado pupular, EL PALS, Mar. 6, 1997; Interview with Garcla-Alix, supra note 239 (GR-
2).
674. § 849 LECr., supra note 149.
675. GImENo SENDRA, COMENTAIUOS, supra note 43, at 394-95.
676. The Supreme Court of the Russian Federation reversed 19 of the first 173 judg-
ments before the new jury courts, including nine of the 10 acquittals which were ap-
pealed by the prosecution. Thaman, ZSTW, supra note 409, at 211-12.
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that caused the reversals of homicide convictions in CS-1677 and GI-2,'7 '
and these decisions were uncontroversial. More troubling were the rever-
sals m the Otegi case and m B-13, 679 because in both cases the verdict
forms were not challenged by either party and the juries' verdicts, while
admittedly "scandalous," were perfectly within the discretion allowed ju-
ries to determine the mental elements of homicide. Nevertheless, the
judges in both cases went out of their way to criticize the jury for their
judgments and to point out that their verdicts were contrary to the facts.
Both cases (especially the Otegi case) were publicized in the national me-
dia, and in both cases the appellate court set aside the jury's verdict.
VI. Conclusion
A. The Spanish Jury: Tougher or More Lenient than the Professional
Bench?
One of the main criticisms of the classic jury is that its verdicts are
unpredictable and often based on emotions, sympathies, or prejudices
rather than intelligent and rational appreciation of the facts. Every Euro-
pean country that has experimented with the classic jury has its tales of
"scandalous acquittals" or jury nullification that have shaken establishment
faith m the institution.680 Certainly the acquittal of Mikel Otegi of'the
677. See supra text accompanying notes 524-26. It should be noted that the error was
so obvious that even the public prosecutor sought the reversal of the conviction, albeit
with chagrin. Interview with Gastaldi Mateo, supra note 231 (CS-1).
678. After the reversal based on errors in formulation of the verdict form in GI-2, see
supra text accompanying note 574,. the Chief Prosecutor of Girona Province called the
judge's conduct of the trial "lamentable," claiming that "a judge cannot conduct a jury
trial as if it were a normal trial. He must read, take courses and study well because there
are potential problems, but this judge did not do it and you see the result." Marta Costa-
Pau, Anuladoporprimera vez el veredicto de unjurado popular, EL PAIs, June 11, 1997,
at 24; Dec. TSJ (GI-1) (on file with author).
679. See supra note 430. It discusses the decision of the TSJ of Andalucla which as-
signed as error the giving of an "intent to kill" question, in a case in which it was sup-
posedly "not in issue," dud to the amount of stab wounds and the places they were ad-
ministered. The judge's instructions and judgment, in which he admitted that the
evidence did not support his verdict, were also deemed erroneous. El TSJC anula otro
juico con jurado por emitir un veredicto contradictorio, LA VANGUARDIA (July 29,
1997) <http://www2.vanguardia.es> (B-13).
680. The Vera Zasulich case of 1878 is such a case in Russian histoiy. Thaman, Res-
urrection, supra note 5, at 114-15. The O.J. Simpson case will no doubt go down in
U.S. history as being one of this category, along with the "marvelous acquittals" of those
who opposed British rule during our colonial period, such as that of John Peter Zenger.
See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 11, at 872.
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murder of two Basque policemen in March 1997 will go down in history as
one of this type, and it may trigger substantial reforms in the LOTJ.68 1
But aside from the verdict in the Otegi case (SS-2), it cannot be said
that Spanish juries have been excessively lenient in their first year. In fact,
their possibilities for dictating lenience are circumscribed. The power of
the Spanish jury to recommend a suspended sentence or executive clem-
ency is at most symbolic. 68 2 As noted above, a jury cannot simply acquit
by nullifying the law after they have made affirmative finding as to cor-
pus delicti and the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator.
In the fifty-four homicide verdicts examined, the jury followed the
recommendation of the public prosecutor thirty-four times, three of those
being verdicts of not guilty by reason of insanity.684 The jury followed the
more severe theory of the private prosecutor only three times.68 Thejury
found lesser-included offenses of negligent homicide or infliction of inju-
ries not pleaded by the public prosecutor in nine cases~m and acquitted
thirteen times, seven of which were not pleaded as acquittals by the public
prosecutor.687 Juries were more lenient in the minor, non-homicide prose-
cutions, returning eight acquittals as opposed to nine verdicts in confor-
mity with the prosecution's pleadings. In two cases, the jury actually
returned a verdict more lenient than that requested by the defense.°*
681. For a discussion of the reform proposals triggered by the Otegi acquittal, see in-
fra Part VI.F
682. The first Russian juries often found "lenience" or "special lenience," which can
eliminate a possible death penalty and otherwise substantially mitigate prison sentences.
Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, at 135-38.
683. See supra Part V.L.5.
684. The three acquittals due to insanity, pleaded as such by the prosecution, came in
AB-1, GI-1 and LU-1. Prots. Ver. (AB-1, GI-1, LU-1) (on file with author). Technically,
the jury's verdict in GI-l qualified the homicidal act as a lesser-included offense of neg-
ligent homicide, so that verdict could be qualified also as having sided with the defense.
In five other cases, the jury convicted of the homicide, but found mitigating circum-
stances alleged by the defense. Prots. Ver. (3-6, LP-i, PO-3, SE-2, VA-1, VI-1) (on file
with author).
685. Prots. Ver. (GR-1, M-4, SE-1) (on file with author).
686. Prots. Ver. (AL-1, B-2, B-13, BI-1, GI-I, GR-2, HU-I, MU-1, 0-3) (on file with
author).
687. Prots. Ver. (3-9, B-11, B-14, CS-I*, M-2, MA-5, SS-2) (on file with author).
688. Prots. Ver. (A-2, AV-I, B-7, GR-3, LU-2, MA-2, PM-I, TE-1) (on file with
author).
689. In CS-i*, the defense tried to work out a conformidad to homicide, with the
mitigating circumstance of imperfect self defense after the evidence had been taken, but
ended up with an acquittal due to a finding of perfect self defense. Interview with
Gastaldi Mateo, supra note 231 (CS-I*). In MA-2, the defense pleaded guilty to a mis-
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Most who have attempted analyses of the first jury trials have come to
similar conclusions. In their analysis of twenty-one trials, Carmona and
DePafil found that the percentage of acquittals, four of twenty-one (or
nineteen percent) was about the same as that of courts with professional
judges. They also determined that the only excuses which juries found to
be proved were those alleged by the public prosecutor.690 Of the nineteen
cases where there was actually a factual dispute, only three verdicts were
"deviant," i.e., different than what professional judges would likely have
returned.691 A former President of the Spanish Supreme Court was able to
characterme only five of the eighty-four cases investigated in another study
(some of which were cases resolved through conformidad without a jury
trial) as "polemical," i.e., 
worthy of censure.
692
Of these five "polemical" verdicts, three involved arguably what
Carmona and DePafil have called "grave difficulties" juries have in con-
fronting the "psychological fact of intent to kill in cases involving mutual
combat and family killings."693 In B-2 and B-13, the juries refused to ac-
cept that the defendants intended to kill their victims, and in neither case
were they given the option of a reckless homicide by phrasing the issue in
terms of dolo eventual, or the intent to do an act likely to cause death.694 In
demeanor threat charge and the trespassing charge, but the jury acquitted. P1. Def., Prot.
Ver. (MA-2) (on file with author).
690. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note. 106, at 18-20. The four acquit-
tals were in AB-1, AV-1, MA-i and PM-i. Prots. Ver. (AB-1, AV-1, MA-1, PM-1) (on
file with author).
691. The "deviant" verdicts were the acquittals in MA-I and PM-1, and the conviction
for infliction of injuries in B-2. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106, at
22-23.
692. These were PM-I, M-2, B-2, B-13, and the Otegi case (SS-2). Prades, Juicio al
Jurado, supra note 136, at 3. At least two of these verdicts were not overly criticized at
the time they were returned. In PM-i, the acquittal of two defendants for bribery came
as a surprise to some, including a journalist who described the alleged payments to the
police as a "bribe by the book" for which a panel of judges would have no trouble in
convicting. J. Francisco Mestre, Sorpresa ante la decisi6n deljurado, UJLTIMA HORA,
May 28, 1996, at 12 (PM-1). On the other hand, the judge told the author that he would
have acquitted on the facts presented by the prosecution. Interview with L6pez Ortega,
supra note 299. The prosecutor said that the case could have gone one way or the other,
depending on the panel ofjudges, for "there is as much unpredictability among judges as
amongjunes." Interview with Roig, supra note 522 (PM-1). Most observers greeted the
verdict in B-2 with approval. Lawyers proclaimed that the jury "had done a great job
towards consolidating this institution" and a Barcelona judge proclaimed: "[t]here is no
doubt that justice has gained in humanity." One lawyer did insist that a professional
bench would have convicted the defendant of homicide. Francesc Peir6n, El jurado se
apunta un tanto, LA VANGUARDIA, Sept. 22, 1996, at 34 (B-2).
693. See supra note 429.
694. Objs. Ver. (B-2, B-13) (on file with author).
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M-2, the prosecutor neglected to request a question addressing either
reckless or negligent homicide, which led to the defendant's acquittal e95
In other cases in which the jury rejected murder or intentional homicide
theories, resulting in convictions of negligent homicide or the infliction of
injuries, the jury was also not given the option of finding reckless homi-
cide. This was the case in AL-1 and 0-3, in which the jury could choose
only between intentional and negligent homicide. 96 Although in BI- the
prosecutor requested questions formulated in terms of intentional and
reckless homicide, it was the trial judge who sua sponte submitted the
negligent homicide question which the jury affirmed, perhaps avoiding an
acquittal.'9 This tendency for the jury to reduce murders and intentional
homicides to negligent homicides or less has been criticized, 698 but it ap-
pears as if the inclusion of theories of reckless murder and lesser-included
offenses and more precise instructions as to the elements of these offenses
would eliminate some of these controversial verdicts.'"
On the other hand, there have been a number of verdicts which critics
found to be more severe than those a professional bench would have
handed down. In B-3, 0-2, and SE-1, the jury found an aggravating factor
of "treachery," elevating a homicide charge to one of murder, where the
trial judge would not have done so. 700 As discussed above, the verdicts in
M-4 and GR-1 were more severe than those requested by the public prose-
cutor. In GR-1, the jury showed no sympathy for the seventy-three year
old paranoid defendant who stabbed her eighty-one year old neighbor to
death, and returned a guilty verdict, rejecting the united plea of the public
695. Observers agreed that professional judges would have at least found the defen-
dant guilty of negligent hormcide instead of acquitting him. But the same observers cau-
tioned that the defendant's extreme remorse over what he claimed was his accidental
killing of his brother touched the audience, and that the failure to request a lesser degree
of homicide led to the acquittal. Hemrnndez, supra note 323 (M-2).
696. Obj. Ver. (AL-1) (on file with author); Obj. Ver. (0-3) (on file with author); see
Appendix III-D. The trial judge in AL-I said he would have returned a verdict of inten-
tional homicide in the case. Interview with Rufz-Rico Rufz-Mor6n, supra note 212 (AL-
1).
697. Obj. Ver. (BI-i) (on file with author); Interview with Picazo Blasco, supra note
480 (BI-1).
698. It constituted one of the main criticisms voiced by Izaguirre Guerricagoitia, su-
pra note 239 (SS-1), and Lacaba Sanchez, who said that in that sense, the jurors were
"very pious." Lacaba SAnchez, supra note 162 (GI-1, GI-3).
699. Carmona Ruano & DePa6i Velasco have the same thesis. Carmona Ruano &
DePafil Velasco, supra note 106, at 68-69.
700. Interview with Gimeno Jubero, supra note 226 (B-3); Interview with Donapetry
Camacho, supra note 97 (0-3); Carmona Ruano, supra note 237 (SE-1). The murder
conviction was reduced to a homicide on appeal. Dec. TSJ (SE-1) (on file with author).
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prosecutor and the defense to find her not guilty by reason of insanity.70 1
The guilty verdict in GR-2 was set aside by the TSJ of Andalucia because
it was based on insufficient evidence, and an acquittal was entered.
70 2
Most observers, including the judge, the public and private prosecutors,
and the defense, insisted that the jury was harsher than a panel of profes-
sional judges would have been in its trespassing verdict in V-1.733
Although the liberal insanity and diminished capacity laws in Spain7 4
have led to a surfeit of defense pleadings in this area, juries have been
quite stingy in allowing such defenses. When juries have followed such
theories, it has usually been in cases where they have also been pleaded by
the public prosecutor. Thus, of the twenty-seven cases in which a com-
plete excuse due to mental illness or drug or alcohol intoxication has been
pleaded, which would fully eliminate cnminal responsibility, the jury
found it to be true in only three cases when it was not also pleaded by the
prosecution. 70 5 In the twenty-six cases in which diminished capacity for
mental defect or intoxication was pleaded, it was accepted only five times
where it was not also pleaded by the prosecution.0 6 A defense of accident
was pleaded seven times and accepted once by the jury.70 " Self defense
was pleaded ten times and accepted thrice.708 Finally, heat of passion or
extreme emotional disturbance (obcecaci6n) was pleaded twelve times and
accepted only twice by the jury, each time when pleaded by both prosecu-
tion and defense.70 9
So far, the Otegi case (SS-2) has been sut generis among the first
Spanish jury trials. Whether the "scandalous acquittal" was due to poor
strategy on the part of the prosecution,710 fear of reprisals on. the part of the
701. As the author observed, the prosecutor noted that a panel of judges will seldom
ever convict when the prosecutor asks for an acquittal. Interview with Antonio Navajas
Ramos, Public Prosecutor of Granada Provincial Court, Granada (July 5, 1996) (GR-1).
702. Un tribunal de Analucia revoca el veredicto de unjurado popular, EL PAIS, Mar.
6, 1997 (GR-2).
703. Interview with De la Rua Moreno, supra note 218; Velert, supra note 212. It
was opined that a professional court would have suspended the sentence. Yolanda
Laguna, El prumer jurado de Valencia declara culpable al acusado, aunque recomienda
el mndutoparcial, LEVANTE, May 29, 1996, at 25 (V-i).
704. See supra Part V.K.5.
705. Prot. Ver. (HU-1, MA-5, SS-2) (on file with author).
706. Prot. Ver. (MA-4, 0-3, PO-3, SE-2, VA-I) (on file with author).
707. Prot. Ver. (M-2) (on file with author).
708. Prot. Ver. (B-1i, CS-I*, BA-1) (on file with author).
709. Prot. Ver. (GR-4, MA-3) (on file with author).
710. The presiding judge called a news conference the day after the acquittal and
criticized the public and private prosecutors for not having given the jury an option other
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julry,7 11 or outright sympathy of a number of the jurors for the radical cause
of Basque independence, 712it must be treated as an aberration because of
the Basque Country's peculiar circumstances. Otherwise, there is little
indication that Spanish juries will be more likely to acquit defendants or
return lenient verdicts than would the professional bench .
B. Private and Popular Prosecutors in the Spanish Jury Trial:
Empowering the Victim and the Public-at-Large in the Criminal
Trial
In certain cases, the harshness of the jury's verdicts can be traced to
the active role of the public prosecutor in representing the interests of the
victim.714 The clearest example of this was in GR-1. Despite the fact that
all of the forensic medical and psychiatric witnesses testified that the de-
fendant had her cognitive and volitional capacities completely annulled by
than murder and acquittal. Javier Peyalba, El magistrado deljuicio a Otegi cree quefis-
caly acusaci6n erraron en susplanteamientos, DLAMO VASCO, Mar. 8, 1997, at 3 (SS-2).
The private prosecutor m an interview emphasized that lesser options were available in
the 98 questions and that the judge himself was free to add any further questions which
could have facilitated, for instance, a verdict of simple homicide. Mufloz, supra note
347 (SS-2).
711. This was the prevailing view immediately after the trial. Intxausti, Eljurado,
supra note 489; I. Zubtria, EIjurado ha tenido miedo, advierle la madre de uno de los
ertzainas muertos, EL CORRFO (Mar. 7, 1997) <http://www.diario-elcorreo.es>; Mufioz,
supra note 347 (SS-2). The situation in the Basque Country was very tense during the
Otegi trial. Carlos L6pez, El crimen de Itsasondo queda impune, EL PERI6DICO (Mar. 7,
1997) <http://www.elpenodico.es> (SS-2). H-istorically, juries have tended to use their
express or implicit powers of nullification to a great degree in periods of civil war or
civil unrest. This was-true in the colonial United States, and in the period of revolution-
ary turmoil in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Russia and Spain.
712. Reporters from the conservative national newspaper El Mundo discovered that at
least two of the jurors had links to Hem Batasuna, the leading Basque political party
supporting independence, and it was speculated that some radical sympathizers had ma-
nipulated the other jurors into voting for acquittal. According to the article, at least one
juror did not realize they were acquitting him. Gurruchaga & Escudier, supra note 142
(SS-2).
713. The prosecutor m V-1, Interview with AlcAntara Barbany, supra note 175, and
even the defense lawyer who won the acquittal believed that juries will generally be
tougher on defendants than the professional bench. Interview with Feliu Bordeu, supra
note 314 (PM-1).
714. For a brief introduction to the victim's role as private prosecutor, see supra note
156. The victim's interests were represented by a private prosecutor in approximately 21
of the 54 homicide trials that went to verdict. In at least 21 cases, the defendant and vic-
tim were from the same family, which explains the absence of a public prosecutor in most
of those cases. Private prosecutors participated in only five of the 20 minor non-
homicide cases, most likely because it is costly to hire a lawyer and the stakes are too
small m those cases. Interview with Gastaldi Mateo, supra note 231 (CS-I).
19981
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
her mental illness and even the public prosecutor asked the jury to find the
seventy-two year old woman with no prior criminal history not guilty by
reason of insanity, the jury followed the recommendations of the public
prosecutor, representing the interests of the eighty-six year old victim's
family and returned a guilty verdict.715 In M-4, the public prosecutor
pleaded two counts of murder, but added a mitigating circumstance of di-
minished capacity for drunkenness in requesting a sentence of twenty-five
years in prison against a man who killed his mother and a friend of his sis-
ter. The private prosecutor requested a thirty-six year sentence and
pleaded no mitigating circumstances; the jury returned such a verdict, re-
sulting in a thirty-three year sentence. 716 In SE-1, the private prosecutor's
successful advocacy led to a conviction for murder, instead of homicide as
the public prosecutor pleaded, and to a sentence of fifteen years in prison,
one in excess of that requested by the public prosecutor.
717
The active role of the private prosecutor in Spanish jury trials clearly
reduces the benefits a defendant can hope to secure from the nine citizens
who sit in judgment on the case. In U.S. trials, a defendant can sometimes
wm sympathy from the jury by portraying himself (wrongly or rightly) as
an ordinary citizen confronting (and perhaps victimized by) the all-
powerful State as personified by the prosecutor.718  In Spanish trials in
which the victim is represented by a lawyer in the private prosecutor role,
another ordinary citizen competes with the defendant for the sympathy of
the jury-and usually has much more appealing grounds for doing sol
The presence of a private prosecutor also gives the prosecution two
voices against the defendant's one in a criminal trial. The author has no-
715. The author's observation; Gallastegui, supra note 237 (GR-1).
716. Pl. Pub. Pros., Pl. Pvt. Pros., Judg. (M-4) (on file with author), Despite the sen-
tence of 33 years, the longest prison sentence the defendant can serve for a double mur-
der is 25 years under Spanish law. Twenty years is the longest sentence for a single of-
fense, yet it can rise to 25 years if a person is convicted of two counts of a crime
punishable by up to 20 years and up to 30 years if convicted of three or more such
counts. This limit pertains, even if the sentences are in different trials. § 76 CP 1995,
supra note 69.
717. Pl. Pub. Pros., Pl. Pvt. Pros., Judg. (SE-1) (on file with author). The private
prosecutor requested a sentence of 30 years, yet, as was noted, the trial judge did not
agree with the presence of the aggravating factor, and it was subsequently set aside on
appeal. See supra note 700. Active representation of the victim's interest by public
prosecutors likely also played a role in the harsh verdicts returned in V.1 and CS-1.
718. The "victim" has virtually no procedural rights during the evidentiary phase of
criminal trials in the United States. Although the prosecutor often purports to represent
the victim, the victim or the victim's family (in homicide cases) may not hire its own
lawyer to defend its own interests (which may be different from those of the State) and
speak with its own voice in the trial. LA FAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 76., at 629-30.
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ticed a defacto division of labor in which the public prosecutor plays the
"good cop" role and the private prosecutor that of the "bad cop. '7 9 This
does not mean, however, that public and private prosecutor necessarily
work together in plotting strategy.20 For instance, in SA-1 both the public
prosecutor and defense qualified the defendant's killing of his wife as at
most negligent homicide and requested that the case be handled pursuant to
the abbreviated procedure and not before a jury. It was the private prose-
cutor, however, representing the parents of the victim, who qualified the
killing as a murder (despite the lack of any solid evidence in this respect)
and requested ajury trial.71
The private prosecutor almost always asks for more prison time, a
higher fine, and, most importantly, damages as part of the attached civil
suit.722 In fact, money, as in most civil actions seems to be the prime
moving force behind many private prosecutions. ' 3 This was exemplified
in B-2, in which a well-known former television presenter represented the
interests of the victim's family. The private prosecutor originally pleaded
that the defendant was guilty of homicide and should be sentenced to thirty
years for stabbing a taxi driver to death. The public prosecutor had origi-
719. This was clearly the case in V-1 and GR-I. The private prosecutor asked for an
"exaggerated" sentence of four years and two months in the former, compared to the
public prosecutor's request for a sentence of one year. In the latter, the public prosecutor
asked for an acquittal by reason of insanity and the private prosecutor asked for a con-
viction. Both public prosecutors stressed that their role was that of a neutral seeker of
justice, not a "party," seeking to win at all costs, as has become the case with prosecutors
hm the United States. Interview with Alcintara Barbany, supra note 175 (V-1); Interview
with Navajas Ramos, supra note 701 (GR-1).
720. According to the public prosecutor in GR-l, public and private prosecutors sel-
dom communicate with one another for they are pursuing different interests. However,
the private prosecutors will rely on the public prosecutors for access to documents. In-
terview with Navajas Ramos, supra note 701 (GR-l).
721. Pub. Pros. Pl., Pvt. Pros. P1., Def. Pl. (SA-1) (on file with author). Interview
with Nieto Nafria, supra note 235 (SA-1). The jury agreed with the public prosecutor's
pleadings in the end. Prot. Ver. (SA-1) (on file with author).
722. The prosecutor in GR-1 noted that if the private prosecutor pleaded the identical
charge and sentence as the public prosecutor, the victim's family would ask, "[w]hy am I,
then, paying you this money?" Interview with Navajas Ramos, supra note 701 (GR-1).
As was noted, the victim does have a right to a court-appointed lawyer to defend his or
her interests under the Spanish law. See supra Part V.C.3. A brief comparison of the
amount of prison time and damages pleaded by the public and private prosecutors in 20
homcide cases that went to verdict (excluding CS-I*) revealed the following rough fig-
ures: the public prosecutor pleaded a total of approximately 391 years prison, compared
to 546 for the private prosecutor. The total damages pleaded by the public prosecutor
were approximately 374 million pesetas in comparison with 793 million pleaded by the
private prosecutor.
723. Interview with Navajas Ramos, supra note 701 (GR-1).
19981
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
nally requested a sentence of twenty-seven years. At the close of the tes-
timony, the private prosecutor modified his pleadings to ask that the de-
fendant be convicted only of attempted murder and be subject to a ten year
imprisonment, alleging that the cause of the victim's death was not the stab
wound, but the failure of the city ambulance service and the victim's own
taxi company, Servitaxi, to take him to a nearby hospital in time to save
him. The jury followed this recommendation, finding no intent to kill and
no proximate cause, and the private prosecutor indicated he would use this
verdict to support his civil suit against the city and Servitaxi.
724
The participation of the victim as public prosecutor in Spanish crimi-
nal cases illustrates both positive and negative aspects of the institution.
On the positive side, the victim can differentiate his legitimate interests
from those of the public prosecutor and vigorously pursue them in the
criminal prosecution. The Spanish procedure, with its full and early par-
ticipation of the victim and defendant in the preliminary investigation, its
possibilities for consensual resolution of the case through conformidad,
and its empowerment of the victim at trial, could accommodate some of the
perceived benefits of a "privatization" of the criminal law and the turn to a
dispositional mode based on consensus rather than the state's legal obliga-
tion to pursue the truth. 25 On the other hand, the tendency of public
prosecutors to emphasize the pursuit of monetary damages even at the ex-
pense of truth in the case could lead to a conversion of the criminal trial
into a "Market of Calaf," as the judge in B-2 warned. 26
Brief mention should be made of the possibility of a "popular prose-
cutor" playing a role in the Spanish jury trial. The right to so-called acci6n
popular gives any citizen, organization, or citizen's group the right to pur-
sue a criminal prosecution.72 In SS-1, the city government of the town of
Hernani participated in the double murder trial and requested a sentence of
724. The jury's verdict contradicted earlier findings by the investigative judge and the
Barcelona Provincial Court that neither the city nor Servitaxi was responsible for the
victim's death. Mufioz, supra note 306; Blanca Cia, Eljurado dice que el acusado no
quiso matar al taxista, EL PAlS (CATALAN ED.), Sept. 21, 1996, at 1, 7 (B-2).
725. See supra Part V.H. For an impassioned plea to accord victims similar rights in
the U.S. criminal trial, such as the ability to veto a plea bargain and play a role tanta-
mount to that of the defendant at trial, see GEORGE P FLETCHER, WITH JUSTICE FOR
SOME. PROTECTING VICTIMS' RIGHTS IN CRIMINAL TRIALS 193-95, 201, 248 (1996).
726. Peir6n & Marchena, supra note 169 (B-2).
727. §§ 101, 270 LECr., supra note 149. See also supra note 157. A similar mecha-
nism is available in the U.S. for citizens to prosecute civil suits to enforce the federal en-
vironmental laws. JEFFREY G. MILLER, CiTIzEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF
FEDERAL POLLUTION CONTROL LAWS (1987).
[Vol. 21:241
Spare Returns to Trial by Jury
thirty years, identical to that requested by the private prosecutor.7 s It was
defense counsel's successful appeal to the San Sebastifin Provincial Court
m the Otegi case to prevent the government of the Basque Country from
itself playing the role of popular prosecutor that prevented it from being
the first jury trial in the Basque Country." The communal government
the Xunta of Galicia, acted as popular prosecutor in the minor forest fire
case in PO-1.7 30 Aside from providing a theoretical third prosecutorial
voice against the defendant, acci6n popular has not yet played a significant
role in Spanish jury trials. This could change, however, if cases are
charged which arouse local citizen's groups to participate as popular
prosecutors. A Spanish human rights group, the Asociaci6n Pro Derechos
Humanos, recently entered into the prosecution of two police officers, who
shot and killed a sixteen year old boy in the Province of Cidiz who was
fleeing from them in a car.731
C. The Length of Jury Trials
Critics of the introduction of the classic jury were afraid that the new
system would result in substantially longer trials which would further slow
down the snail-like pace of Spain's criminal justice system and exacerbate
the crisis in which it already finds itself. Typically, critics compare the
time it would have taken a professional bench to have tried the same
case.732 Nevertheless, Spanish jury trials tend to take less time than com-
728. P1. Pop. Pr., Pl. Pvt. Pros. (SS-1) (on file with author). Interview with Juan
Piqueras Valls, Public Judge of San Sebastidn Provincial Court, San Sebastihn (June 6,
1997) (SS-1).
729. Interview with Castells Arteche, supra note 142 (SS-2).
730. P1. Pop. Pros. (PO-1) (on file with author).
731. Mongui6 F. Prez, El fiscal califica de homicidio la muerte de un joven par la
policia en El Puerto, ELPAts ANDALUCIA, June 18, 1997, at 6.
732. For instance, the judge in V-1 insisted that the trespassing case would have
lasted sixty to ninety minutes before a professional bench; in contrast, it lasted two days
before ajury. Interview with De la Rua Moreno, supra note 218 (V-I). A lawyer ob-
serving B-i, which lasted two days, said he had tried such a trespassing case in thirty
minutes. Salvador Enguix, Juicio al Jurado, LA VANGUARDIA, June 2, 1996, at 5 (B-1).
In GR-1, the homicide trial lasted eight and one-half hours; the judge said it would have
taken a mere thirty minutes in a non-jury trial. Interview with Tapla bUpez, supra note
234 (GR-1). The presiding judges in two-day homicide trials insisted they would have
taken only a morning in front of a professional bench. Interview with Alvarez Seijo, su-
pra note 230 (0-1); Interview with Conde Salgado, supra note 139 (LU-I). The Secre-
tary in TE-I said it was "stupid" to have a two day trial and six hours of deliberation in a
threats case. Interview with Daniel Sinchez Clemente, Secretary of the Teruel Provincial
Court, Teruel (June 23, 1997) (TE-I). Threats'trials usually last about twenty minutes
before a professional court. Interview with Gastaldi Mateo, supra note 231 (CS-1).
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parable U.S. trials. The minor, non-homicide trials are typically handled in
one to two days.733 Most homicide trials last no more than three days,
though a few have lasted more than a week.3
Although the trial itself lasts considerably longer than a comparable
trial before a professional bench, not to speak of one pursuant to the abbre-
viated procedure, it is hoped that jury cases will actually proceed to trial
faster and thus result in more expedient justice. The LOTJ was intended to
speed up the preliminary investigation, which accounts for the over-
whelming amount of time in crimial cases. Thus, the prosecutor in GR-1
believes that the administration of justice will actually be improved by the
celerity of the newjury procedures and, indeed, Spanish jury cases proceed
to trial as fast, if not faster than U.S. cases. This is unusual for a conti-
nental European criminal justice system.
735
D. The Monetary Cost of Trial by Jury
Not only do the Spanish jury trials take up more time than non-jury
cases, but that time translates into a considerable cost to the courts due to
the large per diem remuneration paid to jurors under the LOTJ. Trial
judges and the media have voiced complaints as to how costly jury trial
733. PM-1, P0-1, P0-5 and TE-1 were handled in one day. V-1 and B-I, on the
other hand, took two days until a verdict was reached.
734. Of the 43 homicide trials for which the data is available, two were tried in one
day (GR-1 and PA-1) and an additional 22 were tried in two or three (lays. Five trials
took four days and seven trials took five days. The co-defendant trials in AL-2 and B-14
took seven days, as did BI-1. The Otegi case (SS-2) took nine days and GR-2, the case
involving a girl's tragic drowning death, took 10 days, due to the fact that everyone in
the village was called as a witness. Interview with Bellver Garcia-Alix, supra note 239
(GR-2). SS-3, involving three co-defendants, also took over two weeks.
735. He emphasized that it had taken only seven months to bring GR-1 to trial. Inter-
view with Navajas Ramos, supra note 702 (GR-1). A study of 22 of the first cases sub-
ject to the jury law revealed that the average preliminary investigation (including pre-
liminary hearing) in the investigative courts lasted 6.25 months and the cases were
brought to judgment in the provincial courts in an average of 2.36 months (including jury
selection procedures, pretrial motions and trial). The longest of those cases took 12
months (SE-1) and the shortest four months in all (PM-I). Carmona Ruano & DePafil
Velasco, supra note 106, at 86-89. The Otegi case (SS-2), not part of the aforemen-
tioned study, took substantially more time (14 months, 2 weeks). This does not compare
unfavorably with the time it takes to bring a defendant to trial in the U.S. felony courts,
despite our lack of any formal, jurisdictional preliminary investigation. For instance, in
1992 it took an average of five months to bring a defendant to trial in the federal courts
following arraignment in the trial court, which usually takes place approximately 30 days
after arrest. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS, 1993 REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 67.
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will be for Spanish courts. The petty trespassing charges litigated in V-1
and B-1 cost those courts around 500,000 pesetas ($4,000) just to pay for
the jurors.736 According to the judge in VA-1, that five day trial cost the
court 950,000 pesetas. 77 The media put the tab for the trial in CS-1 at
nearly two million pesetas because two of the jurors were put up at the
five-star Hotel Intur and all had their meals there. 3  The judge in LP-2
complained that the trial cost two million pesetas, enough money to pay for
a court composed of professional judges to render 200 sentences.73 9
These costs must be absorbed by a criminal justice system that is
sorely lacking in funds for its day to day business. Even the pro-jury pub-
lic prosecutor in PM-1 complained of the cost of the new procedures while
lamenting the facilities in which the prosecutors of the Provincial Court
had to work.740 Much money has also been spent on renovating the courts
to accommodate the jury in the courtroom and jury room and providing ar-
eas for jurors to relax and prepare coffee.
74 1
736. Interview with De la Rua Moreno, supra note 218 (V-I). De La Rua Moren put
the figure at 400,000 pesetas for the two day case, but said that the court would have to
pay 100 million pesetas in a year, which could pay for the salaries of 11 or 12 new
judges. Following B-1, it was alleged that after two trials the Barcelona Provincial
Court's budget would be exhausted for jury cases. Francese Peir6n, La experlencia del
juico con jurado szembra dudas por sus dilaciones y costes econdmicos, LA
VANGUARDLa, June 1, 1996, at 23 (B-1). The cost of a typical trial in Oviedo Provincial
Court lasting three days was estimated at 500,000 pesetas. Interview with Alonso Cre-
spo, supra note 322 (0-2). ($1.00 U.S. is equal to 125-140 pesetas).
737. Telephone Conversation with Jos6 Mifambres Fl6rez, Public Judge of Valladolid
Provincial Court (June 7, 1996) (VA-I). The President of Lugo Provincial Court esti-
mated that an average trial there costs one million pesetas. Interview with Conde Sal-
gado, supra note 139 (LU-1). After thejudgment in GI-2 was reversed, critics lamented
the waste of 800,000 pesetas "for nothing." Costa-Pau, supra note 678 (GI-2).
738. Isabel Femndez, Cerca de dos millones costard a la admmnistracidn estejuicto
popular, MEDITERRAJNEO, Nov. 20, 1996, at 14 (CS-1).
739. Statement of Eduardo de Urbano, Judge of the Las Palmas Provincial Court, EL
MuNDo (Mar. 13, 1997) (LP-2).
740. He showed the author an office m which 11 prosecutors had to work. Interview
with Roig, supra note 522 (PM-1). The prosecutor in V-1 voiced similar complaints.
She worked in the library because she had no office. Interview with AlcAntara Barbany,
supra note 175 (V-1). A secretary of an investigative court in Salamanca maintained that
prosecutors often must work at home due to lack of office space and when a trial is set it
is often difficult to get them by phone to come to work. Interview with Carmen Vicente,
Secretary of Investigative Court No. 3, Salamanca (May 20, 1996).
741. The two jury courtrooms in Barcelona are more luxurious and better technologi-
cally outfitted than any court the author has seen elsewhere. They include closed-circuit
television screens and microphones, and, with their stained-glass windows, have more of
the feel of cathedral naves. The author's observation; Interview with Thomas Andreu,
supra note 292; Webster, supra note 70 (B-I). A similar renovation with a megaphone
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E. Circumvention of the Jury Procedures
The monetary cost of paying jurors for what sometimes turn out to be
trials lasting several days is certainly one of the main reason; that prose-
cutors and courts seem to be doing all they can to avoid having to use the
new jury trial procedures. Critics have claimed that too few cases are be-
ing tried, thus giving little chance for the 500,000 Spaniards on the jury
lists to participate in the administration of justice.742 Since the first week
of jury trials in late May 1996, which saw two trespassing trials and one
for bribery,743 only seventeen additional trials for minor non-homicide
cases were tried as of June 1, 1997 744 Although Spain introduced jury trial
simultaneously in all its fifty provinces, the first trials took place only six
months after the law went into effect, and only around seventy-seven cases
actually went to trial in the first year. This should be compared with the
experience in Russia, in which the first trial was held only six weeks after
the law went into effect and, though the jury law was introduced in only
nine of eighty-nine regions, 173 trials were held in the first year.745
In the wake of the verdict in the Otegi case (SS-1), it can be predicted
that circumvention of trial by jury will further increase, Whether it will
ever reach the level it does in the United States, where approximately
seven percent of jury-eligible cases are actually litigated before lay pan-
els746 is doubtful, but the "threat" of trial by jury, coupled with its compli-
cated, time-consuming and costly procedures, has unmistakably brought
with it methods, both statutory and informal, of circumventing its jurisdic-
tion.747
system was undertaken in Granada. Gallastegui, supra note 237 (GR-1). The Madrid
renovation necessitated the removal of columns that obstructed the view of the jury and
the spectators' view of the trial. Hernndez, supra note 141 (M-l). The renovation of
the Valladolid courtroom cost 18 million pesetas. El crimen de Rueda inaugura hey el
primerjuicto con jurado en Valladolid, EL NORTE DE CASTILLA, June 3, 1996, at 5 (VA-
1).
742. Prades, supra note 136, at 2. Commentators had expected "hundreds of trials"
and only around 80 have gone to trial. Id.
743. V-I, B-1 and PM-1.
744. See supra Part V.G for a discussion of the practice of resolving such cases
through conformidad and exercise of the prosecutorial charging power.
745. Thaman, ZSTW, supra note 409, at 212. This took place despite reluctance in
some of the Russian provinces to encourage the use of the new procedure. Thaman, Res-
urrection, supra note 5, at 140. Some of this discrepancy is certainly attributable to the
fact that Russia has a much higher murder rate than Spain.
746. Alschuler, supra note 11, at 922.
747. On the French and English mechanisms for avoiding the jurisdiction of the jury
court, see supra note 178.
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F. The Otegi Verdict and the Future of Trial by Jury in Spain
After reporting on the first jury trials in late May 1996, the national
news media paid little attention to the new institution until the shock of the
acquittal of Mikel Otegi of the murder of two Basque policemen on March
6, 1997.748 Even in the provinces, the newspapers usually covered the first
trials in each area, but later trials aroused comparatively little interest.
49
The Otegi case (SS-2) vaulted the issue of trial by jury back into the na-
tional spotlight. Mass demonstrations greeted the verdict in the Basque
Country.750 Basque police organizations claimed that the verdict "mur-
dered Ifiaki and Jos6 Luis a second time" and constituted a "terrible prece-
dent, because it is like giving a carte blanche to youth like Otegi, who say
they feel harassed by the ertzamtza, to attack us and even kill us.' 751 Po-
litical parties reacted to the acquittal by demanding LOTJ reforms aimed at
preventing the recurrence of such "scandalous acquittals" in the future.
The main reform proposals have focused on (1) the desirability ofjury
trials in the Basque Country in general, due to the heightened political ten-
sion in the region, the activity of terrorist groups, and the question of al-
lowing for changes of venue to avoid this problem; (2) changing the list of
crimes subject to the jury court's jurisdiction, for instance, by eliminating
crimes against police or other public officials; (3) the restriction of the
jury's role to deciding only questions of historical fact and not the guilt of
the defendant; (4) the reform of the appellate procedures to facilitate
greater appeal of acquittals; and (5) the transformation of the classic jury
into a "mixed court" or its complete abolition.
The ruling Partido Popular (PP) of Jos6 Maria Aznar began calling for
a LOTJ reform to prevent the recurrence of "grotesque" jury verdicts like
that in the Otegi case the day after the verdict, and was generally joined in
748. Intxausti, supra note 489; L6pez, supra note 711 (SS-2).
749. Josd Antonio Martin Pallin, Disparan contra eljurado, EL PAlS, Mar. 19,,1997,
at 11.
750. On March 10, 1997, thousands of Basque policemen and the families of the de-
ceased ertzainas demonstrated in San Sebastian against the verdict. Cientos de erizainas
reclaman la condena del asesino convcto de Itsasondo, EL CORREO, Mar. 11, 1997;
Magistrados consideran que el acta de votaci6n deljurado liene zrregularldades, DiARIO
VAsco, Mar. 1I, 1997 (SS- 2). Demonstrations demanding justice for the victims were
also held in the smaller towns of Zumarraga and Urretxu. Christina Torres, Martiarena
dice que Otegi ha pedido el pasaporte para irse del Pais Vasco, EL CORREO (Mar. 21,
1997) <http://www.diano-elcorreo.es> (SS-2).
751. Han asesinado por segunda vez a nuestros companeros dicen los sindicators
policiales, EL CoRREo (Mar. 7, 1997) <http'J/www.diario-elcorrco.es> (SS-2).
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its efforts by the Basque National Party (PNV).752 The opposition Socialist
Party (PSOE), which had pushed through the LOTJ before being thrown
out of office in 1996, claimed the PP was using the Otegi case to get rid of
trial by jury, as it was the only party which had opposed its introduction in
1995. The United Left (IU) and the Catalan party CiU joined the PSOE in
opposing LOTJ reform. 3
The first major concern was whether the political and social climate
in the Basque Country was conducive to allowing juries to decide serious
criminal cases with political overtones. The day after the Otegi verdict,
Juan Alberto Belloch, Minister of Justice during the last Socialist Govern-
ment and the main force behind the LOTJ's passage,7 54 raised this ques-
tion.75 5 This view was seconded by the Interior Ministry's Representative
in the Basque Country, Juan Maria Atutxa, who had pushed for a change of
venue in the Otegi case before it was tried, 56 and by the Chief State Prose-
cutor, Juan Ortiz Urculo. 57 The new President of the Council of Judges,
Javier Delgado Barrio, has also spoken in favor of limiting jury trials to ar-
eas where conditions of social pressure will not effect the legitimacy of the
proceedings.5  Although Belloch and the PSOE spoke in favor of
amending the law to provide for a change of venue where it could be
752. The Government called on the State Prosecutor to launch such a reform effort.
Los partidos descalifican un fallo injusto que avala la impunidad de los radicales, EL
CORREO (Mar. 7, 1997) <http://www.diano-elcorreo.es>; Javier Mufloz, El Gobterno y el
PNV abogan par reformar el jurado para que no se repitan veredicios absurdos, EL
CORREO (Mar. 8, 1997) <http://www.diano-elcorreo.es> (SS-2).
753. Joaqufn Almunia, spokesperson of the PSOE, called it "political indecency" for
the PP to blame the Socialists for the jury legislation, and thus for the. Olegi verdict.
Raimundo Castro, El Gobierno cambiard la Ley del Jurado par el caso Otegi, EL
PERI6DICO (Mar. 8, 1997) <http://www.elperodico.es> On the position of the CiU and
the IU, whose leader, Julio Angiita, accused the PP of "using one case to eliminate the
democratic development of the justice system," see Molins aconseja serenidad en la re-
forma del jurado, EL PERI6DICO (Mar. 10, 1997) <http://www.elperiodico.es> (SS-2)
[hereinafter "Molins aconseja"].
754. The evening of the Olegi verdict, the mother of slain Basque policeman Iflaki
Mendiluze stated that she would "call 'this Belloch' and tell him the damage he has done
to our family." Un jurado declara no culpable y deja en libertad aljoven que mat6 a
dos ertzeinas, EL PAls, Mar. 7, 1997, at 1 (SS-2).
755. Estupor e indignacz6n en los partidos vascos par la absolucu6n, DIARIO VASCO,
Mar. 7, 1997, at 5 (SS-2).
756. Mufloz, supra note 752.
757. Salome Garcia, El Gobierno baraja sustraer aljurado el ataque a policlas, EL
PER1ODICO (Mar. 11, 1997) <http://www.elpenodico.es> (SS-2).
758. L. F Rodriguez, Los juicios con jurado deben llevarse donde no extsta la pre-
si6n social, EL CORREO, Mar. 7, 1997 (interviewing with Javier Delgado, President of the
General Council of the Judicial Branch).
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shown that the political climate was not conducive to a fair trial, the cur-
rent Minister of Justice, Margarita Mariscal de Gante, rejected this ap-
proach in favor of amending the substantive provisions of the law to make
verdicts like that in the Otegi case impossible.
759
The Otegi verdict occurred on the eve of a general strike planned by
the radical Basque nationalist party Herri Batasuna (HB) to protest the ar-
rest of its leadership and soon after a wave of assassinations attributed to
the terrorist wing of the movement, the ETA.760 The verdict also came at a
time when the quality ofjustice meted out by the professional Basque judi-
ciary had also been seriously called into question.761 The morning on
which the Otegi jury began deliberations, another judge in the San Sebas-
tidn Provincial Court, Luis Bldnquez, announced a decision acquitting a
Basque juvenile of assaulting police officers, and calling into question the
veracity of the testimony of Basque policemen in general. This decision
reversed the juvenile court ruling of Jos6 Luis Barragfn, the presiding
judge in the Otegi case. The day after the Otegi verdict, Barragdn held a
press conference claiming that Blinquez delayed announcing the judgment
from February 18 until March 6, 1997, to intentionally influence the Otegi
jury's deliberations. 62 Barragin's recriminations led to calls for the CGPJ
to investigate the San Sebastian Provincial Court for the huge inequality in
justice meted out by its different sections.763 Defenders of trial by jury
emphasized that the problem was not the jury or the LOTJ, but the situa-
tion in the Basque Country itself, which undermined the independence of
jurors as well as professional judges. According to the PSOE and the IU,
judges return scandalous verdicts just as the Otegi ,ury did, but no one de-
mands that judges be removed as decisionmakers. 64 Indeed, recent polls
showed that 70.2% of Basques think that judges decide criminal cases
759. Belloch acusa a! PP de aprovechar el caso Olegi para acabar con eljuradoo EL
CoREo (Mar. 10, 1997) <http://www.diario-elcorreo.es> (SS-2).
760. Carlos L6pez, El crimen de Itsasondo queda impune, EL PERu6DICO (Mar. 7,
1997) <http://www.elperiodico.es> (SS-2).
761. .Indeed, the Basque police association, Hemen Gaude, besides protesting the jury
verdict, also called for the removal ofjudges who "put their own security above their ju-
dicial duties." Muftoz, supra note 751 (SS-2).
762. Peyalba, supra note 710; Javier Mufloz, Barragdn pide a! Consejo del Poder Ju-
dicial que mnvestigue a Bldnquez, EL CORREO (Mar. 8, 1997) <http://www.diario-
elcorreo.es> (SS-2).
763. Javier Mufloz, El Poder Judicial abre una nvestigacidn sabre la crisis de la
Audiencia donostiarra, EL COREO (Mar. 12, 1997) <httpi/www.diario-elcorrco.es>
(SS-2); Javier Mufloz,, La Audiencia convulsa, EL CORREO (Mar. 16, 1997)
<http://www.diano-elcorreo.es> (SS-2).
764. Castro, supra note 753.
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based on fear765 and sixty percent of Basques feel that the Otegi verdict
was based on the jury's fear that revenge would be taken on them if they
convicted the young Basque nationalist
66
As discussed above, the PP and the PNV reject the notion that the
problem lay only in the conditions in the Basque Country and also reject
any solutions such as change of venue or a "state of emergency" suspend-
mg the law 767 One of the changes recommended by the PP, the Catalonian
CiU and the more conservative judicial organizations is to alter the list of
crimes subject to the jury court's jurisdiction so that cases like Otegi will
not be decided by juries.768 A member of the IU supported reaching the
same result by expanding the jurisdiction of the National Court, which is
the exclusive forum for the trial of terrorist crimes, to include cases like
Otegi, which are not classic terrorist offenses but have political over-
tones.769
The PP and PNV's most radical reform proposal is to restrict the jury
to deciding only questions of fact and leaving the qualification of the fac-
tual answers and the technical finding of guilt to the professional judges.
Both parties advocated a similar position during the parliamentary debates
before the enactment of the LOTJ, but their positions were not adopted.770
A PNV spokesperson and delegate of the CGPJ from the Basque Country
advocated stripping the jury of the capacity to decide issues of excuse, jus-
tification, mitigating and aggravating circumstances.771
Juan Alberto Belloch has equated the PP model "in which the citizens
have no responsibility" as being tantamount to "eliminating the institu-
765. El 70% de los vascos cree que losjueces acttan con miedo, EL MUNDO (Mar. 16,
1997) <http://www.el-mundo.es> (SS-2).
766. El.60% de los vascos cree que Otegi fue absuelto por miedo a represalias, EL
CORREO (Mar. 30, 1997) <http://www.diario-elcorreo.es> (SS-2).
767. Castro, supra note 753; Ferran Gerhard, Mariscal trabaja ya en ia nueva Ley del
Jurado, EL PERI6DICO (Mar. 9, 1997) <http://www.elperiodico.es> (SS-2).
768. For statements of PP spokespersons Luis De Grandes and Andrds Ollero to this
effect, see C. Valdecantos, El PP quiere limitar las competenctas del jurado, EL PAIS,
(Mar. 8, 1997) <http://www.elpais.es> Crimes involving the police are, according to the
Public Prosecutor, among those which should not be tried by juries. Garcia, supra note
757. For the support of CiU spokesperson Manuel Silva for such a refbrm, see Castro,
supra note 753. The two conservative organizations of judges are the Asociaci6n profe-
sional de la Magistratura and the Asociaci6n Judicial Francisco de Vitoria.
769. For the statement of Diego L6pez Garrido, Professor of Constilutional Law and
Deputy of the IU, see Gerhard, supra note 767 (SS-2).
770. Valdecantos, supra note 768 (SS-2) (citing the Feb. 15, 1996 parliamentary de-
bate).
771. For the opinion of Emilio Olabarrfa, see Mufioz, supra note 752 (SS-2).
[Vol. 21:241
Spain Returns to Thal by Jury
tion."772 He has also insisted that the verdict in the Otegi case would not
have been altered by such a reform, for a judge would be bound by their
finding that he was "temporarily insane" at the time of the shootings.'
Finally, the current Minister of Justice, Mariscal de Gante, has advo-
cated changing the appellate remedies possible after a verdict of acquittal
to allow for a verdict such as that in the Otegi case to be set aside by a
higher court. 74 Some have opposed this solution as "clearly unconstitu-
tional."775
While there were some voices calling for the complete abolition of
trial by jury immediately after the Otegi verdict," 6 politicians' tones have
become more moderate over time, and even the PP now claims that the
question is not of abolishing trial by jury but of improving a law which
was defective at the outset." Unlike the politicians, who are not yet sug-
gesting the abandonment of the classic jury orjurado puro, long-time de-
fenders of the "mixed court" or tribunal de escabinado who lost in their
attempts to interpret the mandate of article 125 of the CE to allow for this
form of lay participation have rejoined the debate in the wake of the Otegi
verdict. They argue that this transformation would be a constitutional
method of preventing "scandalous verdicts."
778
772. Belloch acusa, EL CORREO, supra note 759 (SS-2).
773. Anabel Diz, Belloch critica la falta de informes midicos, EL PAls, Mar. 11,
1997 (SS-2).
774. Gerhard, supra note 767. See the similar position of PP spokesperson Andrds
Ollero. Belloch acusa, EL CORREO, supra note 759. After the Otegi verdict, Andrds de
la Oliva, Professor of Procedural Law at the Complutense University in Madrid, called
the current appellate mechanisms "distorted" and criticized them for being more "preoc-
cupied with maintaining the result of the trial by jury than the wisdom or justice of the
case in relation to the facts and the law." C. Valdecantos & B. De la Cuadra, Losjurstas
yen casi imposible que el veredicto de absoluci6n de Otegi pueda revocarse, EL PAlS
(Mar. 8, 1997) <http://www.elpais.es> (SS-2).
775. See opinion of Professor L6pez Gamdo. Molins aconseja, supra note 753 (SS-
2).
776. For example, the statement of PNV spokesperson Joseba Egibar. Estupor e in-
dignaci6n, DIARIO VASCO, supra note 755 (SS-2).
777. C. Valdecantos, Andrds Ollero, Portavoz del PP. 'Con amigos como el PSOE el
jurado no precisa enemigos, EL PAls, Mar. 13, 1997, at 20.
778. Juan-Luis G6mez Colomer, Ninguna Ley del Jurado garantiza veredictosjustos,
in EL MEDTERRANEO, March 1997; see also Andr6s Ibdnez, Perfecto, Problemdtlcoju-
rado puro, EL PAlS, Mar. 14, 1997, at 11. Andrds Ibfnez also criticized the "tedious ter-
minology of left/right" which has infected the positions of the political parties after the
verdict: "[n]ow, as before, on one side, juries-like mothers-there is only one, the pure
one, and only a reactionary could question this; and, on the other side, the implicit, or
even explicit defense of a mystic elitism of jurisdiction functioning with a sacerdotal
character. . "
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The Popular Party's final attempt to amend the law coincided, perhaps
not accidentally, with the conservative newspaper El Mundo's April 22,
1997 expos6 of the Otegi jury.7"9 The PP introduced a bill to amend the
list of crimes subject to the jury court's jurisdiction to exclude crimes
against public authority, to restrict the province of the jury to that of an-
swering questions of fact, and to change appellate procedures. Although
supported by the National Basque Party (PNV), its former ally CiU urged
it to table the bill until the judge's association (CGPJ) and the State Prose-
cutor's Association (FGE) had a chance to study the law's impact in a
systematic manner.
The Basque Country TSJ's reversal of the Otegi acquittal on June 27,
1997 quieted the emotions stirred by the jury's verdict, and there has been
little discussion of the LOTJ in the national news media since. The Otegi
reversal was met with satisfaction, not only by the families of the victims,
but also by supporters of trial by jury.781 The only dissenting voice was
Otegi's lawyer, who claimed that the reversal was contrary to the law and a
result of pressure by the Ministry of Justice on the courts. 82
It remains to be seen whether the uproar caused by the Otegi verdict
will completely subside and whether jury trials will continue in the current
779. Gurruchaga & Escudier, supra note 142 (SS-2). See discussion supra Part V.E.
780. Ram6n Gorriaran, El Gobterno deberd otr al Poder Judicial y a la Fiscalla antes
de reformar eljurado, EL CORREO (Apr. 23, 1997) <http://www.diario-elcorreo.es>. Pas-
cual Garcfa, El Congreso ista al Gobierno a informarse sobre eljuicio con jurado, EL
MUNDO. (Apr. 23, 1997) <http://www.el-mundo.es>; Rosa Paz, CiU altera el plan del
PP para reformar la ley del jurado par el caso Otegi, LA VANGUARDIA (Apr. 23, 1997)
<http://www2.vanguardia.es> Recently appointed State Prosecutor Jes~s Cardenal an-
nounced in mid-October 1997 the intention of introducing a bill to strip the jury of its
power to decide the guilt question, while maintaining its competence with regard to ag-
gravating and mitigating circumstances. Jos6 Maria Brunet, El fiscal general propane
recortar competencias a los jurados, LA VANGUARDIA (Oct. 14, 1997)
<http://www2.vanguardia.es>
781. Gustavo L6pez-Mufloz y Larraz, President of the Asociac6n Pro Jurado, said
that the reversal shows that the law "has appellate safeguards for possible error." B. Do
la Cuadra, Divisi6n entre losjuristas sobre el nuevo jurado vasco para el 'caso Olegi,'
ELPAts, June 28, 1997, at 14 (SS-2).
782. Aurora Intxausti, Otegi volverd a ser juzgado par matar a dos 'ertzainas', EL
PAts, June 28, 1997, at 13 (SS-2). It should also be remembered that the President of the
TSJ of the Basque Country decided sua sponte 'to have the case decided, contrary to its
own rules, by all five members of the court en banc, instead of by the usual panel of
three. Javier Mufloz, Zorrilla cita al plento del Tribunal Superior para ver los recursos
del casa Itsasondo, EL CORREO (May 9, 1997) <http://www.diario-elcorreo.es> (SS-2).
Not surprisingly, most jurists believed that it would be next to impossible to reverse the
Otegi verdict at the time the appeal was being considered. Valdecantos & De la Cuadra,
supra note 774.
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halting fashion and take root in Spanish soil. With all of the manipulation
that has occurred to keep cases from being litigated by juries, the Otegi
case slipped through and should be treated as an anomaly.7s3 With the ex-
ception of the Otegi case, the Spanish jury trials have dealt primarily with
domestic homicides which have aroused very little public interest or con-
troversy.
7 4
If the LOTJ survives the current attacks more or less intact and cases
with terrorist or radical nationalist overtones do not lead to the impaneling
of juries who are afraid to vote in a just manner, the Spanish criminal jus-
tice system could reap real rewards from this gamble with the classic jury.
First, by shifting some of the burden of preparing and litigating cases
from the investigative and trial courts to the parties, some of the clogging
of Spanish dockets may be relieved, and cases might move more smoothly
through the system. Although jury trials may take less time, as judges, sec-
retaries and lawyers become more familiar with the procedures, some of
that benefit could be nullified by an increasing "adversaliaziation" of the
procedure, greater sophistication in presenting motions, arguing cases, and
so forth, as has happened in the United States. Further, the simplification
of the investigative stage and a shortening of the time limits could have
real benefit to the quality ofjustice.
The mere presence of the jury, coupled with the lack of an investiga-
tive file and the correlative need to present all evidence orally to the jury,
will enhance the immediacy of the trial and contribute to a real equality of
arms at that level. The jury itself, by finding the facts and determining the
enhancing, aggravating and mitigating factors which inform the sentencing
decision, will liberate the judge from much of the pedantic regurgitation of
prior written pleadings, findings, and legal dogma which constitute most of
the process of "rendering judgment" in the continental European criminal
trial.
785
783. The famous 1878 case of Vera Zasulich in Russia was a case that could have
been tried in the military courts, but an ambitious prosecutor wanted to show the country
that persons who attacked Tsarist officials were common criminals. That "scandalous
acquittal" led to a firmer exclusion of all political cases from the Russian jury court.
784. Despite the rampant rise of organized crime and murders by Mafia "hit squads"
in Russia, the first year of Russian jury trials saw virtually no cases relating to gangland
slayings. The murders were often domestic, among friends, and invariably connected
with drunkenness. During that time, no case with the notoriety of the Otegi case was
tried, most likely because all Russian police and judges put their security ahead of their
official duty. See Thaman, Resurrection, supra note 5, Appendix.
785. In the words of the Chief Prosecutor of Madrid Province, Joaqufn Sinchez-
Covisa, "[j]ustice is full of dust. The jury has been like opening the windows to let in
fresh air from the streets. A magnificent experience." He admitted that his fellow prose-
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These positive factors must be weighed against certain negative fac-
tors that have aroused sustained criticism: (1) the prohibitive cost of im-
paneling juries due to their high per diem allowance and the need to se-
quester juries overnight in hotels during extended; (2) the incredibly
complicated nature of many of the verdict forms, coupled with the need to
give reasons for the verdict, which could cause many reversals on appeal;
and (3) the eclectic selection of crimes subject to the jury court's jurisdic-
tion.
The Council of Judges has recently stated that the first experiences
have generally been positive and that "citizens have demonstrated the same
common sense, or lack of it, as judges have.' 786 A recent poll has indi-
cated that 43.2% of Spaniards support the introduction of trial by jury and
42.4% are opposed.
Prior attempts to introduce trial by jury never took hold in Spain. The
only sustained period in which it functioned was 1888 through 1921. The
fact that it lacks solid support among the population, among judges and
lawyers, and among law professors means that reforms along the lines of
those taken m Germany, France, Italy, and Portugal, converting the classic
jury into a "mixed court," are certainly possible. The rise of the conserva-
tive Partido Popular, which opposed trial by jury, and the wane of its sup-
porter, the Socialist Party, has also undermined its possibilities of survival
in its present form. The Otegi case has given the opponents of the classic
jury some needed ammunition to attack the LOTJ, the "swan song" of its
bitter rivals. The fate of the new Spanish jury hangs in the balance.
cutors, who generally feel that jurors lack preparation to deal with the complexities of
justice and show excessive benevolence in their verdicts, "will want to throw boiling
water on my head when they read this, but this is how I think." Prades, supra note 136,
at 1, 3. In the words of the Chief Prosecutor of Burgos Province, trial by jury will help
in "desanctifying theadministration of justice," Interview with Mena, supra note 162
(BU-1), or in the words of one of the authors of the LOTJ, to "weaken the sacerdotal na-
ture ofjudicial power." Interview with Varela Castro, supra note 101 (PO-).
786. Prades, supra note 136, at 1.
787. Poll of Centro de Investigaciones Soctoldgicas, cited in Paz, supra note 780.
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APPENDIX I
SUMMARIES OF THE FIRST SPANISH JURY TRIALS
ALBACETE PROVINCIAL COURT (AB)
AB-1 CORREA CASE
December 10, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Matias Correa Arenas (51 years-old,
no record) with homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with the aggravating circum-
stance of being related to the victim (§ 23 CP 1995) and the mitigating cir-
cumstance of spontaneous remorse (§ 21(4) CP 1995). The prosecutor also
requested acquittal on excuse of insanity (§ 20(1) CP 1995) and internment
in a psychiatric facility for fifteen years.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor added additional aggravating factor of abuse of
superiority (§ 22(2) CP 1995). The private prosecutor also requested ac-
quittal, thirteen years internment in psychiatric facility and twenty million
pesetas m damages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled in conformity with pleadings of public prosecutor.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
On May 24, 1996, at around 7:00 a.m., defendant strangled his sev-
enty-nine year old mother, Carmen Arenas Fraile, to death in their home in
La Roda. Defendant was mentally ill and was diagnosed as being schizo-
phrenic.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of homicide with the aggravating factors of
being related to the victim and abuse of superiority and the mitigating cir-
cumstance of spontaneous remorse. Defendant was acquitted due to the
excuse of insanity and was committed to a psychiatric facility for ten years.
Damages of 1.5 million pesetas were imposed.
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Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Prot.
Ver., Judg.
2. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106.
ALICANTE PROVINCIAL COURT (A)
A-1 REINOSA CASE
April 7, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Esteban Reinosa Fernfndez (28 years-
old, 4 priors) with trespassing in a dwelling (§ 202(2) CP 1995) and caus-
ing injuries (§ 147(1) CP 1995), with the aggravating factor of recidivism
(§ 22(8) CP 1995) and the partial excuses of mental illness and narcotics
addiction (§§ 21(1), 20(1) CP 1995). The public prosecutor requested
seven months detention for the trespassing and five months for the inflic-
tion of injuries, which could be substituted with a fine, and damages in the
sum of 88,520 pesetas.
Pleadings of Defense
Defense pled acquittal either due to not having committed the acts or
due to being unconscious of having committed them (§20(1) CP 1995).
Summary of Evidence at Trial
On June 4, 1996, defendant went to the dwelling of Leonor Lacfircel
Fernndez in Alicante and knocked on the door. He had been in the house
once before to visit her son, and desired entrance in the house to sleep, as
he said he had no place to stay. Lacdrcel refused to open the door where-
upon defendant kicked it in. Once inside, he took off Lacfirel's glasses and
punched her twice in the face, cutting her lip. Defendant claimed he was a
heroin and cocaine addict with a neurosis-psychosis and an eye disorder
and therefore was unconscious of what he was doing.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury convicted defendant of trespassing in a dwelling and inflict-
ing injuries but found his cognitive abilities were notably affected by his
drug addiction, mental problems and eye problem. They also found the
aggravating factor of recidivism. They recommended a suspension of the
sentence. He was.sentenced to six months and a fine for the trespassing
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and a fine of 30,000 pesetas for inflicting the injuries. Damages were im-
posed in the sum of 53,520 pesetas. Sentence was not suspended due to
defendant's recidivist status.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Conversation with Secretary of Section 1 of the Provincial Court,





The public prosecutor charged Andr~s Navarro Torres (26 years-old,
no record) with trespassing in a dwelling (§ 490 CP 1973), and requested a
punishment of two months detention and a fine of 100,000 pesetas.
Pleadings of Defense
Acquittal.
Summay of Evidence at Trial
At around 8:30 a.m. on May 21, 1996, defendant knocked on the door
of the dwelling occupied by Maria de los Dolores Montes de Oca Moreno
in Elda and was admitted. A month prior to the incident, he had lived with
her in an intimate relationship. He wanted to spend the night there. After
a heated discussion, she asked him to leave but he refused. She left to




1. Review of Procedural Documents: Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Conversation with Secretary of Section 1 of the Provincial Court,
Carmen Galipienso Calatayud, on June 19, 1997, at Alicante Provincial
Court.
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A-3 BLASCO CASE
April 21-22, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Vicente Luis Blasco Gregorio (28
years-old, no record) with murder (§406 CP 1973) and, in the alternative,
with homicide (§ 407 CP 1973) with the mitigating circumstances of par-
tial diminished capacity due to alcoholic intoxication and spontaneous re-
morse (§§ 9(2) & (9) CP 1973).
Pleadings of Defense
Defense pled for acquittal due to temporary insanity caused by alco-
holic intoxication and in the alternative due to accident.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
At around 6:00 a.m. on March 2, 1996, defendant and the victim,
Pedro Juan Vallds Llobell, left the pub "La Travessa" in Teulada. They
argued in the parking lot. Defendant went to his car, took out a hunting ri-
fle, and eventually fired one shot, killing Vallds. Defendant testified that
the victim had threatened to kill him and he was in fear. Then, the victim
verbally taunted the defendant and grabbed the barrel of the gun. The gun
went off. Defendant also claimed he was too drunk to be responsible.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of homicide with the mitigating circum-
stances of diminished capacity due to drunkenness and spontaneous re-
morse. He was sentenced to seven years prison and twenty million pesetas
in damages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Conversation with Secretary of Section 1 of the Provincial Court,
Carmen Galapienso Calatayud, on June 19, 1997, in Alicante Provincial
Court.
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The public prosecutor charged Antonio Vicente Deltell (28 years-old,
3 priors) with threats (§§ 493,495.1 CP 1973) with the aggravating circum-
stance of recidivism (§ 10(15) CP 1973) and requested six months deten-
tion and, in the alternative, banishment from Mon6var for two years.
Pleadings ofPrivate Prosecutor
Same as public prosecutor, except private prosecutor requested ban-
ishment for three years.
Pleadings of Defense
Acquittal.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant had a relationship with Lucia Sarmiento Alare6n, which
the latter terminated. Starting in the middle of February 1996, defendant
began stalking Alarc6n. He followed her to her work in Mon6var threat-
ening to kill her if she did not renew their relationship or if she went out
with another man. Defendant repeated the threats, continued to wait for
her outside of her house, follow her to work, and follow her home. She
was so afraid she persuaded family members and friends to accompany her
to work and back. Defendant claimed he was addicted to glue-sniffing and
did not know what he was doing.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to three months
detention.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Conversation with Secretary of Section 1 of the Provincial Court,
Carmen Galapienso Catalayud, on June 19, 1997, in Alicante Provincial
Court.
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A-5 HERRAIZ CASE
May 20, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Arsenio Herraiz Alcazar (18 years-old,
no record) with omission of the duty to render aid (§195(1) CP 1995), and
requested a sentence of six months prison and a fine of 200 pesetas a day
for six months.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled an infraction of mere negligence (§ 621.3 CP 1995),
and requested a fine to be imposed for fifteen to thirty days, or an infrac-
tion of gross negligence (§ 621.1 CP 1995). In both cases, defense re-
quested suspension of driver's license from three months to a year.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
At around 9:30 p.m. on June 22, 1996, the defendant drove his fa-
ther's car on a street m Alcoy He did not notice a pedestrian crossing the
street, and struck her, knocking her down. A passersby came to help the
victim. Defendant noticed the assistance in his rearview mirror, but he fled
the scene.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted as charged. He was sentenced to six months
prison and a fine of 200 pesetas a day for six months.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Conversation with Secretary of Section 2 of the Provincial Court,
Carmen Galapienso Catalayud, on June 19, 1997, in Alicante Provincial
Court.
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ALMERIA PROVINCIAL COURT (AL)
AL-I MORADE CASE
January 28-30, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Issiae Morade (adult, no record) with
homicide and trespass in a dwelling, and asked for fifteen years prison and
damages.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor charged murder with an aggravating circum-
stance that it happened in the victim's home, and asked for eighteen years
of prison.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense asked for acquittal, claiming self-defense and lack of in-
tent to kill.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
On May 16, 1996, defendant climbed up a metal ladder and entered
the family home of David Doru Cosma, where he had lived in February in
exchange for doing domestic chores. When Doru found defendant in his
house a fight erupted and both hit each other. Defendant eventually pulled
out some scissors he was carrying in his bag, and stabbed Doru in the neck.
Dora's jugular vein and carotid artery were damaged. Defendant claimed
that Dorm had seized a large stick and was pursuing him in the house and
hitting him in the head, so that he acted in self-defense. He also claimed
he only intended to injure Doru. After the incident, defendant fled and
hailed a policeman. Defendant informed the policeman of his actions. On
June 9, 1996, Doru died after having undergone surgery.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of trespass and causing the victim's death
without intent to kill. The judge sentenced him to four months for the
trespass, and a fine of 250,000 pesetas and five years for causing injuries
and negligent homicide with use of a dangerous instrument.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Obj. Ver.
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2. Interview with President of Almeria Provincial Court, and PJ, Juan
Ruiz-RIco Rufz-Mor6n, on June 18, 1997, in Almeria Provincial Court.
3. E-mail letter dated March 25, 1997 from jury administrator, Fran-
cisco Hernindez, and conversation with same, on June 18, 1997, in
Almeria Provincial Court.
AL-2 AMADOR/AMADOR CASE
May 14-16, 19-22, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Baldomero Amador Amador (27 years-
old, criminal record) with homicide (§ 407 CP 1973), the infliction of inju-
ries with gross negligence (§§ 565, 420, 421(1) CP 1973), and with illegal
possession of a weapon (§ 254 CP 1973), and requested a sentence of
nineteen years prison and damages of twenty-six million pesetas. The
public prosecutor charged Ram6n Amador Amador (32 years-old, no rec-
ord) with aiding and abetting a homicide (§§ 407, 12(2), 16 CP 1973) and
requested a seven year prison sentence.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal of the homicide and the infliction of
injuries on a theory of accident (§§ 6(b) CP 1973, 5 CP 1995), but admit-
ted guilt to illegal possession of the weapon and requested a sentence of
six months. The defense amended to later deny guilt for the illegal posses-
sion charge.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
In the afternoon of January 28, 1996, the defendants, who are brothers
and Gypsies, met each other in the Discotheque "Templo Anubis" in
Almeria. At some point, defendant Ram6n's son appeared. Ram6n sought
the permission of the co-owner, Jos6 Lara Fuentes, to let his s;on enter the
premises. A bouncer, Joaquin Ortiz GonzAlez, was opposed to the idea and
an argument started. At some point, defendant Baldomero and the co-
owner Lara were outside the bar. Baldomero drew a nine mm. pistol and
fired it m the air. Lara then went at him apparently to try to take the gun
from Baldomero's hands, but another shot was fired entering and exiting
Lara's head, killing him instantly. .Eventually the bullet ended up in the
cheek of the bouncer Ortiz, wounding him.
Baldomero testified that he was upset when Ortiz made derogatory
comments about Gypsies, and that he was pushed out of the discotheque
and surrounded by at least eigzht people. Baldomero claimed lie pulled the
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gun to protect himself, and fired a warning shot to intimidate his attackers.
He testified that when Lara leaped on him, Lara grabbed his wrists and the
gun went off accidentally.
Ram6n testified that he remained in the bar and at the door, but other
witnesses testified that he was next to Baldomero and urged him to "kill
them." Evidence showed that Ram6n had blood and gunshot residue on his
clothing.
Verdict and Sentence
Both defendants were convicted of all charges. Baldomero was sen-
tenced to nineteen years prison and Ram6n to seven years prison. Dam-
ages were assessed in the sum of twenty-six million pesetas.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: P1. Pub. Pros., Pl. Def., Rul.
Just. F., Prot. Tr., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Interview with PJ, Benito Gdlvez Acosta, on June 18, 1997, in
Almeria Provincial Court.
AVILA PROVINCIAL COURT (AV)
AV-1 BARBERO CASE
October 7, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Antonio Barbero Ruiz (adult, 3 priors)
with omission of the duty to render aid (§ 195 (3)(2) CP 1995), and re-
quested one year prison, a fine, and damages of 680,000 pesetas.
Pleadings of Defense
Complete Denial. Acquittal.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
In the morning of January 4, 1996, defendant's Renault sped through
Avila and ran over ninety-one year old Emilio Garcia de Sande, who was
hospitalized for seventy days. The driver sped on, not coming to Garcia's
aid. The prosecutor claimed defendant was the driver, and defendant de-
nied this fact.
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1. Review of Procedural Documents: P1. Pub. Pros., P1. Def., Obj.
Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. CarmonaRuano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106.
BADAJOZ PROVINCIAL COURT (BA)
BA-1 CARRACEDO CASE
May 12-13, 1997
Pleadings of the Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor chraged Diego Carracedo Fernfindez (57 years
old) with murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995).
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal due to self-defense.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
The defendant's son had been addicted to drugs for 14 or 15 years,
and constantly threatened his partents and his sister, with whom he lived,
to get money for drugs. At around 1:00 p.m. on June 21, 1996, the son re-
turned home under the influence of drugs and alcohol and threatened his
parents and sister. His sister called the police, but they were unable to
quell the situation. The parents and daughter left the home, its they often
did. A short time later, the defendant returned home, believing that his son
had gone to purchase drugs with money he had obtained from them. When
the son returned home, he came at his father with a large hanmer, threat-
ening to kill him. The Defendant shot his son three times in self-defense,
killing him.
Verdict and Judgment
The defendant was acquitted.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Judg.
(all partial).
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BARCELONA PROVINCIAL COURT (B)
B-I BEURIBERI CASE
May 29-30, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Miguel Angel Beuriberi Zaga-Edu (29
years-old, one prior) with criminal threats (§ 493(1) CP 1973) and tres-
passing in a dwelling (§ 490 (1,2) CP 1973) or in the alternative §§ 202(1),
202(2) CP 1995). The public prosecutor requested five months detention
for the threats under CP 1973, and one year jail plus a four month fine of
1000 pesetas a day for the burglary under the law of 1995. The aggravat-




Summary ofEvidence at Trial
In June 1992, defendant began living with the victim, Maria Avelina
del Corral Pulido, in her dwelling in Badalona. The victims two grown
daughters also lived there. A few months later, the victim terminated her
relationship with defendant after she discovered his relationship with an-
other woman. Maria asked him to leave. Defendant refused on all occa-
sions to leave the dwelling. On several occasions the victim asked the po-
lice to help her evict defendant.
On December 11, 1995, the "Brigade for the Protection of Victims"
executed a written order of the Supreme Court of Catalonia's prosecutor,
and moved the victim and one daughter to a hotel. The order gave defen-
dant twenty-four hours to leave. The locks to the house were changed. At
this time, letters were found in which defendant threatened the victim with
death and threatened that the house would "fly away" if he was evicted or
he found out she had another lover.
On the same night, defendant returned to the house, broke the door in,
and entered. He remained there until his arrest on December 21, 1995.
Defendant maintained in his testimony that he believed he had a right to
live in the house.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was found guilty of both charges. The jury recommended
both suspension of sentence and clemency. Defendant was sentenced to
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six months jail and a fine of 500 pesetas a day for two months. Clemency
was recommended.
Sources of Information
1. Review of procedural documents: order returning the case for fur-
ther investigation, Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Interview with former President of Barcelona Provincial Court, and
PJ, Gerardo Thomas Andreu, on June 25, 1997, in Barcelona Provincial
Court.
3. Newspaper articles:
1. Blanca Cia, El jurado de un juicio a un hombre negro, exami-
nado sobre racismo, EL PAtS, May 30, 1996, at 30.
2. Carmen Mufioz, El jurado de BCN tuvo que pasar un filtro
antiracista, EL PERIODICO, May 30, 1996, at 28.
3.. Francesc Peir6n, Siete mujeres y dos hombres hacen historia al
juzgar un caso de vzolencia domistica, LA VANGUARDIA, May 30, 1996, at
27.
4. Blanca Cia, El jurado halla culpable a unjoven que invadi6 el
piso de su compafiera, EL PAtS, May 31, 1996, at 29.
5. Francesc Peir6n, La experiencia del juicio con jurado siembra
dudas por sus dilaciones y costes econ6micos, LA VANGUARDIA, June 1,
1996, at 23.
6. Salvador Enguix, Juicio al Jurado, LA VANGUARDIA, June 2,
1996 (La Semana, at 5).
7. Blanca Cia, Todo mds claro y largo, EL PAtS, June 3, -1996, at 32.
8. Justin Webster, Jury trials return to Spain 57 years on,
EUROPEAN, June 6-12, 1996, at 8.
B-2 PONCE CASE
September 16-20, 1996
Pleadings of the Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Rafael Ponce Santos (213 years-old, no
record) with murder (§ 406 CP 1973), and requested a twenty-seven year
prison sentence. The public prosecutor amended to charge murder under
the CP 1995 (§ 138) and lowered imprisonment request to sixteen years.
The public prosecutor requested twenty million pesetas in damages.
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Pleadings of the Private Prosecutors
The pnvate prosecutor representing the victim originally asked for
thirty years, but amended his pleading to that of attempted murder (§§ 138,
16.1 CP 1995), due to the perceived lack of proximate cause, and a pun-
ishment of ten years. The private prosecutor requested fifty million pese-
tas damages.
The private prosecutor representing the taxi company maintained its
pleadings of murder (§ 406 CP 1973), and requested a sentence of thirty
years.
Pleadings of the Defense
The final pleading was for a conviction of'inflicting injuries (§§ 420,
421.1 CP 1973), with mitigating circumstances of legitimate defense,
drunkenness, and heat of passion. Defense also asks for six months and
one day prison.
Summary of the Evidence at Trial
On November 26, 1995, the taxi driven by the victim, Alvaro L6pez
Pereira (27 years-old), slightly collided with a vehicle occupied by four
persons, including the defendant An argument ensued, as a consequence
the defendant went to his house nearby, took a knife, and ended up fatally
stabbing the taxidriver.
Defendant contended that after the accident the taxidriver began in-
sulting and hitting his friend David, the driver. When he went to help his
friend, the victim hit him as well. David helped him up and suggested they
go or the taxidriver would kill them. The taxidriver took their keys out of
the ignition, preventing them from leaving. The taxidriver then radioed for
help from his friends. Defendant claimed he went to call for help when he
saw the victim hurting his girlfriend. Then he went and looked for a knife.
He claimed he only wanted to intimidate the taxidriver, not to kill him. De-
fendant admitted he had drunk alcohol and taken two pills of "ecstasy."
Forensic experts differed as to whether the victim, who died within
ten minutes of the stabbing, could have lived had he immediately been
taken to the hospital. Both the defense and the private prosecution asserted
that the victim would have lived had the city ambulance company and the
taxi company not been negligent in failing to summon help.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury convicted defendant of inflicting injuries, and acquitted him
of murder and homicide. The jury claimed that he acted mildly under the
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influence of alcohol, and he acted in a heat of passion. The jury decided
that death ensued from twenty to thirty minutes after the wound. Defen-
dant was sentenced to four years imprisonment. Appeal denid by TSJ of
Catalufia on December 17, 1996.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Prot.
Ver., Judg., Dec. TSJ.
2. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106.
3. Newspaper Articles
1. Francesc Peir6n & Domingo Marchena, La lentitud y el espec-
tdculo marcan el segundo juiclo con jurado en Barcelona, LA
VANGuARDiA, Sept. 17, 1996, at 23.
2. Carmen Mufioz, El acusado de matar a un taxisra dice ante el
dice ante eljurado que no quiso hacerlo, EL PERI6DICO, Sept. 17, 1996, at
34. 1
3. Francesc Peir6n, Los testigos dicen aljurado que una absurda
pelea de trdfico llev6 a la muerte un taxista, LA VANGUARDIA, Sept. 18,
1996, at 23.
4. Francesc Peir6n, Enfrentamiento entre medicos al explicar ante
eljurado la muerte del taxista, LA VANGUARDIA, Sept. 20, 1996, at 24.
5. Carmen Mufioz, Lafiscalpide unapena menorpor la muerte del
taxista, EL PERIODICO, Sept. 20, 1996, at 26.
6. Blanca Cia, Eljurado dice que el acusado no quiso matar al tax-
ista, EL PAis, Sept. 21, 1996, at 1,7.
7. Francesc Peir6n, El jurado absuelve de asesinato al joven que
mat6 a un taxista y critica el retraso de la ambulancia, LA VANGUARDIA,
Sept. 21, 1996.
8. Francese Peir6n, El jurado se apunta un tanto, LA VANGUARDIA,
Sept. 22, 1996, at 34.
B-3 LLOPIS CASE
Judgment November 18, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged David Llopis Marn (28 years, no rec-
ord) with murder (§ 139.1 CP 1995) with an aggravating factor of excep-
tional cruelty (§ 22.5 CP 1995), and requested eighteen years prison and
twenty million pesetas in damages.
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Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor alleged the aggravating factor of being related
to the victim (§ 23 CP 1995), and asked for twenty years imprisonment and
eighty-one million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense plead homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with a complete excuse
of temporary insanity (§ 20.1 CP 1995) and subsidiary mitigating circum-
stances as fallback positions. The defense asked for acquittal and intern-
ment in a psychiatric facility. In.the alternative, if found guilty, defense
requested five years in prison.
Summary ofEvidence at Trial
The defendant began living with the victim, Esther Garcia Garcia, and
her two children from a previous marriage at the beginning of 1994. In
September 1995, they had a mutual child. In November 1995, the victim
broke off the relationship. Defendant claimed the break-up threw him into
a depression and psychic deterioration, which he had suffered earlier due
to brain injuries m an auto accident in 1989; but, the relationship with the
victim had helped appease his psychic deterioration. He claimed that she
kicked him out after she had spent all his money and began seeing another
man. He acquired a machete with a twenty-one cm blade. On January 3,
1996, defendant waited for Garcia at her house, followed her in, and
stabbed her thirty-one times, killing her. He then attempted to cut his own
throat in the presence of the police.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found defendant guilty of murder with the aggravating cir-
cumstance of being related to the victim. The judge set aside the aggra-
vating circumstance of being related to the victim and sentenced defendant
to sixteen years prison and forty-seven million pesetas in damages. Appeal
denied by TSJ of Catalufia on February 11, 1997.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Judg.,
Dec. TSJ.
2. Interview with PJ, Miguel Angel Gimeno Jubero, on June 25, 1997,
in Barcelona Provincial Court.
3. Carmona Ruano & DePail Velasco, supra note 106.
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B-4 TORT CASE
November 25-26, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Francisco Tort Casas (32 years-old, no
record) with murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995), and requested a sentence of
twenty years prison and forty million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor added the aggravating circumstance of abuse
of confidence (§ 22(6) CP 1995), and asked for a twenty year sentence un-
der CP 1995. In the alternative, the private prosecutor charged §§406(1) &
(4), 9(1), 8(1) CP 1973, and requested a thirty year sentence.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense alleged defendant was guilty of homicide (§ 407 CP
1973) with the mitigating circumstance of mildly diminished capacity (§
9(1) CP 1973), and requested twelve years and one day prison sentence. In
the alternative, the defense alleged substantially diminished capacity (§§
9(1), 8(1) CP 1973), and requested a sentence of six years and one day
prison.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant acquainted himself with fourteen year old Marcos Gra-
nados Ortiz and his sister, Carolina Granados Ortiz (16 years-old), at the
Terrassa Swim Club. In late December 1995, defendant conceived a plan
to kill the entire Granados Ortiz family with the exception of Marcos, and
then to live on the proceeds from their family bar. Marco; agreed to help
the defendant in the plan. On February 8, 1996, Marcos let the defendant
into the family home in Terrassa. Defendant had brought a machete and
some oilcloths with him to package up the bodies. When Carolina came
home, defendant strangled her with his forearm, and then used a belt to
finish her off.
Defendant claimed he had drunk eight beers before the incident which
undermined his ability to understand and control his acts. Evidence was
adduced that defendant suffered from an emotional disturbance that also
diminished his capacity to understand and control his acts.
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Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995) with the ag-
gravating circumstance of abuse of confidence (§ 22(6) CP 1995) and the
mitigating circumstance of mildly diminished capacity (§§ 20(1), 21(6) CP
1995). He was sentenced to fifteen years prison and 12.1 million pesetas
in damages. Affirmed by TSJ of Catalufia on March 10, 1997.
Sources of Information





The public prosecutor charged Fernando Marn Barreras (29 years-
old, no record) with murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995), and requested a prison
sentence of eighteen years and damages of twenty million pesetas.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor added an aggravating circumstance of abuse of
confidence (§ 22(6) CP 1995), and also asked for twenty years prison and
thirty million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal due to temporary insanity (§ 20(1) CP
1995), with a fall-back position of incomplete temporary insanity and the
mitigating factor of heat of passion (§ 21(3) CP 1995).
Summary of Evidence at Trial
In January 1995, the defendant began a romantic relationship with
Pilar Ferrer Navarro. As a result, Pilar and her husband, Joan Casas, initi-
ated divorce proceedings. Defendant and Pilar began living together, and
defendant went to work in her father's restaurant in Barcelona. At the end
of April 1996, the couple split up, and Pilar sought her ex-husband again.
In the afternoon of May 28, 1996, defendant saw Joan Casas talking
to Pilar at the bar in the restaurant, and he felt they were making fun of
him. The prosecution claimed he then took a kitchen knife with a twenty
cm blade and hid it in a lavatory. The defendant then invited Pilar in the
lavatory to confront her. When she told him their relationship was over, he
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grabbed the hidden knife and stabbed her four times in the pectoral region,
killing her.
He then stabbed himself twenty times and fell unconscious and also
nearly died. Defendant testified that he did not hide the knife with the in-
tention of attacking Pilar, but he had forgotten it in the lavatory after fixing
a defective paper towel dispenser with it. A kitchen aide who cleaned the
lavatory regularly testified he had never noticed anything wrong with the
towel dispenser.
The defense produced testimony that defendant suffered from an
emotional disorder caused by the strife between his mother and father and
the early death of a former girlfriend. The defense claimed this disorder
caused him to be temporarily insane at the time of the homicide.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found defendant guilty of murder with the aggravating factor
of abuse of confidence and the mitigating factor of having attempted to
mitigate the damages (§ 21(5) CP 1995). The jury recommended clemency
and a suspension of the sentence. The defendant was sentenced to fifteen
years prison and damages of 18.2 million pesetas with no recommendation
of clemency Affirmed by TSJ of Catalufia on March 18, 1997.
Sources of Information




Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jos6 Medina Garcia (46 years-old,
prior criminal record) with murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995), and requested sev-
enteen years imprisonment and forty million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
Same as public prosecutor, except the private prosecutor requested
twenty years prison and fifty million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal due to temporary insanity from intoxi-
cation (§ 20(2) CP 1995) and uncontrollable fear (§ 20(6) CP 1995). In the
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alternative, the defense pled guilty of homicide, with the mitigating cir-
cumstances of imperfect self-defense (§§ 21(1), 20(4) CP 1995) and heat
of passion (§ 21(3) CP 1995).
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Around midnight on January 6, 1996, defendant went to the Pub L.P.
to look for Antonio Vaca Nieto. Vaca arrived with Digo Siez Chac6n
shortly thereafter. Defendant and Vaca had a brief discussion. Ten or fif-
teen minutes later defendant left, followed by Vaca and Siez. Siez testi-
fied that defendant urged them to follow him, then pulled out a sawed-off
shotgun. Defendant fired at Vaca, hitting him in the face and the body,
killing him. Defendant fled and hid the weapon.
Defendant testified that he was drunk and the victim told him he had a
gun. Defendant reportedly heard a gunshot and was overcome by an un-
controllable fear that his life was in danger. As a result, defendant pulled
out his sawed-off shotgun and his finger touched the trigger without him
knowing it was pointed at the victim.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of murder with the mitigating circumstance
of mildly diminished capacity due to alcohol consumption. Defendant was
sentenced to sixteen years in prison and 24.2 million pesetas in damages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: R. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Judg.
B-7. SOLYVERT DEL VALLE CASE
February 17-18, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Norys Solyvert del Valle Rodriguez
with trespassing in a dwelling (§§ 490(1,2), 69 CP 1995).
Pleadings of Defense
Acquittal.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
In August 1995, the defendant came to Spain from Cuba with her
husband. She left him after fifteen days, allegedly because he forced her to
work as a prostitute. In early February 1996, defendant was homeless, so
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Eduardo Nogueira Puente offered to let her stay in his dwelling. A month
later, she moved in after Nogueira had separated from his wife. Nogueira
testified that the condition of her moving in was that she would do house-
work. Defendant did not do the housework, so he asked her to leave. She
refused and threatened hun with a knife, then cut her own wrists. In March
1996, the police evicted her. In early April 1996, fifty-one year old Ram6n
Vilasis Guiteras let her stay in his home. When defendant and Vilasis had
a falling out due to her refusal to work, he asked her to leave. She again
refused. Vilasis claimed she put sangre de regla in his food to drug him.
In late April, the police evicted her.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was acquitted. Judgment affirmed in the TSJ of Catalufta
on June 2, 1997.
Sources of Information




Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jos6 Maria G6mez L6pez (21 years-
old, two prior convictions) with murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995) with the ag-
gravating circumstance of abuse of confidence (§ 22(6) CP 1995), and re-
quested twenty years imprisonment and damages of twenty million pesetas.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor charged defendant with murder (§ 406(4) CP
1973) with the aggravating factors of recidivism and abuse of confidence
(§§ 10(15), 10(9) CP 1973), and requested thirty years imprisonment and
forty million pesetas in damages. In the alternative, the request was twenty
years if CP 1995 were applied.
Pleadings of Defense
Defendant pled guilty to assisting a suicide (§ 143(3) CP 1995) with a
mitigating circumstance of heat of passion or annulment of his mental ca-
pacities due to a traumatic occurrence (§ 21(3) CP 1995), and requested a
sentence of three years imprisonment.
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Summary of Evidence at Trial
In 1994, defendant met the victim, Gemma Agudo (17 years-old),
when he was working as a peddler at fairs. They had a relationship of
which the victim's parents did not approve. In February 1996, defendant
sent a letter purportedly from the victim to the victim's parents. He forged
her signature on the letter which otherwise indicated their intent to commit
suicide together. Defendant then strangled the victim in their attic. He
placed bottles of pills near her body and then went out to a bar and ate a
sandwich. After eating, he made a call requesting help, claiming a girl was
dead and a young man was nearly dead in the attic. He then returned to the
attic and feigned as if he were dying.
Defendant claimed he and the victim had intended a double suicide.
Initially, they were supposed to stab each other, but the victim balked and
took the pills instead. However, forensic experts testified that the victim
died of strangulation and that defendant had no trace of any medicine in
his system. Defendant testified that he was being framed by the investiga-
tive judges and by the doctors.
Defendant claimed that he and the victim planned mutual suicide be-
cause the victim's parents wouldn't let them live together. The prosecu-
tion claimed the victim had threatened to leave defendant, so he had con-
cocted the mutual suicide story.
Verdict and Judgment
Defendant was convicted of murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995). He was
sentenced to sixteen years imprisonment and eleven million pesetas in
damages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Rul. Just F., Obj. Ver., Judg.
2. Newspaper Articles
1. Francesc Peir6n, Amor tajante, LAVANGUARDIA, Apr. 15, 1997.
2. Ines Martnez Ribas, Juicio a unjoven por asesinar a su novia y
simular un suicidio, EL PERIODICO, Apr. 15, 1997.
3. E.N.C., El crimen delfalso Romeo, EL CORREO, Apr. 15, 1997.
4. El acusado de matar a su novia llam6 por telfono para salvarse
de su supuesto suicidio, LA VANGUARDIA, Apr. 16, 1997.
5. El jurado condena por asesinato al "Romeo" de Terrassa, LA
VANGUARDIA, Apr. 18, 1997.
6. El 'Romeo de Tarrasa' condenado a 16 aflos de cdrcelpor matar
a su novia, EL CORREO, Apr. 30, 1997.
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7 LaAudiencia impone 16 aifos deprisi6n aljoven de Terrassa que
mat6 a su novia, LA VANGUARDIA, Apr. 30, 1997.
B-9 RODRfGUEZ/MAYOR CASE
Judgment April 28, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Mario Rodriguez Salmer6n (adult,
with criminal record) and Andr6s Mayor Mir (adult, no criminal record)
with homicide (§ 138 CP 1995), and requested a sentence of eleven years
prison and fifty million pesetas in damages against both.
Pleadings of Defense
Acquittal.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
The prosecution's evidence showed that defendants met with Pilar
Pag6s and the victim, Antonio Lobo P6rez, at Plaza Bosca in Barcelona.
Rodriguez allegedly pushed Pag6s and Lobo came to her defense hitting
Rodriguez. The defendants left and returned, Mayor canying a knife.
Mayor gave the knife to Rodriguez. The defendants lured Lobo away from
the others on the Plaza, and Rodriguez stabbed him in the neck. Lobo died
two days later.
Defendants testified that they were not responsible for the attack.
Rodriguez adduced evidence that he was addicted to drugs and maintained
that this affected his responsibility
Verdict and Sentence
The prosecutor dismissed charges against Mayor at the conclusion of
the evidence. The jury acquitted Rodriguez.
Sources of Information




The public prosecutor charged Luis Miguel Ugal Montero (35 years-
old, 4 prior convictions) with murder (§ 406(5) CP 1973) with the aggra-
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vating circumstances of treachery and recidivism (§§ 10(1) & (15) CP
1973) and the mitigating factor of partial diminished capacity (§§ 9(10),
9(1),8(1) CP 1973), The prosecutor requested a thirty year prison sentence
and fifteen million pesetas in damages. The prosecutor also charged
Raimundo Martinez Montero (48 years-old, 9 prior convictions) with the
same charges on a theory of complicity and asked for twenty-seven years
prison.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal. In the alternative, defense pled guilty
of murder with the aggravating circumstance of recidivism and the miti-
gating circumstance of temporary diminished capacity (§§ 9(l), 8(1) CP
1973). Both defendants requested on the murder pleading a sentence of six
years and one day of prison.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
On the morning of May 14, 1996, the defendants and Francisco Lac-
era Rodriguez were drinking together in a bar. They left and visited some
other bars in Ugal's van. Along the way, defendants and Lacera got into
an argument. Lacera ran from the defendants who chased him in the van.
Ugal caught him and hit him several times. Lacera escaped again and
climbed to an overlook. Ugal drove to the access point to the overlook and
climbed the stairs to where Lacera was standing. Martinez allegedly stood
watch by the car.
Ugal caught Lacera and beat him with a "gypsy club" in various parts
of his body. He then stabbed Lacera twenty-nine times with a knife in the
head, neck, thorax and abdomen, killing him.
Verdict and Judgment
Ugal was convicted of murder with the aggravating factor of recidi-
vism, and was sentenced to twenty-seven years prison. Martinez was con-
victed of homicide (§ 406 CP 1973) and was sentenced to fourteen years
and eight months. Twelve million pesetas in damages were imposed.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Prot.
Ver., Judg.
1998]
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
B-1I DA SILVA CASE
May 7-8, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Margarita da Silva Cardoso Marqu6s
Lousada (33 years-old, no record) with homicide (§138 CP 1995) with a
mitigating circumstance of imperfect self-defense (§§ 21(1), 20(4) CP
1995), and requested a sentence of five years prison and five million pese-
tas in damages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal based on accident or, in the alternative,
perfect self-defense.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
The defendant lived with the victim, Rafael Gonzfilez Alarc6n, for
four years. According to the testimony of the defendant, GonzAlez was a
cocaine addict and subjected her to physical and mental maltreatment.
On September 11, 1996, defendant and victim had an argument. Gon-
zAlez struck defendant with his fists and feet. Later in the day, GonzAlez
tried to hit defendant with an iron bar, and then pulled a butterfly knife,
cutting her lightly on the left forearm and in the back. They struggled and
the GonzAlez dropped the knife.
Defendant picked up the knife and stabbed him once in the abdomen,
resulting in his death.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was acquitted on a theory of self-defense.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Judg.
2. Conversation with President of Barcelona Provincial Court, and PJ,
Francisco Javier B6jar Garcia, on June 25, 1997, in Barcelona Provincial
Court.
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B-12 PEREZ CASE
May 12-14, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Manuel Pdrez Segura (38 years-old, no
record) with homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with the aggravating factors of
abuse of superiority and being related to the victim (§§ 22(2), 23 CP 1995)
and the mitigating circumstance of spontaneous remorse (§21(4) CP 1995).
The public prosecutor requested a fifteen year prison term and damages of
eighteen million pesetas.
Pleadings of Defense
Defendant admitted homicide, but alleged complete excuse of tempo-
rary insanity (§§ 20(1) & (2) CP 1995) and spontaneous remorse. The de-
fense asked for acquittal, or in the alternative, a one month and one day jail
term.
Summary ofEvidence at Trial
Defendant lived with his sixty-eight year old mother, Dolores Segura
Melero. At 3:00 a.m., defendant went to his mother's room and stabbed
her up to twenty-five times in the head, neck, thorax and abdomen. She
died of the wounds.
The prosecution alleged he had demanded money from her to go out
to a bar and she had refused. After he had killed her, defendant ransacked
her bedroom unsuccessfully in search of money.
Defendant denied requesting money, and alleged he was temporarily
insane due to ingestion of alcohol and cocaine, coupled with his antisocial
personality which derived from having undergone brain surgery as a youth.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of homicide with the aggravating circum-
stances of abuse of authority and being related to the victim and the miti-
gating circumstance of spontaneous remorse. Defendant was sentenced to
fifteen years prison and eighteen million pesetas in damages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Prot.
Ver., Judg.
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B-13 ORTEGA CASE
May 20-23, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Domingo Ortega Pdrez (54 years-old,
criminal record) with homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with the aggravating cir-
cumstance of being related to the victim (§ 23 CP 1995), and requested
fifteen years prison and damages of fifteen million pesetas.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor charged defendant with murder (§ 406(1) CP
1973) with the aggravating circumstances of excessive cruelty and abuse of
superiority (§§ 10(5,8) CP 1973), and requested a thirty year prison sen-
tence and 100 million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense plead guilty to homicide (§ 407 CP 1973) with the in-
complete excuse of heat of passion and trauma (§§ 9(8), 8(1), 9(1) CP
1973) and the mitigating circumstance of spontaneous remorse (§9(9) CP
1973), and requested a punishment of four years, two months and one day
of prison and fifteen million pesetas in damages.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
The defendant stabbed his wife, Maria Angeles Campoy Candelas, to
death in a bar he owned in Barcelona. This occurred after an argument.
He stabbed her seven times in the front part of the thorax and in the back.
Defendant claimed he was enraged that three young men had come to
the bar to sell drugs to his wife, and his capacity to formulate the intent to
kill was diminished by alcohol ingestion.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of causing victim's death, but without intent
to kill. He was sentenced for a negligent crime resulting in death (§ 565
CP 1995) to six years m prison and thirty-six million pesetas in damages.
Reversed by TSJ of Catalufia on July 28, 1997.
Sources of Information
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1. Francesc Pezr6n, Unjuez critica que unjurado condene por im-
prudencia al hombre que mat6 a su esposa, LA VANGUARDIA, May 31,
1997.
2. Pere Rios, Unjuez critica el veredicto de unjurado que s6lo con-
sider6 imprudencia matar a una mujer a pufialadas, EL PALS, May 31,
1997.
3. El TSJC anula otro juicio con jurado por emitir un veredicto
contradictorio, LA VANGUARDIA, July 29, 1997.
B-14 MATA/BLAZQUEZ CASE
May 26-June 3, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Juan Manuel Mata Exposito (22 years,
no record) with attempted homicide (§§ 407, 3,51 CP 1973), and requested
six years prison. The defense expressed its conformidad (agreement) with
the pleadings, so the public prosecutor modified its other charges to inflic-
tion of injuries (§§ 420, 420(1) CP 1973). The public prosecutor charged
Jos6 Blizquez Cruz (21 years, no record) with murder (§ 406(1) CP 1973
and infliction of injuries (§§ 420, 421(1) CP 1973), and requested a sen-
tence of twenty-seven years prison and forty million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor charged Blizquez with murder (§ 139(1,2),
140, CP 1995) with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superiority (§
22(2) CP 1995), and requested a sentence of thirty years prison and forty-
five million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal in that Bldzquez was not the perpetra-
tor. In the alternative, defense pled for participation in a fight (§ 154 CP
1995) and requested a nine month prison sentence.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
The defendant Mata met Francisco Gabriel Cafladas Maroto and
Manuel and Jos6 Antonio Dominguez Rodriguez in the Bar 'Thoenix."
They left the bar and went drinking elsewhere, returning the next morning.
When they returned, Cafiadas' auto had been hoisted and all four wheels
stolen.
Mata entered the bar and attacked the bouncer, Gabriel Sdnchez Cas-
tillo, with a butterfly knife and stabbed him in the chest. Mata then pur-
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sued Sinchez to another bar. When repelled at that bar, he returned to the
bar "Phoenix" and attacked the owner, Francisco Pardo Marti, with the
knife, wounding him in the back.
Thereafter, defendant Bldzquez, who worked in the bar "Phoenix" as
a protector, stabbed Mata with a knife in the back. Bldzquez later attacked
Cafiadas first with his fists, and then with a knife he had in his trousers. A
friend of Bldzquez stopped the attack and disarmed him, but Blfzquez later
grabbed the knife, chased Cafiadas down the street, and finished him off,
raising his arms m a victory gesture.
BlAzquez denied inflicting the mortal wounds and also claimed self-
defense.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury acquitted Blizquez of all charges.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Prot.
Ver., Judg.
BILBAO PROVINCIAL COURT (BI)
BI-1 TELLECHEA CASE
April 7-11, 14-15, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jos6 Ignacio Tellechea Arias ,(44
years-old, 6 priors) with homicide (§ 407 CP 1973), and requested thirteen
years prison and eight million pesetas m damages. The prosecutor later
amended to allege the aggravating circumstance of recidivism (§ 10(15) CP
1973) and requested a fifteen year sentence.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for accjuittal based on self defense and insuperable
fear (§ 8(4) & (10) CP 1973). The defense also alleged partial excuse
factors plus the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to kill and of
spontaneous remorse (§ 9(4) & (9) CP 1973).
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant provided Antonio Romero Moriano some cocaine for
15,000 pesetas in the Harlem Bar where Antonio worked as a waiter.
When defendant returned to the bar, Antonio demanded the money back,
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claiming the cocaine was bad. Defendant did not agree. Antonio took out
a baseball bat and threatened to kill defendant after he got off work if the
money was not repaid. Antonio's girlfriend, Maria Jess Ulloa Valcrcel
(36 years-old), also threatened defendant with a "butterfly knife."
Defendant left the bar, purchased a knife, and returned to the bar with
Jos6 Antonio Montes Garachana, who was to act as mediator. When de-
fendant was seated at a table in the bar, Antonio grabbed the baseball bat
in one hand and a bottle in the other and told Maria Ulloa to "stick him."
Maria approached, so defendant drew his knife with a twenty cm. long
blade and stabbed her in the stomach, causing her immediate death.
Defendant claimed he was in fear of Maria, who was threatening him
with a "butterfly knife." Eyewitnesses testified she did not have the knife
when she was stabbed. No knife was found on her body. Defendant fur-
ther claimed he did not intend to kill her and was acting in self-defense. At
trial Antonio testified that both he and Maria were under the influence of
heroin at the time of the offense.
Verdict and Judgment
Defendant was convicted of negligent homicide (§§ 565, 407 CP
1973) with the aggravating circumstance of recidivism and the mitigating
circumstance of spontaneous remorse. He was sentenced to six years im-
prisonment and eight million pesetas in damages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: P1. Publ. Pros., P1. Def., Obj.
Ver., Judg., Appellate Briefs of Publ. Pros., Def.
2. Telephone conversation with the PJ, Jos6 Maria Lid6n Corbi, on
June 4, 1997.
3. Newspaper Articles
1. Javier Mufioz, Una sola puhalada y la mato, caramba!, EL
CORREO, Apr. 8, 1997.
2. Javier Mufioz, Un 'chino' antes de morr, EL CORREO, Apr. 9,
1997.
3. Javier Mufioz, El alegato de Tellechea, EL CORREO, Apr. 12,
1997.
4. J. Guillenea, Eljurado declara culpable de homicidio al hombre
que mat6 a una mujer en el barrio chino de .Bilbao, EL CORREO, Apr. 16,
1997.
5. Eljuez condena a Tellechea a seis aflos como autor de un homi-
cidio imprudente, EL CORREO, Apr. 27 1997.
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BI-2 LEGARRETA CASE
May 12-13, 1997
Pleadings of the Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Asensio Legarreta Muruaga (82 years-
old, no record) with murder (§ 139 (1) CP 1995) with the aggravating cir-
cumstance of being related to the victim (§ 23 CP 1995) and mitigating
factor of complete excuse of insanity (§ 20(1) CP 1995). The prosecutor
requested internment in a psychiatric facility for no longer than nineteen
years and two million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled in conformance with prosecutor's pleadings, except
the defense denied the aggravating circumstance of being related to the
victim. The defense further requested a dismissal and requested placing
defendant in his family's custody to undergo psychiatric treatment as a se-
curity measure.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
At his farmhouse, defendant knocked his brother down with a stake
and then bashed his head m with a spade. He and his brother had lived to-
gether in seclusion for 30 years without problems. The victim had helped
the defendant get psychiatric treatment for what experts claimed was a de-
lirious psychotic disorder manifested in paranoid delusions that his brother
and neighbors were making up stories about him. Defendant then decapi-
tated his brother and chopped up his body into nine pieces before putting
the pieces into a fruit crate. He testified he was "fed up" with his brother.
Verdict and Sentence
After the testimony, the public prosecutor and the defense reached a
conformidad and the jury was dissolved. By agreement, defendant was not
guilty by reason of insanity. The judge ordered him into the family cus-
tody for four years, during which time he must undergo psychiatric treat-
ment.
Sources ofInformation
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Publ. Pr., Pl. Def., Judg.
2. Newspaper Articles
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1. J.M, .Un jurado popular juzga a un hombre que mat6 a su her-
mano y lo descuartiz6 en un casero de Mungia, EL CORREo, May 13,
1997.
2. Un juez de Bilbao pide que se eviten vistas con jurado 'sin con-
tenido', EL CoRREo, May 23, 1997.
BURGOS PROVINCIAL COURT (BL)
BU-1 VIVAR CASE
March 4-6, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Prudente Vivar Prez (75 year-old, no
record) with one count of parricide (§ 405 CP 1973) and one count of mur-
der by treachery (§ 406(1) CP 1973), and requested a sentence of fifty-two
years prison and thirty million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
Same as public prosecutor, except private prosecutor also charged
murder with premeditation (§ 10(6) CP 1973). The private prosecutor also
requested fifty-eight years prison and forty-four million pesetas in dam-
ages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal based on temporary insanity due to
mental disturbance (§ 8(1) CP 1973). The defense admitted four million
pesetas in damages.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant was mared to his wife Leonor Martfnez Rubio (75 years-
old) for fifty years. In 1988, his wife's blind brother, Nicanor Martinez
Rubio, came to live with them in their house in Burgos. The relationship
between defendant and his wife deteriorated. In 1995 and 1996, Leonor
complained several times to the police that defendant was beating her. De-
fendant blamed all his problems on Nicanor and suspected Nicanor and his
wife of plotting against him. His wife devoted all her energies to her
brother and had not spoken to defendant in eighteen months.
In April 1996, defendant secretly taped a conversation between his
wife and Nicanor in which he discovered she was trying to gain ownership
of another house they owned. His wife had also begun divorce proceed-
ings against him. Two weeks later, defendant decided to kill both of them
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and himself. Defendant, a carpenter, went to his workshop and returned to
his wife's bedroom with a small hammer. He hit her repeatedly in the head
with intent to kill her. He then went to the bedroom of the eighty-three
year old Nicanor and hit him repeatedly until he lost the hammer. The de-
fendant then retrieved a carpenter's claw hammer. Upon returning to Ni-
canor's room to finish hun off, defendant found his bleeding wife, whom
he again repeatedly struck with the claw hammer until she was dead. He
killed Nicanor and then took a host of pills and wrote a suicide note on the
front-page of the local newspaper. He turned on the gas, blocked the doors
with towels, and passed out. But, defendant awakened the next day.
Defendant testified the idea to kill them arose suddenly and was not
premeditated.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted as charged and sentenced to twenty-seven
years prison and twenty million pesetas in damages. His appeal to reduce
the amount of civil damages was rejected by the TSJ of Castilla y Le6n on
may 23, 1997.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: P1. Pub. Pros., PA. Pvt. Pros., P1.
Def., Obj. Ver., Judg., Dec. TSJ.
2. Interviews with President of Burgos Provincial Court and PJ, Juan
Sancho Fraile, and Pub. Pros., Fernando Mena, on June 4, 1997, in Burgos
Provincial Court.
3. Newspaper Articles
1. Belen Delgado, Prudente Vivar afirma que mat6 a su mujer y a
su cuflado porque le tenian abandonado, DIARIO DE BURGOS, Mar. 5,
1997, at 7.
2. Belen Delgado, Los psiquiatras y los mddicos forenses constatan
que Prudente Vivar no estd loco, DIARIO DE BURGOS, Mar. 6, 1997, at 7.
3. Belen Delgado, El primer jurado popular declara culpable de
parricdio y asesmato a Prudente Vivar Pirez, DIARIO DE BURGOS, Mar.
7, 1997, at 5.
4. Belen Delgado, Prudente Vivar pide que se rebaje la indemni-
zaci6n por matar a.su esposa, DIARTO DE BURGOS, May 20, 1997, at 7.
5. Belen Delgado, La Sala de lo Penal del TSJ rechaza el recurso
de Prudente Vivar, DIARIO DE BURGOS, May 28, 1997, at 6.
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CASTELLON PROVINCIAL COURT (CS)
CS-1 TRILLO CASE
November 18-20, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jos6 Trillo Muro (41 years-old, no re-
cord) with homicide (§ 407 CP 1973). The prosecutor requested thirteen
years imprisonment and fifteen million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
Same as public prosecutor, except the private prosecutor asked for
seventeen years and six months prison and 40 million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Defense
Defendant requests acquittal due to complete justification of self de-
fense (§ 20(4) CP 1995). At trial, pleadings modified to homicide (§407
CP 1973) with the imperfect self-defense (§§ 8(4), 9(1), 66 CP 1973) and
six months and one day prison term requested.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
The defendant's estranged wife, Juana Lumbreras Fernindez, called
defendant to arrange a meeting to discuss their court date regarding their
separation. The victim, Miguel Garrido Sinchez (32 years-old),was a
close friend and neighbor of defendant with whom he had business deal-
ings. Gar:ido was with Juana when she called defendant: Garrido took the
telephone, and called defendant, various derogatory names. Defendant re-
fused the meeting, but later agreed when Juana said they would be alone.
Defendant met Juana at the Pub "Klip" in Vila-Real at about midnight
and they discussed their problems. The victim entered and insulted defen-
dant. The argument led to their ejection from the pub. As defendant left
the club, he was knocked nearly unconscious and believed that the victim
had done this. Later the victim came out into the street wielding some
nunchaku sticks. Defendant pulled out a knife with a 9.5 cm blade to de-
fend himself. The victim hit defendant several times in the arms with the
nunchakus. Defendant testified that the victim lunged at him with the nun-
chakus, and he held the knife out motionless in self-defense. The knife
impaled the victim in the heart, killing him instantly. A neighbor, who saw
the fight from his window, testified that defendant lunged at the victim
when victim's arms were raised.
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Defendant wiped the knife off on the victim's shoulder, threw it under
a car, but was preventing from walking away by a group of boys. He was
thereafter arrested.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant found guilty of homicide (§ 406 CP 1973) and was sen-
tenced to twelve years and six months prison and twenty-five million pe-
setas in damages. The sentence was overturned by the TSJ of Valencia on
Mar. 11, 1997. Defendant was retried on June 3-4, 1997, and acquitted.
See CS-1*, infra.
Sources of Information
1. Review of procedural documents: P1. Pub. Pros., Pl. Pvt. Pros., P1.
Def., Jur. Sel. Prot., Rul. Just. F., Prot. Tr., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.,
Notices of Appeal of Pub. Pros., Pvt. Pros., Def., Dec. TSJ.
2. Conversation with President of Castell6n Provincial Court, and PJ,
Fernando Tintor6 Loscos, Pub. Pros., Antonio Gastaldi Mateo, and Pvt.
Pros., Eugenio Ponz Nomdedeu, on June 20, 1997, in Castell6n Provincial
Court.
3. Newspaper Articles
1. Angeles Durin, Los jueces admiten la objeci6n de conciencia
para no serjurado, EL PAlS, Nov. 16, 1996, at 25.
2. Vicente Cornelles, El juez acepta las excusas para negarse a ser
jurado, MEDITERRANEO, Nov 16, 1996, at 14.
3. Angeles Durdn, Seis hombres y tres mujeres, primer jurado de
Castell6n en un caso de homtczdio, EL PAlS COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA,
Nov. 19, 1996, at 1,6.'
4. Isabel Fernandez, El jurado se estren6 ayer al juzgar a Jose
Trillo, el homiczda de Vila-real, MEDITERRANEO, Nov. 19, 1996, at 11.
5. Isabel Fernndez, Cerca de dos millones costard a la administra-
ci6n estejuicio popular, MEDITERRANEO, Nov. 20, 1996, at 14.
6. Angeles Dur n, El jurado centra en la venganza el m6vil del
homicidiojuzgado en Castell6n, EL PAS COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA, Nov.
20,1996, at 6.
7. Angeles DurAn, Eljurado declara culpable al acusado de matar
a un hombre en Vila-real, EL PAS COMUNIDAD VALENClANA, Nov.
21,1996, at 1.
8. Isabel Ferninde, El jurdo declar6 culpable a Trillo en cinco ho-
ras, MEDITERRANEO, Nov. 21,1996, at 11.
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9. Vicente Cornelles, Eljurado popular condena a doce afios a Josd
Trillo, MEDITERRANEO, Nov. 27, 1996, at 10.
10. Angeles Durfin, Pena de 12 afios de cdrcel para el condenado
par eljurado en Castellrn, EL PAlS COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA, Nov. 27,
1996, at 7.
11. Sara Velert, Anulado un juicio par una consulta del jurado al
juez en la deliberacirn, EL PAS, Mar. 12, 1997, at 22.
CS-2 CARMONA CASE
November 25, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Juan-Antonio Carmona Carmona (40
years-old, no record) with homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with the incomplete
excuse of mental retardation (§§ 21(1), 20(3) CP 1995), and requested six
years prison and fourteen million pesetas in damages..
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor charged homicide, and asked for fourteen
years imprisonment and restitution of eighteen million pesetas.
Pleadings ofDefense
The defense pled for acquittal by reason of insanity.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
In the night of June 24-25, 1996, defendant was celebrating his
mother's birthday and that of his cousin, Juan Carmona Bautista (29 years-
old), in an abandoned house in which the three lived. Defendant was born
deaf and dumb like his mother, and was mentally retarded as a result of
living in poverty and being without special education. Defendant got
drunk and had an argument with Juan about a bicycle. Defendant then
went out and drank some more. He came back with a blood alcohol con-
tent of between 22.7 and 24.7 per cent and woke up his cousin, making
primitive noises and wildly gesticulating. Defendant asked his cousin for a
cigarette. When Juan refused they fought with their hands; whereupon, de-
fendant grabbed a butcher knife. Juan disarmed the defendant with the aid
of a hatchet. The fight stopped and they decided to visit their grandmother.
But, defendant took a huge kitchen knife and stabbed Juan in the stomach.
He died a few minutes later.
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Verdict and Sentence
After selection of a jury, the public prosecutor, private prosecutor,
and defense agreed to a conformidad whereby defendant admitted the
charge pled by the public prosecutor - homicide with the partial excuse of
mental retardation - and was sentenced to six years in a psychiatric insti-
tution with restitution of fourteen million pesetas. The jury was dis-
charged.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Judg.
2. Newspaper Articles
1. Vicente Comelles, El jurado no intervino en el segundojuicio en
Castell6n con este nuevo prodedimiento, MEDITERRANEO, Nov. 26, 1996,
at 10.
2. Angeles DurAn, El acuerdo entre las partes evita la segunda
condena popular en Castell6n, EL PAlS COMMUNIDAD VALENCIANA, Nov.
26, 1996, at 6.
CS-I* TRILLO CASE-RETRIAL
June 3-4, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
Same as in CS-1.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
Same as in CS-I.
Pleadings of Defense
Same as in CS-1.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Similar to CS-1.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found defendant not guilty due to self-defense. He was ac-
quitted.
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Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Publ. Pros., Pl. Pvt. Pros., Pl.
Def., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg., Appellate Brief of Pvt. Pros. (June 19.
1997).
2. Interviews with Pub. Pros, Antonio Gastaldi Mateo, and Pvt. Pros,
Eugenio Ponz Nomdedeu, on June 20, 1997, in Castell6n Provincial Court.
3. Newspaper Articles
1. La viuda de Garrido dice que elpresunto homicida de Vila-real
tram6 su asesinato, CASTELLON DIARIO, June 4, 1997, at 5.
2. La viuda de Garrido afirma que Trillo queria pagar a un
'mat6n'. MEDITERRANEO, June 4, 1997.
3. El jurado considera a Trillo culpable de la muerte de un amigo
en Vila-Real, CASTELL6N DIARIO, June 6, 1997, at 9.
4. Sandra Romero, Eljurado declara otra vez a Trillo culpable del
crimen de Vila-Real, MEDrrERRANEo, June 6, 1997, at 11.
5. Liria Erviti, Eljurado considera a Josd T. culpable de la muerte
de un vecino de Vila-Real, LEVANTE, June 6, 1997, at 5.
6. Sandra Romero, Trillo sabrd el limes si va de nuevo a prisidn,
MEDITERRANEO, June 7, 1997
7. Sandra Romero, Trillo abandona la cdrcel y disfruta de su liber-
tad, MED1TERRANEO, June 8, 1997.
8. Liria Erviti, Absuelven al vecino de Vila-Real quefue condenado
por elprimerjurado a 12 affos, LEVANTE, June 8, 1997, at 5.
9. Liria Erviti, La sentencia cuestionar, una vez mds, la aplicacidn
de la Ley del Jurado, LEVANTE, June 8, 1997, at 5.
10. Un posible quebrantamiento de forma permitiria recurrir el
fallo deljurado, LEvANTE, June 9, 1997, at 3.
11. Sandra Romero, Trillo: 'Han hecho justicia, MEDITERRAEO,
June 9, 1997, at 7.
12. Angeles Durdn, La acusacidn pide al TJ otra repeticidn del
primer juicio porjurado de Castell6n, EL PAlS COMUNIDAD VALENCIANA,
June 20, 1997, at 8.
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C6RDOBA PROVINCIAL COURT (CO)
CO-1 G6MEZ CASE
July 8-11, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
Originally, the public prosecutor charged Rafael G6mez Servifin (19
years-old, no record) with parricide (§ 405 CP 1973), but later amended
the charge to homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with the mixed aggravating factor
of being related to the yictim (§ 23 CP 1995). The public prosecutor re-
quested twenty-four years prison and fifteen million pesetas in damages
but then amended his request to thirteen years prison under CP 1995.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled guilty to negligent homicide (§ 142 CP 1995) for a 2
year prison sentence. In the alternative, the defense pled homicide with the
complete excuse of teniporary insanity related to his impulsive character
disorder and the provocation of the incident (§ 20(1) CP 1995), and asked
for an acquittal; or, again m the alternative, defendant pled for a related in-
complete excuse (§ 21(1) CP 1995) and a sentence of six years or the miti-
gating circumstance of heat of passion and a sentence of 10 years. Finally,
defendant also pled alternatively for homicide with the mixed aggravat-
ing/mitigating circumstance of being related to the victim, and a sentence
of six years. Damages were requested in the event of a conviction for one
million pesetas.
Summary of the Evidence at Trial
The victim, defendant's father, was a chronic alcoholic, who suffered
from pancreatitis and a damaged eardrum, and had not worked for years.
Defendant and his father had fought for years. When defendant was a
young child, his father would beat him, his sisters and his mother and lock
them out of the house. The mother worked to support the family.
There was evidence that defendant did not respect his father. Defen-
dant had been seeing psychologists for fifteen years due to an impulsive-
aggressive character disorder. He had been addicted to drugs and was ex-
pelled from school for fighting. Defendant, his child, and the child's
mother lived in his parent's house.
Several eyewitnesses testified that defendant and his father started an
argument in the family home. The victim was drunk. The defendant took
a knife from the kitchen, but he was disarmed before he could attack his
father. The father threatened to turn the defendant in, and defendant alleg-
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edly threatened to kill him if he tried. Verbal taunts and insults were ex-
changed. Then, defendant retrieved another knife and stabbed his father
once m the chest, who died shortly thereafter.
The eyewitnesses told investigators that they saw defendant come at
his father on the couch with the knife in his fist. At trial, the eyewitnesses
testified they could not see the knife. Defendant claimed amnesia for most
of the events, but claimed the knife was in his sleeve and that he acciden-
tally stabbed his father.
Psychiatrists and forensic experts testified that defendant suffered
from an impulsive character disorder, but was not insane when he com-
mitted the offense.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted as charged of homicide with an aggravating
factor of having been related to the victim. Defendant was sentenced to
twelve years and six months imprisonment and damages of one million pe-
setas. The aggravating factor of relation to the victim was set aside on ap-
peal by TSJ of Andalucia on November 11, 1996, but no modification of
sentence was made.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Dec. TSJ.
2. The author observed the entirety of the evidentiary portion of the
trial, including closing arguments and instructions on July 8-10, 1996.
3. Conversation with the President of C6rdoba Provincial Court and
PJ, Diego Palacios Luque, Pub. Pros., Jesus Barnab6 Aparicio, and Def.,
Anna Tamayo Urefia, on June 10, 1996, in C6rdoba Provincial Court.
Telephone conversations with Pub. Pros., Def., and PJ, on June 12, 1996.
4. Newspaper Articles
1. La Audiencia de Cdrdoba celebra hoy su primer juicio con ju-
radoy elsegundo deAndalucia, DIARIO C6RDOBA, July 8, 1996, at 41.
2. Manuel Guerrero, El dificil entorno del parricida de las Moreras
centra elprimerjuicio con jurado en Cdrdoba, DIARIO CORDOBA, July 9,
1996, at 1, 3.
3. Manuel Guerrero, Los forenses descartan el accidente como
causa del crimen de las Moreras, DIARIO CORDOBA, July 10, 1996, at 5.
4. Manuel Guerrero, El fiscal aplica el nuevo Cddigo Penal y pide
13 afios de cdrcel para el parricida de Las Moreras, DIARIO C6RDOBA,
July 11, 1996, at 4.
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5. Manuel Guerrero, El primer jurado culpa undnimemente al
acusado delparricidio de Las Moreras, DIARIO C6RDOBA, July 12, 1996,
at 1,3.
6. Primera revisi6n en Espafia de la sentencia de un jurado popu-
lar, EL PAlS, Dec. 12, 1996, at. 27
GIRONA PROVINCIAL COURT (GI)
GI-1 GONZALEZ CASE
Oct. 22, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Mariano Gonzilez Sdnchez (32 years-
old, no record) with homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) and alleged the partial ex-
cuse of insanity (§§ 22(1), 20(1) CP 1995) and the aggravating circum-
stance of being related to the victim (§ 23 CP 1995). The prosecutor re-
quested seven years and six months prison or psychiatric institution
internment. The prosecutor later amended to request acquittal due to com-
plete excuse of insanity (§20(1) CP 1995).
Pleadings of Defense
The defense alleged the crime of negligent homicide (§ 142 CP 1995),
but with the complete excuse of insanity (§20(1) CP 1995). The defense
requested acquittal and commitment to a psychiatric institution.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
The defendant suffered from paranoid schizophrenia and had been
getting treatment for nineteen years before the homicide. On the night of
May 18, 1996, defendant got into an argument with his mother, Maria
Teresa Sinchez Mufioz (57 years-old), who was also mentally ill, in their
dwelling. Defendant picked up a hockey stick from which the curved end
had been broken off, and beat his mother repeatedly on various parts of the
body, including arms, shoulders, the head and nose. Noticing that his
mother was motionless, the defendant sat her in a chair and sponged off
her wounds. Defendant then took twelve antidepressant and antipsychotic
pills and slept until 11:00 a.m., when his brothers found their mother, who
was dead in the chair. The autopsy indicated that none of the blows struck
by the defendant was of itself lethal, and that she had perhaps died as a re-
sult of shock and a spinal injury when she fell.
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Verdict and Sentence
The jury found defendant had committed the crime of injuring his
mother. Defendant was acquitted due to the excuse of insanity and com-
mitted to a psychiatric facility for no more than five years.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Publ. Pros., Pl. Def., Obj.
Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Interview with President of Girona Provincial Court and PJ,
Fernando Lacaba Sdnchez, on June 26, 1997, at Girona Provincial Court.
GI-2 BOURAADA CASE
Judgment March 11, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The defendant Boujamaa Bouraada was charged with homicide with
the mitigating circumstances of spontaneous remorse.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal on self-defense grounds.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
The defendant lived with Mohamed Belabdi's apartment since the
mid-1995. In May 1996, an argument erupted between defendant and Be-
labdi. Belabdi told defendant to leave. Defendant left, but returned later
the same day, and waited for Belabdi. When Belabdi returned, he ordered
defendant to leave but defendant refused. A fight started, and defendant
grabbed a stick while Belabdi grabbed a knife. Defendant allegedly
knocked Belabdi so hard with the stick that he dropped the knife. They
struggled, defendant grabbed the knife and stabbed Belabdi five times,
killing hun. Defendant testified that Belabdi had him down on his back
and was choking him when he grabbed the knife, and instinctively stabbed
Belabdi in self-defense.
Verdict and Sentence
The defendant was found guilty of homicide with the mitigating eir-
cumstance of spontaneous remorse and was sentenced to twelve years and
one day in prison and damages of twelve million pesetas. Judgment re-
versed by the TSJ of Catalufia on June 9, 1997.
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Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Dec. TSJ.
2. Newspaper Articles
1. Marta Costa-Pau, Anulado por prmera vez el veredicto de unju-
rado popular, EL PAlS, June 11, 1997, at 24.
GI-3 BARDERA/BOUABDELLI/REBBOUHA CASE
May 28, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Juan Bardera Calvet (30 years-old, no
record), Youssef El Bouabdelli (adult, no record), and Abdellah Rebbouha
(adult, no record) with conditional threats (§493(1) CP 1973), and re-
quested five months detention for each.
Pleadings of Defense
All defendants denied the charges.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
From 1987 to 1989, the defendant Bardera worked for Andr6s P6rez
Martin at the finn "Comercial Marti, S.A." In 1989, P6rez fired Bardera
due to some irregularities with the accounts. Bardera threatened revenge.
At the beginning of 1996, Bardera experienced economic difficulties. As a
result, he left an extortion note for P6rez threatening to kill P6rez's chil-
dren if the money was not paid. The note was signed: "Revolutionary Tax,
E.T.A." P6rez found the note and notified police. Perez deposited a bag
full of newspaper clippings at the place and time specified in the note. The
police set up surveillance. Two Moroccans and defendants Bouabdelli and
Rebbouha drove by on a motorbike and picked up the bag. They were ar-
rested, and both told police that a blond man had offered them. 2,000 pese-
tas each to pick up the bag. They claimed ignorance as to the bag's con-
tents.
Rebbouha twice saw defendant Bardera and notified the police, who
finally arrested him on January 25, 1996.
Verdict and Sentence
The prosecutor dismissed the charges against Bouabdelli and Reb-
bouha at trial. Bardera was convicted of uttering conditional threats and
sentenced to five months detention.
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Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Publ. Pros., P1. Def., Prot. of
Deliverance of Obj. Ver., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Interview with PJ, Fernando Lacaba Sanchez, on June 26, 1997, in
Girona Provincial Court.
GRANADA PROVINCIAL COURT (GR)
GR-1 SANCHEZ CASE
July 4, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
Originally, the -public prosecutor charged Maria Sinchez L6pez (72
years-old, no record) with homicide (§ 407 CP 1973), with the mitigating
circumstances of mental illness which partially annulled her mental ca-
pacities (§§ 8(1), 9(1) CP 1973). The prosecutor also requested a one-year
jail sentence if mental capacity annulment was found to be partial. If an-
nulment was found to be complete, the prosecutor requested acquittal, but
with locked mental facility internment. At trial, the prosecutor requested
acquittal on the complete excuse of insanity, and requested ten years in-
temment in a psychiatric facility and eight million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor alleged the same charge, but without mitigat-
ing circumstances. The private prosecutor also requested fourteen years,
eight months and one day imprisonment and twenty million pesetas in
damages. The request for punshment was reduced to four years at trial,
and the private prosecutor admitted the mitigating factor of partial annul-
ment of her mental capacities.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal on grounds of insanity with ambulatory
treatment.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Between 11:00 p.m. and 12:00 a.m., the victim, Virtudes Zarzas
Aguilera (86 years-old), was visiting her neighbor, the defendant. At some
point during this visit defendant stabbed the victim more than twenty
times in the thorax, abdomen, neck and other parts of the body with a 22
cm blade. She died shortly thereafter of the wounds. Defendant then be-
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gan cutting herself with the same knife. Evidence was presented that the
knife had been wiped clean, as none of the victim's blood was found on it.
Evidence was adduced in the form of statements to the police and
psychiatrist's reports that defendant suffered from severe paranoid delir-
ium at the time of the killing. She felt that all of the neighbors were trying
to drive her crazy She felt that people sneaked into her home and rear-
ranged things to drive her crazy
Defendant claimed amnesia as to most of the events.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found defendant guilty of homicide with the mitigating cir-
cumstance of partial annulment of her mental capacities. The jury recom-
mended the benefits of a suspended sentence.
Sources of Information
1. Review of procedural documents: P1. Pub. Pros., P1. Pvt. Pros., P1.
Def., reports of forensic experts, autopsy report, declaration of defendant
during investigation, Prot. Tr., Obj. Ver.
2. The Author observed the entire trial, except jury selection and sen-
tencing.
3. Conversation with the President of Granada Provincial Court and
PJ, Fernando Tapia L6pez; and interview with Pub. Pros., Antonio Navajas
Ramos, on July 5, 1996. Brief Conversations with Pvt. Pros., Enrique La-
bella, and Def., Enrique Antonio Ceres Ruiz, on July 4, 1996, all in Gra-
nada Provincial Court.
4. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106.
5. Newspaper Articles
1. Ines Gallastegui y Efe, El primer jurado andaluz deliberard hoy
sobre la culpabilidad de unapresunta homicida, IDEAL, July 4, 1996, at 6.
2. Ines Gallastegui y Efe, El primer jurado andaluz dicta un vere-
dicto de condena contra una mujer que mat6 a su vecina, IDEAL, July 5,
1996, at 5.
4. El primer jurado andaluz condena a una homicida de 74 aIfos y
se opone a que se le conceda el indulto, EL PAIS-ANDALUCIA, July 5,
1996, at 5.
5. Mohamed El Khattat El primer Jurado Popular de Andalucla
condena a la homicida de Esc6znar, CR6NICA DE GRANADA, July 5, 1996,
at 3.
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GR-2 MARTOS/MARTOS CASE
Verdict December 2, Judgment December 5, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Antonio Martos Chaves (67 years-old,
no record) and Antonio Martos Rodriguez (41 years-old, no record) with
murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995) and the aggravating circumstance of being re-
lated to the victim (§ 23 CP 1995). The prosecutor also requested eighteen
years prison for both defendants and fifteen million pesetas in damages.
The prosecutor later modified charges to negligent homicide (§ 142(1) CP
1995) and requested four years prison and ten million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor alleged the same charges as the public prose-
cutor, but charged Rosa Martos Rodriguez and Isabel Rodriguez Molina
with omission of the duty to render aid (§§ 28(1), 11(a) CP 1995). The
private prosecutor requested twenty years prison and 18 million pesetas
damages each for Antonio Martos Chaves and Antonio Martos Rodriguez.
For Rosa Martos and Isabel Rodriguez, the private prosecutor requested a




Summary of Evidence at Trial
On March 28, 1996, four year-old Antonia Martos Pdrez was found
floating dead from drowning in a pond. Antonia's sister, Carmen, testified
that while playing her grandmother, Isabel, had pushed Antonia causing
her to hit her head on the ground and fall unconscious. Her grandfather,
Antonio Martos Chaves, tried to revive her. But when he was unable to do
so, he took Antonia up to the pond and threw her in to cover up the inci-
dent and protect his wife. Antonia's father did nothing to prevent the acts
of his father; rather, he engineered a false hunt for the child in another lo-
cation to give his father time to return from the pond. The defendants tes-
tified that they did nothing and that the child must have drowned.
Verdict and Sentence
The defendants were convicted of negligent homicide (§§ 407,565 CP
1973) with the aggravating factor of being related to the victim. The jury
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unanimously recommended both suspending the sentence and clemency.
Both defendants were sentenced to three years imprisonment and eleven
million pesetas in damages. The TSJ of Andalucfa set aside the judgment
and entered an acquittal due to lack of sufficient evidence of guilt.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. pub. pros, P1. Pvt. Pros, P1.
Def., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Interview with PJ, Carlos Bellver Garcia-Alix, on June 18, 1997 in
Granada Provincial Court.
3. Newspaper Articles
1. Un tribunal de Analucia revoca el veredicto de un jurado popu-
lar, EL PAiS, Mar. 6, 1997.
GR-3 GARCiA CASE
Judgment April 22, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Miguel Garcia Almendros (45 years-
old, criminal record) with trespassing in a dwelling (§ 490(1,2) CP 1973)
and requested six months and one day imprisonment.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense requested an acquittal.
I
Summary of Evidence at Trial
On April 16, 1996, a decree of separation was entered in the marriage
of defendant and Encarnac16n Bonet Rubifio, and the family dwelling was
awarded to Bonet. Before receiving an official judicial order of eviction,
defendant went to his house and found the locks had been changed. He
returned later that evening and entered the house through a balcony. De-
fendant took some towels, bedclothes and a television. Only the next day




1. Review of Procedural Documents: Judg.
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GR-4 PEREZ CASE
May 15-17, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Domingo P6rez Gilvez (24 years-old,
no record) with murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995) with the mitigating circum-
stances of heat of passion (§ 21(3) CP 1995) and spontaneous remorse (§
21(4) CP 1995). The public prosecutor requested ten years imprisonment
and damages often million pesetas.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor added a charge of illegal possession of a
weapon (§ 564(2) CP 1995) and alleged no mitigating circumstances. The
private prosecutor also requested a fifteen years and six months prison
sentence and fifteen million pesetas in damages. The private prosecutor
amended to allege spontaneous remorse, but requested a seventeen year
sentence.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal, then amended to allege the complete
excuse of temporary insanity (§ 20(1) CP 1995). In the alternative, mur-
der, with the mitigating circumstances of spontaneous remorse and the in-
complete excuse of heat of passion and extreme emotional disturbance (§
21 CP 1995) was pled. In case of conviction, the defense requested a sen-
tence of three years and nine months.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant's father and brother visited their neighbor, Rafael Cano
Aguilera (71 years-old). Defendant's mother, Maria Bfirbara Gfilvez Lorca
(73 years-old), went with them. Defendant's father and brother accused
Cano of having sexually molested defendant's mother. Both Cano and de-
fendant's mother denied the accusations and all went home.
The next morning, defendant and his father breakfasted and discussed
the incident the day before. Defendant went out to look for his mother,
who usually breakfasted with them, and found her dead, hanging from an
oak tree on their property. Assuming she hanged herself due to the sexual
harassment of Cano, defendant went to his house, took a shotgun, and went
looking for Cano. When he found Cano, he shot him in the chest and then
in the right lumbar region, killing him instantly. Defendant called the po-
lice, surrendered and confessed.
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Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of murder with the incomplete excuse of
temporary mental disturbance and the mitigating circumstance of sponta-
neous remorse. Defendant was sentenced to seven years, six months and
one day prison and twelve million pesetas in damages. The jury recom-
mended both a suspended sentence and partial amnesty.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: P1. Publ. Pros., Pl. Pvt. Pros., Pl.
Def., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Interview with PJ, Carlos Rodriguez Valverde, on June 18, 1997, in
Granada Provincial Court.
GUADALAJARA PROVINCIAL COURT (GU)
GU-1 GARCiA CASE
Verdict May 26, 1997,
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Ram6n Garcia Garcia (31 years-old,
prior record) with trespass in a dwelling (§ 490 CP 1973), one count of
premeditated murder by treachery (§ 406(1) & (4) CP 1973), and another
count of premeditated murder (§ 406(4) CP 1973) with abuse of superiority
(§ 10(8) CP 1973), and requested fifty-eight years imprisonment and
twenty-nine million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor charged defendant with trespass in a dwelling
(§ 202(2) CP 1995) and two counts of murder by treachey (§ 139(1) CP
1995) alleging aggravating factor of being related to the victim (§ 23 CP
1995). The private prosecutor also requested forty-four years imprison-
ment and thirty-three million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense admitted to two counts of homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with
the mitigating circumstance of extreme emotional disturbance (§ 21(3) CP
1995) and requested ten years imprisonment.
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Summary of Evidence at Trial
In the morning of March 4, 1996, defendant armed himself with a
large kitchen knife and went to his estranged wife's house where she lived
with her brother. Defendant had earlier threatened to kill "the entire fam-
ily." Defendant kicked in the kitchen door window and entered the house.
He met his wife in the hall, who had been awakened by the sound of
breaking glass, and stabbed her to death. Her brother awoke, hearing the
screams. He confronted the defendant and was also stabbed three times.
Her brother ran out of the house and called for help and then collapsed
dead.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted as charged by the public prosecutor and
sentenced to fift y-eight years imprisonment and twenty-nine million pese-
tas m damages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Judg.
HUELVA PROVINCIAL COURT
HU-1 BARRERA CASE
April 2-4, 7 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jos6 Miguel Barrera Riquel (29 years-
old, no record) with homicide (§ 407 CP 1993) and requested a sentence of
twelve years and six months imprisonment and sixteen million pesetas in
damages.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
Same as public prosecutor, but the private prosecutor requested four-
teen years and eight months imprisonment
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal due to temporary insanity caused by de-
fendant's mental illness and the peculiarities of the situation (§8(1) CP
1973), and defense of self and property (§ 8(4) CP 1973).
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Summary of Evidence at Trial
In the evening, defendant came to meet a friend who worked as a
prostitute. As defendant was waiting in his car, the victim, Rosa Maria
Palacios Beltrdn (27 'years-old), who was also a prostitute, approached.
She solicited an act of prostitution and the defendant accepted. They drove
to an area used for shooting clay pigeons. Defendant parked the car, took
off his trousers, and lay down on the seat. When the victim did not per-
form, defendant realized that his wallet was missing. Believing that pros-
titutes often steal, defendant took out a knife to recuperate his wallet. A
fight started and defendant stabbed the victim twice, once in the heart, and
she died immediately.
Evidence was adduced that the defendant suffered from personality
disorders and was undergoing psychiatric and drug treatment for several
years. The remote location, the conduct of the victim and fear allegedly
annulled his intellectual and volitional capacities at the time of the stab-
bing.
Verdict and Judgment
The jury found that defendant was guilty of causing the victim's
death, but he was in a state of temporary mental disturbance "provoked by
the unexpected and disagreeable situation in which he was involved, to
which his difficult pathological personality contributed." The jury also
found that he acted in defense of his property, but that he used excessive
force in exercising this defense. Defendant was sentenced to four years
imprisonment and sixteen million pesetas in damages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Judg.
LAS PALMAS DE GRAN CANARIAS PROVINCIAL COURT (LP)
LP-1 GONZALEZ CASE
July 3-4, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Juan Gonzalez Sudrez (82 years-old,
no record) with parricide (§ 405 CP 1973), but then amended to a homicide
charge (§ 138 CP 1995) with the aggravating circumstance of being related
to the victim (§ 23 CP 1995). The prosecutor also requested a thirteen year
prison sentence and ten million pesetas damages.
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Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor asked for acquittal due to a transitory mental
disturbance (§ 20(1) CP 1995) and mitigating factors of non-habitual
drunkenness, lack of intentionality, heat of passion and spontaneous re-




Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant went to the house of a neighbor, Alfonso Cabrera Sufirez.
Cabrera had had a long-term relationship with defendant's wife, which
caused defendant's separation from her two years earlier. After a discus-
sion with Cabrera, defendant returned home, took a twenty-two cm. long
knife and went to his wife's house. Defendant stabbed her nine times and
hit her with an iron bar cane on various parts of her body. She died at the
scene. He then turned himself in.
On the day in question defendant had drunk some whisky. He was
also motivated by jealousy. The defense produced evidence that, as a re-
sult of the defendant's deafiess, peculiar personality, advanced age, and
his tendency to feel like the object of scorn, his mental faculties were com-
pletely annulled. They also maintained his alcohol ingestion caused a
complete annulment of his mental faculties as well.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of homicide and found that his mental fac-
ulties were mildly diminished due to his peculiar personality, advanced
age, tendency to feel himself the object of scorn, etc. The jury recom-
mended a partial clemency due to his advanced age. Defendant was sen-
tenced to ten years prison, with a petition for clemency in relation to half
of the sentence.
Sources of Information
1. Review of procedural documents: Rul. Just. F., P1. Pub. Pros., Pl.
Pvt. Pros., Pl. Def., Obj. Ver., Prot Ver., Judg.
2. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106.
3. Newspaper articles:
1. Un tribunal popular juzga hoy un caso de asesinato en la Audi-
encia de Las Palmas, DIARIO DE AVISOS, July 3, 1996.
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2. La Audiencia Provincial de Las Palmas celebra el primer juicio
canario conjurado, LA GACETA DE CANARIAS, July 3, 1996, at 20.
3. Primer juicio con Tribunal de Jurado en Canaras, EL DIA, July
4, 1996.
4. B. HernAndez, Dos mujeres y siete hombres decidirdn si un an-
ciano de 82 aflos es culpable de homicidio, DIARIO DE AVISOS, July 4,
1996, at 20.
5. B. Hernfndez El primer tribunal con jurado de Canarias con-
dena al anciano homicida, DIARIO DE AVISOS, July 5, 1996, ait 21.
LP-2 XENAKIS/ARVALIDIS/AETUS/BAYOUD CASE
November 19-27, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Konstantinos Xenakis (61 years old),
Vassilios Arussalidis (40 years old), Salufeerthi Oswin Aefus Bernard (42
years old), and Aly Aly Bayoud (34 years old) with 2 counts of homicide
(§ 407 CP 1973) and Xenakis with violation of labor security laws (§
499(3) CP 1973) and requested 13 years in prison for each defendant.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal.
Summary of Evidence of Trial
Xenakis was the captain of a ship, the Panaqia Tinou, registered' in
Malta, which left the Liberian port of Buchannan on February 20, 1996,
with a cargo of wood bound for Greece. The other defendants were crew
members. The defendants testified that as many as 21 Liberians stowed
away on the ship without their knowledge.
As the ship approached the port of La Luz de las Palmas for supplies,
two of the stowaways went overboard and drowned. The prosecution
claimed that the crew forced the men to jump, while the defense argued
that they had no knowledge of the incident.
I
Verdict and Sentence
All defendants were acquitted.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Prot.
Ver., Judg.
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2. Newspaper Articles
1. La Fiscaliapuede basar su recurso en el caso Otegui en que no
se hizo calificaci6n alternativa como homicidio, ABC, Mar. 9, 1997, at 25.
2. Con lo que cuesta un jurado hay para dictar doscientas senten-
cias, EL MUNDO, Mar. 13, 1997.
LP-3 REBAQUE CASE
February 18-19, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Santiago Rebaque Melian (30 years
old, no record) with trespassing in a dwelling (§ 202(1) CP 1995) and
threats (§ 169(1) CP 1995) and requested five years imprisonment and a
fine of 150,000 pesetas.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal, with a fallback defense of admitting
the threat charge with the complete or partial excuse of a personality disor-
der and ingestion of drugs (§§ 20(1), (2), 21 (1), (2) CP 1995).
Summary of Evidence at Trial
At around 9 p.m. on August 2, 1996, the defendant went to the home
of his ex-companion and allegedly gained entrance by saying "open the
door or it could get worse." She opened the door to calm him and he al-
legedly pushed her and entered the house. He locked the door, took a
knife, and threatened to kill her if she did not produce their child. She es-
caped and the police were called. The defendant cut the gas line, an-
nouncing that he would blow up the house if the child were not produced.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of the threats charge and acquitted of tres-
passing. He was found to have acted under diminished capacity due to in-
gestion of drugs. The jury recommended a suspended sentence and partial
clemency. The defendant was sentenced to 11 months in prison.
Sources of Information
(1) Review of Procedural Records: Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver.,
Judg.
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LUGO PROVINCIAL COURT (LU)
LU-I MENDAIRA CASE
November 5, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Josd Luis Mendafila Justo (28 years-
old, no record) with parricide (§ 405 CP 1973), but requested acquittal due
to insanity (§ 8(1) CP 1973) with indefinite committal to a locked psychi-
atric facility Later, the public prosecutor amended to charge homicide (§
138 CP 1995) with the aggravating factor of being related to the victim (§
23 CP 1995), and requested acquittal due to insanity (§ 20(1) CP 1995) and
psychiatric internment of not more than twelve years and 10 million pese-
tas in damages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal on a theory of accident, though defen-
dant was insane at the time.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
At age nineteen, defendant was diagnosed as a schizophrenic and was
hospitalized then and several times afterwards. Nevertheless, he worked as
a graphic designer and was also a painter. Yet, he felt people stole his
ideas and patented them, and he felt the radio spoke to him.
Defendant went into a psychotic state on February 4, 1996. Later that
evening after he had been to the hospital, defendant went home and hugged
his seventy-seven year old mother, Caridad Angela Justo Rivas, to death,
suffocating her with his hands around her neck. Defendant confessed, but
his lawyer argued there was no proof of defendant's authorship, as his con-
fession could not be believed and there were no witnesses.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity and was com-
mitted to a psychiatric facility for more than twelve years. Ten million pe-
setas in damages were awarded.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: P1. Publ. Pros., P1. Def., Obj.
Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
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2. Interview with President of Lugo Provincial Court and PJ, Remigio
Conde Salgado, on June 10, 1997, in Lugo Provincial Court.
3. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106.
4. Newspaper Articles
1. Jos6 Manuel Freire, El primer jurado declara inimputable al
perturbado que asftxi6 a su madre, EL PROGRESO, Nov. 6, 1996, at 25.
LU-2 LOPEZ CASE
April 3-5, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jos6 L6pez Gandoy (32 years-old, 8
priors) with homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) and inflicting injuries (§ 617(1) CP
1995), and requested a fifteen year prison sentence and 20.07 million pe-
setas in damages.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor charged defendant with murder (§ 139 CP
1995), attempted murder (§§ 128, 16, 62 CP 1995) and trespassing in a
dwelling (§ 202(2) CP 1995) with the aggravating circumstances of abuse
of superiority and being related to the victim (§§ 22(2), 23 CP 1995). The
private prosecutor also requested twenty-five years prison for the murder,
four years for the trespassing, and three years for the attempted murder.
Damages of 19.8 million pesetas were requested.
Pleadings of Defense
Defendant pled guilty to negligent homicide (§ 142(1) CP 1995), but
with the complete excuse of temporary insanity caused by excessive
drinking (§§ 20(1) & (2) CP 1995). Defendant requested internment in a
hospital for treatment.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant broke his way into his ex-girlfriend's apartment and at-
tacked her. He pushed her into a window, breaking it. Her 14 year-old
son, Javier, came to his mother's aid, stabbing defendant in the leg with a
sharp instrument used to fish for octopus. But, defendant pulled out a
knife and stabbed Elisa in the heart, killing her. Javier fled to a bar and
called the police while the defendant looked around the house for him in
order to kill him.
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Elisa had broken off their relationship because of defendant's abuse.
He had destroyed her car, beaten her up, and destroyed other property. De-
fendant claimed he was a chronic alcoholic and was drunk on the day of
the killing and was therefore unable to understand his actions. He also
claimed that the victim fell on a knife held in her own hand after a strug-
gle.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of homicide and attempted homicide, with
the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superiority. He was also con-
victed of trespass. He was sentenced to fourteen years imprisonment for
the homicide and three years for the attempted murder. Damages were as-
sessed at twenty million pesetas.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Publ. Pros., Pl. Pvt. Pros., P1.
Def., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Interview with PJ, Edgar Armando Femndez Cloos, on June 10,
1997, in Lugo Provincial Court.
3. Newspaper Articles
1. Jos6 Manuel Freire, '0 Bailarin' dice en el jucio que la muerte
de su ex novtafuefortuita, EL PROGRESO, Apr. 4, 1997, at 29.
2. Jos6 Manuel Freire, Tres horas no bastaron al tribunal popular
parajuzgar a '0 Bailarin', EL PROGRESO, Apr. 5, 1997, at 25.
3. El jurado cree culpable a '0 Bailar in' y su condena rondard los
veinte afilos, EL PROGRESO, Apr. 6, 1997.
1
MADRID PROVINCIAL COURT (M)
M-1 SANZ CASE
October 7-8, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Luis Sanz Sacristan (56 years-old, no
record) with murder (§ 139.CP 1995) with the aggravating factor of being
related to the victim (§ 23 CP 1995) and the complete or partial excuse of
insanity (§§ 20(1); 21(1) CP 1995), and requested a fourteen year incar-
ceration either m prison or in a psychiatric facility in the event of a con-
viction or acquittal, or, in the event of a finding of complete excuse, in-
ternment in a psychiatric facility for no more than 20 years. Damages were
assessed at thirty million pesetas. At trial, pleadings were changed to mur-
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der, but not guilty by reason of insanity with fifteen years in a psychiatric
facility.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense claimed defendant committed a homicide (§ 138 CP
1995) with the partial excuse of insanity and requested a three year prison
term or no more than three years in a psychiatric institution.
Summary ofEvidence at Trial
Defendant stabbed his wife to death in their apartment. He testified
that they had a discussion, and then his wife took a knife. He tried to take
it away from her and then he couldn't remember what happened. Accord-
ing to the autopsy, his wife was killed by twenty-one stab wounds.
According to psychiatrists, defendant's twenty-four year marriage
deteriorated when defendant began to believe his wife had a lover and was
captured by a "net of international prostitution." The psychiatrists agreed
that defendant was psychotic and not guilty by reason of insanity.
Verdict and Sentence
After the evidence was taken, prosecution and defense reached a
conformidad that defendant was not guilty by reason of insanity and should
be committed to fifteen years in a psychiatric facility. The jury was dis-
charged. Twenty million in damages were assessed.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Publ. Pros., P1. Def., Prot. of
Conformidad, Judg.
2. Conversations with PJ, Jos6 Luis Calvo Cabello, and Chief Prose-
cutor of Madrid Province and Pub. Pros., Joaquin Sanchez Covisa, on
September 20, 1996, in Madrid Provincial Court, about the upcoming trial.
Conversation with Jury Administrator, Javier de Frutos, on June 13, 1997,
in Madrid Provincial Court.
3. Newspaper Articles
1. Jos6 A. Hemndez, Una sala de la Audiencia se reforma para
que elfjurado pueda ver al acusado en el primer juicio, EL PAlS, Oct. 6,
1996.
2. Jos6 A. Hernndez Primer dia de nuevejueces sin toga, EL PAlS,
Oct. 8, 1996, at 1,3.
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3. Jos6 A. Hern6.ndez, El uez disolvz6 el primer jurado de Madrid
al aceptar elparricida ingresar 15 afios en un psiquidtrico, EL PALS, Oct.
9, 1996, at 1,5.
M-2 PtREZ CASE
November 5-6, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Angel P6rez Barrera (17 years-old, no
record) with homicide (§ 407 CP 1973) with the aggravating circumstances
of being related to the victim (§ 11 CP 1973), and the mitigating circum-
stance of being a minor (§ 9(3) CP 1973). He requested eight years prison
and damages often million pesetas.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense asked for an acquittal based on accident and self-defense.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant got into an argument with his brother over a pair of pants.
Defendant's brother hit defendant several times. Defendant testified that
he then took a knife and held it in a defensive position, without making any
stabbing motions, in order to stop the victim from hitting him. The victim
jumped on defendant and both fell on the sofa. The knife stuck in the vic-
tim's chest as he fell on defendant and he died instantly.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury acquitted the defendant.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Prot. of Discussion of Obj. Ver.,
Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Interview with the PJ, Francisco Javier Vieira Morante, and the
Pub. Pros., Joaquin Sdnhez Covisa, on September 20, 1996, in Madrid
Provincial Court before the trial.
3. The author observed the computerized selection of the jury panel in
the case on September 20, 1996, in Madrid Provincial Court.
4. Newspaper Articles
1. Jos6 A. Hernndez, "Declaramos no culpable a... ", EL PAS,
No4 10, 1996, at 6.
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M-3 MORENO CASE
December 18-20, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Miguel Moreno Rosillo (40 years-old,
no record) with conditional threats (§§ 493(1) CP 1973, 169(1) CP 1995)
and requested a four month detention sentence.




Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant went to Francisco Fraile Rodriguez's office, and demanded
that Fraile give him the papers to an automobile purchased from Fraile six
months earlier or at least return the money he had paid Fraile. The reason
was that the automobile did not function properly. Fraile alleged that de-
fendant pulled out a gun, grabbed him by the neck, held the gun to his
head, and threatened him. Defendant fired a shot which broke a window in
the office, when Fraile tried to wriggle out of defendant's grasp. Defen-
dant testified that Fraile attacked him, and the gun fell to the floor. Defen-
dant picked it up, was shoved, and the gun went off accidentally. He de-
nied making any threats.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of threats (§ 493(1) CP 1973) and was sen-
tenced to two months detention, which were suspended pursuant to the jury
recommendation.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: P1. Publ. Pros., P1. Pvt. Pros., P1.
Def., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Prot. of Return of Verdict, Judg.
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M-4 RECIO CASE
April 25-30, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Victoriano Recio Sfinchez (47 years-
old, no record) with two counts of murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995) with the ag-
gravating factor of being related to one of the victims (§ 23 CP 1995) and
the incomplete excuse of drunkenness (§§ 21(1), 20(1) CP 1995). A
twenty-five year prison sentence and eighty million pesetas in damages
were requested.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutors (3)
Same as public prosecutor, except the private prosecutor did not al-
lege mitigating circumstances. The private prosecutor also requested
thirty-six years prison.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense admitted to two murder counts, but alleged complete ex-
cuse of temporary insanity due to drunkenness (§§ 20(1) & (2) CP 1995).
The defense requested an acquittal.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
After drinking heavily, defendant returned to his home where his
mother, Amparo Sbnchez Escudero (69 years-old), his sister, Soledad, and
her companion, Francisco Ojeda Bay6n (26 years-old), were watching
television. After commenting about the death of a married couple in the
news that day, the defendant went to his bedroom, took a .12 caliber shot-
gun and returned to the living room. Without saying a word, he shot Ojeda
in the heart and killed him. His sister and mother took flight but defendant
fired at his mother, hitting her in the back and causing her death. Defen-
dant fled and hid at a his father's store until he was arrested two hours
later. After another two hours, defendant's blood was tested. and showed a
concentration of .182 % blood alcohol content. Defendant claimed he was
drunk and was not responsible for his actions.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of two murder counts with the aggravating
circumstance of being related to one of the victims. Defendant was sen-
tenced to thirty-three years prison, although only twenty-five years must be
served (§ 76(a) CP 1995). Damages were assessed at 100 million pesetas.
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Sources ofInformation
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Publ. Pros., P1. Pvt. Pros., Pl.
Def., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
MALAGA PROVINCIAL COURT (MA)
MA-1 TORRES CASE
December 2-3, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Benjamin Torres Plock (16 years-old,
no priors) with parricide (§ 405 CP 1973) with the mitigating circumstance
of being a juvenile (§ 9(3) CP 1973) and the aggravating circumstance of
treachery (§ 10(1) & (6) CP 1973). The prosecutor requested nineteen
years prison and fifteen million pesetas in damages. In the alternative, the
prosecutor charged murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995) and requested a sentence of
twelve years and six months.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense admitted murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995) with the mitigating
circumstance of being a juvenile and the incomplete excuse of insanity (§§
20(1), 20(1) CP 1995) and extreme emotional disturbance (§ 21(3) CP
1995), and the aggravating circumstance of being related to the victim (§
23 CP 1995). The defense requested a prison sentence of one year and six
months. The defense later amended to add the mitigating circumstance of
spontaneous remorse (§ 21(4) CP 1995).
Summary of Evidence at Trial
At the age of twelve or thirteen years, defendant's mother sent defen-
dant to live with his father so that she could exercise her profession of
prostitution. Defendant was abused psychologically and physically by his
father. He ran away from home three times. Then, allegedly, he planned
to kill his father by putting him in a sofa and burning the sofa. This plan
was expressed in written form and found later by the authorities.
One evening, defendant returned from a discotheque late and he testi-
fied that his father beat him. When his father fell asleep, defendant
stabbed him nine times in the neck and clavicular region, causing his death.
The defense presented evidence that defendant suffered from a per-
sonality disorder which altered his capacity to understand and control his
actions.
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Verdict and Sentence
The defendant was convicted of murder (§ 139(1) CP :1995) with the
mitigating factor of being a juvenile (§ 9(3) CP 1973) and the aggravating
circumstance of being related to the victim. He was sentenced to eleven
years, three months and one day prison and fifteen million pesetas in dam-
ages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: P1. Pub. Pros., P1. Def., Rul.
Just. F., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Interview with President of Milaga Provincial Court and PJ,
Manuel Torres Vela, on June 17, 1997, m Mdlaga Provincial Court.
3. Carmona Ruano & DePaf1 Velasco, supra note 106.
MA-2 MARTiN CASE
December 18, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Antonio Martin Casado (36 years-old,
3 priors) with trespassing m a dwelling (§ 490(2) CP 1973), and making
threats (§ 493(2) CP 1973) with the aggravating factor of recidivism (§
10(15) CP 1973) and the incomplete excuse of drug addiction (§ 9(1) CP
1973). The prosecutor requested five months detention and a fine of
51,000 pesetas.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense admitted guilt to a misdemeanor threat charge (§ 585(2)
CP 1973) and trespassing in a dwelling (§ 490(2) CP 1973). The defense
also alleged mitigating circumstances of drug addiction, heat of passion
and extreme emotional disturbance (§ 9(8) CP 1973). The defense also re-
quested one day detention for the threat and two months for the trespass-
ing.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
The prosecution alleged that defendant broke in his neighbor door,
pulled a knife, and threatened to kill him. His sister-in-law told him to
leave and he did so. But, defendant testified that he knocked on the door,
was admitted peaceably, and then left when asked to. He admitted being a
heroin addict and claimed his addiction affected his ability 'to conform his
conduct to the law.
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1. Review of Procedural Documents: Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Prot.
Ver., Judg.
2. Carmona Ruano & DePail Velasco, supra note 106.
MA-3 QUERO CASE
March 3-5, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jos6 Maria Quero Martin (32 years-
old, prior record) with homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with the aggravating cir-
cumstance of abuse of superiority (§ 22(2) CP 1995) and being related to
the victim (§ 23 CP 1995) and the mitigating circumstance of heat of pas-
sion (§ 21(3) CP 1995). The prosecutor also requested ten years prison
and fifteen million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense admitted homicide with the mitigating circumstances of
diminished capacity (§§ 20(1), 21(1) CP 1995) due to mental disturbance
and drug consumption, heat of passion, spontaneous remorse (§ 21(4) CP
1995), and the mixed circumstance of being related to the victim. The de-
fense requested five years prison.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant returned to his home from the hospital after visiting his
mother who had had a heart attack. He was drunk, having imbibed beer
and cuba libres at the hospital. He became furious at his father, who had
chosen to play dominoes and drink, instead of visiting defendant's mother
in the hospital. Defendant beat him viciously, breaking his ribs and ster-
num and injuring his lungs, causing his death the next day.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of homicide with the mitigating circum-
stances of diminished capacity, heat of passion and spontaneous remorse.
Defendant was sentenced to nine years prison and fifteen million pesetas
damages.
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Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Obj. Ver., Judg.
MA-4 GARRIDO/MUJNOZ/VILLODRES CASE
April 22-26, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Antonio Garrido Silva (21 years-old,
no record) and Francisco Javier Mufioz Sedeflo (23 years old, no record)
with homicide (§ 407 CP 1973), illegal possession of a weapon (§ 564(1)
CP 1995), and unconditional illegal detention (§ 485 CP :1973). Garrido
was additionally charged with conditional illegal detention (§ 481(1) CP
1973), and Jos6 Antonio Villodres del Pino (21 years-old, no record) was
charged with unconditional illegal detention. The prosecutor requested
fourteen years prison for the murder, ten years and one day for the first
unlawful detention, seven years for the second illegal detention, and two
years and six months for the unlawful weapons possession, along with ten
million pesetas in damages against Garrido and Mufloz. The prosecutor
requested ten years and one day prison against Villodres.
Pleadings of Defense
Garrido admitted the homicide, but alleged complete excuse of tem-
porary insanity (§ 8(1) CP 1973), with an alternative of incomplete excuse
(§§ 9(1), 8(1) CP 1973). Mufioz denied the charges, but pled in the alter-
native the complete excuse of temporary insanity due to insuperable fear (§
20(6) CP 1995). Villodres requested an acquittal.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Robin Jarrett Lewis owed defendant Garrido a debt. Garrido set out
with defendant Mufioz to find him. Garrido and Mufioz picked up Villo-
dres and eventually drove to Jarrett's house, where they waited for him.
When Jarrett returned home, he was confronted by Garrido about the debt.
Garrido and Mufioz allegedly forced Jarrett into Garrido's car and they
drove to the Garrido's garage where Garrido choked Jarrett to death. Gar-
rido and Mufioz then took the body to a remote area and set fire to it.
Mufioz testified he did not know Garrido was going to kill Jarrett and was
in deadly fear of Garrido. Garrido adduced testimony that he suffered
from an "intermittent explosive personality," which diminished his crimi-
nal responsibility
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Verdict and Sentence
Garrido was convicted of homicide with the mitigating circumstance
of mild diminished capacity, a conditional illegal detention, and illegal
possession of a firearm. Mufioz was convicted of illegal possession of a
firearm and concealing a homicide (§9 17(2), 54, 407 CP 1973). Villodres
was acquitted. Garrido was sentenced to twelve years and six months
prison and ten million pesetas m damages. Muiioz was sentenced to one
year prison.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: P1. Pub. Pros., P. Def., Obj.




The public prosecutor charged Francisco Martin Caiiestro (22 years-
old, no record) with parricide (§ 405 CP 1973). In the alternative, the
prosecutor alleged homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with the aggravating factor of
being related to the victim (§ 23 CP 1995), and requested fourteen years
prison and fifteen million pesetas in damages. Later, the prosecutor
amended to allege spontaneous remorse and requested twelve years prison.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense denied charges. In the alternative, defendant pled admis-
sion to homicide with the complete excuse of insanity (§ 20(1) CP 1995).
A further alternative position of incomplete excuse of insanity and the
mitigating circumstance of spontaneous remorse was alleged; in such
event, defense requested a sentence of two years and six months prison.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
As early as 1992, defendant had exhibited aberrant conduct and had
been diagnosed as suffering from a depressive schizoaffective disturbance
in 1994. He thrice attempted suicide. Defendant lived with his family and
had a conflictive relationship with his father due to the defendant's habit-
ual use of cocaine and heroin, his refusal to work, and his homosexuality.
In 1996, defendant got into an argument with his father at the family
home, whereupon defendant stabbed his father twenty-three times with a
fifteen cm. blade in the head, neck, thorax, abdomen and arms, killing him.
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Defendant called the police, confessed, and expressed satisfaction and re-
morse. The father was found with a book draped over his body, entitled:
"Men, Men. Traps and Myths of Masculinity, Today's Themes."
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was found not guilty by reason of insanity and committed
to a psychiatric facility for a maximum of twelve years. Damages of fif-
teen million pesetas were assessed.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Pub. Pros., P1. Def, Obj.
Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
MURCIA PROVINCIAL COURT (MU)
MU-1 CORTtS CASE
July 17-18, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Enrique Ignacio Cort6s Bautista (39
years-old, 2 prior convictions) with homicide (§ 407 CP 1973) with the ag-
gravating circumstance of being related to the victim (§ 11 CP 1973) and
requested fifteen years imprisonment.
Pleadings of the Defense
The defense asked for acquittal, raising the self-defense justification
(§§ 9(1),8(4) CP 1973) and the complete excuse of insanity (§ 8(3) CP
1973). In the alternative, the defense asked for a homicide conviction (§
407 CP 1973) with the mitigating circumstances of partial excuse due to
insanity (§§ 9(1), 8(3) CP 1973), spontaneous remorse (§ 9(9) CP 1973),
and lack of intent to cause a harm of such gravity as occurred (§ 9(4) CP
1973). In the alternative, the defense asked for internment in a special
educational center for the time necessary to give basic instruction or im-
pose per § 61(5) CP 1973 punishment two grades less than that for homi-
cide.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
An argument began in Francisca Bautista Vargas' apartment, between
her sons, Antonio Bautista Vargas (37 years) and the defendant. Insults
were exchanged. Francisca tried to separate them and both ran into the
street. At some point in the altercation, defendant took an olive tree
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branch and hit Antonio several times causing him to bleed. Defendant
eventually wrapped the olive branch around Antonio's neck causing me-
chanical asphyxiation and suppression of oxygen to the brain. His mother
and some neighbors took him to the hospital where he died. Defendant
later took a bucket of water and washed the blood stains from the street
and changed his clothes. He then turned himself in and showed the police
where the olive branch lay.
Defendant claimed he was attacked by Antonio first and used the ol-
ive branch in self-defense. He claimed no intent to kill. He also claimed
he freely confessed to the police. However, the police claimed he denied
responsibility when he turned himself in.
Evidence was adduced that defendant had been deaf from birth and
was mildly mentally retarded.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was found guilty of causing the his brother's death without
intent to kill. The defendant's acts were qualified as being simultaneously
the infliction of corporeal injury (§ 421(1) CP 1973) and negligent homi-
cide (§§ 565, 407 CP 1973), and he was sentenced to six years deprivation
of liberty.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Pub. Pros., Pl. Def., Rul.
Just. F., Prot. Tr., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106.
OVIEDO PROVINCIAL COURT (0)
0-1 FERNANDEZ CASE
October 22-23, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Leoncio Femdndez Garcia (73 years-
old, no record) with parricide (§ 405 CP 1973) with the aggravating cir-
cumstance of treachery (§10(1) CP 1973) and requested a 28 year prison
sentence and damages of twenty million pesetas. The prosecutor later
amended to charge homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with the aggravating cir-
cumstances of being related to the victim and abuse of superiority (§§ 23,
22(2) CP 1995) and requested fifteen years prison and twenty million pe-
setas in damages.
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Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled homicide (§ 407 CP 1973) with mitigating circum-
stances of diminished capacity and heat of passion (§§ 9(1,8) CP 1973).
The defense amended to charge homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with the excuse
of temporary insanity caused by a mental disturbance and drunkenness (§§
20(1,2) CP 1995) and, in the alternative, with mitigating circumstances of
diminished capacity and heat of passion (§§ 21(1) & (3) CP 1995) with a
punishment often years prison.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Due to an argument with his wife and son the night before, the defen-
dant had slept with the cattle in an outbuilding. The next morning, defen-
dant returned to the farmhouse with ax in hand. Defendant had a difficult
relationship with. his wife and son, Laudelino, and often beat them.
Laudelino apparently saw defendant coming with an ax, so he went outside
to confront defendant with a club in his hand. Defendant testified that he
came with the ax to do some chores and was surprised by Laudelino's at-
tack with the club. Defendant was hit in the arm and sustained a fracture,
but got the upperhand. He hit Laudelino in the head, chased him, and fi-
nally finished him off with blows in the head and back while Laudelino
was on the ground. Defendant claimed he had drunk some cognac the
night before.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of homicide with the aggravating factor of
being related to the victim and was sentenced to thirteen years prison and
twenty million pesetas in damages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Publ. Pros., PI. Def., Prot.
Tr., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Interview with PJ, Jos6 Maria Alvarez Seijo, on June 9, 1997, in
Oviedo Provincial Court.
3. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106.
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The public prosecutor charged Luis Lastra Pdrez (61 years-old, no re-
cord) with murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995) with the aggravating circumstance
of being related to the victim (§ 23 CP 1995) and the mitigating circum-
stance of spontaneous remorse (§ 21(4) CP 1995) and requested seventeen
years prison.
Pleadings of Defense
Defendant pled guilty of homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) but with the com-
plete or partial excuse of insanity (§§ 20(1), 21(1) CP 1995) and the miti-
gating circumstance of spontaneous remorse. The defense requested ac-
quittal, or in the alternative, a sentence of two years and six months in
prison.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
In March 1996, defendant was attempting to repair something in his
bathroom. His 25 year-old, speech-and-hearing-impaired daughter, Ana
Florinda Lastra L6pez, was in the hall house-cleaning. She asked defen-
dant to wait with his repairs until she had cleaned the bathroom. He re-
fused. An argument ensued and defendant took a mechanic's ball-hammer
from his toolbox and began hitting his daughter in the head and thorax.
She tried to escape, running through the house with her father in pursuit.
He finally killed her with multiple blows to the head.
In December 1995, defendant's wife had died and he began to see a
doctor for depression. One psychiatrist testified that he had an obsessive-
compulsive and depressive mental illness, and defendant asserted that this
excused or mitigated his responsibility.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of murder with the aggravating circum-
stance of being related to the victim and the mitigating circumstance of
spontaneous remorse. Defendant was sentenced to fifteen years prison.
Sources ofInformation
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Publ. Pros., P1. Def., Prot.
Tr., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
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2. Interview with PJ, Bernardo Donapetry Camacho, and conversation
with Secretary of Section 3 of Oviedo Provincial Court, Evelia Alonso
Crespo, on June 9, 1997, in Oviedo Provincial Court.
0-3 ALONSO CASE
April-18, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Fernando Alonso Moro (33 years-old,
no record) with homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with the mitigating circum-
stance of spontaneous remorse (§ 21(5) CP 1995) and the aggravating cir-
cumstance of being related to the victim (§ 23 CP 1995). The prosecutor
requested an eight year prison sentence and damages of 600,000 pesetas.
Pleadings of Defense
Defendant pled guilty of inflicting injuries (§§147(1), 148(1) CP
1995), but requested acquittal due to the complete excuse of insanity and
alcoholic intoxication (§§20(1) & (2) CP 1995). In the alternative, the de-
fense pled diminished capacity for the same reasons, as well as heat of pas-
sion (§§ 21(2), (3) & (5) CP 1995) and the aggravating factor of being re-
lated to the victim. The defense requested a one year sentence as an
alternative.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant's unemployment and compulsive alcoholism created ten-
sion in the family home. Defendant asked his mother for money and then
drank at several bars in town. Later in the evening, he returned home to
ask his mother for more money to continue drinking. His father objected
and an argument ensued, in the course of which, defendant stabbed his fa-
ther once in the stomach. Defendant leaped out the window and immedi-
ately summoned a taxi to take his father to the hospital. He was operated
on and his condition improved. However, five days later, his father had a
coughing spell rupturing his injured vena cava, and he died.
Defendant claimed he was drunk and suffered from a phobic anxiety
disorder, accompanied by sentiments of inferiority, timidity, lack of initia-
tive, indecision and intranquility. This disorder either completely or par-
tially diminished his criminal responsibility.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of inflicting injuries on his father without
intent to kill (§§ 147, 148 CP 1995) with the incomplete excuse of alco-
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holic intoxication (§§ 21(1), 20(2) CP 1995) and the mitigating circum-
stance of spontaneous remorse, and the aggravating factor of being related
to the victim. Defendant was sentenced to two years prison.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Pub. Pros., Pl. Def., Prot.
Jur. Sel., Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
PALENCIA PROVINCIAL COURT (PA)
PA-i ANTOLNI CASE
May 27, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
Angel Antoln Reguero (37 years-old, no record) was charged with
homicide (§ 407 CP 1993) with the aggravating circumstance of being re-
lated to the victim (§ 11 CP 1993) and the incomplete excuse of mental ill-
ness (§§ 9(1), 8(1) CP 1993) and requested 8 years prison.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense stipulated to homicide, but alleged complete defense of
insanity (§8(1) CP 1993) and requested acquittal.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
The defendant lived with his mother and his three brothers. Defen-
dant suffered from a somatic delirious mental disorder causing him to be-
lieve he was dying of cancer. He got along with all, except his brother
Manuel. He resented Manuel's gambling addiction. Manuel was also deaf
and difficult to understand.
Defendant and Manuel got into an argument. Defendant grabbed a
knife and stabbed Manuel several times in vital organs . Manuel ran into
the street and fell, dying in a pool of blood.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was found guilty as charged of homicide with the mitigat-
ing circumstance of having a mental disorder which partially affected his
volitional and cognitive capacities. The jury also recommended possible
suspension of part or all of the sentence. The defendant was sentenced to
six years and one day deprivation of liberty.
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Sources of Information
1. Review of procedural documents: P1. Pub. Pros., P1. Def., Rul. Just.
F., Prot. Jur. Sel., Prot. Tr., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Interviews with the President of Palencia Provincial Court and PJ,
Gariel Coullaut Ariflo, and Chief Prosecutor of Palencia Province and Pub.
Pros., Manuel Martfn-Granizo Santamaria, on June 5, 1996, in Palencia
Provincial Court.
3. Gustavo L6pez Mufioz y Larra7, Cr6nica del Primer Juicio ante el
Tribunal del Jurado celebrado en Palencia, el 27 de mayo de 1996 des-
puis de 60 auios de suspensi6n, in OTROSI (1996).
4. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106.
5. Newspaper Articles
1. Blanca Cia, El primer veredicto del jurado reinstauradofue con-
denatorio en un caso de homicidio, EL PAS, May 28, 1996, at :26.
2. Blanca Cia, Puedes tenerproblemas de conciencia, EL PALS, May
28, 1996, at 26.
3. Juicio al Jurado, LA VANGUARDIA, June 2, 1996 (La Semana, at
4-5).
4. Blanca Cia, Juezpor un dia, EL PAS, June 3, 1996, at 32.
5. Blanca Cia, Todo m6s claroy largo, EL PAS, June 3, 1996, at 32.
PALMA DE MALLORCA PROVINCIAL COURT (PM)
PM-1 ALONSO/SCHOTZE CASE
May27, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Juan Carlos Alonso Martin (32 years-
old, no record) and Lothar Gerhard Schiltze (35 years-old, no record) with
bribery of a public official (§§ 391, 387 CP 1973). The public prosecutor
requested two months of jail and a 400,000 pesetas fine. During trial, the
prosecutor amended to charge a violation of §§ 423(1), 421 CP 1995 and
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Summary ofEvidence at Trial
Schiitze, a German national, was owner, and Alonso was the manager
of the chain-store "Sounds and Fashion." The police had begun an.investi-
gation of "Sounds and Fashion," allegedly suspecting them of selling pi-
rating compact discs. On January 7, 1996, the police raided one store, and
seized some 10,000 compact discs.
On January 8, 1996, Schiitze and Alonso met to discuss the investiga-
tion. Alonso called the police to try to arange a meeting that night, which
never resulted. The next day Schiitze instructed Alonso to go the police
station and present them with 200,000 pesetas in an envelope, along with a
letter indicating that the money was a donation for needy, community chil-
dren . The letter was signed by Schlltze, but was written in Spanish by
Alonso at Schiitze's direction.
Schaitze testified that it was customary in Germany to donate money
for philanthropic purposes when opening a new business in a town and that
this was his intent. The defense argued that no prosecution was ever un-
dertaken for any violations of the compact disc laws.
Verdict and Sentence
Both defendants were acquitted.
Sources dflnformation
1. Review of procedural documents: Pl. Pub. Pros., PI. Def., Rul. Just.
F., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg. All documents reprinted in, 1 TRIBUNALES
DE JUSTICIA 37-48 (1997).
2. The author observed the entire trial except jury selection.
3. Interviews with the President of Palma de Mallorca Provincial
Court and PJ, Juan Jos6 L6pez Ortega, Chief Prosecutor of Palma de Mal-
lorca Provincial Court and Pub. Pros., Ladislao Roig, on May 28, 1996, in
Palma de Mallorca Provincial Court; and interviews with Def., Miguel Fe-
liu Bordeu, on May 28, 1996, at his office in Palma de Mallorca. Conver-
sation with the defendant Schiltze, on May 27, 1996, in Palma de Mallorca
Provincial Court.
4. Carmona Ruano & DePail Velasco, supra note 106.
5. Newspaper Articles
1. Expectaci6n en medios juridicos ante el primerjuicio con jurado
en Palma, DIARIO DE MALLORCA, May 27, 1996, at 26.
2. Andreu Manresa, La vista de Palmafue una clase de Derecho,
EL PAiS, May 28, 1996, at 27.
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3. Juan Carlos De la Cal, "Ustedes son la Justicia", EL MUNDO,
May 28, 1996, at 51.
4. Javier E. Olivares, El jurado tard6 tres horas en emitir un vere-
dicto absolutorio, DIARIO DE MALLORCA, May 28, 1996, at 9.
5. Marisa Gohii, Y la Justicia se encarn6, DIARIO DE MALLORCA,
May 28, 1996, at 10.
6. Jos6 Luis Mir6, El primer jurado declara 'no culpables' a los
dos acusados de intentar corromper a un guardia civil, EL DIA DEL
MUNDO DE BALEARES, May 28, 1996, at 10.
7. Jos6 Luis Mir6, "Ustedes son la Justicia", EL DIA DEL MUNDO
DE BALEARES, May 28, 1996, at 11.
8. J. Francisco Mestre, Veredicto de inocencia en el primer juicio
con unjurado popular en Palma, ULTIMA HORA, May 28, 1996, at 11.
10. J. Francisco Mestre, Sorpresa ante la decisi6n del jurado,
ULTIMA HORA, May 28, 1996, at 12.
PM-2 DE RON CASE
February 17-18 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Juan de Ron Cant6 (31 years-old, one
prior conviction) with homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) and attempted forcible
robbery (§§ 237, 242, 15,16 CP 1995) with the aggravating circumstance
of recidivism (§ 22(8) CP 1995) and requested fifteen years prison for the
homicide, eighteen months for robbery, and fifteen million pesetas in dam-
ages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense stipulated to negligent homicide (§ 142(1) CP 1995) and
the mitigating circumstance of being a narcotics addict (§§ 20(2), 21.2 CP
1995). The defense requested two years prison.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
In July 1996, defendant went to the victim's house. He testified that
he had shot up 1/2 gram of cocaine just before going to see the victim. De-
fendant was on probation from an October 1995 conviction for robbery and
had participated in a methadone treatment program for six months. Defen-
dant asked the victim, as he had done many times in the past, for money to
buy cocaine. The victim refused. An argument ensued and defendant
pulled out his knife, stabbing the victim five times. Two of the wounds, in
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the abdomen and neck, caused his death, the other three were characterized
as defense wounds. The fact that furniture was in disarray indicated a
struggle had ensued. Two neighbors responded to the victim's cries for
help but defendant closed the door saying nothing was the matter. The
prosecution claimed defendant then searched the apartment for money, but
was arrested in a closet by the police before he found any.
Defendant claimed he only wanted to intimidate the victim with the
knife, and that the victim first lunged at him, impaling himself in the ab-
domen. Then they both fell on the floor, causing the victim to again im-
pale himself in the neck. Defendant claimed he was under the influence of
cocaine and was suffering from a mental illness which diminished his re-
sponsibility.
Verdict and Judgment
Defendant was convicted of homicide and acquitted on the attempted
robbery. He was sentenced to fifteen years prison.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Publ. Pros., Pl. Def., Obj.
Ver, Prot. Ver., Judg.




The public prosecutor charged Boussaid Nacer (27 years-old, no rec-
ord) with homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with the mitigating circumstance of
spontaneous remorse (§ 21(4) CP 1995).
Pleadings of Defense
The defense stipulated to homicide with additional mitigating circum-
stance of heat of passion (§ 21(3) CP 1995) and insuperable fear (§§ 21(1),
20(6) CP 1995).
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant had an argument with Malek Nasri over a cassette of Ber-
ber music. Later, defendant armed himself with a 20 cm. knife blade and
went to the town of Fontellas from his house in the mountains. He met
Nasri and stabbed him in the heart, killing him. Defendant claimed Nasri
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approached him aggressively and reached into a bag. Defendant thought
he was reaching for a knife and was in fear for his life.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of homicide with the mitigating circum-
stance of spontaneous remorse and was sentenced to ten years prison and
ten million pesetas in damages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Prot.
Ver., Judg.
2. Carmona Ruano & DePail Velasco, supra note 106.
PONTEVEDRA PROVINCIAL COURT (P0)
P0-1 GARCiA CASE
October 8, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jose Garcia Leit6n (40 years-old, no
record) with arson of forest lands (§ 553 bis(c) CP 1973) and requested
two months detention, a fine of one million pesetas and damages of 15,000
pesetas.
Pleadings ofPopular Prosecutor
Representing the Xunta of Galicia, the popular prosecutor proffered
the same charges and requested three months detention and a fine of 1.5
million pesetas.
Pleadings of Defense
Denial. The defense requested acquittal. Later, the defense modified
to admit, in the alternative, violations of infractions (§§ 595,596 CP 1973),
but claimed they were superseded by CP 1995. The defense also claimed
incomplete excuse of drunkenness (§§ 8(1), 9(1) CP 1973) and the miti-
gating circumstance of drunkenness (§ 9(2) CP 1973). The defense re-
quested fines of 100,000 pesetas and 250,000 pesetas if excuse was found
valid, or a detention of one months and one day and a fine of one million
pesetas if only the mitigating circumstance was found to be true.
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Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant was walking home with his two dogs. He set fire to some
bushes, but the dampness caused the fire to extinguish by itself. In total,
one square meter of bushes was burned.
Defendant testified that he was intoxicated that day and did not re-
member his actions.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of setting fire to woodlands (§ 533 bis(e) CP
1973) with the mitigating circumstance of drunkenness (§ 9(2) CP 1973).
Defendant was sentenced to one month and one day detention and a one
million pesetas fine. The imposition of punishment was suspended for two
years in accordance with the jury's verdict. The court also petitioned the
Government to grant amnesty in accordance with the jury's verdict.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: P1. Pub. Pros., P1. Pop. Pros., Pl.
Def, Prot. Tr., Obj. Ver., Prot. ver., Judg.
2. Conversation with President of Pontevedra Provincial Court and PJ,
Luciano Varela Castro, on June 11, 1997, in Pontevedra.
3. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106.
4. Newspaper Articles
1. Santy Mosteiro, Comenz6 en la Audiencia Provincial el proceso
para la designaci6n de los 3.750 jurados populares, DIARIO DE
PONTEVEDRA, Sept. 25, 1995.
2. Santy Mosteiro, La Audiencia Provmcial fue la primera de
Galicia en celebrar la elecci6n dejurados, DIARIO DE PONTEVEDRA, July
22, 1996.
3. Santy Mosteiro, Undo de cada 146pontevedresesformardparte
de la nueva lista del jurado popular, DAR!O DE PONTEVEDRA, Sept. 27,
1996.
4. Santy Mosteiro, El primerjurado popular de Galicia invirti6 mas
de dos horas para emitir un veredicto de culpabilidad, DIARIO DE
PONTEVEDRA, Oct. 9, 1996.
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PO-2 RODRIGUEZ CASE
October 23, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jos6 Ricardo Rodriguez Barros (33
years-old, no record) with trespassing in a dwelling (§ 490(2) CP 1973)
and requested one year jail, a 100,000 pesetas fine, and damages of 65,200
pesetas.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
Same as public prosecutor.
Pleadings of Defense
Simple denial.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
For almost ten years, defendant and his wife had been legally sepa-
rated. In 1995, he had been ordered to leave the family house. However,
in April 1996, defendant broke his way his estranged wife's dwelling. She
defended herself with a harpoon and he screamed loudly. The police came
and arrested defendant.
Verdict and Sentence
After the jury was selected and heard some evidence, the public and
private prosecutors reduced the requested sentence from one year to six
months, and defendant admitted the offense. He was sentenced to six
months jail, a 100,000 pesetas fine, and damages of 65,200 pesetas.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: P1. Publ. Pros., Pl. Pvt. Pros., P1.
Def., Judg.
2. Newspaper Articles
1. El segundo jurado popular de Galicia se disolv16 sin llegar a in-
tervenir, DIARIO DE PONTEVEDRA, Oct. 24, 1996.
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PO-3 AGUETE CASE
November 5-6, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jos6 Manuel Aguete Portabales (46
years-old, 7 prior convictions) with homicide (§ 407 CP 1973) and re-
quested fifteen years prison and 16.2 million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings ofPrivate Prosecutor
The private prosecutor charged murder (§ 406(5) CP 1973) and re-
quested a twenty-five year prison sentence.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal. In the alternative, the defense pled for
a homicide conviction with the mitigating circumstances of imperfect self-
defense (§§(9(1), 10, 8(4) CP 1973), drunkenness (§9(2) CP 1973), lack of
intent to kill (§ 9(4) CP) 1973), and temporary mental disturbance (§§
9(10), 8(1) CP 1973).
Summary of Evidence at Trial
In the early morning, the defendant stabbed Jos6 Luis Garcia Boullosa
with a knife in the chest and back at a bar-restaurant, causing his death. He
also battered Garcia with a chair as he lay on the ground dying. Defendant
had defended himself from an earlier non-lethal attack by the victim. De-
fendant was drunk and suffered from a paranoid personality disorder
which, according to expert witnesses, did not affect his mental or volitional
capacities.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of homicide with the mitigating circum-
stance of drunkenness (§ 9(2) CP 1973). The court found the aggravating
circumstance of recidivism (§ 10(15) CP 1973). Defendant was sentenced
to fifteen years prison and 3.2 million pesetas in damages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Judg.
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PO-4 ABALO CASE
December 12, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jos6 Manuel Abalo Prado (44 years-
old, no record) with trespassing m a dwelling (§ 490(1) CP 1973), and re-
quested three months detention and a fine of 100,000 pesetas
Pleadings ofDefense
Denial. The defense requested dismissal of the case.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant was married to Monserrat Inmaculada P6rez Quintela and
they lived together m an apartment in Cangas. Though legally separated in
1992, defendant continued to live with Pdrez and their son. But, P6rez
changed the locks on the house m January 1996. Defendant entered their
house after their son. Pdrez asked him to leave, but he refu,;ed. Defendant
stayed until February 1996, when he left voluntarily.
Prez testified that she told him to leave and he refused. Defendant
testified that he lived in the house, paid the rent, bought a car for the fam-




1. Review of Procedural Documents: P1. Pub. Pros., P1. Def., Obj.
Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
PO-5 REY CASE
January 13 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jos6 Benito Rey Val (30 years-old, no
record) with omission to render aid (§ 489 CP 1973) and requested one
year jail.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
Same as public prosecutor, except the private prosecutor requested
two years and four months prison.
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Pleadings of Defense
Simple denial.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
At around 12:50 am., defendant was out driving. Despite good illu-
mination, defendant struck Angel Jesfis Mufiiz Rodrfguez, who was cross-
ing the street, throwing him ten meters and causing serious injuries. The
defendant fled the scene. The defendant testified that he did not realize he
hit a person. He knew something struck his car, so he stopped, looked
back and saw nothing.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted as charged and the jury recommended a
suspended sentence. Defendant was sentenced to six months and one day
ofjail, which was suspended for a two year period.
Sources oflnformation
1. Review of procedural documents: Pl. Pub. Pros., P1. Pvt. Pros., P1.
Def., Prot Tr., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Conversation with PJ, Julio C. Picatoste Bobillo, on June 11, 1997,
in Pontevedra Provincial Court.




The public prosecutor charged Francisco Javier Dominguez Alego (32
years, five prior convictions) with negligent homicide (§§ 407, 565(1) &
(5) CP of 1973) and requested four years imprisonment and fifteen million
pesetas in damages.
Pleadings ofPrivate Prosecutor
The private prosecutor charged the defendant with parricide (§ 405
CP 1973), then amended to charge murder (§ 138 CP 1995) with the ag-
gravating circumstances of being related to the victim (§ 23 CP 1995) and
abuse of superiority (§ 22(2) CP 1995). The private prosecutor requested
fifteen years prison and twenty million pesetas in damages.
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Pleadings of Defense
The defense requested a complete acquittal on theory of accident, and
pled the defendant's narcotics addiction as an explanation fbr his five prior
convictions.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant and his wife, with whom he had been married for 12 years,
returned to their apartment in the evening after doing some, shopping. De-
spite defendant's heroin and cocaine addiction, his numerous convictions,
and his methadone treatment and rehabilitation efforts, the couple had
lived without any incidents or complaints of spousal abuse.
As they returned home, defendant got into an argument with Gregorio
Casimiro Bahia over use of a storage room. Defendant became enraged
and his wife tried to calm him. They both entered their apartment. Defen-
dant took a shotgun from under the bed and loaded it. He testified that he
intended to scare Bahia with it. His wife yelled at him, asking him what he
was going to do. Defendant testified as he turned around to confront his
wife, the gun went off, hitting her near the right armpit and killing her, due
to massive loss of blood.
Ballistics experts testified that the right barrel and safety of the shot-
gun were in terrible condition and that any light touching or jostling of the
trigger could cause the right barrel to fire. The victim was killed by such a
discharge of the right barrel. Defendant claimed ignorance to the gun's
condition and that he had no intention of killing his wife.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found defendant guilty of negligently causing his wife's
death and found he had knowledge of the gun's poor working order. He
was sentenced to two years prison and fifteen million pesetas in damages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Pub. Pros., Pl. Pvt. Pros., P1.
Def., Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Interview with President of Salamanca Provincial Court and PJ,
Fernando Nieto Nafria, on June 12, 1997, in Salamanca Provincial Court.
Conversation with Chief Prosecutor of Salamanca Province, and Pub.
Pros., Federico Bello Landrove, on May 20, 1996, m Salamanca Provincial
Court before the trial.
3. Carmona Ruano & DePail Velasco, supra note 106.
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SAN SEBASTIAN PROVINCIAL COURT (SS)
SS-1 L6PEZ CASE
October 1-5, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Antonio Ramon L6pez Perea (33
years-old, no record) with two counts of homicide (§ 407 CP 1973) with
the incomplete excuse of temporary insanity (§§ 9(1), 8(1) CP 1973), and
the aggravating factor of abuse of superiority (§ 10(8) CP 1973) and a
mitigating factor of spontaneous remorse (§§ 9(10), 9(9) CP 1973). The
prosecutor also requested a sixteen year prison sentence.
Pleadings of Prnvate Prosecutors
The private prosecutor charged defendant with unlawful possession of
a weapon (§ 245 CP 1973) and two counts murder by treachery (§ 406 CP
1973) with the aggravating factor of committing the crime at night (§§ 10-
13 CP 1973). The private prosecutor requested thirty years prison for each
of the murders, an additional four years for the weapons charge and forty-
nine million pesetas in damages. A second private prosecutor requested
maximum sentences for both murders and fifty-two million pesetas in
damages. During trial, the private prosecutors dropped the aggravating
factor of committing the crime at night and admitted spontaneous remorse.
Pleadings of the Popular Prosecutor
Representing the City Government of Hernani, the popular prosecutor
charged defendant with two counts of murder and requested thirty years
prison.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense asked for acquittal due to complete excuse of temporary
insanity and, in the alternative, a one year sentence for each homicide with
a partial excuse of temporary insanity.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
On February 7, 1996, defendant had a street fight with four members
of a family that defendant was feuding with. This was just another episode
in that family feud. Thereafter defendant went to his home, took a shot-
gun, loaded it with two cartridges, and went to a bar owned by relatives of
the rival family. During a power outage in the city, defendant entered the
bar and shot a rival family member in the chest, killing him instantly. As
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another member tried to help, defendant shot him in the back, killing him
instantly.
Defendant went home, hid the gun and the cartridges, and was ar-
rested. He was later released due to insufficient evidence. A week later,
defendant confessed to a newspaper reporter and then to an investigative
judge. Defendant claimed he was suffering from a psychic disorder when
he killed the victims.
Defendant had no criminal record but was allegedly a heroin addict
who had been arrested numerous times.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of two counts of homicide with the aggra-
vating circumstance of abuse of superiority, the incomplete excuse of tem-
porary insanity, and a mitigating circumstance of spontaneous remorse. He
was sentenced to twenty years prison and 18.6 million pesetas in damages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Publ. Pros., P1. Pvt. Pros., P1.
Pop. Pros., P1. Def., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Conversations with the PJ, Juan Piqueras Valls, and Pub. Pros.,
Jesfis Maria Izaguirre Guerricagoitia, on June 6, 1997, in San Sebastifin
Provincial Court; and interview with assistant defense counsel, Miguel
Castells Arteche, on June 6, 1997, at Lanziego Restaurant in San Sebas-
tidn.
3. Antonio Maria Lorca Navarrete, Cr6nica del Primer Juicio Oral
con Jurado Celebrado en Guipuzcoa despuis de la Reinstauracicn del
Tribunal del Jurado, in 8 REVISTA DE DERECHO DEL PAlS VASCO 453-69
(1996).
4. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106.
5. Newspaper Articles
1. Pedro Gorospe, La mitad de los candidatos aljurado se excusa
para evitarjuzgar al presunto homicida de dos 'ertzainas', ]EL PAS, Feb.
3, 1997
2. Pablo Ordaz, Miedo a hacerjusticia, EL PAlS, Feb. 9, 1997, at 10.
3. Un tribunal marcadopor la pol mica, EL CORREO, Mar. 7, 1997.
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SS-2 OTEGI CASE
February 24-March 6, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Mikel Otegi Unanue (24 years-old, no
record) with two murder counts (§ 406(1) CP 1973), and two counts of at-
tacks on public officials (§§ 231-232 CP 1973). The public prosecutor
also requested fifty-seven years, eight months and twelve days prison and
twenty-eight million pesetas in restitution. Later, the prosecutor amended
to allege the mitigating circumstance of diminished capacity and requested
fifty-five years and four months prison and a 200,000 pesetas fine.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
Same as public prosecutor, except the private prosecutor requested
sixty years prison. The private prosecutor later reduced pleading to fifty-
nine years. Restitution of fifty million pesetas was requested.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled for acquittal based on complete excuse of temporary
insanity due to drunkenness and extreme emotional disturbance caused by
Basque Police (Ertzaintza) harassment (§ 8.1 CP 1973). In the alternative,
the defense pled homicide (§ 407 CP 1973) with the partial excuse of di-
minished capacity (§ 9.1 CP 1973) with six months and one day incarcera-
tion.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant was a sympathizer of "Jarrai," the youth wing of the "Co-
ordinadora Abertzale Socialista," a nationalist group sympathizing with the
ETA terrorist organization. He testified that he was constantly harassed by
the ertzaintza (police). His brothers testified that the police would always
park on the road to their house when defendant was home, but never when
he was out of town. In the past, defendant had been beaten up by the
Basque police and had pressed charges, but they were subsequently dis-
missed. Defendant also had been involved in street demonstrations when
some Basque nationalists had been arrested in France.
In regard to the incident at trial, defendant testified that after returning
in the afternoon from driving a truck to Germany, he played cards with
friends and drank. That night he went to a rock festival and continued
drinking beer. Early in the morning he went to Ordizia, picked up his
niece, and went to a bar where he had breakfast. His niece testified that he
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was very drunk. The owner of the bar testified he did not act drunk. A
Basque policeman (ertzaina) in civilian clothes came into the restaurant.
The policeman and the owner testified that defendant yelled at the police-
man. The owner told the ertzaina to ignore him and leave, which the po-
liceman did. Defendant followed him outside insulting him, then slugged
him m the face. When the police officer got into his car and locked the
door, the defendant kicked his door.
Defendant and his niece left the bar. Defendant dropped his niece off
in Ordizia and proceeded home, where defendant's family lived in a farm-
house on a mountain overlooking Ordizia. Defendant testified he saw a
police car on the road home. But, defendant drove on and went straight to
bed. He testified that, when he heard his dog barking he got out of bed and
went through the barn to the street. Two policemen were at the door. An
argument started. The policemen informed defendant that he was under
arrest. (Apparently they had followed him home and noticed erratic driv-
ing.) Defendant told them to leave. Defendant testified that one officer
took out a pistol and pointed it at him.
Defendant retreated into his house, loaded a shotgun with three car-
tridges, and returned to confront the ertzaintza. He claimed one officer
again pointed his gun at him when he "blacked out." He awoke to find two
police officers dead on the ground near the police car.
Forensic medical experts testified that the officers hail been shot at
close range, and died instantly. According to a neighbor, defendant kicked
at their bodies and muttered insults in Basque. After the killings, defen-
dant called police on the police car radio, saying: "A fanner has killed two
sepoys because of their politics." He was arrested at the scene.
Three hours after the killings, a blood test showed that defendant had
a .059 blood alcohol content. Forensic clinic directors testified that defen-
dant had a low capacity for controlling his aggressive impulses and that he
suffered a "paranoid personality disorder," which "slightly or moderately
attenuated his responsibility" at the time of the killings. Defense psychia-
trists agreed, but opined that defendant's responsibility was "very reduced"
or "annulled."
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found defendant not guilty of the murders on grounds of
complete excuse of temporary insanity His acquittal was overturned on
appeal by the TSJ of the Basque Country on June 27, 1997.
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Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Pub. Pros., Pl. Pvt. Pros., Pl.
Def., Prot. Tr., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg. Judgment also pdblished as, La
Sentencia del 'caso Otegi, EL PAiS, Mar. 12, 1997, at 23.
2. Conversation with Def., Miguel Castells Arteche, on June 6 1997,
at Lanziego Restaurant in San Sebastidn.
3. Newspaper Articles
1. Pedro Gorospe, La mitad de los candidatos aljurado se excusa
para evitarjuzgar alpresunto homicida de dos 'erizainas', EL PAlS, Feb.
3, 1997.
2. Pablo Ordaz, Miedo a hacerjusticia, EL PAS, Feb. 9, 1997, at 10.
3. Aurora Intxausti, Presentan alegaciones otros 19 preseleccio-
nados para ser jurados de un presunto homicida de dos 'ertzainas, EL
PAS, Feb. 17, 1994.
4. J.L. Barberia, Habrd juicio por el asesinato de dos 'erizainas'
tras hallar 20jurados aptos, EL PAS, Feb. 18, 1997, at 15.
5. Eljuicio de Itsasondo por el asesinato de dos erizainas comienza
magiana, EL CORREO, Feb. 23, 1997.
6. Aurora Intxausti, Unjurado popular juzga desde hoy alpresunto
asesino de dos 'ertzainas'; EL PAS, Feb. 25, 1997.
7 Ivan Orio, Otegi dice que tuvo una fuerte discusi6n' con los dos
ertzainas antes de disparar. 'Hubo gritos y me encontrd con dos cuerpos
en el suelo', asegura el acusado, EL CORREO, Feb. 25, 1997.
8. Comenz6 eljuicio por el 'caso Ttsasondo' tras elegirse el Jurado,
ABC, Feb. 25, 1997, at 23.
9. Ivan Orio, El jurado presencia en el caserfo de Otegi la recon-
struccidn del crimen, EL CORREO, Feb. 26, 1997
10. Javier Peyalba, El jurado, en el lugar del crimen, DIARIO
VASCO, Feb. 26, 1997.
11. Aurora Intxausti, Otegi alega tener lagunas mentales al recon-
struir el doble crimen de Itsasondo, EL PAS, Feb. 26, 1997.
12. Ivan Orio, "No se le notaba que estuviera borracho" dice la
duefia del bar donde desayun6 Otegi, EL CORREO, Feb. 27, 1997.
13. Javier Peyalba, 'No se le notaba que estuviera borracho,' ase-
gura la duelia del bar donde almorz6 el inculpado, DIARIO VASCO, Feb.
27, 1997.
14. Aurora Intxausti, Otegi llam6 'hios de puta' a los 'erizainas'
que mat6, EL PAS, Feb. 27, 1997.
15. Ivan Orio, Otegi dio positivo en una prueba de alcoholemia tres
horas despuds del crimen, EL CORREO, Feb. 28, 1997.
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16. Javier Peyalba, Mikel Otegi dio positivo tres horas despuds de
haber disparado contra los dos ertzainas, DIARIO VASCO, Feb. 28, 1997.
17. Javier Peyalba, Los familiares de los dos ertzainas laman
asesino a Mikel Otegi y abandonan la sala, DIARIO VASCO, Mar. 4, 1997.
18. Ivan Orio, Familiares de los ertzanas llaman 'asesino' al
acusado y abandonan la sala, EL CORREO, Mar. 4, 1997.
19 Ivan Orio, Los forenses creen que Otegi tiene 'trastornos para-
noides 'y un escaso control de su agresividad, EL CORREO, Mar. 4, 1997
20. Aurora Intxausti, Discrepanczas sobre el estado mental de Otegi
cuando mat6 a dos 'ertzamas'; EL PAfS, Mar. 4, 1997, at 20.
21. Javier Peyalba, Fue un acto 'vii y cobarde,' movido por el
'odio' de Otegi hacia la Ertzazntza, afirman las acusaciones, DIARIO
VASCO, Mar. 5,1997, at 6.
22. Ivan Orio, Las acusaciones dicen que Otegi cometi6 un 'acto
vil'por su 'odio' hacia la Ertzaintza, EL CORREO, Mar. 5, 1997.
23. Ivan Orio, El fiscal pide 56 a&os para Otegi y dice que padece
un 'trastorno intermitente', EL CORREO, Mar. 5, 1997.
24. Javier Peyalba, Eljurado delibera desde anoche sobre la culpa-
bilidad o mocencia de Mikel Otegi, DIARIO VASCO, Mar. 6, 1997, at 8.
25. Javier Peyalba, El jurado absuelve a Otegi porque no era
'duefto de sus actos' cuando mat6 a dos ertzainas, DIARIO VASCO, Mar. 7,
1997, at 3.
26. Aingeru Munguia, 'Es para volverse loco, 'dice elpadre de uno
de los ertzanas muertos en Itsasondo, DIARIO VASCO, Mar. 7, 1997, at 4.
27. Estupor e indignact6n en los partidos vascos por la absoluci6n,
DIARIO VASCO, Mar. 7, 1997, at 5.
28. Un tribunal marcado por la poldmica, EL CORREO, Mar.
7,1997
29. Javier Mufioz, Eljurado deja libre al autor de la muerte de dos
ertzainas porque 'no era dueflo de sus actos', EL CORREO, Mar. 7, 1997.
30. Los partidos descalifican un fallo 'injusto' que avala la 'im-
pundad' de los radicales, EL CORREO, Mar. 7, 1997.
31. I. Zubiria, 'El jurado ha tenido miedo, ' advierte la madre de
uno de los ertzanas muertos, EL CORREO, Mar. 7, 1997.
32. 'Han asesmado por segunda vez a nuestros compalieros' dicen
los sindicatospolicales, EL CORREO, Mar. 7, 1997.
33. Carlos L6pez, El crimen de Itsasondo queda impune, EL
PERI6DICO, Mar. 7, 1997
34. Asombro por la actitud de lajusticia en Euskadi, EL PERIODICO,
Mar. 7, 1997
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35. Javier Peyalba, El magistrado deljuicio a Otegi cree que fiscal
y acusaci6n erraron en sus planteamientos, DIARIO VASCO, Mar. 8, 1997,
at 3.
36. Javier Mufio, El Gobierno y el PNV abogan por reformar elju-
rado para que no se repitan veredictos 'absurdos', EL CORREO, Mar. 8,
1997.
37. Javier Mufioz; Barragdn pide al Consejo del Poder Judicial que
investigue a Bldnquez, EL CORREO, Mar. 8, 1997.
38. Javier Mufioz Eljuez del 'caso Itsasondo' reconoce que el ve-
redicto deljurado ha creado alarma social, EL CORREO, Mar. 8, 1997.
39. I. Zubiria, 'Prefiero ser la madre de Iflaki que la madre de un
asesino', EL CORREO, Mar. 8, 1997.
40. C. Valdecantos & B. De la Cuadra, Losjuristas yen casi impo-
sible que el veredicto de absolucidn de Otegi pueda revocarse, EL PAlS,
Mar. 8, 1997.
41. C. Valdecantos, El PP quiere linitar las competencias delju-
rado, EL PAS, Mar. 8, 1997.
42. Raimundo Castro, El Gobierno cambiard la Ley del Jurado por
el 'caso Otegi', EL PERIODICO, Mar. 8, 1997.
43. Carlos L6pez Eljuez hace responsable delfallo a la acusacidn,
ELPERIODICO, Mar. 8, 1997.
44. Ferran Gerhard, Mariscal trabaja ya en la nueva Ley del Ju-
rado, EL PERIODICO, Mar. 9, 1997.
45. Javier Mufioz, Hay datos para pensar que Inbo miedo, EL
CORREO, Mar. 9, 1997.
46. La Fiscaliapuede basar su recurso en el caso Otegui en que no
se hizo calificaci6n alternativa como homicidio, ABC, Mar. 9, 1997, at 25.
47. Belloch acusa al PP de aprovechar el 'caso Otegi'para acabar
con eljurado, EL CORREO. Mar. 10, 1997.
48. M.G., El dificil rodaje del jurado popular, EL PAS, Mar. 10,
1997, at 18.
49. El fiscal desea recurrr el 'caso Otegi 'por error del juez al in-
struir aljurado, EL PAS, Mar. 11, 1997.
50. Anabel Di6z, Belloch critica la falta de informes midicos, EL
PAS, Mar. 11, 1997.
51. Cientos de ertzainas reclaman la condena del 'asesino con-
victo'de Itsasondo, EL CORREO, Mar. 11, 1997.
52. Aingeru Munguia, Un millar de erizainaspide en Donostia que
se hagajusticia con los dos agentes muertos en Itsasondo, DIARIO VASCO,
Mar. 11, 1997, at4.
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53. Magistrados consideran que el acta de votaci6n del jurado tiene
irregularidades, DIARIo VASCO, Mar. 11, 1997, at 6.
54. Javier Mufioz, El Poder Judicial abre una investigaci6n sobre
la crisis de la Audiencia donostiarra, EL CORREO, Mar. 12, 1997.
55. Javier Mufioz, El juez del 'caso Itsasondo' afirma que Mikel
Otegi merece ser condenado por doble homicidio, EL CORREO, Mar. 12,
1997
56. Aurora Intxausti, El recurso del 'caso Otegi' se basard en la
falta de elementos de convicci6n deljurado, EL PAS, Mar. 12, 1997, at 23.
57 Camilo Valdecantos, El PP pide al Gobierno que excluya del
jurado los delitos contra la autoridad y sus agentes, EL PAS, Mar. 12,
1997, at 22.
58. B. De la Cuadra, El Poder Judicial investiga a la justicia
guipuzcoana, EL PAS, Mar. 12, 1997, at 22.
59. Mariscal no cree que el jurado de Otegi actuase por ideas
politicas, ELMUNDO, Mar. 13, 1997.
60. Arzalluz cree que eljurado que absolvi6 a Otegi lo hizo por sus
ideas politicas, EL PAS, Mar. 13, 1997.
61. Javier Mufioz La Fiscalia pide explicaciones por las criticas
deljuez del 'caso Itsasondo', EL CORREO, Mar. 14, 1997.
62. Javier Mufio, La Audiencia convulsa, EL CORREO, Mar. 16,
1997.
63. El 70% de los vascos cree que losjueces actfian con miedo, EL
MUNDO, Mar. 16, 1997.
64. Javier Mufioz, La acusaci6n particular del 'caso Itsasondo' re-
curre hoy elfallo, EL CORREO, Mar. 17, 1997.
65. Cristina Torres, Martiarena dice que Otegi ha pedido el
pasaporte para irse del Pals Vasco, EL CORREO, Mar. 21, 1997.
66. El fiscal dice que el juez mstruy6 de forma inadecuada al ju-
rado del caso Itsasondo, DIARIO VASCO, Mar. 22, 1997.
67 Javier Mufioz, La Policia pone elpasaporte de Otegi a disposi-
ci6n deljuzgado, EL CORREO, Mar. 22, 1997.
68. Jos6 Luis Barberia, El fiscal recurre la absoluti6n de Otegi por
'infracci6n de ley' y 'quebrantamiento de normas', EL PAlS, Mar. 22,
1997, at 19.
69 El 60% de los vascos cree que Otegi fue absuelto pormiedo a
represalias, EL CORREO, Apr. 5, 1997.
70. Carmen Gurruchaga & Juan Carlos Escudier, La ca6tica ac-
tuaci6n deljurado del 'caso Otegi', EL MUNDo, Apr. 22, 1997, at 6-7.
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71. Juristas afirman que eljurado en el caso Otegi ha delinquido al
revelar la deliberacin, DIARIO VASCO, Apr. 23, 1997.
72. Carmen Gurruchaga, Divergencias entre los jueces sobre si es
posible anular la decisz6n deljurado, EL MUNDO, Apr. 23, 1997.
73. Javier Mufioz, Zorrilla cita alpleno del Tribunal Superior para
ver los recursos del 'caso Itsasondo', EL CORREO, May 9, 1997.
74. El fiscal cree prudente que cmco jueces vean la apelacidn del
'caso Itsasondo, EL CORREO, May 10, 1997.
75. Aurora Intxausti, Otegi volverd a serjuzgado por matar a dos
'ertzainas', EL PA S, June 28, 1997, at 13.
76. A. Guenaga, Satisfacci6n de las familias por el fallo, EL PALS,
June 28, 1997, at 13.
77. B. De la Cuadra, Divisidn entre los juristas sobre el nuevo ju-
rado vascopara el 'caso Otegi', EL PAlS, June 28, 1997, at 14.
78. Eljurado inventa una duda y no se sabe qud hizo para szuer-
arla, EL PAfS, June 28, 1997, at 14.
79. Los jueces admited alfin que Otegi se hafugado y ordenan su
detenci6n, LAVANGUARDIA, July 8, 1997
SS-3 FERNANDEZ/FERNANDEZIRIONDO CASE
May 26- June 10, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Roberto Ferndndez Castaflares and his
son Ifaki Fernndez Tena with murder (§ 139(1) CP 1995) and requested
seventeen years imprisonment and ten million pesetas restitution. The
prosecutor also charged Josu Endika Iriondo Estenaga with a crime against
the administration of justice (§ 451(2) CP 1995) and requested three years
imprisonment.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
Same pleadings as public prosecutor, except the private prosecutor
requested twenty years imprisonment for Roberto and Ifiaki Fernd.ndez, and
three years prison for Iriondo. The private prosecutor also requested four-
teen million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Defense
Acquittal. All defendants denied culpability.
19981
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant Endika was cleaning his land with defendants Roberto and
iaki when the victim, Hilarlo Fraile Nadador, approached. Fraile angrily
and repeatedly demanded that Endika ask defendants Roberto and Ifiaki,
who were father and son, to return two axes. The victim kept insulting fa-
ther and son; whereupon, Ifiaki showed Endika the handle of a knife he
carried while making a threatening comment about Fraile to E, ndika.
Later, father and son allegedly went to Fraile's hut. Roberto allegedly
called for the victim to come out , then hit him with an ax butt. When
Fraile fell, the son allegedly stabbed hun twice. Returning to their house,
the father told Ifiaki to make sure Fraile was dead. The son returned and
stabbed him twice more, killing him.
Roberto and Ifiaki deny taking part in Fraile's killing. They reported
finding him dead and gave statements to the police denying their complic-
ity However, Endika testified to their guilt in the killing.
Psychiatrists testified that Ifiaki was a violent, aggressive person with





1. Review of Procedural Documents: P1. Pub Pros., Pl. Pvt. Pros., P1.
Def.
2. Conversations with Defs., Idoia L6pez Araiz and Jesis Sorabilla,
on June 6, 1997, at San Sebastifin Provincial Court.
3. Newspaper Articles:
1. Cristina Torres, Cinco horas de interrogatorio no bastaron para
la elecci6n de unjurado en GuipiLzcoa, EL CORREO, May 27, 1997.
2. Cristina Torres, 'Tenia miedo de que me matasen', EL CORREO,
May 30, 1997.
3. Cristina Torres, No me explico la reacci6n de Endika; no debe
ser una buena persona, EL CORREO, May 31, 1997.
4. Javier Penalba, Los peritos destacan el carecter violento de uno
de los acusados en el crimen de Eibar, DIARIO VASCO, June 6, 1997, at 16.
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SEVILLA PROVINCIAL COURT (SE)
SE-1 CORRO CASE
Sentence December 3, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Juan Antonio Corro Mart'inez (15
years-old, no record) with homicide (§ 407 CP 1973) and requested a
fourteen year prison sentence and twenty million pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor charged defendant with murder (§ 406(1) &
(5) CP 1973) and requested a thirty year prison sentence and forty million
pesetas in damages.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense pled infliction of injuries (§§ 420, 421(1) CP 1973) and
negligent homicide (§§ 565(1) & (2), 407 CP 1973) with the incomplete
excuse of temporary mental disturbance (§ 9(1), 8 CP 1973), and the miti-
gating circumstance of diminished capacity (§§ 9(10), 9(1), 8(1) CP 1973).
Summary of Evidence at Trial
The defendant stabbed Francisco Rodriguez Yffiez five times with a
knife, causing his death. Defendant claimed that Y~flez first tried to stran-
gle him, so he drew the knife and stabbed Yfifiez in self-defense.
Verdict and Sentence
The defendant was convicted of murder with treachery (§ 139 CP
1995). He was sentenced to fifteen years prison with damages assessed at
eleven million pesetas. The verdict was later modified to homicide, and
the sentence modified to thirteen years prison by the TSJ of Andalucia on
February 12, 1997.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Obj. Ver., Copy of Questions
Asked by the Jury, Judg., Dec. TSJ.
2. Interview of President of Sevilla Provincial Court and PJ, Miguel
Carmona Ruano, on June 16, 1997, in Sevilla Provincial Court.
3. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106.
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SE-2 GARCiA CASE
May 19-23, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Francisco Garcia Adame (42 years-old,
no record) with homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) and requested a twelve year
prison sentence and damages of fifteen million pesetas.
Pleadings of Defense
Acquittal. Alternatively, defendant pled guilt to negligent homicide
(§ 142 CP 1995) with the excuses of temporary insanity, drug addiction,
and self-defense (§§ 20(1),(2) & (4) CP 1995). Also, in the alternative, de-
fendant alleged these excuses as mitigating circumstances.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant testified to having a drug addiction for around twenty
years. In the afternoon, defendant said he bought three heroin papers from
Manuel Lifian Arric6n, an acquaintance from whom he occasionally
bought drugs. Defendant ingested some of the drugs and realized they
were of poor quality. He looked for Lifian and found him the next morning
at square where drug addicts hung out.
Defendant testified that he confronted Lifian about the bad drugs and
demanded his 3,000 pesetas back. Lifian said he had spent it. They began
pushing and shoving. Defendant said he turned to go, but Lifian came after
him with a knife. Defendant pulled out a knife and stabbed Lifian in the
heart, killing him. Defendant claimed he was aiming for Liian's left arm,
since Lifian had his right hand in a cast. A knife was found in the victim's
belt under his body A witness said the victim had hit the defendant with
his cast four or five times and threatened to kill the defendant.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) with the in-
complete excuse of diminished capacity due to drug consumption and drug
addiction (§§21(1), 20(2) CP 1995). He was sentenced to seven years
prison and fifteen million pesetas in damages.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Pl. Publ. Pros., PI. Def., Prot.
Tr., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
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2. Interview of PJ, Antonio Gil Merino, on June 16, 1997, in Sevilla
Provincial Court
3. Carmona Ruano & DePail Velasco, supra note 106.
TERUEL PROVINCIAL COURT
TE-1 ANGUI/GARCiA CASE
April 7, 10, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Cristobal Angui Dominguez (41 years-
old, no record) with conditional threats (Q 493(1) CP 1973) and theft
(§§514, 515 CP 1973) and requested a two year sentence for the threats
and four months for the theft. Virginia Garcia Miravete (16 years-old, no
record) was charged with theft with the complete or partial excuse of insu-
perable fear (§§ 10(8), 9(1) CP 1973) and the mitigating circumstance of
being ajuvenile (§ 9(3) CP 1973) and with the aggravating circumstance of
abuse of confidence (§10(9) CP 1973). A 125,000 pesetas fine was re-
quested.
Pleadings of Defense
Defendant Angui denied the charges completely. Defendant Garcia
admitted the theft but alleged duress, through insuperable fear caused by a
death threat.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant Garcia testified that defendant Angui accosted her. Alleg-
edly, Angui pulled a knife and threatened to kill her if she did not steal
money from "some gypsies with whom she worked." Two days later, de-
fendant waited for her outside Oliver Borja's house after instructing her to
steal money for him. Garcia testified that she stole 625,000 pesetas from
the Borja house and gave it to Angui because she was scared to death.
When she was confronted about the missing money she first lied that she
had put it in the bank, and then admitted she had stolen it at Angui's be-
hest
Angui denied he had induced or threatened Garcia to take the money.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury acquitted Angui of all charges, but convicted Garcia of theft
with the aggravating circumstance of abuse of confidence and the mitigat-
ing circumstance of being ajuvenile. She was fined 125,000 pesetas.
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Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Rul. Just. F., Obj. Ver., Judg.
2. Conversation with the Secretary of the Court, Daniel Sfinchez
Clemente, on June 23, 1997, in Teruel Provincial Court.
VALENCIA PROVINCIAL COURT (V)
V-1 MILLAN CASE
May 27-28, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Antonio Millhn Mallor (54 years-old,
no prior record) with trespassing m a dwelling (§ 490(2) CP 1973). The
prosecutor also requested a one year jail term, a 200,000 pesetas fine, and
damages of 75,000 pesetas.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
Same charges as public prosecutor. The private prosecutor requested
punishment of four years, two months and one day of jail, a 500,000 pese-
tas fine, and damages of 2.08 million pesetas.
Pleadings of Defense
Acquittal.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant had a business and intimate relationship with Hilaria Pe6n
Garcia which had deteriorated in the months before the incident. Prosecu-
tion witnesses testified that defendant came to Pe6n's house where she
lived with her daughters. From the garden, he asked her to open the door.
After silence as a response, defendant broke the living room window and
entered. He cut himself in the head. Then holding a piece of glass, he
threatened the dwelling's occupants and allegedly tried to assault one
daughter who was protected by her mother. Friends of Pe6n forced defen-
dant out of the house and the police were called.
When defendant was outside he took a hammer and damaged Pe6n's
automobile parked in front. Defendant claimed he came to Pe6n's house to
retrieve televisions which he had paid for and some of his clothing. He
was allowed to enter, but once inside Pe6n's residence, he was attacked
with an iron bar, which fractured his skull and other areas. He denied tres-
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passing. Defendant also wanted to prove that he was the father of Peon's
daughters.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant convicted as charged. The jury recommended a partial
clemency. Defendant was sentenced to one year jail and a 300,000 pese-
tas fine. Damages of 75,000 pesetas were awarded.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Ord. Tr., Pl. Pub. Pros., Pl. Pvt.
Pros., Pl. Def., Rul. Just. F., Prot. Jur. Sel., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Interviews with the President of Valencia Provincial Court and PJ,
Juan Luis de la Rua Moreno, and Pub. Pros., Felisa Alc.ntara Barbany, on
May 30, 1996, in Valencia Provincial Court.
3. Newspaper Articles
1. Juan Carlos De la Cal, "Ustedes son la Justicia", EL MUNDO,
May 28, 1996, at 51.
2. Sara Velert; Valencia, seis jurados recusados, El Pats, May 28,
1996, at 27.
3. Sara Velert, El jurado de Valencia condena aI acusado de al-
lanamiento de morada, EL PAfS, May 29, 1996, at 30.
4. Teresa Laguna, El Jurado emiti6 un duro veredicto de culpabili-
dad, sin condena condicional, LAS PROVNCIAS, May 29, 1996, at 44.
5. Primer culpable del jurado popular, DIARIO 16 VALENCIA, May
29, 1996, at 14.
6. Yolanda Laguna, El primerjurado de Valencia declara culpable
al acusado, aunque recomienda el indulto parcial, LEVANTE, May 29,
1996, at 25.
7. Teresa Laguna, Los juristas detectan un error en el veredicto del
primer Jurado valenciano, LAS PROVINCIAS, May 20,1996, at 37.
8. El juez matiza la decisi6n del primer jurado de Valencia, EL
PAiS, June 1, 1996, at 32.
9. Salvador Enguix, Juicio al Jurado, LA VANGUARDIA, June 2,
1996, (La Semana, at 4-5).
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VALLADOLID PROVINCIAL COURT (VA)
VA-I LLANOS CASE
June 3-7, 1996
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jos6 Antonio Llanos Mateo (45 years-
old, no record) with murder (§ 406 CP 1973) with the aggravating circum-
stances of premeditation, treachery and excessive brutality. Originally, the
prosecutor requested thirty years prison and fifteen million pesetas in dam-
ages, but reduced his plea to fifteen years at the end of the trial's eviden-
tiary portion.
Pleadings of Defense
Defendant pled guilty to homicide (§ 407 CP 1973) with the mitigat-
ing circumstances of heat of passion, lack of mtentionality, drunkenness,
and spontaneous remorse (§§ 9(2), (4), (8) & (9) CP 1973). He requested
an eight year prison sentence and fifteen million pesetas in damages.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant married the victim, Maria de los Angeles Estudillo Ruiz, in
Granada. Evidence was produced that both defendant and victim swore at
the Virgin of Anguish altar to remain faithful to the other or else the be-
trayed could kill the betrayer.
The couple moved to Spain and two children were born. Defendant
had trouble finding work and began drinking. The victim worked two jobs
to support the family. In 1992, the marriage entered into crisis. By June
1992, the victim began separation proceedings. In May 1993, defendant
and victim sought counseling, though defendant was paranoid about the
counseling.
Defendant claimed he had sexual relations with the victim's sister,
Monserrat, on several occasions in October 1993. He produced documents
signed by Monserrat, confirming their acts. Montserrat denied this and
testified that defendant had her only sign blank pieces of paper. In July
1994, the victim finalized a decree of separation giving her the family
house and care of the children and awarding child support to be paid by de-
fendant. In September 1995, defendant was finally evicted and the locks
were changed. On this date, he allegedly came drunk to the house, van-
dalized it, threatened to kill the victim, and demanded his things be put on
the street.
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The victim began seeing another man. The prosecution presented
evidence to show that defendant hatched a plan to kill her in November
1995. Defendant gathered together the Virgdn de Angustias oath, the al-
leged declaration of Monserrat, and pictures of Monserrat and his children
and spent the day m several bars drinking. One bartender heard defendant
suggest that his wife would die. About the time the victim was due to
come home, defendant allegedly cut the electric wires on a street near their-
house and waited. When the victim was leaving the house for her second
job at 7:00 p.m., defendant allegedly attacked her with a sharp object and
then bludgeoned her in the head after she was already mortally wounded.
She bled to death in the street. Defendant went home, took the documents
and pictures, and turned himself in.
Defendant claimed he went back to his wife's house to retrieve per-
sonal items when he ran into her. She cursed at him, and then pushed him
and knocked him down. He had been drinking all day and was drunk, so
became enraged. He also alleged that she had paraded around in bars with
her new boyfriend which hurt him. He began beating her with something
he picked up off the ground. He did not mean to kill her. Once he saw she
was bleeding, he turned himself into a police station in an adjoining town.
Defendant claimed that he had often threatened to kill his wife, but this
was just his way of talking.
Verdict and Sentence
The jury found defendant guilty of homicide with the mitigating cir-
cumstances of mildly diminished capacity due to alcohol and spontaneous
remorse. They recommended a suspended sentence. The judge sentenced
him to fifteen years prison and twenty million pesetas in damages.
Sources ofInformation
1. Review of procedural documents: Pub.Pros.PI., Def. Pl., Rul. Just.
F., Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. The author observed the readings of the pleadings, opening state-
ments, most of the evidentiary portion of the trial, and the closing argu-
ments of the parties on June 3-5, 1996.
3. Conversation with the PJ, Jos6 Mifiambres Flores, and Interview
with Chief Prosecutor of Valladolid Province, and Pub. Pros., Luis Maria
Delgado L6pez, on June 4, 1996, in Valladolid Provincial Court. Tele-
phone Conversation with PJ on June 7, 1996.
4. Carmona Ruano & DePafil Velasco, supra note 106.
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5. Newspaper articles
1. El 'crimen de Rueda' maugura hoy el primer juiclo con jurado
en Valladolid, ELNORTE DE CASTILLA, June 3, 1996, at 5.
2. Juan Carlos Le6n, Siete hombres y dos mujeres dic.fardn el vere-
dicto en el primer juicto con jurado, EL NORTE DE CASTILLA, June 4,
1996, at 3.
3. Ifligo Arrue, El homicida de Rueda y su ex exposa se dieron li-
cencia mutua para matarse en caso de adulterio, EL MUNDO DE
VALLADOLID, June 4, 1996, at 7.
4. Ifiigo Arrue, 'Paito' anunc16 a su compafiero de residencia que
su ex mujer 'no comeria ese aflo el turr6n', EL MUNDO DE VALLADOLID,
June 5, 1996, at 9.
5. Juan Carlos Le6n, Josj Antonio Llanos anunci6 que su mujer no
comeria el turr6n, EL NORTE DE CASTILLA, June 5, 1996, at 7.
6. Ifligo Arrue, Los forenses dicen que Paito mat6 con 2 armas, EL
MUNDO DE VALLADOLID, June 6,1996, at 10.
7 Ifiigo Arrue, Uno de los miembros deljurado era el tendero de la
fallecida en Medina, EL MUNDO DE VALLADOLID, June 7, 1996, at 9.
8. Juan Carlos Le6n, Eljurado decidird la culpabilidad de 'Palto'
con 54preguntas, EL NORTE DE CASTILLA, June 7, 1996, at 9.
9. Ifiigo Arrue, El jurado dice que 'Paito' mat6 a su mujer en
estado de embriaguez, con saila y premeditaci6n, EL MUNDO DE
VALLADOLID, June 8, 1996.
10. Juan Carlos Le6n, El jurado declara a 'Paito' culpable de
haber dado muerte a su ex mujer, EL NORTE DE CASTILLA, June 8, 1996, at
3.
11. Juan Carlos Le6n, 'Paito, ' condenado a 15 alos de prisi6n por
el 'crimen de Rueda', EL NORTE DE CASTILLA, June 13, 1996.
12. Juan Carlos Le6n, 'El jurado nos libera de una responsabili-
dad', ELNORTE DE CASTILLO, June 16, 1996, at 10-11.
VITORIA PROVINCIAL COURT (VI)
VI-1 REY CASE
May 5-9, 1997
Pleadings of Public Prosecutor
The public prosecutor charged Jos6 Manuel Rey Rivadulla (30 years-
old, no record) with homicide (§ 138 CP 1995) and requested ten years
imprisonment. In the alternative, negligent homicide (§ 142 CP 1995) and
five years imprisonment was requested. During trial, the prosecutor re-
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duced pleadings to negligent homicide and eighteen months prison, or mis-
demeanor negligent homicide (§§ 621(2), 142 CP 1995). The other alter-
native pleading was negligence and the infliction of wounds, either as a
felony (§ 147(1) CP 1995)) or as a misdemeanor (§§ 617, 77 CP 1995),
with a 60,000 pesetas fine or six weekends of detention.
Pleadings of Private Prosecutor
The private prosecutor pled homicide with aggravating factor of abuse
of superiority (§ 22(2) CP 1995) and requested fourteen years imprison-
ment and forty million in damages. The prosecutor also requested a civil
judgment against the insurance company "La Equitativa" and the owner of
the Discotheque "La Isla."
Pleadings of Defense
Accident. Acquittal.
Pleadings of Civil Defendants
The civil defendants requested acquittal, and in the alternative, eleven
million pesetas in damages.
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant was the bouncer at the discotheque "La Isla." The victim
was a chronic alcoholic who had 30 run-ins with the police within the pre-
ceding six months. The victim tried to gain entry to "La Isla" at around
midnight. Defendant prevented his entry. Witnesses said he threw the
victim down on the sidewalk twice. Defendant testified that the victim
threw himself down. The victim died eighteen hours later in the hospital
of a fractured skull and brain trauma.
Verdict and Sentence
Defendant was convicted of grossly negligent homicide (§ 142 CP
1995) and the jury recommended the sentence be suspended. He was sen-
tenced to one year in prison and eleven million pesetas in damages to be
paid by the insurance company. Prison sentence was suspended for two
years.
Sources of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Obj. Ver., Prot. Ver., Judg.
2. Conversation with Secretary of Vitoria Provincial Court, Maria
Lourdes Ronda Arauzo, on June 4, 1997, in Vitoria Provincial Court.
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3. Newspaper Articles
1. A.M., El primer jurado popular de Alava saldrd de una lista de
20 hombres y 26 mujeres, EL CORREO, Apr. 2, 1997.
2. R.C., El fiscal rebaja a 18 meses su petici6n para el acusado de
homicidio en el 'caso La Isla', EL CORREO, May 7, 1997.
3. R.C., Tiempo de veredicto, EL CORREO, May 8, 1997.
4. R.C., El jurado declara culpable de homicidio imprudente al
acusado del 'caso La Isla', EL CORREO, May 9, 1997




The public prosecutor charged Jesfis Dones Gil (31 years-old, no rec-
ord) with homicide (§ 407 CP 1973) with the incomplete excuse of dimin-
ished capacity (§§ 8(1), 9(1) CP 1973) and the aggravating factor of abuse
of superiority (§ 10(8) CP 1973), and requested eight years and one day
imprisonment.
Pleadings of Defense
The defense admitted the homicide (§ 407 CP 1973) but with com-
plete excuse of temporary insanity (§ 8(1) CP 1973) and requested acquit-
tal. In the alternative, the defense alleged the mitigating circumstance of
spontaneous remorse (§ 9(9) CP 1973).
Summary of Evidence at Trial
Defendant was an alcoholic and had drunk abundant quantities the
night of the homicide. Around 12:15 a.m., defendant returned home,
turned on the corridor lights, and entered the room where his uncle was
sleeping in order to access his closet. This woke up his uncle who pro-
tested vigorously. The defendant became infuriated and went to the
kitchen. He returned to the room with a 17 cm blade intending to make
his uncle quit complaining. Defendant stabbed his uncle nine times, killing
him. He then took 50,000 pesetas from an automatic teller machine, went
to a friend's home, and informed his friend that he would turn himself in.
Defendant was arrested coming out of a bar before he made it to the police
station.
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Verdict and Judgment
Defendant was convicted as charged but with the additional mitigat-
ing circumstance of spontaneous remorse. He was sentenced to six years
and one day imprisonment.
Source of Information
1. Review of Procedural Documents: Judg.
PROVINCIAL COURTS WHICH HAVE HAD NO JURY TRIALS
BEFORE 6.1.97.
1. SEGOVIA PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Letter from President of the Provincial Court, Adolfo Prego
de Oliver y Tolivar, dated March, 19, 1997.
2. JAEN PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Letter from President of the Provincial Court, Luis Garcia-
Valdecasas y Garcfa-Valdecasas, dated March 19, 1997.
3. CUENCA PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Letter of President of the Provincial Court, Joaquin Vesteiro
P6rez, dated March 12, 1997.
4. SANTANDER PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Letter of President of the Provincial Court, dated March 7,
1997.
5. LA RIOJA PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Letter of President of the Provincial Court, Jos6 Luis Conde-
Pumpido Ferreiro, dated March 19, 1997.
6. TARRAGONA PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Letter of Secretary of the Second Section of the Provincial
Court, dated April 2, 1997. Although, Tarragona expected two jury trials
in June 1997.
7. SORIA PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Letter of Rafael Suarez Diaz, Secretary of the Provincial
Court, dated March 14, 1997.
8. LLEIDA PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Fax Letter of the President of the Provincial Court, dated May
28, 1997, indicating the first trial would be on June 16, 1997.
9. ZAMORA PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Telephone Call, June 3, 1997.
10. LA CORUINA PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Telephone Call, June 3, 1997.
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11. ORENSE PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Telephone Call, June 3, 1997.
12. LEON PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Telephone Call, June 14, 1997
13. CACERES PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Telephone Call, June 14, 1997.
14. HUESCA PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Telephone Call, June 16, 1997
15. CADIZ PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Telephone Call, June 14, 1997. A.H.R., El primer jurado de
Cddizjuzga un homicidio, EL PAlS, June 17, 1997, at 6 (announcing first
trial).
16. CIUDAD REAL PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Television Broadcast, June 3, 1997, announcing first jury
trial.
17 TOLEDO PROVINCIAL COURT
Source: Telephone Call, June 11, 1997
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APPENDIX II
OTEGI CASE PLEADINGS
1. PLEADINGS OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR
In the Court of First Instance
Number 3 of Tolosa
THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, issuing forth the notification of the
pleading conferred by Order the First of January 1996, pronounced in the
Jury Trial Proceedings number 1/95 of this Court, under articles 27.4 and
29.1 of the L.O. 5/95, requests the COMMENCEMENT OF ORAL TRIAL
with regard to D. MIKEL MIRENA OTEGI UNANUE, who has reached
the age of majority and who is without a prior criminal record, making the
following PROVISIONAL PLEADINGS:
FIRST- The accused spent the evening of the 9th to the 10th of De-
cember 1995 at a rock concert that was being held in the locality of Itsa-
sondo and in various bars, where he consumed an indeterminate quantity of
alcoholic beverages, without it being possible to determine either their na-
ture, or the influence that the same were able to have upon the conscious-
ness and intent of the same [the accused].
At about 8:00 on the 10th of December 1995, the accused, in the
company of his niece, Dofia Ana Carmen Zurutuza Otegui, went to the
Tbarre Bar in the referenced locality, where they had breakfast without the
accused consuming more alcoholic beverages.
At about 10:15, the accused had an altercation with the Basque po-
liceman with professional number 10239, who was off-duty (acts for which
independent proceedings are being followed), departing immediately af-
terwards toward his home in the Oteizabal Farmhouse, situated in the same
locality, driving the Renault 11 vehicle, registration number SS-2958-X at
an excessive speed and in a strikingly erratic manner. During part of this
trip, he was accompanied by Dofia Ana Carmen Zurutuza Otegui. After
leaving her at her home, the accused went toward his own, where he went
to bed.
The previously referred to driving of the accused alerted the attention
of the Patrol with plate number 1041 of the Basque Police belonging to the
Beasain Precinct, which has incorporated it, completely uniformed and
identified, Don Jos6 Luis Gonzdlez Villanueva, a Basque police officer
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with professional number 10206 and Don Ignacio Jesis Mendiluce Eche-
berria, a Basque police officer with professional number 13326, due to
which both [officers] decided to follow the vehicle that the accused was
driving to the home of the same [the accused], for the purpose of carrying
out the relevant procedures.
Once the referred to Patrol arrived to the Oteizabal Farmhouse, its oc-
cupants got out the patrol vehicle, having been seen by the accused who
was alerted by the barking of the dogs.
The accused, after detecting the presence of the Basque policemen,
with full awareness of his condition and with the intention to kill, picked
up a semiautomatic shotgun of the Benelli brand, model SL-121, 12/70
caliber, with manufacturer's number G36507, for whose possession and
use the accused had the corresponding license and which was placed in a
type of attic, separate from the room in which he was sleeping, loaded it
with three cartridges of semi-metallic ammunition, U.E.E. brand, type RIO
100, 12 caliber, and he headed toward the exterior of the Farmhouse.
With the intention of preventing any type of defense, he came out
from the interior of the home in a sudden manner while the Basque po-
licemen were with their backs turned and unaware, firing two shots, one
from an approximate distance of 2.5 meters at officer 10206, who received
the impact in the outer left scapular region, and the other from an approxi-
mate distance of 1.5 meters at officer 13326, who received the impact in
the right infraclavicular region, both dying instantly.
Immediately afterwards, the accused, using the radio transmitter of
the patrol vehicle, broadcast such expressions as "sepoys" and "a landlord
has killed two sepoys because of the politics that you follow."
Don Jos6 Luis GonzAlez Villanueva, was married to Dofia Maria del
Carmen Garcia Estepa who, at the time these acts occurred, was 29 weeks
pregnant.
Don Ignacio Jesfis Mendiluce Echeberria was single at the time these
acts occurred, his parents being Don Juan Francisco Mendiluce Aguirre
and Dofia Severina Echeverria Aldalur.
SECOND- The referred to acts constitute:
A.) Two crimes of PREMEDITATED MURDER from aricle 406.1
of the Criminal Code.
B.) One crime of ASSASSINATION [Atentado] from articles 231
and 232 of the Criminal Code, in connection with article 7.2 of the L.O.
2/86.
The crime of ASSASSINATION is in a relation of CONCURSO
IDEAL per article 71 of the Criminal Code with two crimes of Premedi-
tated Murder (meaning that the sentence will run concurrently).
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THIRD- The accused is responsible for the referred to crimes under
the concept of PERPETRATOR from articles 12.1 and 14.1 of the Crimi-
nal Code.
FOURTH- There are no circumstances mitigating criminal responsi-
bility.
FIFTH- Proceed to impose upon the accused for each one of the
crimes of murder the penalty of 28 YEARS, 10 MONTHS and 21 DAYS
of imprisonment, complete ineligibility during the time of the sentence and
costs.
In addition, it will be decreed the CONFISCATION of the semi-
automatic shotgun, Benelli brand, model SL-121, 12/70 caliber, with
manufacturer's number G36507, property of the accused and used in the
acts.
SIXTH- The accused will compensate:
A.) Dofia Maria del Carmen Garcia Estepa in the sum of twelve mil-
lion pesetas.
B.) Her child or children in the sum of five million pesetas.
C.) Don Juan Francisco Mendiluce Aguirre and Dolia Severina
Echeverria Aldalur in the sum of eleven million pesetas.
2. PLEADINGS OF THE PRIVATE PROSECUTOR
In the Court of First Instance
Number 3 of Tolosa
PILAR GALARZA ELOLA, Attorney of the Courts and of Maria
Carmen Garcia Estepa, and of Francisco Mendiluce Aguirre, exercising the
right to utilize a private prosecutor in the proceeding before the Jury Trial
Court number 1/95 initiated by the Court of First Instance Number 3 of
Tolosa, I say:
That issuing forth the conferred notification of the pleading I request
the setting of a preliminary hearing and afterward the opening of oral trial




1.) Mikel Otegi Unanue, the 10th day of December 1995, at about
10:30, in the locality of Itsasondo, voluntarily fired a 12/70 caliber hunting
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shotgun at Iffaki Jesus Mendiluce Echevarria, hitting him in the right infra-
clavicular region and causing his death in a nearly instantaneous manner.
2.) The same day and time and in the same locality, Mikel Otegi Un-
anue voluntarily fired the same weapon at Jos6 Luis Gonzalez Villanueva,
hitting him in the left scapular region and causing his death in a nearly in-
stantaneous manner.
3.) Mikel Otegi Unanue fired at Ifiaki Jesus Mendiluce Echevarrfa
without any prior intervening provocation on the part of the latter.
4.) Mikel Otegi Unanue fired at Jos6 Luis GonzAlez Villanueva with-
out any prior intervening provocation on the part of the latter.
5.) Mikel Otegi Unanue fired at Ifiaki Jesfis Mendiluce Echevarria at
an approximate distance of one meter.
6.) Mikel Otegi Unanue fired at Jose Luis GonzAlez Villanueva at an
approximate distance of one meter.
7.) Mikel Otegi Unanue fired at Ifiaki Jesfis Mendiluce Echevarrfa in
a sudden and unexpected manner, without the latter having -the possibility
of defending himself.
8.) Mikel Otegi Unanue fired at Jos6 Luis GonzAlez Villanueva in a
sudden and unexpected manner, without the latter having the possibility of
defending himself.
9.) In the moment of receiving the shot, Jesuis Mendiluce Echevarria
was a Basque police officer, wearing the regulation uniform, and he was
carrying out the typical functions of his position.
10.) In the moment of receiving the shot, Jos6 Luis Gonzilez Villa-
nueva was a Basque police officer, wearing the regulation uniform, and
was carrying out the typical functions of his position.
11.) Mikel Otegi Unanue, when he fired at Jes6s Mendiluce Echevar-
ria, was aware that he was firing at a Basque police officer.
12.) Mikel Otegi Unanue, when he fired at Jos6 Luis Gonzflez Villa-
nueva, was aware that he was firing at a Basque police officer.
13.) Mikel Otegi Unanue, on the date of committing the related acts
had no prior criminal record.
14.) Mikel Otegi Unanue, when he committed the indicted acts was
over the age of eighteen.
15.) Mikel Otegi Unanue, when he committed the indicted acts was
aware of his acts and was able to control his impulses.
16.) The deceased, Jos6 Luis GonzAlez Villanueva, leaves his wife,
Maria Carmen Garcia Estepa, who is at this time eight months pregnant.
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17.) The deceased, Ifiaki Jesfis Mendiluce Echevarria, single, leaves
as his closest relatives his parents Francisco Mendiluce Aguirre and
Severina Echevarria Aldalur.
SECOND:
The acts that have just been set out constitute:
a). A crime of premeditated murder defined in article 406-1 of the
Criminal Code, in force in the moment of committing the acts, and one
crime of assassination of an public official defined in article 231 of the
same code, in connection with article 7-2 of the Law of Security Forces of
the State, m concurso ideal with article 71 of the Criminal Code.
b). Another crime of premeditated murder defined in article 406-1 of
the Criminal Code, in force in the moment of committing the acts, and one
crime of atentado against a public official defined in article 231 of the
same code, in relation with article 7-2 of the Law of Security Forces and
Bodies of the State, in concurso ideal with article 71 of the Criminal Code.
THIRD: The accused is responsible as a perpetrator, in accordance
with article 14-1 of the Criminal Code.
FOURTH: There are no circumstances mitigating criminal responsi-
bility.
FIFTH: Proceed to impose upon the accused the following penalties:
A.) For the first offense of premeditated murder the penalty of thirty
years imprisonment, to be served concurrently with the crime of assassina-
tion.
B.) For the second offense of premeditated murder the penalty of
thirty years imprisonment.
In all the crimes with the limitation of fulfillment of the penalty es-
tablished in article 70.2 of the Criminal Code. Incidentals. Costs. Pay-
ment for preventive detention. Confiscation of the weapon.
The accused will compensate Maria Carmen Garcia Estepa the sum of
thirty million pesetas. The accused will pay Francisco Mendiluce Aguirre
and Severina Echevarria Aldalur the sum often million pesetas a piece.
I PETITION TO THE COURT: To accept as issued the conferred no-
tification of the pleading, calling the parties to the preliminary hearing and
approving, at the correct time, the opening of oral trial against the accused
before the Jury Trial Court, for the crimes with which he is charged.
It is justice I ask for in Tolosa the second of February, 1996.
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3. PLEADINGS OF THIE DEFENSE
In the Court of First Instance
Number 3 of Tolosa
DORZA MARIA DEL CARMEN CHIMENO RODRIGUEZ, Attorney
of the Courts and of MIKEL OTEGUI UNANUE, I appear in the Pro-
ceeding for the Jury Trial Court number 1/95 and with respect I say:
That I issue the conferred notification of pleading, formulating, in ac-
cordance with article 29.2 of the L.O. 5/95, the pleadings, of a provisional
nature, and the offer of proof, that follow below.
PROVISIONAL PLEADINGS
FIRST.
1.) Beginning especially m 1991, in Mikel Otegui Unanue there de-
veloped a feeling of harassment and persecution, of which he felt himself
to be the object, on the part of the Basque Police. The said feeling reached
a level that became unbearable.
The referred to feeling was caused by two categories of circum-
stances, that converge upon Mikel Otegui Unanue, namely:
a). The existence of a personality which tends to, or is predisposed to
emotionality, or includes a pre-existing pathology, in Mikel Otegui.
b). The existence of incidents with the Basque Police, in which Mikel
Otegui was injured, and of conduct by the Basque Police, which Mikel
Otegui relates to his person. By way of example of the conduct of the
Basque Police, we point to the frequent presence of the Basque Police in
the vicinity of the Oteizabal farmhouse or on the access road to the same.
The end result is the creation of sickness or mental illness (underly-
ing) based on the sense of persecution and harassment, which are experi-
enced at extreme and unbearable levels in the personality of Otegui.
2). Mikel Otegui spent the evening of the 9th to the 10th of Decem-
ber 1995, dawn and the following hours of the morning, at a Rock concert
and alternating between bars, consuming an excessive quantity of alcoholic
beverages.
Before leaving to have a rest, more specifically, at about 10:15 on De-
cember 10th, Mikel had an argument with a Basque police officer, identifi-
cation number 10.239, who was not wearing his professional badge and
who was off-duty at the time. Mikel recognized the man as a Basque po-
lice officer, although, he had had no prior contact with the officer. There
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existed no objective and obvious reason for the altercation, in which
Otegui acted aggressively and with a complete lack of control.
In the same out of control state of Mikel Otegui and as a consequence
of it, a fight occurred between him and his niece, Ana Zurutuza, nineteen
years old, who at that moment was accompanying him.
Given the state in which Mikel Otegui found himself, the niece tried
to drive the car. Mikel refused, and the niece left on foot toward her home.
Mikel, driving the car, caught up with her. The niece got into the car and
together they went to Ordicia, where she got out and Mikel continued to
the Oteizabal farmhouse. The driving of the vehicle, at all times, is erratic,
as a consequence of [Otegui's] previously mentioned lack of control.
Once at the farmhouse, Mikel Otegui removed his outer clothing, and
went to bed.
3). On the route followed by Mikel Otegui, which was his usual
route, by a mountain road, to travel from Ordizia to the Oteizabal farm-
house, the referred [Otegui] passed Basque police officers, Jose Luis Gon-
zalez Villanueva and Ignacio Jesfis Mendiluce Etzeberria, on patrol in the
official police vehicle.
At that time, the Basque police officers appear in the place where the
Oteizabal farmhouse is located.
4). Before the arrival of unknown persons, the dogs of the farmhouse
would bark. For a long time previously, each time the dogs barked, in the
nighttime, Mikel got up from bed, convinced that it was the Basque Police,
and he went out to look. On this occasion, he did the same, and barefoot
and while in his underclothes, he finds himself with two Basque police of-
ficers.
5). Between the two Basque police officers, one on one side and one
on the other, Mikel Otegui takes part in a verbal confrontation, in an ele-
vated tone and of violent content, the content of which on the part of Mikel
Otegui was directed towards the officers that they leave the place and that
they leave him in peace and on the part of the officers, logically, to assert
their authority and to carry out the actions that they were trying to achieve
on that occasion. The confrontation reached a level that led one of the
Basque police officers to demand obedience to his orders, relying on the
warning effect and effect of superiority, which is created, or in some re-
spect, that is asserted, by the possession or the exhibition of a weapon, in
the exercise of police duties. Nevertheless, Otegui did not submit [to their
orders], rather in fear he fled to the interior of the farmhouse; but in his
flight, he saw the shotgun. Mikel was a habitual hunter. Instinctively, he
took it and with it he returned where the Basque police officers were; and
19981
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
the altercation continued in terms, which culminated in the loss of control,
with the two shots and deaths of the officers.
6). The shots m question where produced while Mikel Otegui was
acting in a state of temporary mental disturbance, a consequence of his
sickness or underlying mental illness, staying up all night, consuming ex-
cessive quantity of alcohol and the circumstances of the situation.
7). After these acts Mikel Otegui attempted to communicate what had
happened to the Basque Police. In any event, he asked a brother to notify
the Basque Police by telephone. Having recovered at that point, he waited
for the arrival of the Basque Police, accepting his responsibility.
SECOND: The acts constitute separate crimes of homicide from arti-
cle 407 of the current Criminal Code.
THIRD: The accused is a perpetrator according to article 14.1 of the
Crimmal Code.
FOURTH:
The grounds for acquittal of article 8.1 (temporary mental distur-
bance) or secondarily the mitigating circumstance of article 9.1(a), in con-
nection with the aforementioned grounds for acquittal of article 8.1 (imper-
fect temporary mental disturbance) converged.
Also converging in his situation are the mitigating circumstance from
article 9.9 of the Criminal Code (remorse and confession of the offense) or
his defect that which is analogous to article 9.10 in connection with that
referred to in 9(a) of the same article of the Criminal Code.
FIFTH: May it be issued the acquittal of the accused or due to his de-
fect the imposition of two penalties of six months and one day of impris-
onment.
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A.) FACTS ALLEGED BY THE PARTIES
QAl: By the Public Prosecutor: "That, around 6:00 a.m. on March 2,
1996, Vicente Luis Blasco Gregorio, an adult without a criminal record,
just after leaving the Pub 'La Travessa,' situated across from the train sta-
tion in Teulada with an acquaintance, Pedro Juan Valls Llobell, and be-
cause of a minor verbal dispute between the two, went to his car, took a
semi-automatic .12 caliber Beretta shotgun out of the trunk, loaded it, and
suddenly shot him in the chest, perforating the heart, and causing his in-
stant death. At 8:15 a.m. the defendant turned himself in at the local police
station in Teulada, admitting he was responsible for the act."
Vicente Luis Blasco Gregorio, who had a license to carry the weapon,
had consumed a number of alcoholic beverages which influenced his con-
duct (unfavorable fact).
QA2: For the Defense: "That, around 6:00 a.m. on March 2, 1996,
Vicente Luis Blasco Gregorio, an adult of good behavior and without a
criminal record, who had ingested a large quantity of alcoholic beverages
in many bars, the last being the Pub 'La Travessa,' in Teulada, was fol-
lowed by his acquaintance, Pedro Juan Vallds Llobell, when he left the bar,
who had pursued, insulted and repeatedly threatened to kill Vicente Luis
Blasco Gregorio in the same bar, and, now that they were in the parking lot
of the pub, the aforementioned Pedro Juan Vall6s Llobell again threatened
the defendant, who, while not being conscious of what he was doing due to
his profound drunkenness, went to his car, took a .12 caliber Beretta shot-
gun out of the trunk, loaded it, and told Pedro Juan Vall6s to stop threat-
ening him and to leave him, and he responded that he was not going to'let
him kill him, and he came at Vicente Luis, trying to take the gun away
from him, and it went off accidentally, hitting the chest of Pedro Juan
Vall6s Llobell, causing his death (favorable fact)."
B.) FACTS ALLEGED WHICH CAN DETERMINE AN EXCUSE
FROM RESPONSIBILITY
QBI: Defendant's state of intoxication was so intense that he was not
conscious of his acts (favorable fact).
C.) NARRATION OF THE FACT WHICH DETERMINES THE
LEVEL OF EXECUTION, PARTICIPATION OR MODIFICATION OF
RESPONSIBILITY
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QCI: The fact is the death of Pedro Juan Vall6s Llobell by a dis-
charge from the shotgun of Vicente Luis Blasco Gregorio which the latter
had pointed at the former. The jury decides whether the fhct occurred as
the Public Prosecutor described it, or, on the contrary, as described by the
defense.
QC2: The act was consummated and the victim died.
QC3: The author of the discharge was the defendant and the jury must
specify if it was done voluntarily-an unfavorable fact-or accidentally-
a favorable fact.
QC4: Also the jury should specify if the level of intoxication was high
and notably diminished the consciousness and will of the defendant-fa-
vorable fact.
QC5: Or, on the contrary, if it was an intoxication which only mildly
diminished his consciousness and will. The thesis of the Public Prosecu-
tor-unfavorable fact.
QC6: The act occurred in such a sudden way that the victim had no
possibility to defend himself-thesis of the Public Prosecutor-unfavor-
able fact.
QC7: If the defendant found himself in a situation of superiority or
advantage m relation to the victim who was unarmed. Supplement of the
Public Prosecutor (unfavorable fact). *
QC8: The discharge happened accidentally after the victim said "you
don't have the balls to kill me, but I do to kill you" and grabbed the barrel.
Supplement of the Defense (favorable fact).
QC9: Both parties stipulate to spontaneous remorse (favorable fact).
D.) CRIMINAL ACT FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANT MUST BE
DECLARED GUILTY OR NOT GUILTY
QD1: If the jury accepts the thesis of the Public Prosecutor that it is a
murder for which the defendant must be declared guilty, or a homicide
with abuse of superiority for which he also must be declared guilty (unfa-
vorable fact).
QD2: If the jury accepts the thesis of the defense that it is a homicide,
but the defendant must be declared not guilty due to his state of complete
intoxication (favorable fact).
B. CASE B-4
QI: On February 8, 1996 at an undetermined time after 1:00 p.m., Mr.
Francisco Tort Casas, an adult with no prior criminal record, strangled
Miss Carolina Marcos Granado with his right forearm around the neck,
producing her death by asphyxiation (unfavorable fact).
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Q2: The act of Mr. Francisco Tort Casas was realized in an unex-
pected and sudden way, without Miss Carolina Marcos Granado having
any possibility of defending herself (unfavorable fact).
Q3: Mr. Francisco Tort Casas intentionally took advantage of the con-
fidence entrusted in him by Miss Carolina Marcos Granado to try to kill
her with greater ease (unfavorable fact).
Q4: Mr. Francisco Tort Casas has a character disorder which mildly
affects the awareness and volition of his acts (favorable fact).
Q5: The character disorder suffered by Mr. Francisco Tort Casas af-
fects in a serious way the awareness and volition of his acts (favorable
fact).
THE JURY DECLARES: That Mr. Francisco Tort Casas is GUILTY
(7 votes) or NOT GUILTY (5 votes) of having caused the death of Miss
Carolina Marcos Granado.
THE JURY DECLARES: That Mr. Francisco Tort Casas is GUILTY
(7 votes) or NOT GUILTY (5 votes) of having caused the death of Miss
Carolina Marcos Granado with treachery.
Only in case of a declaration of guilt of FRANCISCO TORT CASAS.
The criteria of the jury is FAVORABLE (5 votes) or NOT
FAVORABLE that, in case of a conviction, and in case the prerequisites
and conditions determined by the law are present, the sentence will be sus-
pended.
The criteria of the jury is FAVORABLE (5 votes) of NOT
FAVORABLE that clemency shall be proposed to the National Govern-
ment in the sentence.
C. CASE CS-1*
QI: On February 4, 1996, the defendant Jos6 Trillo Muro and his
wife, Juana Lumbreras, met around 12 o'clock at the Pub '%lip" in Calle
Zaragoza, no. 25 of Villareal, to discuss their marital situation, inasmuch
as they had a court date the following day in the Villareal court, which was
the reason that Juana had called him earlier, at around 11:30 a.m., and
while they were seated at a table, Miguel Garrido Sinchez approached
them and insulted Jos6, calling him a "queer," to which he replied "son of
a whore," whereupon Miguel, after having returned to the bar, returned to
the table and continued the discussion with Jos6, in the course of which the
latter slapped Miguel twice. UNFAVORABLE.
Q2: Thereafter, the proprietor of the pub, criticizing their conduct,
urged them to leave the bar, which Jos6 Trillo did, his wife following him
at a short distance, and as he was leaving the pub, Jos6 fell to the ground
after having received a blow to the occipital region, after which he got up
and continued on his way with his wife down Zaragoza Street, and when
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they reached the intersection with Huesca Street, he backtracked anew to
the pub, where he met the selfsame Miguel Garrido at the door, renewing
the argument, both of them engaging in a fight in which Miguel used some
nunchakos and Jos6 a knife, 9.5 cm long with an American handle.
UNFAVORABLE.
Q3: During the fight, which continued down Zaragoza Street to the
intersection with Huesca Street, both fighters attacked one another, Miguel
hitting Jos6 with the nunchakos in his forearms and Jos6 trying to cut Mi-
guel with the knife, with Miguel retreating all the time until, when Miguel
lifted his arm in which he held the nunchakos and was left without protec-
tion, Jos6 Trillo stabbed him at the level of the heart, leaving Miguel fa-
tally wounded, whereupon he collapsed to the ground, after which Jos6
pulled the knife out of his body and cleaned it on his shoulder.
UNFAVORABLE.
Q4: Thereafter, Jos6, without helping Miguel, approached his wife
and threatened her and, proceeding down Huesca Street towards the Co-
rona de Arag6n Square, threw the knife under a car while he was being
chased by a group of youths who peppered him with insults due to what he
had done, and which made the work of the police easier, who approached
in a patrol car, into which Jos6 finally was taken. UNFAVORABLE.
Q5: Around 7:00 p.m. on February 4, 1996, Juana Lumbreras
Fernd.ndez, while in the company of Miguel Garrido Sfinchez, made a tele-
phone call to her husband Jos6, to arrange a meeting to resolve their mari-
tal situation, but Jos6 refused, due to his having been insulted by phone by
Miguel with words such as "son of a whore," cornudo and cabr6n (other
insults), but Juana insisted with a second call to the same end and the de-
fendant agreed to a meeting-due to the fact that they had a court date in
the Villareal court the next day-in the pub Klipp, during which Miguel
appeared when Jos6 and his wife were already seated at a table, and while
passing by them he insulted the former, calling him a cornudo and a
"queer" (maricona), to which Jos6 responded to let them alone, whereupon
Miguel went to the bar, but returned anew to the table, renewing the in-
sults, until the proprietor upon the request of Juana Lumbreras, insisted
they finish their drinks and leave the bar. FAVORABLE
Q6: Due to the impossibility of talking with his wife, Jos6 left the pub
followed by her, while Miguel went to the bar and offering the owner
5,000 pesetas told him, "use this in case anything happens," whereupon he
left after the others. FAVORABLE
Q7: While leaving the pub, Jos6 Trillo received a blow to the occipital
region, which made him fall to the floor shaken, and as he got up he asked
his wife what had happened. FAVORABLE.
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Q8: In the meantime, Miguel Garrido had entered the pub again and
told the waiter: 'just look at that good-for-nothing queer," while getting his
change. FAVORABLE.
Q9: Jos6 Trillo, after getting up off the ground, found himself face-to-
face with Miguel, who had again left the pub, and had exhibited some nun-
chakos which he brandished, hitting Jos6, who protected himself with his
arms, which were bruised, and at a given moment, he withdrew the knife
which he habitually carried with him, opened it and used it to protect him-
self from the blows, availing himself of the American handle, and hoping
that Miguel would see this and stop hitting him. FAVORABLE
Q10: Nevertheless, Miguel, emboldened by the ingestion of alcohol,
augmented the intensity and frequency of the blows, and at a moment in
which he raised the nunchakos to hit Jos6 in the head, he fell on him and
was impaled by the knife which Jos6 held extended, falling on it.
FAVORABLE.
Qll: Shortly thereafter the police arrived, to whom Mr. Trillo said:
"it was r' and turned himself in. FAVORABLE
Q12: The defendant Jos6 Trillo stabbed Miguel with the knife with
the intent of killing him. UNFAVORABLE.
Q13: The defendant Jos6 Trillo caused the death of Miguel Garrido,
defending himself against the illegitimate aggression of Miguel of which
he had been the object. FAVORABLE
Q14: The defendant, Jos6, used a knife in his defense, a weapon that
was proportionate to the nunchakos used by Miguel. FAVORABLE.
Q15: The defendant did not in any way provoke the aggression from
Miguel of which he was the object. FAVORABLE.
Q16: The defendant turned himself in voluntarily to the police
authorities without offering any resistance, while saying: "it was I."
FAVORABLE
Q17: Jos6 Trillo Muro is guilty of having caused the death of Miguel
Garrido Sinchez, this act constituting the crime of homicide.
Q18: In the case of being convicted, does the jury consider it appro-
priate to concede to him the benefits of a suspended sentence, if the neces-
sary preconditions therefore exist?
Q19: Does the jury consider it appropriate, in the case of being con-
victed, to propose to the Government a total or partial clemency as to the
punishment imposed?
D. CASE 0-3
The following facts will be excluded from the verdict and should be
deemed proved due to the conformidad of the parties:
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The defendant Fernando Alonso Moro, 34 years-off.age, with no
criminal record, who suffered for years from a personality disorder char-
acterized as a phobic disorder (social phobia), and as a schizoid disorder of
the personality, manifested in his withdrawn nature, his incapacity to
maintain social relationships and his compulsive tendency to consume al-
coholic beverages, lived with his parents at the house located in Alta Ten-
derina Street, No. 38 downstairs, in Oviedo, having frequent problems with
them, due to his reiterated demands for money and his inclinations to
drink.
On April 15, 1996, the defendant left the family house around 6:00
p.m. and, after having ingested various alcoholic beverages in various bars,
returned home around 10:30 p.m.
Once there, a heated argument erupted in the bathroom, between him
and his father due to his refusal to give him money, during the course of
which Fernando stabbed him with a knife. He immediately ran in search of
help returning a short time later, transporting his wounded father to the
Central Hospital of Asturias.
If the jury does not find questions 3A or 3B proved, the following
should be excluded from the verdict as having been stipulated to by the
public prosecutor:
At the time of the incident the defendant Fernando Alonso Moro
maintained his mental lucidity, but had his mechanisms for controlling his
emotions diminished, in particular that of his aggresivity, due to the alco-
holic beverages he had drunk during the afternoon of this day, due to his
compulsion to drink alcohol.
THE FOLLOWING FACTS ARE SUBMITTED TO THE JURY
FOR CONSIDERATION AND THEY SHOULD DECLARE THEM
PROVED OR NOT.
FACT ONE
Q1A (Unfavorable): In the course of the argument, both, standing and
facing each other, in order to end the life of his father, the defendant with-
drew a knife with a 7.5 cm blade from his pants pocket, and holding it by
the handle, stabbed him forcefully and violently at the level of the epigas-
trium which penetrated deeply into the stomach reached the area of the
posterior wall of the abdomen, injuring the transverse mesocolon, the jeju-
num and some blood vessels at the root of the mesentery, lightly hitting the
external layer of the inferior vena cava at the part situated in the proximity
of the root of the mesentery, causing him to undergo emergency surgery in
the Central Hospital of Asturias which enabled him to survive temporarily
from the aggression.
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In the early hours of the 20th, while still in the hospital, his inferior
vena cava burst in the area which had been hit, possibly due to a fit of
coughing, provoking a massive hemorrhage in the wound, which, despite
the immediate medical care, caused his death at 2:50 a.m., which was the
result of the wounds inflicted.
(in case the previous question is not deemed proved)
Q1B: (Favorable) In the course of the argument and as its tone esca-
lated, the defendant withdrew a knife which he carried and stabbed his fa-
ther with the sole intention of wounding him, inserting the knife in the up-
per part of his stomach into which the weapon penetrated, and having been
given emergency surgery in the Central Hospital of Asturias for the ab-
dominal injuries with a laparotomy, which was completed successfully, he
got noticeably better.
Thereafter, in the morning of the 20th and as a consequence of a
strong fit of coughing which created a brusque alteration of intra-
abdominal pressure, a rupture from within outwards toward the wall of the
inferior vena cava provoked a bloody massive retroperitoneal, and the pa-
tient suffered a cardio-respiratory stroke secondary to an acute hemor-
rhagic shock, which caused his violent death at 2:50 a.m. on the 20th,
which was not a direct consequence of the wounds inflicted.
FACT TWO
Q2A (Favorable): The defendant Fernando Alonso Moro, at the time
of committing the acts, had his capacity to understand and purposefully act
totally annulled due to an anxiety disorder of a phobic type, accompanied
by feelings of inferiority, timidity, lack of initiative, indecision and lack of
tranquillity.
(in case the previous question is deemed not proved)
Q2B (Favorable): The defendant, Fernando Alonso Moro, at the time
of committing the acts, was beside himself, in an unreflected and impulsive
reaction, which was the fruit of excitement, and which was obfuscated due
to the aggressivity unleashed by his father and the reproaches of being a
do-nothing and drinker, and had his capacity to understand and purpose-
fully act affected as a result.
FACT THREE
Q3A (Favorable): The defendant, Fernando Alonso Moro, at the time
of committing the acts, was completely drunk as a consequence of the al-
coholic beverages he ingested during the afternoon of this day, due to his
compulsion to drink alcohol, and thus was not conscious of his acts.
(in case the previous question is deemed not proved)
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Q3B (Favorable): The defendant, Fernando Alonso More, at the time
of committing the acts, was drunk m an appreciable degree, which notably
affected his mental lucidity as a consequence of the alcoholic beverages he
ingested during the afternoon of this day, due to his compulsion to drink
alcohol.
Q4: Finally, the jury must declare as to Fernando Alonso vloro:
(only respond as to the letter which corresponds to the paragraph of
fact one which you have deemed proved)
4A
(a)-Guilty of having killed his father
(in case a majority for a guilt decision has not been reached)
(b) Not guilty of having killed his father.
4B
(a) Guilty of having injured his father, producing as a consequence of
the wounds his later death.
(in case a majority for a guilt decision has not been reached)
(b) Not guilty of having injured his father nor of producing as a con-
sequence of the wounds his later death.
4C
(a) Guilty of having injured his father.
(in case a majority for a guilt decision has not been reached)
(b) Not guilty of having injured his father.
OTHER QUESTIONS
(Going to suspended sentence and clemency)
E. CASE SA-1
Q1. Maria del Carmen del Arco Apancio, 30 years of age, died in her
dwelling, situated in this City and in the Calle Manuel Soler, apartment 4,
around 8:00 p.m. on the 19th of December, 1995, as a result of a gunshot-
realized with a cartridge of buck shot, type 00, 8.65 mm., which came from
a shotgun with two barrels, 12 caliber, Sarasqueta brand, that at that mo-
ment was in the hands of the defendant Francisco Javier Dominguez
Alego. (unfavorable fact)
Q2. The victim and the defendant, 31 years of age, were married on
the 3d of December 1983 and had two children, Oscar and Myriam, 13 and
12 years of age (unfavorable fact)."
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Q3: Their matrimonial relationship can be considered to have been
acceptable (favorable fact).
Q4: The aforementioned weapon, which was acquired a month previ-
ously, was in terrible condition of security for it had been damaged and
poorly repaired, such that, once loaded, the right barrel fired when moder-
ately stroked or after a similar light rubbing of the trigger (unfavorable
fact).
Q5: Its poor functioning was not known by the defendant because he
was never a hunter and had never fired it with any kind of ammunition
(Favorable Fact).
Q6: Nevertheless he had noticed that the trigger did not offer any re-
sistance to the finger and that the safety for the right barrel did not function
(unfavorable fact).
Q7: Minutes before the related incident, in the presence of his wife
and in the doorway of the apartment building, the defendant asked his
neighbor and secretary of the Community of Property Owners, Gregorio
Casimiro Bahia, in a heated manner to immediately give him the keys to a
storage room, which he felt he had a right to use, but the use of which had
been denied him (favorable fact).
Q8: Immediately thereafter, both entered their apartment but without
the wife succeeding in pacifying the angry mood of her husband who, to
insure and affirm his request of his neighbor, took the shotgun from the
place he kept it, and started descending again to the door to look for him
(favorable fact).
Q9: When he headed out the apartment so armed, his wife tried to
prevent him warning him of his mood and excitation, saying: 'Where are
you going? What are you going to do' (favorable fact)
Q10: The defendant tried to free himself of his wife and in that mo-
ment the shot was fired through the right barrel of the shotgun, while both
spouses were standing and facing each other about one meter apart, and it
hit her at the level of the left shoulder and armpit with a downward trajec-
tory at a slight angle from left to right which rapidly caused her death due
to a massive loss of blood and destruction of her vital organs. (unfavorable
fact).
Q11. After this happened, the defendant banged himself against the
walls of his apartment and in a loud voice said he wanted to die in place of
his wife and tried to cut himself. (favorable fact).
Q12. The defendant is a habitual consumer of drugs but this con-
sumption had no relation to the justiciable fact and in the moment of the
incident he was not affected or influenced by them. (Favorable Fact).
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In accordance with the answers offered to the questions posed, the
jury must elect only one of the following three questions, the first two of
which demand a majority of seven votes for the affirmation of one of them,
and the last of which demands a majority of five votes:
Q13A: The defendant wanted to fire the weapon at his wife, desiring
and consenting to her death.
Q13B: The defendant, who did not want to fire against his wife,
caused her death due to a lack of foresight and caution in relation to the
bad condition of the weapon, or a lack of diligence and caution in its han-
dling.
Q13C: The defendant was not guilty in any case of the death of his
wife.
In case of being found guilty the jury's criteria about the application
or non-application to the accused of the benefits of a suspended sentence
and as to a petition for clemency of his sentence is requested.
F. CASE VI-1
Does the jury consider the following fact proved?
UNFAVORABLE FACTS
Narrated by the Public Prosecutor.
QI: When Mr. Alonso insisted in entering the discotheque "La Isla"
for the first time, he argued with Jos6 Manuel Rey Rivadulla, who grabbed
him, raised him up to medium height, grabbing him by the collar and the
belt, and holding him in a horizontal position with his mouth down, threw
him on the ground, even though Mr. Alonso was able to protect himself
with an arm before falling.
Q2: Teodoro Alonso got up and distanced himself some meters from
the discotheque; after a few minutes he returned again to Mr. Rey. He
grabbed hun under the shoulders, put a leg behind hun and pushed him at
the same time, causing him to fall; Mr. Alonso fell to the ground and hit
his head on the sidewalk pavement, and lost consciousness.
Q3: As a consequence of this blow received at the time of his fall,
Teodoro Alonso Alfonso received a craneo-encephalic trauma with a frac-
ture of the cranial vault, and was admitted at 12:30 a.m. of the same day to
the Santiago Hospital. Despite surgery at 2:30 a.m. he died at 6:00 p.m. on
July 21, 1996, the cause of his death being the aforementioned craneo-
encephalic trauma.
Q4: Jos6 M4nuel Rey Rivadulla wanted to hurt Teodoro Alonso, but
not to cause his death.
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Q5: Jos6 Manuel Rey Rivadulla should have foreseen that, due to the
form of the aggression and the part of the body affected by the blow, it
could have caused death.
Q6: This absence of caution could be qualified as grave, for it was
obviously foreseeable that the fall of the victim could cause his death by
hitting his head on the ground.
Q7: This absence of caution could be qualified as minor, because it
was not easily foreseeable that the fall of the victim would cause a blow to
his head against the ground and his ensuing death.
Narrated by the Private Prosecutor.
Q8: (coincides with Q1 of the Public Prosecutor)When Mr. Alonso
insisted in entering the discotheque "La Isla" for the first time, he argued
with Jos6 Manuel Rey Rivadulla, who grabbed him, raised him up to me-
dium height, grabbing him by the collar and the belt, and holding him in a
horizontal position with his mouth down, threw him on the ground, even
though Mr. Alonso was able to protect himself with an arm before falling.
Q9: Mr. Teodoro Alonso Alfonso got up and when he found himself
some meters from the entrance to the discotheque, Mr. Jos6 Manuel Rey
Rivadulla approached him and placed himself behind him, grabbing him
forcefully with both arms and putting pressure on his chest at the same
time as he made him fall to the ground. With the pressure caused by both
arms, Mr. Jos6 Manuel Rey Rivadulla fractured two ribs, the sixth and the
seventh, belonging to Mr. Teodoro Alonso Alfonso.
Q10: Mr. Teodoro Alonso got up and, after having retreated some
meters, returned towards the discotheque, at which time Jos6 Manuel Rey
approached him, grabbed him, lifted him up, and threw him head-first on
the ground. One could hear a loud blow as Teodoro Alonso's head hit the
ground. This blow fractured Mr. Teodoro Alonso's skull and caused his
death.
QI 1: Mr. Jos6 Manuel Rey threw Mr. Teodoro Alonso on to the
ground knowing that his act could kill him and with the intention of doing
so, or at least he imagined it that death would probably result and none-
theless he threw him down.
Q12: After the aggression, Mr. Jos6 Manuel Rey returned to his place
of work and continued his functions as doorman.
FAVORABLE FACTS
Narrated by the Defense
Q13: If Mr. Teodoro Alonso Alfonso habitually, especially on Fridays
and Saturdays, went to the door of the discotheque "La Isla" and other
19981
Hastings Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
places of leisure and provoked altercations due to his desire to enter, al-
ways being under the influence of alcohol.
Q14: If Mr. Teodoro Alonso Alfonso, in a continuous and habitual
way, was taken home by the Municipal Police, or to Hospital Centers or
the police station, upon the requests of the doormen of the discotheque "La
Isla" and other party establishments due to drunkenness and his own disor-
derly conduct.
Q15: If Mr. Teodoro Alonso Alfonso would throw himself on the
ground and offer physical resistance when they tried to detain him or pre-
vent his access to an establishment.
Q16: If on July 21, 1996 Mr. Jos6 Manuel Rey Rivadulla, while ful-
filling the proper duties of his job, as guard or doorman of the discotheque
"La Isla," was insulted by expressions such as muerto de hambre, "son of a
whore," etc. by Mr. Teodoro Alonso Alfonso.
Q17: If Mr. Teodoro Alonso Alfonso tried to enter the discotheque
without paying and by using force.
Q18: If in the morning of July 21, 1996, there was a fight between Mr.
Teodoro Alonso Alfonso and Mr. Jos6 Manuel Rey Rivadulla, and Mr.
Teodoro fell to the ground and hit his head.
Q19: If once Mr. Teodoro Alonso was on the ground, it was Mr. Jos6
Manuel Rey Rivadulla who called the police and an ambulance and re-
mained with Mr. Teodoro, caring for him, until he was taken away by the
ambulance.
Q20: If the death of Mr. Teodoro Alonso Alfonso was accidental, due
to falling completely apart from any conduct or will of Mr. Jos6 Manuel
Rey Rivadulla.
Q21. If the possible injuries suffered by Mr. Teodoro Alonso Alfonso
to his head were accidental, due to a fall completely apart from the conduct
or will of Mr. Jos6 Manuel Rey Rivadulla.
FACTS WHICH CONSTITUTED A MODIFICATION OF PENAL
RESPONSIBILITY
Q22: If Mr. Teodoro Alonso was drunk at the time of the incident and
his weight and constitution were much less and weaker than those of Mr.
Jos6 Manuel Rey.
Q23: If Mr. Jos6 Manuel Rey took advantage of this circumstance to
commit the aggression against Mr. Teodoro Alonso.
VERDICT OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE
FIRST - The jury considers that Mr. Jos6 Manuel Rey Rivadulla is
guilty or not guilty of a crime of homicide for having intentionally caused
the death of Mr. Teodoro Alonso Alfonso or for having been aware his
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death would probably occur, and nevertheless having thrown Teodoro
down causing his death.
SECOND - The jury considers that Mr. Jos6 Manuel Rey Rivadulla is
guilty of not guilty of a crime of negligent homicide for having caused the
death of Mr. Teodoro Alonso Alfonso by gross negligence.
THIRD - The jury considers that Mr. Jos6 Manuel Rey Rivadulla is
guilty or not guilty of a misdemeanor of negligent homicide for having
caused the death of Mr. Teodoro Alonso Alfonso by simple negligence.
FOURTH - The jury considers that Mr. Jos6 Manuel Rey Rivadulla is
guilty or not guilty of having inflicted the head injuries incurred by Mr.
Teodoro Alonso Alfonso.
FIFTH - The jury considers, in the case of the guilt of Mr. Jos6
Manuel Rey Rivadulla, that the benefits of a suspended sentence should be
applied if the preconditions required by law exist.
SIXTH - The jury considers the possibility of soliciting clemency for
the defendant, either complete or partial.

